"National Integration and the Vicissitudes of State Power in Ghana: The Political Incorporation of Likpe, a Border Community, 1945-1986",

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Abstract

This is a study of the processes through which the former Togoland Trust Territory has come to constitute an integral part of modern Ghana. As the section of the country that was most recently appended, the territory has often seemed the most likely candidate for the eruption of separatist tendencies. The comparative weakness of such tendencies, in spite of economic crisis and governmental failure, deserves closer examination. This study adopts an approach which is local in focus (the area being Likpe), but one which endeavours at every stage to link the analysis to unfolding processes at the Regional and national levels.

Part One of the thesis deals with the background to, and the trajectory of, the Togoland unification movement which surfaced after 1945. Both the appeal of the movement and its inherent limitations are attributed to the legacy of uneven development bequeathed by a minimalist colonial state. Having presented an overview of the movement, the third Chapter examines the intersection between local politics and the strength of opinion on the unification question in Likpe. The generational differences between the contending parties, which are related to educational indices, help to explain not only the victory of the Convention People's Party, but also the triumph of the integrationist ideal. Furthermore, it is possible to account for the greater receptivity of the Central Togo minorities in the light of the marks left by British administrative policy.

Part Two assesses the impact of the deteriorating environment of the 1970s upon political consciousness in the Volta Region. The failure of the secessionist movement is examined, as is the contention that most rural communities preferred simply to retreat from the centre. Particular attention is paid to cross-border smuggling, which has been little studied, and to the political ramifications thereof. This section draws both on extensive interviews amongst the Bakpele, whose experience of these events is most distinctive, as well as on official documentation.

Part Three considers the efforts of the Rawlings regime to more closely integrate centre and periphery, whilst returning to a nonstatist model of governance. The revolutionary phase and the subsequent change of direction are both examined through the prism of Likpe. An analysis is made of government efforts to stamp out smuggling with the active cooperation of border communities. The final Chapter evaluates local reactions to the political reform programme, which turned out to be supportive yet at variance with the official perspective.

The introductory and concluding Chapters endeavour to tease out the implications of the study for the wider debate concerning the interaction between state and civil society in contemporary Africa.

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List of Abbreviations

AEC	All-Ewe Conference
ADB	Agricultural Development Bank
AESC	Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ARPB	Association of Recognized Professional Bodies
CDR	Committee For the Defence of the Revolution
CMB	Cocoa Marketing Board
COCOBOD	Cocoa Board
CPP	Convention People's Party
CUT	Comité de l'Unité Togolaise
DC	District Commissioner
EPC	Evangelical/ Ewe Presbyterian Church
FPD	Front For the Prevention of Dictatorship
GAFACO-OPS	Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GBC	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GBO	G.B. Ollivant
GNTC	Ghana National Trading Corporation
GWSC	Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation
JFM	June 4 Movement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LISEC	Likpe Secondary School
NAL	National Alliance of Liberals
NCD	National Commission on Democracy
NDC	National Defence Committee
NDM	New Democratic Movement
NLC	National Liberation Council
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NPP	Northern People's Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NUGS	National Union of Ghanaian Students
OFY	Operation Feed Yourself
PDC	People's Defence Committee
PFP	Popular Front Party
PMFJ	People's Movement for Freedom and Justice
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
PTP	Parti Togolais du Progres
PWD	Public Works Department
SMC	Supreme Military Council
TC	Togoland Congress
TDC	Town Development Committee
TOLIMO	National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland
TU	Togoland Union
TUC	Trades Union Congress
TVA [Council]	Town/Village/Area
UGFCC	United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council
UAC	United Africa Company
UN	United Nations
UNC	United National Convention
UP	United Party
VODYA	Volta Development and Youth Association
VORADEP	Volta Region Agricultural Development Project
VORDA	Volta Region Development Association
VOYA	Volta Youth Association
VRDC	Volta Region Development Corporation

MAP 1 : THE VOLTA REGION



Chapter One:

Introduction: The Issues and the Setting

> "... large and small African states alike see themselves as nation-states like the countries of Europe and Asia, occasionally with a disarming matter-of-factness. But in Africa, as in almost all of the developing world's younger states, there is a great discrepancy between claims and reality. Most of them have successfully managed the process of state-building, even if they have had to rely on one-party systems and military dictatorship as a last resort. But in many cases nation-building has not matured beyond infancy"[1]

> "Peasants avoid it, urban workers despise it, military men destroy it, civil servants rape it and academicsponder the short- and long-term results."[2]

1.1. Clearing the Decks: The Debate About State and Society

An enquiry into the politics of 'national integration', a primary concern of the 1960s, may seem anomalous at a time when the trend is apparently towards disintegration across much of Africa. Apart from the ravages of economic crisis, the recrudescence of secessionism and civil war threaten the integrity of a number of states. On the critical list are Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, while many others may be counted as serious casualties.[3] Moreover, the surfacing of regionalism in hitherto stable countries such as Senegal warns of a possible contagion effect. The present condition of Africa has engendered such pessimism that one British newspaper, of reputedly liberal persuasions, recently suggested that the situation might only be redeemed through a resumption of colonial rule - if only the continent had something to offer.[4] The doomsday scenarios do, however, ignore the fact that the majority of African states have cohered remarkably well in spite of the strains to which they have been subjected. This thesis seeks, by means of a local study, to examine the vector of forces that have held state and society together in Ghana, a country that has experienced more than its fair share of political turmoil and economic dislocation.

Any such study could do worse than consult a standard historical work, published as far back as 1963. In A Political History of Ghana, David Kimble drew attention to the subtle processes through which people from the Colony, Ashanti and (to a more limited extent) the Northern Territories acquired a sense of common identity in the context of colonial rule.[5] He highlighted the integrative effects of the churches, the press, voluntary associations, modern communications and education. In spite of concerted efforts by the Gold Coast authorities to impede the articulation of a national consciousness, colonialism inevitably created the conditions for new ways of thinking about the world and the place of the colonized within it:

> "It was the existence from 1902 onwards of a common territory, with clearly defined boundaries, governed by a single British authority, that provided the physical framework within which the claim to Gold Coast nationhood could develop"[6]

There is a temptation to dismiss this book as a product of its time. Conceived in the wake of independence, it is arguably teleological in its approach to nationalism and overly concerned with the affairs of a small educated elite. Yet, Benedict Anderson has shown has shown that it is the colonial elite which was usually the first to 'imagine' itself as belonging to a more embracing national community, by virtue of its mobility and proximity to the state.[7] Besides, with nobody quite realizing it, the latest contributions to an ongoing debate have returned to the original point of departure - or somewhere close to it. In order to clarify the objectives of this thesis, it may help to retrace some of the foosteps.[8]

During the formative years of African studies not everyone was as optimistic as Kimble. In fact, the majority of political scientists were more impressed by structural faults which they traced to the core of the 'new states'. The flaw did not appear to lie with the state apparatus which, with the exception of Guinea and the former Belgian Congo, had been transferred in relatively good working order. The real source of danger was believed to lie in the fissiparous character of 'traditional' structures. On the one hand, the economies of Africa were divided into small modern enclaves and large subsistence sectors. On the other hand, writers observed that loyalties were usually vested in the clan, the village and the

'tribe' rather than the nation.[9] If 'tradition' was the problem, then the 'modernization' of social, economic and political structures was perceived as the solution. The task of political science lay in establishing the synchrony of these interlocking processes. Writers like Huntington and Apter, for example, pondered the political stresses created by the breakdown of traditional society and the emergence of new social categories.[10]

The newly independent regimes often located their objectives within a similar framework. One justification for the creation of the one-party state was that it was supposed to fence off arenas in which ethnic appeals might be exploited. Another was that it enabled energies to be channelled into the resolution of pressing developmental issues. Not every observer swallowed the bait, but many were prepared to give modernizing regimes the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, African governments often expressed a desire to accelerate the process of economic development. As Killick has shown, the Nkrumah regime received the advice of many eminent development economists who believed that a 'big push' was essential for the achievement of self-sustained development.[11] In the absence of other sources of capital, it fell upon the state to invest directly in production, and especially in manufacturing which was regarded as the motor of economic development.

By the end of the first decade, disappointment with the record of African regimes led to closer scrutiny of the claims that had been made on their behalf. One-party states were shown to be no more stable, given the incidence of military takeovers, or any less prone to the strains of ethnicity. The Convention People's Party was a paradigmatic case. Following the evaporation of the party in the wake of the 1966 coup, analysts began to question whether it had ever really enjoyed mass support. The assessment was that the CPP had always been a 'rag-bag' of local interests, which had been bound to the centre primarily through expectations of patronage. As soon as competitive politics was suspended, the ruling party ceased to lubricate local networks and thereby forfeited much of its popular

appeal.[12] One positive consequence of these revelations was that researchers momentarily revived an interest in the dynamics of community politics.[13] Equally, the ambitious economic plans of the Nkrumah regime were subjected to a withering critique and their failings contrasted with the 'economic miracle' in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.[14]

During the 1970s, mounting disillusionment fostered a concern with the pathologies of state power. Since the same errors were endlessly repeated, it seemed appropriate to search for structural determinants of political action. The ascendancy of neo-Marxist dependency theory was one result of the intellectual re-tooling that took place. Proponents of this approach began by taking issue with the central tenets of modernization theory. They argued that the persistence of traditional society was a myth given the prolonged penetration of global capitalism, and that the real barriers to economic and political integration were imposed by external dependency. On the one hand, unequal exchange and/or the domination of foreign capital foreclosed the options for autonomous development. On the other hand, dependency promoted the sedimentation of a comprador class around the apparatus of the state, which was positioned so as to cream off a portion of the surplus that was externally expropriated. Issa Shivji punctured much of the enthusiasm for the Tanzanian brand of state socialism, when he depicted the Arusha Declaration not as a victory for peasants and workers, but for a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.[15] Although there was some debate concerning the progressive potential of the African 'petite bourgeoisie', the consensus was that it had so far shown itself incapable of exerting its autonomy from international capital.[16] A by-product of the debate over the post-colonial state was the re-interpretation of ethnicity. Anthropology had already demonstrated that 'tribes' were not primordial givens, but were often created amidst the insecurity of the urban environment.[17] Radical political economy pursued the point, arguing that 'tribalism' was an appeal which was often exploited by sections of the aspirant class in the heat of battle for mastery of the state.[18] This explanation worked most convincingly for Nigeria, in which context

it was also deployed by mainstream political scientists.[19] The implication was that the threat to national unity issued less from the inner logic of social structures than from the nature of the post-state and the class that controlled it.

Towards the end of the decade, the persuasive value of the dependency paradigm began to wane, while neo-classical political economy staged a revival. The Berg Report, commissioned by the World Bank, set the tone when it maintained that the African crisis was a consequence of injudicious policy choices rather than the iniquities of the world economy.[20] Yet this did not explain the recurrence of ill-chosen policies, a conundrum which Robert Bates set out to solve. On the premise that adverse pricing policies accounted for the weak performance of African agriculture, Bates re-examined the interests which were serviced by the state.[21] He concluded that the coalition of forces which had assumed power at the time of independence helped condition the subsequent orientation of the state. In Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, where the ruling party had firm roots in the countryside, government policy tended to protect rural producers. But in most cases, where the hub of political activity was in the towns, there was tendency towards urban bias. Apart from their own interests, such regimes were more likely to capitulate to urban demands for cheap food and employment, which necessitated the manipulation of agricultural prices. In a separate article, which is in some tension with this thesis, Bates broached the question of ethnicity. Treading some familiar ground, he linked its incidence to competition for resources which were often concentrated around the apparatus of the state.[22] The similarity between the writings of Bates and the dependency school are in some ways striking. Whereas their predecessors had regarded traditional society as the immovable obstacle, they both located divisive tendencies at the level of the state.

In the course of the 1980s, the ground shifted yet again. This time, the context was a deflation of the Ivorian and Kenyan success stories and a marked deterioration of the political and economic environment across the rest of the

continent. The state appeared a less convincing villain, as African societies appeared to re-assert their autonomy from the centre. A turning point was the re-interpretation of the Tanzanian experience by Goran Hyden.[23] His central thesis was that the peasants had never properly been captured since they had never been separated from control of land. This meant that they could reproduce themselves autonomously of the state. Hyden claimed that repeated efforts to control peasant production in Tanzania had been stymied by a withdrawal into an economy of affection. More provocatively, he asserted that the task facing African regimes of all ideological persuasions was remarkably similar, namely to fully subordinate the peasants to new relations of production.[24] Since the publication of these views, much attention has focussed on the ability of Africans to exercise their 'exit option'.[25] In a comparison of Ghana and Guinea, for example, Azarya and Chazan map out different levels of disengagement from the state: ranging from suffer-manage strategies and physical migration to the creation of parallel economies and enclosure within alternative institutions.[26] Jean-François Bayart has retained the state as focus of attention, but has nevertheless stressed the frailty of its control.[27] He describes the creation of a 'political space' over which those who rule seek to assert their hegemony. At different times, African societies (occupying a multiplicity of 'time-spaces') engage with, challenge or disengage from the state as it suits them. The most extreme position has been advanced by Jackson and Rosberg, who argue that it is only the norms of international relations, which are unsympathetic to secessionist movements and positively hostile to territorial aggrandizement, that have ensured the survival of African boundaries in their present form.[28]

Although the revisionist literature exudes an air of novelty, in key respects it denotes a reversion to earlier models of African politics. For example, in a more recent article, Hyden has insisted on the survival of a peasant mode (read 'traditional society'), characterized by the production of use- rather than exchange-values.[29] He has also assimilated ethnicity to his usage of the moral economy concept, so that 'tribes' are once again rendered as refractions of a

peasant consciousness.[30] And in the final analysis, his advocacy of the market as a means to capture the peasantry bears more than a passing resemblance to a central tenet of the modernization school.[31] Hyden is by no means alone. The discrete 'time-spaces' occupied by African societies within the Bayart model also have a familiar ring to them.

Where recent accounts differ is, of course, in denying the capacity of the state to integrate atomized social segments. An uneasy feeling that some vital joints have been unscrewed partly explains an ambivalence towards current processes. Although one can detect a hint of satisfaction that the state has finally been put in its place, political scientists cannot easily forget a fundamental precept which has reigned supreme since the time of Thomas Hobbes, namely that the state performs essential functions.[32] Yet, many of the concerns derive from the logic of the model as much as they do from reality. Indeed a fundamental problem is that the debate has tended to outstrip the empirical evidence. Those countries which seem in worst shape are the least likely to sustain effective research programmes or to receive close attention from expatriate scholars anxious to achieve optimal results during a sabbatical break.

In spite of the significance attributed to parallel economies, the present literature raises more questions than it answers. What it does invalidate is the notion that peasants are incorrigibly wedded to subsistence. Producers who carry cash crops (such as cocoa, coffee and groundnuts) across borders and who stock up with scarce consumer items are surely not exhibiting a marked preference for use-values. The difficulty comes with interpreting the virulence of hoarding, smuggling and the black market more generally. From one angle, the latter may be seen as a direct challenge to the state and often the boundaries which it seeks to uphold. This approach is exemplified by Azarya and Chazan:

> "Our contention is that, in most instances, these activities are construed in the eyes of the actors as responses to government policies and not to general, economic, social or physical forces."[33]

This is not the only possible construction. If the state is as remote as is sometimes claimed, then peasants are likely to regard smuggling simply as going about their business. To suggest otherwise, assumes that peasants accept the pretensions of the central authorities. The fact of the matter is that smuggling has been subjected to so little close research that it is difficult at this stage to make many generalizations.[34]

Of course, when illegal actions are carried openly and repeatedly, then central authority may be held up to ridicule. Yet it should not be assumed that an inability to enforce price controls or to check smuggling is a sign of uniform weakness, or that anybody reads it as such. Surveillance is often the thing that African states are good at. Thus Bayart quotes one Zairian official as follows:

> "If, despite the crisis, there is one thing that is in good working order, that is our intelligence service!"[35]

Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the workings of the second economy from the activities of the state. Janet MacGaffey argues that the second economy in Zaire has furnished opportunities for accumulation outside of the state, but is also quite clear that access to the state confers special advantages.[36] Similarly, Kasfir has observed the close association between *magendo* and the vagaries of power in Uganda.[37] What emerges from his critique of Green is precisely how little is known about the ubiquitous parallel economy.

Secondly, little attention has been paid to the consequences of state decay for the preservation of national unity. Although Hyden forecasts a heightening of ethnic cleavage, the logic of earlier research suggests the opposite as the state becomes a less exciting prize.[38] Nevertheless, a retreat into a plethora of local arenas merely replaces the spectre of ethnic confrontation with the equally worrying prospect of steady fragmentation. But once again, the evidence for withdrawal is surprisingly limited. Chazan has applied an exit model to Ghana, but without tabling any substantial empirical support. Given that an earlier corpus of local studies exposed a dependence upon the state, it is as well to exercise caution. Part Two of this thesis will present evidence that is at some variance with her interpretation.

One of the attractions of the Bayart model, apart from the fact that it is extremely open-ended, is that it reconciles aspects of the revisionist interpretation with the 'statish' realities encountered by the average researcher. Bayart quietly restores an element of social cohesion into the equation through the concept of civil society. This refers to a matrix of institutions which exist outside of and in an ambivalent relationship to the state.[39] It embraces the churches, trade unions, business groups and a range of voluntary associations, each with their own priorities and modes of discourse. Although Bayart suspects that civil society is currently too fractured to set the agenda, it is significant that he portrays African political systems as substantially greater than the sum of their communal parts. This begs the crucial question of where civil society began.

At this juncture, one is back at the point where political scientists parted company with Kimble. Over the past thirty years, a fascination with ethnic diversity and local particularity has obscured the extent to which Africans also participate in national communities. These are reproduced through the operations of the state but also through civil society. This includes the press, radio, churches, schools, banks, the postal system, and - not to be under-estimated - the national football league. The implication is that an erosion of state power need not of itself portend the fracturing of society, at least in the short term. In countries where development is fairly evenly spread, the level of cohesion is likely to be that much greater, not least because regional elites will have an equivalent stake in the nation. Yet it would be wrong to be assume that national consciousness is the exclusive preserve of these elites. Two researchers who enquired into identity along an 'artificial' West African frontier recently concluded:

> "That national identity is at least as important in the Nigeria-Niger border region of Hausaland as ethnic identity makes plain that recent reports of the death of the African state are indeed premature."[40]

Ghana has occupied a special place in academic debate over the decades, having undergone the whole gamut of experiences. Ghana has spawned elections, coups,

a mutiny and a short-lived revolution. It has also enjoyed years of comparative prosperity, a longer period of acute economic hardship and a more recent period of painful reconstruction. The fabric of the nation and even the structures of the state have somehow endured all of this without a serious threat of breakdown. This thesis aims to shed some light upon this reality, using an approach that is distinctive in three respects. First of all, it takes the form of a case-study from the Volta Region. When so much basic documentation is unobtainable, local evidence is an essential means both of reconstructing the past and making sense of the present. As far as possible, an attempt has been made to straddle the divide between macro- and micro-levels of analysis. A great deal of local material which has no wider political significance has reluctantly been omitted. Yet this cuts both ways, since viewing politics through a local prism requires one to screen out events which might nevertheless be considered of importance on a national canvas. Secondly, this is an exercise in political economy in the sense that it deals not only with modes of consciousness, but also with the material conditions which have given rise to them. Finally, the thesis adopts a fairly long-term historical perspective, for the obvious reason that both identities and structures are forged over decades rather than months or even years. It remains at this juncture to say something more about the area of research.

1.2. The Scope of Research

1.2.1. The Locality

At the time of defining a research topic, it was necessary to isolate a region for closer study. The Volta Region was the obvious candidate, since it has long been regarded as the soft underbelly of the Ghanaian state. Like most other African frontiers, the border with Togo bisects a number of ethno-linguistic zones, the most well-known of which is populated by the Ewe. Over time, the Ewe seemed more willing than most to question the legitimacy of this 'line drawn on a map'. Furthermore, the Region has acquired some notoriety (largely undeserved) for

the proliferation of smuggling activity. Finally, the Volta Region has been subjected to comparatively little research by comparison with Ashanti or even the North.

The selection of a case-study proved less straightforward. After three months based in Accra, punctuated by visits to the Region, Likpe was identified as the most suitable location for field research. The final decision owed something to accident as well as to design. National security was a sensitive issue towards the end of 1985, which made it inadvisable to display too avid an interest in the border. Since Mate is not only a border village but also the headquarters of Likpe Traditional Area, research at this site was less likely to arouse suspicion. Buem-Borada would have served almost as well, and indeed a comparative study seemed briefly to have its merits, but the excellent research environment in Likpe finally settled the matter. A second reason was that, in the course of examining the daily newspapers for 1983, Likpe surfaced in reports and editorials in connection with smuggling. This hinted at promising material for closer research. Finally, Likpe possessed added interest by virtue of the public figures it has produced. During the 1970s, Major-General Utuka was a prominent member of the Supreme Military Council. At the time of writing, both the Foreign Secretary, Dr. Obed Asamoah, as well as the Vice-Chairman of the opposition Movement for Freedom and Justice, Ray Kakrabah-Quarshie, come from Likpe. At an early stage, it was realized that the careers of these local sons might serve as a device by which to trace the links between centre and community through time.

The choice also harboured its problems. Although Likpe is a cocoa growing community (an important consideration when it came to estimating levels of cross-border traffic), it is not strictly-speaking part of Eweland. Other Ghanaians tend to perceive the Volta Region as populated by an Ewe majority in the south and an Akan minority in the north. But the ethnographic map is considerably more convoluted than that. In the second decade of this century, R.S. Rattray

identified a number of splinter groups.[41] He observed that some of these originated in the Gold Coast, while others were indigenous. Diedrich Westermann subsequently referred to the latter as 'Togo remnant groups', implying that they were autocthonous, unlike the Ewe who had migrated westwards from Notsie in the early eighteenth century.[42] In practice, linguistic categories and oral traditions are often at odds with each other. Kropp Dakubu and Ford list the following Ghanaian languages as part of the Central Togo cluster (the preferred term): Adele, Lefana/Lelemi (Buem), Sekpele (Likpe), Siwu (Lolobi and Akpafu), Sele (Santrokofi) and Bowiri.[43] Yet Rattray recorded that the Buem-Lefana originated in Ashanti, the Bowiri in Cape Coast and the Likpes in Atebubu. The reality is that, while some groups like the Akpafu appear largely autocthonous, most are an amalgam of peoples who entered the region at different times. Distinct traces survive in the form of dialect variations and the diverse oral traditions of individual clans and villages.[44] These minorities, which have scarcely been noticed by modern researchers,[45] are quite distinct from their larger Akan and Ewe neighbours. Some of the minorities that are interspersed with the Ewe (the Agotime, Avatime, Logba, Nyangbo and Tafi) have absorbed cultural influences from their neighbours. Others which are located north of Hohoe (Likpe, Akpafu, Buem-Lefana, Bowiri, Lolobi and Nkonya) have been less affected by the Ewe, but substantially so nonetheless.

What began as a research snag soon developed into an important sub-theme of the research. Together, the Bakpele (the name which Likpe people prefer) and the other minorities have been numerous enough to help direct the course of political development in the Region. Yet they have barely been mentioned in previous studies. This thesis aims therefore to fill a gap. Individually, these minorities are too small to stand alone and have therefore tended to associate with larger ethnic blocs. The quite startling shifts of identity over time provide valuable insights into the political economy of ethnicity. In particular, they illustrate the situational (as opposed to primordial) character of African ethnicity which has been so well documented by Crawford Young with specific reference to Zaire.[46]

Table 1.1:

Profile of the Volta Region Minorities

Name	Place of Origin	Numbers in 1960
Agotime	Adangbe	n.a.*
Akpafu	indigenous	5,370
Avatime	Ahanta	7,920
Bowiri	Cape Coast	3,280
Lefana (Buem)	Ashanti	15,900
Likpe	Atebubu	7,140
Logba	indigenous	2,090
Nkonya	Accra/Cape Coast	11,050
Nyangbo	Aburi	1,940
Santrokofi	indigenous	2,230
Tafi	indigenous	1,350

* Note: the census figures include Agotime with the figures for the Adangbe as a whole, who numbered 237,440 in 1960.

(Source: M.B.K. Darkoh , "A Note on the Peopling of the Forest Hills of the Volta Region of Ghana", Ghana Notes and Queries, XI, 1970; D. Smock and A. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism, p.283)

Likpe Traditional Area comprises ten villages: Mate, Bala, Avedzeme, Todome, Bakwa, Agbozome, Koforidua, Kukurantumi, Abrani and Nkwanta. The first four represent early settlements, the second four represent more recent breakaways, while Nkwanta is a stranger village. Until comparatively recently, the chief of Mate was simultaneously the Paramount Chief (or Okakple), but a separate Matehene has since been created. Each of the original settlements has its own wing chief, who is formally senior to the sub-chiefs of the newer villages. The chief of Bakwa, who comes under the wing of the Todome chief, in turn appoints an *odikro* to manage the affairs of Nkwanta. All of the chiefs are entitled to sit on the Likpe Traditional Council, which has few formal powers but serves as a clearing house for matters of mutual concern. The political structure of Likpe is notionally pyramidal, but in reality power is highly dispersed - a point that will be underlined in the body of this thesis. This is as true of the individual

villages, where the incumbent chief has to strike an accord with the asafoatse (leader of the youngmen) and the clan heads. Likpe has always been administered as part of a more extensive administrative unit. District boundaries have been a bone of contention and have undergone many alterations over time.

Most of the Bakpele claim affiliation to either the Roman Catholic or the Evangelical Presbyterian Church, each of which traces its roots back to the era of German colonial rule. With the exception of the Likpe Secondary School, all the village schools are managed by one of these churches with assistance from central government. Most recently Likpe, like much of Ghana, has witnessed a proliferation of smaller religious sects which cater to the unfulfilled spiritual needs of their flock. Yet the comparative wealth of the established churches, especially the Catholics, has ensured their continuing relevance to members of the community.

The economy of Likpe has been dominated by the fluctuating fortunes of one crop - cocoa - which has provided the means through which the Bakpele have satisfied a thirst for consumer goods and for education. The spread of cocoa has fundamentally transformed patters of food production and consumption, with a steady displacement of yams and rice by less nutritious cassava. Cocoa has also brought an influx of labourers from Togo and even further afield. Cocoa has also boosted the fortunes of Hohoe as the leading commercial centre, a fact which is not always popular. The Bakpele villages are connected to Hohoe by means of dirt roads that pass through east and west Likpe en route to Kute and Jasikan. Those who need to visit the hospital (there is a clinic in Bakwa), or to purchase goods travel to Hohoe rather than to Jasikan, which is smaller and less accessible. Although the Ewe speaking villages on the Togolese side of the border are not cognate, circumstances have often encouraged trade and even marriage across the frontier. This has ensured the salience of the boundary to government and people alike.

Table 1.2:

The Population of Likpe in 1970

Settlement	Village	Neighbouring Farms	Total
Abrani	1,254	745	1,990
Agbozome	942	-	942
Avedzeme	-	-	-
Bakwa	1,156	67	1,223
Bala	1,170	88	1,258
Koforidua	549	59	608
Kukurantumi	1,420	-	1,420
Mate	2,069	-	2,069
Nkwanta	377	1,201	1,578
Todome	454	264	718
Total:	9,391	2,424	11,815

(Source: Ghana, 1970 Population Census of Ghana)[47]

1.2.2. Methodology and Structure

In the course of research, a wide range of written and oral sources was consulted. Before embarking on fieldwork, and on return from Ghana, extensive use was made of United Nations records covering the Togoland Trust Territory as well as the relevant Colonial Office files. Both of these sources (which have been utilized by previous researchers on the unification movement) provide valuable information on the high politics of the pre-independence period. But they convey little of the atmosphere of the area. Within Ghana, both the Accra archives and the Regional archives in Ho contain a wealth of more locally specific data. Unfortunately, the official record peters out around 1960, around which time files ceased being deposited in the Archives. It was, however, possible to substitute other sources of data, many of which have been little used. Documents housed at the Stool Lands Boundary Settlement Commission and with the Ministry of

Agriculture in Ho furnished information on the Regional economy. Only a fraction of the material has entered the text. A thoroughly unexpected source of data was the personal archive of Nana Soglo Allo III who has kept copies of correspondence with District and Regional authorities for two decades. There is perhaps no clearer symbol of the continuing relevance of the state than these collections of neatly filed letters. Although I did not receive complete access to these files, the information that was gleaned was most useful. Finally, it was possible to reconstruct certain events through a close reading of the national press.

Most of the one-year period actually spent in Likpe (out of a total of fifteen months) was devoted to interviews with chiefs, political activists and ordinary men and women. The object was to probe attitudes towards smuggling, the boundary and national politics, as well as to elicit details concerning the local economy. Most interviews were conducted with specific questions in mind but remained fairly open-ended.[48] Towards the end of the research, a questionnaire was devised in order to draw on a wider pool of people. After a trial run, which required the rephrasing or omission of certain questions, 320 individuals were interviewed. Following the exclusion of part of the batch, for a variety of reasons, 287 responses remained. These provide a reasonably comprehensive picture of the political and economic history of the community. The results have been deployed mostly as supporting evidence in pursuit of specific lines of argument. Due to government sensitivity, it was unfortunately impossible to conduct similar research on the Togolese side of the frontier.

The thesis divides into three sections. These demarcate distinct phases in Bakpele history, but also correspond more or less accurately to the trajectory of the Ghanaian state. Part One spans a period from the end of the Second World War until 1969 and examines the factors that lay behind the emergence and the eventual demise of the Togoland unification movement. Part Two analyses the impact of the crisis upon Likpe during the 1970s and catalogues the variety of

individual and collective responses to personal hardship and collective disappointment. Part Three covers the efforts of the Rawlings regime to establish a new modus vivendi between the state and rural society in the period between 1982 and the end of 1986.

Footnotes to Chapter One:

1. Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), p.119.

2. René Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p.149.

3. A perceptive overview of current politics in Africa is Christopher Clapham, "The African State", paper to Conference of the Royal African Society on "Sub-Saharan Africa: The Record and the Outlook", St. John's College, Cambridge, 14-16, April 1991.

4. See the editorial entitled "Weep for the Lost Continent" in The Independent 31 March 1991.

5. David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), especially chapter XIII and Retrospect.

6. Ibid., p.554.

7. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1983), especially chapter 7.

8. A useful resumé of the literature on the state is Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect", The Journal of Modern African Studies XXVIII, 2, 1990.

9. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p.140.

10. David Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955 and 1963 revised edition).

11. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978).

12. The character of the CPP generated much comment. See, for example, D.L. Cohen, "The CPP of Ghana: Representational or Solidarity Party?"; and Selwyn Ryan, "The Theory and Practice of One Partyism: The CPP Re-examined", both in Canadian Journal of African Studies, IV, 2, 1970.

13. Amongst the most significant local studies are John Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), especially chapters 7 and 8; and Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case-Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

14. Berg interpreted the contrast between the performances of the two economies as evidence for the superiority of gradualist over transformational approaches to development. Green was more inclined to blame poor implementation. See Elliot Berg, "Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast"; and Reginald Green, "Reflections on Economic Strategy, Structure, Implementation and Necessity: Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1957-67", both in Phillip Foster and Aristide Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

15. Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976).

16. For a discussion of this issue, see John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", Socialist Register, 1974.

17. See, for example, Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

18. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971 (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp.198-206,. John Saul, "The Dialectics of Class and Tribe", Race and Class, XX, 4, 1979.

19. Robert Melson and Harold Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds.) Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971). A more recent example is Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (London: Macmillan, 1988).

20. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington: 1981).

21. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), and Essays in the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapter 5.

22. Robert Bates, "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa", in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola (eds.), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview, 1983).

23. Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (London, Heinemann, 1980). Also No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (London: Heinemann, 1983).

24. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, chapters 8 and 9.

25. For example, S.G. Bunker, "Peasant Responses to a Dependent State: Uganda, 1983", Canadian Journal of African Studies XIX, 2, 1985; J. Roitman, "The Politics of Informal Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXVIII, 4, 1990.

26. Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, "Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea", Comparative Studies in Society and History XIX, 1987.

27. Jean-François Bayart, L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

28. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis", The Journal of Modern African Studies XXIX, 1, 1986.

29. Goran Hyden, "Reciprocity and Governance in Africa", in James Wunsch and Dele Olowu (eds.), The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 1990), p.247.

30. Goran Hyden, "Problems and Prospects", pp.70-71.

31. Ibid., pp.76-79.

32. A triumphalist tone pervades the introduction to Wunsch and Olowu, op. cit..

33. Azarya and Chazan, op. cit., p.129.

34. For exceptions, see Janet MacGaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chapter 6; David Collins, "Partitioned Culture Areas and Smuggling: The Hausa Groundnut Trade Across the Nigeria-Niger Boundary Up to the 1970s", in A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1984).

35. Translation of a quotation from Bayart, op. cit., p.301.

36. Janet MacGaffey, "How To Survive and Become Rich Amidst Devastation: The Second Economy in Zaire", African Affairs LXXXII, 328, 1983.

37. Nelson Kasfir, "State, Magendo and Class Formation in Uganda", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XXI, 3, 1983. Kasfir was responding to Reginald Green, "Magendo in the Political Economy of Uganda: Pathology, Parallel System or Dominant Sub-Mode of Production", University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies, Discussion paper no.164, 1981.

38. Hyden, "Problems and Prospects", p.78-79.

39. Jean-François Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa", in Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.111-112.

40. William Miles and David Rochefort, "Nationalism Versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa", American Political Science Review LXXXV, 2, 1991, p.391. See also Miles "Self-Identity, Ethnic Affinity and National Consciousness: An Example from Rural Hausaland", Ethnic and Racial Studies, IX, 4, 1986.

41. GNA (Ho), RAO/C.273 "Togoland: A History of the Tribal Divisions of the District of Misahuhe and of the Sub-Districts of Ho and Kpandu", compiled by R.S. Rattray, District Political Officer, undated.

42. The term, was first used by Struck and appropriated by Westermann. See M.E. Kropp Dakubu and K.C. Ford, "The Central-Togo Languages" in M.E. Kropp Dakubu (ed.), The Languages of Ghana (Kegan Paul International/International Africa Institute, 1988), p.119.

43. Ibid., p.120-121.

44. According to Darkoh, descendants of the original inhabitants are still to be found amongst many of the villages of Avatime. M.B.K. Darkoh, "A Note on the Peopling of the Forest Hills of the Volta Region of Ghana", Ghana Notes and Queries XI, 1970, p.10.

45. Lynne Brydon is a notable exception. She has published a number of articles on the Avatime. See, for example, her "Rice, Yams and Chiefs in Avatime: Speculations on the Development of a Social Order", Africa LI, 2, 1981. On Agotime, see R.G.S. Sprigge, "Eweland's Adangbe" in Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana X, 1969.

46. During the 1940s and 1950s the Bakpele gravitated towards either the Ewe or the Akan ethnic banner when circumstances demanded. By the 1970s, certain sections of the community were being drawn towards identification with a wider Guan community. The Guan 'movement' was an explicit, but not very co-ordinated effort on the part of educated people, mainly from the Eastern and Brong Ahafo Regions, to stake a prior claim to the national heritage. The contention was that the Akans were late arrivals in what became Ghana, the implication of which did not need to be too clearly stated. It is not immediately obvious why anyone in Likpe should have found this position either attractive or remunerative. In this apparent lack of 'rationality', there are some useful parallels to be derived from other parts of Africa. Crawford Young drew attention to some of the quirks of ethnicity in his Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton University Press, 1965), especially chapter 9. He developed his insights on the situational character of ethnicity more fully in The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1976). The co-existence of variant discourses at successive levels of the political hierarchy is a theme which is emphasized in the work of J.-F.Bayart. See for example "La politique par le bas en Afrique noire", Politique Africaine 1, 1, 1981.

47. A separate enumeration was not made for Avedzeme. The 1984 Population Census (of which the Preliminary and Regional reports have been published) does not break the figures down below the Local Council Area. Nevertheless an approximate calculation of the Bakpele population in 1984 can be made on the basis of a projection for the increase recorded for Biakoye as a whole since the 1970 Census. This yields a figure of 13,550. It is worth noting that an analysis of the 1984 Census reveals a curious trend. The growth rate for the Volta Region (26.8%) was the lowest in the country where the average increase was 42.6%. What is more surprising is that Biakoye recorded a meagre increase of 14.7%. Since there is no evidence of a falling birth rate or abnormal rates of infant mortality, the most likely explanation is a high rate of out-migration - even in spite of the urban crisis and the Nigerian expulsions of 1983.

48. Unfortunately, many of the transcripts were stolen along with other research materials in 1986.

Part One: The Integration of British Togoland, 1945-1969

As a geographical entity and as a focus of national identification Ghana is, like most other African states, a fabrication of the colonial period. At the time of independence in 1957, national unity appeared characteristically fragile, even if state structures were credited with a greater degree of efficacy than in most of Africa. British Togoland had been appended most recently (some preferred 'annexed') in controversial circumstances. The Volta Region, comprising Southern Togoland and Gold Coast Eweland, was therefore the part of the country which seemed most likely to peel off at a later date. In spite of the travails of modern Ghana, this has never come to pass. In order to understand the resilience of national structures, it is important to pay close attention to the historical record. Much as the ability of some buildings to survive an earthquake is related to the design and the materials used, so African states bear the imprint of their colonial architects and builders. Part One of this thesis therefore traces the processes through which the former United Nations Trust Territory was integrated with the Gold Coast colony. The evidence from Likpe is used at times to illustrate the broader trends and at other times to capture the nuances. Chapter Two takes a fresh look at the political economy of the Togoland unification movement. Chapter Three follows this up with an analysis of unification politics in Likpe and it environs. Chapter Four deals with the eclipse of the unification movement during the 1960s, thus setting the scene for Part Two.

Chapter Two:

"So Much For Mandates!": The Political Economy of the Togoland Unification Movement Revisited:

In the mid-1950s, the apparently smooth transition of the Gold Coast towards independence was interrupted by the formation of regionally-based parties demanding constitutional safeguards against the centralizing tendencies of the Convention People's Party (CPP). The Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM), the Northern People's Party (NPP) and the Togoland

Congress (TC) forged an alliance, which continued briefly after independence in the form of the United Party. The TC had a wider range of options available to it than its allies by virtue of the special status of Togoland as a United Nations Trust Territory. It could legitimately insist on complete separation from the Gold Coast or limit itself to campaigning for a federal constitution. The focus shifted over time. Although the TC aspired to a position of leadership throughout the Trust territory, its support was effectively limited to Southern Togoland. In the northern sector, the NPP managed to entrench itself on either side of a nominal frontier with the Northern Territories. However much the NPP feared southern domination, and despite its participation in the opposition front, its over-riding concern was to avoid repartitioning the North. The TC was, by contrast, ambivalent on the desirability of maintaining links with the Gold Coast.

This first Chapter reappraises the origins and inspirations of the unification movement. Firstly, it exposes some of the objective factors that underpinned conflicting perceptions of where the best interests of the territory lay. It then proceeds to examine the political dynamics of the movement and the challenge posed to it by the CPP in the 1950s. The primary focus is upon the domestic political arena rather than the complex manoeuvring within the United Nations which has been central to previous accounts.[1] Furthermore, the Chapter is interpretative and therefore omits some of the dense narrative detail which has been displayed elsewhere.[2]

2.1. British Policy Towards Togoland, 1920-1939

The manner in which the British approached their mandate in Togoland (following the expulsion of Germany during the First World War) left an indelible imprint on the territory. Whereas they could have treated Togoland as a distinct unit, they chose instead to divide into into a Northern and a Southern section, each of which was then appended to an existing administrative unit of the Gold Coast. The six Northern districts that were created by Proclamation in 1923 were placed under the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories.[3] In

the south, the Ho District and the Kpandu sub-District were placed under the Commissioner of the Eastern Province. This disrupted many of the links that already existed between north and south and placed an obstacle in the way of latter moves towards reunification.

From the British point of view, such an arrangement was the most economical, a consideration which was always weighed heavily on the 'official mind'. But sections of the local administration also harboured greater designs. These can be traced back to British interest in this part of West Africa in the late nineteenth century. An expanding sphere of influence had been rudely threatened by the German declaration of a protectorate over Lomé and its hinterland in 1884. The ensuing competition for territory was ultimately resolved without recourse to conflict. Britain agreed to relinquish her claims over the Ewe divisions of Krepi in return for gains elsewhere under the Heligoland Treaty of 1890.[4] Subsequent competition in the north ended in 1899 when Britain and Germany partitioned the neutral zone that they had agreed on eleven years previously. Although the eastern boundary of the Gold Coast had been amicably settled, there was some disquiet about the northern sector where the frontier split the Mamprussi, Gonja and Dagomba peoples and assigned Yendi, the capital of Dagbon, to the German sphere.

The outbreak of the First World War and the joint Anglo-French invasion of German Togoland presented a fresh opportunity to redraw the boundaries. The allies agreed on a preliminary division for the duration of the War, which was favourable to the Gold Coast. In the north, the whole of Dagomba was placed under British jurisdiction, as was most of Eweland and the capital of Lomé in the south. Any permanent claim which Britain might wish to stake was strengthened by demonstrations of support from the local inhabitants. A Foreign Office report recorded the 'joyful greeting' which was extended to the British forces when they entered Yendi, together with the request from the Ya Na that the Dagomba people be reunified under the British flag.[5] Similar expressions of loyalty issued

from the Ewe commercial elite of Lomé. In 1914 Governor Clifford of the Gold Coast regarded these gestures as useful ammunition to be deployed subsequently in support of British claims. He wrote that:

> "It should be noted for future reference that any attempt once more to divide the Dagomba country in a manner which is opposed to the ethnological distribution of the native population will be keenly resented by the chiefs and people both in the Northern Territories and in the Sansanne-Mangu district of Togoland. The foregoing remark applies with equal force to the feelings of the natives in the Peki and Misahohe districts and to the Awuna population of the Keta and Lomeland districts."[6]

At the end of the War, the Gold Coast authorities had to settle for less than Clifford considered desirable. The acquisitions in the north were made safe, but there were limits to the claims that could be advanced since Britain required French acquiescence to her designs in East Africa. Furthermore, Togoland was regarded within the Foreign Office as of little intrinsic value.[7] The French, on the other hand, claimed a pressing need for Lomé because their existing port facilities at Cotonou were inadequate. The Lomé merchants and Chambers of Commerce in Britain warned that a further partition of Eweland would cause intolerable hardship and resentment amongst the local population.[8] In the event, wider strategic considerations prevailed and the Milner-Simon Agreement of July 1919 assigned much of Eweland, including Lomé and the commercial centre of Palimé, to France. Eminent public figures in Britain and the Commander of the British Forces in Togoland lobbied for abrogation of the Agreement. Yet with the exception of some minor boundary adjustments, the act of partition survived intact until a renewed challenge was mounted in the 1940s.[9]

The Anglo-French Agreement was followed by the award of League of Nations 'B' Mandates in July 1921. The principle behind the Mandates was one of trusteeship rather than outright territorial acquisition. Nevertheless, the local authorities regarded the new administrative arrangements as a convenient device to eliminate a frontier that should never have been erected in the first place. This was particularly true of the north where pre-colonial ties were consciously

resurrected. In the south, it was doubtful whether the Ewe had ever thought of themselves as a single people. If they had, the 1919 partition was manifestly iniquitous. Yet the authorities were keen to stake out a moral claim to the parts of Southern Togoland that they had recently acquired. The Government anthropologist, R.S. Rattray, investigated a Peki claim to have exercised leadership over the other Krepi divisions in pre-colonial times. Since Peki belonged with the Gold Coast, this might justify integration with the colony. The Peki case was repudiated by most of the Ewe communities and the minorities of British Togoland. Rattray was nevertheless able to make a case on the evidence that the Krepi divisions had once accepted British flags and had concealed them during the period of German rule. His report concluded on a confident note:

> "The case for our right, politically and morally, to take over this part of Togo is in the opinion of the compiler of this short treatise, a strong one."[10]

If such a right did exist, then Britain was also justified in treating her section of Togoland on a virtual par with her colonial possessions. The Permanent Mandates Commission accepted the merits of administrative union with the Gold Coast and thereafter asked few questions beyond demanding an annual report on social and economic conditions in the territory.

British colonialism was notoriously parsimonious and the Gold Coast was no exception, even though the Guggisberg years produced a temporary burst of activity. If the Mandated Territory was to be governed as a part of the Gold Coast, it was axiomatic that it should also contribute its share of the revenue. Since direct taxation was too difficult to administer and highly unpopular, most taxes would have to be derived from import and export duties. Despite French protests, therefore, the authorities insisted on interposing a customs barrier between British and French Togoland, accompanied by the full schedule of Gold Coast duties. At a stroke, trade between the eastern and western sectors of the former German colony was subjected to new tariffs. Many a community discovered that normal commercial intercourse had been redefined as smuggling virtually overnight. The Gold Coast authorities were not opposed to cross-border

trade in principle. On the contrary, they coveted the revenue which the Customs Department might collect. For this reason, they sought to persuade the French to allow imports and exports to pass through Lomé on concessionary terms. This was regarded as essential because, in the words of one Report,

> "The outstanding feature of the country east of the Volta is that from the standpoint of trade it faces eastwards."[11]

The authorities fully expected that the French railway and port facilities would continue to service the needs of southern Togoland, with the Gold Coast state merely creaming off taxes on exports and imported goods.

The eastward orientation was a legacy of German colonial rule. The Germans had embarked on an extensive programme of infrastructural development, central to which was the construction of a national rail network, in order to make their colony viable and indeed profitable. Between 1905 and 1911, Lomé was linked to Anecho, Palimé and Atakpamé by three new railway lines. In addition, 760 miles of motorable roads were constructed between 1900 and 1914.[12] In 1884, the British and the Germans had agreed upon a common set of duties, but in order to finance development spending on this scale the Germans found it necessary to impose higher rates of duty in 1894. Gold Coast officials expressed satisfaction at the resultant increase in smuggling,[13] but the gamble eventually paid off. The total volume of trade expanded, while even the remoter parts of Togoland were drawn into a common commercial nexus centred on the railheads which were in turn tied to the port at Lomé. Communities in immediate proximity to the Palimé railhead reputedly became so deeply immersed in the cultivation of cocoa and oil-palm that they virtually abandoned food cultivation.[14] Indeed, Palimé became the focal point for most of what became the Ho District in British Togoland.

The Gold Coast authorities were aware that the severance of Palimé from its economic heartland threatened to make the railway unprofitable.[15] The French were therefore vulnerable to pressure. However, the Ho District was itself completely dependent upon the railway for the shipment of its cash crops and access to consumer goods. The early years of the Mandate were characterised by

efforts on either side to expose and exploit the weaknesses of the other party. The French refused to grant a "bond-in-transit" to imports bound for British Togoland and imposed additional duties on cocoa, so as to pressure Britain into waiving its duties at the frontier. The impact of high French tariffs upon British Southern Togoland was most severe. Towards the end of 1921, Major Jackson, then the Commissioner of the Eastern Province wrote that:

> "... if the present position of Togoland could be realized and compared with previous years, one could not deny the fact that the inhabitants of our zone, who always looked up to and wanted British Rule, are now faced with the fact that they are forced to pay 20% more for their personal wants when procurable, and receive 3/- per load less for cocoa (due to the Export tax) or, in other words, are placed at a total disadvantage of 45% (taking the present price of cocoa at 12/- per load) in comparison with their kith and kin in the French Zone."[16]

By 1922, Jackson was lamenting the fact that all but one of the firms had closed their stores in British Togoland, preferring to let the farmers make their own way to Palimé as they invariably did.[17] There was, however, an overall decline of production for the market, especially in Buem where the farmers no longer found it worthwhile to harvest their cocoa. This in turn depressed state revenues, which was precisely the opposite of what had been intended. The British authorities were aware that the French could point to their discomfort as evidence for the unviability of their section once divorced from the railway.[18]

Some short-term relief arrived in 1923 when the French granted imperial preferences to cocoa from British Togoland. But the authorities were increasingly reluctant to pin their hopes on Palimé. Borrowing a leaf from the German book, they built new roads from Ho to Adidome and Senchi, where ferries linked the Territory with the Gold Coast and thus reconnected Buem with an alternative market. In 1929, the Kpeve-Hohoe road was extended to Jasikan and Worawora, reaching Kadjebi in 1938. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to the construction of feeder roads.[19] There were, however, narrow limits to the resources which the administration was prepared to commit towards closer economic integration with the Gold Coast. In 1922, Major Jackson spelled out the principle which was

to determine policy throughout the period of the Mandate and later the Trusteeship:

> "From the financial point [of view], the Mandated Area of Togoland is costing the Gold Coast a very large amount annually, whereas the Revenue is very small, therefore until such time as we introduce means of increasing Trade generally, it is not advisable to expend large amounts in Togoland which could with advantage be expended in other parts of the Colony."[20]

This statement echoes a famous dictum on the Northern Territories. The cocoa growing areas of the Ashanti and the Western Province were felt to be more deserving, whereas Captain C.C. Lilley (then the District Political Officer) declared himself unimpressed by the efforts of the Buem cocoa farmers.[21] According to Kwaku, Togoland received only 0.4% of expenditure on Public Works during the Governorship of Guggisberg, at a time when the basic infrastructure of the Gold Coast was put in place.[22] Herein lay a historic 'Catch 22': without more vigorous economic activity the authorities were reluctant to spend money and yet it was difficult to open up the territory without a more elaborate infrastructure. Typically, road construction lagged far behind the cocoa frontier as it moved northwards: thus it was not until 1951 that the road to Kadjebi was extended to the most productive areas of Papase and Ahamansu.

Despite the tight spending limits, some infrastructural development did help to reorientate the economy of southern Togoland. During the 1930s there was a rapid expansion of cocoa production in the Buem forests north of Jasikan, which stimulated a wider recovery. Trade also began to gravitate away from markets in French Togoland and towards the Gold Coast. As early as 1929, it was reported that development in the Ho District had virtually killed trade in Palimé.[23] New commercial centres arose within the Territory, such as Jasikan, Kadjebi and most importantly Hohoe. By 1929, there were as many as nineteen expatriate commercial firms operating out of Hohoe, many of which were based in the Gold Coast.[24] There was also a plethora of petty traders and cocoa brokers, who penetrated the villages and spared the farmers the effort of travelling on foot to Palimé. At the same time, the cost of transporting produce to the latter became

prohibitive, because lorries were forced to return empty as a result of double duties levied upon French imports.

As late as 1938, Captain Lilley, the District Commissioner credited with the most intimate knowledge of Southern Togoland, asserted that it was only the boundary that permitted rivals to Palimé within the British sector:

> "Should French and British Togo ever come again under one Government, Hohoe (like Kpedze) will lose all its importance as a commercial centre. Cocoa will go straight through Palimé [railhead] where I am sure that Government will have its inspection."[25]

This ignored the fact that by the 1930s a more organic relationship was developing with the Gold Coast, even despite the absence of a bridge over the Volta River. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show how the Gold Coast accounted for an expanding share of commerce from British Togoland during the 1930s.

Table 2.1:

Cocoa Exports From British Togoland (tons)

Year	Total	Via Palimé	Via Gold Coast
1932	8,649	5,546	3,193
1933	6,956	5,227	1,729
1934	10,489	4,575	5,714
1935	13,722	7,958	5,764
1936	15,734	9,003	6,731
1937	12,316	3,668	8,648
1938	16,451	5,750	10,701

(Source: Colonial Office. Togoland Annual Reports, 1938, p.72)

Table 2.2:

Produce Passing Over Senchi Ferry, 1931-38 (tons)

1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
2,058	5,187	4,627	6,883	6,633	8,064	9,970	12,258

(Colonial Office. Togoland Annual Reports, 1938, p.19)

Again, when food supplies from French Togoland were severed during the Second World War, Gold Coast traders were able to tap the markets east of the Volta so successfully that they spread food shortages to the Ho District as well. Thus, in 1945 it was reported that:

> "Demands in coastal markets are so large that large quantities of foodstuffs from this district are exported almost every day to Keta, Accra and Koforidua markets by local traders and others from other parts of the country."[26]

As the bonds with the Gold Coast were drawn ever tighter, the economic cohesion of the former German colony began to dissolve. This does not mean, of course, that all trade over the frontier ceased. A substantial proportion of the cocoa and coffee crops continued to be shipped legally through Palimé into the 1950s because France continued to waive duties on cocoa imports from the two Togolands. There was also a great deal of illicit trade which ebbed and flowed depending on prevailing economic conditions. At one level, the recurrence of smuggling can simply be interpreted as the survival of patterns of trade that existed before 1919, but this risks oversimplification. It should also be noted that partition made certain lines of trade profitable for the first time. British restrictions on the importation of guns and spirits, for example, provided a ready source of income for individuals who were prepared to risk smuggling these items across the border from French Togoland. Furthermore, the very vitality of the Senchi nexus opened up new opportunities for the trafficking of consumer

goods into the French zone. The salient point, though, is that the territory now faced west.

Another aspect of British rule was that it facilitated more regular interaction between Togolanders and people from the Gold Coast. The German missionaries of the Bremen Mission had operated in both Gold Coast Eweland and southern Togo before 1914. After the war, the Bremen Mission was expelled and the United Free Church of Scotland assumed nominal control of its activities. After 1927, the Ewe Presbyterian Church (E.P.C.), as it was renamed, was run entirely by Ewe Ministers and operated both in the Gold Coast and in the Trust Territory.[27] The E.P.C. and the Catholic Church both provided a common framework within which believers in the Gold Coast and southern Togoland could interact. The Paris Mission, which carried out the work of the former Bremen Mission on the French side of the border, also maintained close relations with the E.P.C. The two met in a General Synod every three years, but the link was inevitably more distant than between the Gold Coast and British Togoland branches of the Ewe Church.

The British administration did not operate any schools of its own, and so depended on the churches to perform this function, although it offered a subsidy to those schools that complied with official guidelines. Southern Togoland had a total of 83 assisted and 37 non-assisted schools by the outbreak of the Second World War.[28] It was not until 1950 that the Territory acquired its own secondary school, which meant that students wishing to further their education were forced to enrol in the Gold Coast. Those who acquired an education could then seek paid employment, occasionally in Government service but more commonly working for the trading firms. The creation of new Native Authorities in the 1930s opened up fresh opportunities for those who had acquired a basic education. The Hohoe agent of John Holt at the time of the 1937/38 holdup laid the blame for peasant restiveness at the door of recent returnees:

> "Of course, the majority of the BMT chiefs are not intelligent, but there is always a power behind the Stool- either a Stool father who has been educated in Accra or a stranger occupying the post of Registrar to the Chief. These Registrars are clever and anti-white, belonging to the type of bush lawyer."[29]

The first generation of Togolanders to be fully literate in English did indeed take much of its political inspiration from the Gold Coast. Something similar was happening in French Togoland, where the Government insisted on the use of French at all levels in the educational structure. Steadily, the self-image of elites on either side of the frontier began to diverge. Coleman captured this process succinctly when he wrote that:

> "the differences in policy of the Administering Authorities have operated over the past 40 years here as in other colonial territories to weaken or destroy whatever tenuous bonds were developed among the Togoland peoples as a result of the German experience... 'Westernization' is a misnomer for the acculturation process; it would be far more accurate to refer to 'Gallicization' and 'Anglicization'."[30]

Of course, mobility was not confined to the semi-elite alone. Through the 1920s, it was still common for Togolanders to migrate in search of work on the Gold Coast cocoa farms, although increasingly the forests of Buem offered a paying alternative.[31] Migration disseminated an awareness of prevailing conditions in the Gold Coast and the similarity of experiences.

During the 1930s, farmers staged a succession of cocoa holdups in the Gold Coast to protest against pooling agreements between the expatriate firms.[32] Whereas support for the 1930/31 holdup was limited, three years later the farmers in the territory organized their own action and in 1937/38 sales came to a virtual standstill. The latter holdup attracted the support of both farmers and brokers and was co-ordinated through the chiefs who communicated with their counterparts in the Gold Coast.[33] Finally, the many Togolanders who were recruited at the time of the Second World War acquired a set of shared experiences with their Gold Coast counterparts which they fed back into the towns and villages of the Territory.

2.2. The Politics of Unification, 1939-1956

2.2.1. The Ewe Unification Phase

The role of the Second World War in the spread of African nationalism is a stock theme in the historical literature. In the case under consideration, the conclusion of the War was followed closely by demands for the reunification of the Ewe people. Where the Ewe case differs is in its failure to respect territorial boundaries. Reunification implied the removal of frontiers between the Ewe in the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. Thus, the movement seemed to represent the triumph of pre-colonial solidarities over artificial colonial boundaries. D.E.K. Amenumey and Claude Welch provide a more nuanced interpretation, but they both see the movement as in some sense 'natural'. Amenumey makes the point that demands for Ewe reunification did not date from the 1940s, but can be traced back to the original act of partition in 1890. He cites Ewe protests against the division of 1919 as further evidence of an incipient Ewe nationalism at this early stage.[34] The fact that these protests later subsided is attributed by Welch to Anglo-French co-operation which minimized the real inconvenience of the frontier. In his view, all this changed when the Vichy administration in Lomé sealed the frontier with the Gold Coast and British Togoland. The boundary then became a hindrance once again and stimulated the formation of the first pan-Ewe political organization. Welch writes that:

> "The wartime suffering of the Ewe of French Togoland hastened the growth of Ewe nationalism. The leading figure in the early development of the Ewe movement was Daniel Chapman, senior geography master at Prince of Wales College, Achimota. In January 1945, Chapman held a cocktail party at his home attended by many prominent Ewe, in the course of which the possibility of assisting the Ewe of French Togoland arose... To bring wider publicity, Chapman wrote the *Ewe Newsletter*, whose first issue appeared in May 1945."[35]

There is some independent support for this interpretation of events. Sylvanus Olympio, representing the All-Ewe Conference (AEC) at the United Nations

Trusteeship Council in 1947, testified that this organization had been formed as a response to hardships occasioned by the frontier, especially between 1940 and 1942.[36] Some border communities themselves complained to the United Nations about harassment, as in the following petition from Fiokpu in French Togoland:

> "Nos regrets c'est que la plus grande partie de nos terrains est dans la Zône Anglaise sur laquelle nos plantations de café, de cacao, d'igname, de manioc, de maïs s'y trouvent. Par nôtre séparation des douanes il nous est difficile d'y aller. Même si nous apportons des nourritures, les douaniers nous saisissent et nous maltraitent. Pour cette cause nous ne voulons plus être séparés par les limites, ni par les Douanes. Et nôtre désire est de supprimer les limites c'est-å-dire les Douanes du Mono jusqu'å la Volta."[37]

It should be noted, however, that the border had a differential impact upon and within Ewe communities. Those most adversely affected were larger traders and lorry owners who had no option but to trade through official border posts.[38] When the borders were closed or restrictions were placed on border movements, their livelihoods were directly threatened. They also smarted under the exchange controls which were imposed after the conclusion of the War. It comes as no surprise, then, that the commercial elites were at the forefront of protests about the frontier - as they had been in 1919. The frontier was almost certainly less of an imposition upon the majority of rural people if only because it remained highly porous. Thus, in 1949 one observer stated that:

> "... it must be recalled that... the permeability of the frontier between the two Territories, together with the relaxations already introduced, is in fact greatly reducing the real inconveniences arising from the frontier, at least in so far as persons other than traders are concerned."[39]

The Anglo-French response to AEC complaints was to promise measures to alleviate the practical hardships that resulted from the frontier.[40] One such measure was the establishment of a Conventional Zone, which would have removed the customs frontier between the Togolands. A Working Party was set up in 1949 and travelled widely in the three territories, collecting opinions about the present state of the frontier and the possibilities of setting up such a Zone. What most struck members of the Working Party was how little the frontier

really mattered as a physical obstacle. Hence the following note penned by a member of the Party, following a meeting with Anlo chiefs and citizens at Keta:

> "They looked at the whole question from a political point of view instead of from a practical problem of customs frontiers. They are not really inconvenienced by the customs frontier?"[41]

Indeed, the Party was informed that there were many people who made a livelihood from smuggling and who were in no rush to see the frontier removed:

> "The Reverend Baeta mentioned that there were some Ewes who were interested in maintaining the present customs frontier because of the livelihood they made out of smuggling. One smuggler said to him. 'He hoped that the customs frontier would remain until he had made sufficient profit to finish the house he was building.'"[42]

In the early 1950s, a range of imported goods was in short supply, such as bicycles and iron sheets in French Togoland, which kept these interests alive.[43] The findings of the Working Party were confirmed a few years later by the 1953 United Nations Visiting Mission, which concluded that the Ewe unification issue transcended concerns about the frontier:

> "The Mission is of the opinion that the frontier problem is not an economic one, but is a political problem and the Mission is fully alive to the psychological effect which the existence of the boundary has created in the minds of the population.... In fact, the frontier problems are of secondary consideration and of no great significance. The real problem is that of the existence of the frontier itself and will depend on the solution of the unification problem."[44]

Sylvanus Olympio also shed some light on the real objectives behind Ewe unification when he rejected the Anglo-French proposals of 1947. His case was that a weakening of frontier restrictions could never suffice because any boundary between the Ewe would interfere with their aspiration to live as one people:

> "It does not solve the basic problem. In order to ensure the orderly and true progress of the Ewe country, we must have a common educational system, the same political organization throughout the land, and economic unity. This, in our opinion, can be brought about only by the complete unification of the country under oneadministration."[45]

This was a quintessentially nationalist statement, emphasizing the 'spirit' of the Ewe people rather than more mundane considerations. Arguably, the frontier was no less of a burden for that. The crux of the matter is whether the Ewe did indeed conceive of themselves as a single people: in other words, did such an 'imagined community' in fact exist?

2.2.2. From Ewe to Togoland Unification

Sylvanus Olympio and the others conceded that a separate Ewe state would not be viable and that unification would have to take place within a more inclusive political framework. The AEC leadership was dominated by Anlo Ewes such as Daniel Chapman who believed that the solution lay in the union of French Togoland with the Gold Coast and the British Trust Territory. Typically, they envisaged Britain continuing as the administering power. This is significant because it reveals how deeply attached the Anlo leadership was to membership of the Gold Coast nation - a further reminder of the manner in which boundaries can create their own identities. Opinion in French Togoland was more divided. The position of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise (CUT), led by Sylvanus Olympio, was close to that of the Anlo leaders. The CUT leaders had no liking for the French administration that had governed since 1919, but to satisfy some of their compatriots they declared themselves prepared to submit the choice of administering power to a plebiscite.[46] This became the official policy of the AEC after 1949. The French for a time suspected the Ewe unification movement as a front for British expansionism, but once the latter had eschewed any interest in French Togoland, they narrowed their sights on the CUT.

A section of the elite which was pro-French formed a rival Parti Togolais du Progres (PTP) in 1946 and, with active French collusion, displaced the CUT from elective offices in the early 1950s. The PTP opposed the very principle of Ewe unification. The most it would accept was the reunification of the two Togolands, and even this was to be tolerated on condition that France was installed as the

administering power. At first glance, the PTP stance may appear anachronistic, since it was no less Ewe than the CUT. Indeed Dr. Pedro Olympio, its leader, was the cousin of Sylvanus Olympio. It is more comprehensible once one takes into account that the constituency of the PTP comprised those who were most dependent on the French administration. Whereas wealthy traders gravitated to the CUT, the PTP attracted the civil servants and evolués more generally. Their greatest fear was that they might become a Francophone minority within a reunified Eweland, which would place them at an inherent disadvantage in the competition for employment. The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord (UCPN), which was allied to the PTP, brought in the northern chiefly establishment. Apart from a desire to protect their own status, they had no interest in a further expansion of the Ewe population. After 1951, then, the environment in French Togoland was most unfavourable to the unification cause.

For our purposes, what is more significant is that the Ewe unificationists were also delivered a rebuff from within British Togoland. As early as 1943, a Togo Union had been formed to lobby the Resident Minister in West Africa about conditions in the Trust Territory. In 1947, a new Togoland Union (TU) was established in response to the growing debate over the fate of the Ewe and the two Togolands. Its stance was diametrically opposed to that of the AEC It advocated the reunification of the two Togolands, but strongly objected to any political arrangement that would include the Gold Coast Ewe. There were efforts to reconcile the AEC and the CUT with the TU on a number of occasions between 1948 and 1950, but these were not successful.[47] In 1950, the TU insisted that the AEC should be excluded from an enlarged Consultative Commission since its leaders were not natives of Togoland.[48] The TU even went as far as to negotiate a short-lived agreement with the PTP in May 1950, which committed both of these parties to a common front against 'Ewe Tribal conspiracies'.[49] Such behaviour earned the TU the accusation of treachery to the Ewe cause from no less a figure than Daniel Chapman.[50]

The simplest explanation for the attitude of the TU would lie in the apprehensions of the non-Ewe minorities. As early as 1948, the signatures of the chiefs of Buem, Likpe, Avatime and Santrokofi are to be found on TU documents.[51] However, Ewes were equally prominent in the party. The single most salient factor was the imprint of uneven development that had been left by the workings of the Mandate. Support for the TU arose not out of a sense of isolation from the Gold Coast, but from the very intimacy of contact. Significantly, discord first manifested itself openly in the institution which most symbolized the unity of the Ewe, namely the Ewe Presbyterian Church. In 1948, an attempt was made to unseat Reverend Christian Baëta from his position as Synod Clerk, on the grounds that he was channeling scholarships towards his fellow Anlo Ewes. At the same time, most Anlos and Pekis were voted out of office in the Ewe Presbyterian Teachers' Union.[52] Teachers from Togoland believed that postings and scholarships, which were necessary for people from the Territory to further their education outside, were being monopolized by people from the south. Gerald Awuma, who was especially active in the TU at this time, blamed his own dismissal from the Ho-Kpandu district education committee upon the machinations of the Gold Coast Ewe. His personal experiences reinforced his suspicion of a creeping southern invasion:

> "All the key positions in the Government, the Schools, Commerce, and even the Native Administration, are filled with adventurers from Gold Coast Eweland, who, in nearly all cases, are so overbearing and intriguing. Should the inborn Togolander then be judged unreasonable when he rightly concludes that the Gold Coast Government, the Missionary Societies and the Merchant Houses seem to have conspired to support the Gold Coast Ewes in their intrigues and trickery to set up a Totalitarian Tyranny in Togoland and dominate, supplant and oppress the Togolander in his own home?"[53]

The earliest official accounts were unanimous in the view that the TU represented a small number of teachers and that it possessed merely nuisance value. By contrast, the AEC was accredited with a genuine following. Even the Anglo-French Memorandum of 1947 acknowledged that the AEC petitions represented the views of the mass of the Ewe people.[54] This assessment was

rapidly discredited. In some areas, it was the entry of the youngmen into politics which appears to have altered the balance. This happened in the vicinity of Ho in 1950:

> "Asogli has always been a stronghold of the All Ewe Conference, and the majority of the chiefs and elders in the State give their full backing to this party. The young men of Dome on the other hand began to give active support to the Togo Union two years ago and now the whole of Ho excepting Bankoe is nearly 100% Togo Union... In addition to this the young men from Dome have been very active in gaining supporters from amongst the Asafo in the outlying Divisions and as a result many of the young men in all the Divisions are actively opposed to the political opinionsof their Chiefs and elders."[55]

Elsewhere, it was the conversion of the Ewe chiefs which brought communities into the TU fold, all but displacing the AEC from large areas of Togoland.

The success of the TU leaders lay in exploiting a range of political appeals. Amongst the most emotive was the memory of past Anlo treachery. In the eighteenth century, the Anlos had forged an alliance with Akwamu, both of which were client states of an ascendant Asante. The Akwamus had established an hegemony over the northern Ewe (or Krepi) chiefdoms and when Peki led them in a successful revolt between 1829 and 1834, the Anlos had come to the aid of their old ally.[56] Shortly thereafter, the Buems and their neighbours rose in revolt against Kwahu Dukoman, another client state of Asante. In 1869, the Asante, Anlos, Akwamus and Kwahu Dukomans joined forces in a bid to restore control over Krepi and Buem during a train of events which culminated in the British capture of Kumasi in 1874. The widespread devastation wrought by the Asante east of the Volta is remembered to this day. The participation of the Anlo Ewes in the 'unholy alliance' later provided fertile ground for TU activists. The Pekis may have been the heroes of the hour, but their subsequent claim to overlordship was resented.

Incidentally, the British had themselves dismissed the notion that the Ewe were a single people at the time they were seeking to justify the Milner-Simon

Agreement of 1919. This view was later invoked to ward off Ewe unificationist demands. In the definitive words of Captain Lilley:

> "The international boundary has in no wise divided the Ewe-speaking people as a tribe. Though the Ewe-speaking people may have originally been a connected tribe, they have never been such since the exodus from Nuatja [Notsie]. Since that time they have been independent clans."[57]

Historic animosities were reinforced by the high visibility of people from Anlo and Peki in the Trust Territory. Many educated Togolanders harboured a resentment against southerners, who were accused of poaching the few jobs that were available, a grievance that dated back to the partition of German Togoland. In 1922, there were complaints that Gold Coasters had been employed in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy at the expense of Togolanders, because of language considerations. In French Togoland, German-speaking clerks were similarly displaced by Francophone Africans from neighbouring Dahomey.[58] In each case, the malcontents gravitated towards the Bund der Deutschen Togolander, which alarmed the two administering powers by advocating the restoration of German rule. A new generation of school-leavers did not face the same linguistic barriers to employment, but the inadequate educational facilities in Togoland gave Gold Coast Ewes a head-start. This was true not only of the lower reaches of the bureaucracy, but also of employment with the firms. Southerners also controlled much of the retail trade and owned most of the transport in Togoland.[59] Finally, they accumulated a great deal of the wealth generated by the cocoa economy. Despite Article V of the Mandate, which prevented the alienation of land to non-natives of British Togoland,[60] the authorities were powerless to check the widespread sale of land in the forest areas north of Jasikan. Most of the cocoa farms were planted not by people from Buem, but by outsiders, many of whom migrated from French Togoland and Gold Coast Eweland. In 1931, there were 1,279 strangers living in Buem Division (out of a total population of 16,000): 710 came from elsewhere in the Ho District, 463 were Anlos and Pekis, and 106 came from west of the Volta.[61] In 1938, it was estimated that Peki farmers alone accounted for between 20% and 25% of land

purchases.[62] What most disturbed the local population is that the cocoa money was siphoned out of the community by migrant farmers who felt no ties of allegiance to Buem. Thus, whereas the period of the Mandate had witnessed greater prosperity, contrary to the negative picture painted by Kwaku, the fruits thereof were unevenly distributed.

2.2.3. '*Ablode*' Versus 'Cipipification'

After 1950, the TU was able to transcend narrow communalistic appeals. The shift was facilitated by a schism within the party, which precipitated the exit of some of the fiercest critics of the Gold Coast Ewe. The split was occasioned by the Gold Coast constitutional reforms that followed the publication of the Coussey Report. The Native Authority Ordinance of 1949 had created a Southern Togoland Council, along the lines of the Joint Provincial Council in the Colony, and this had already sent its first representative to the Legislative Council in February 1950. Under the new constitution, Southern Togoland could elect three members to the Legislative Assembly, two from rural constituencies and one from the Southern Togoland Council. The leadership of the Togoland unification movement were divided over what their response should be. The founders of the TU, notably Gerald Awuma and Kofi Dumoga welcomed representation as the surest means to guarantee the interests of the territory. Another group who, according to Dumoga had recently infiltrated the party, advocated a boycott of the political structures. S.G. Antor, in particular, argued that involvement in Gold Coast institutions would make it even more difficult for British Togoland to extricate itself and to reunify with French Togoland. In December 1950, the executive of the party withdrew recognition from Dumoga following his agreement to serve on a Working Committee of the Enlarged Anglo-French Consultative Commission. The final break came when Gerald Awuma, Joseph Kodzo and F.Y. Asare were duly elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1951. They were effectively expelled from the party and both Dumoga and Awuma alleged that their lives had been threatened.[63] The irony is that they entered the

ranks of the CPP at very time that their foes in the Anlo leadership were doing so.

Antor was now free to steer a different course. In an attempt to widen the appeal of the party, he toned down its 'youngmen' image and paid greater attention to the chiefs and the farmers. The appeal to traditional authority was a shrewd calculation since chiefly influence was considerable even if the institution was not as deeply rooted as in Ashanti and parts of the Northern Territories. In December 1950, the Togoland Congress (TC) was launched on a platform of non-participation in the Legislative Assembly. Antor claimed that the Congress had evolved out of the deliberations of the chiefs, who had grouped themselves into a Society of Natural Rulers and had then invited the TU, the Togoland United Nations Association, the Togoland Youth Association and the Togoland National Farmers Union (TNFU) to join them. British officials were, however, convinced that Antor had stage-managed the whole affair.[64]

A further realignment of political forces took place in January 1951 when, at a meeting held in Agome-Palimé, the TC and the CUT agreed to work together. Their compromise formula recognized the aspirations of the Gold Coast Ewe, but resolved that the first priority should be the reunification of the two Togolands.[65] For Ewe unificationists like Olympio this compromise was unavoidable because of the British refusal to discuss the future of Gold Coast Eweland. The linking of a reunified Togoland with the Gold Coast at a later date would fulfil unificationist objectives. For Antor and his colleagues, the first stop was the intended as the final destination, although they declared themselves willing to consider the possibility of a union with the Gold Coast at a later date. Commenting on this compromise a few years later, Coleman observed that:

> "... the alliance of the A.E.C., C.U.T., and the T.C. to fight for Togoland unification has indeed been a very strange one - the former using it as a means to achieve Ewe unification, among other things, and the latter as a means to prevent Ewe unification."[66]

Between 1950 and the plebiscite of 1956, the TC repeatedly accused the British of having cynically engineered the absorption of British Togoland. The creation of a new Trans-Volta Togoland Region, which fused Southern Togoland with Gold Coast Eweland, was not welcomed as a step towards Ewe unity, but seen as merely one more ruse to render integration irrevocable. There was undoubtedly some truth to this, as the secret record of British dealings at the United Nations make clear.[67] Antor distrusted Nkrumah and the CPP almost as much as the British officials. The CPP had been slow to take an interest in the Trust Territory. Although the party had been formed in 1949, as late as 1951 it had a membership of only 14 in the town of Ho.[68] As the Gold Coast progressed towards independence, however, Nkrumah feared that a failure to resolve the Togoland question might delay the final transfer of power. The CPP initially advocated a federal relationship with the Gold Coast, but as it gained confidence it began to press for the complete integration of the territory within a unitary state. The aspirations of the Ewe unificationists were to be met by the absorption of French Togoland at a later date. A number of individuals who had been active in the AEC, such as Daniel Chapman, accordingly shifted their allegiance to the CPP. Antor and his colleagues protested at CPP meddling in Togoland politics and accused the leadership of harbouring imperialist designs on the territory. Interestingly, Governor Charles Arden-Clarke concurred, merely adding that in his view imperialism was "not necessarily a bad thing".[69]

As the struggle for control of Southern Togoland unfolded, it became entangled with political developments in the Gold Coast proper. The formation of the NLM and the NPP in 1954 provided the unification movement with allies who shared a common distrust of Nkrumah.[70] The issue of cocoa prices was almost as emotive in parts of Togoland as it became in Asante. Antor complained that the Territory was subsidizing the Gold Coast through taxes levied by the Cocoa Marketing Board. Yet the TC and the TNFU did not campaign for a free market, as has often been alleged, but for the creation of a separate Togoland Produce Marketing Board.[71] This early endorsement of state interventionism is significant and needs

to be viewed in the light of two other considerations. The first was that the development of the Trust Territory had clearly lagged behind that of the southern Gold Coast. That much was admitted by Governor Alan Burns in 1942:

> "I have just returned from a hurried trip through Togoland where I was struck by how little had been done to develop the Mandated Territory. In the Gold Coast itself the roads are, generally speaking, very good: in Togoland they are very bad. In the Gold Coast telegraph and telephone communication is provided at every important centre: in Togoland no such facilities exist. In some cases even the work done by the Germans, has been allowed to deteriorate. Although there is nothing in writing on the subject, I understand that Hodson, fearing (before the present war) the possibility that the Mandated Territory would be given up, deliberately discouraged any expenditure on development and refused to approve of some much-needed works."[72]

By 1950, the situation had not noticeably improved. When citizens of Togoland visited the Gold Coast they could not fail to notice the disparities. Many Togolanders, like their counterparts in the Northern Territories,[73] regarded public spending as the most effective means to narrow the gap. Secondly, taxation of cocoa was less of an anathema since large parts of the territory did not produce cocoa, while in the forest belt many of the farms belonged to strangers. It seemed only fair that they should contribute towards development in the territory. It is also worth repeating that the leadership of the party was largely composed of a salariat whose aspirations might loosely be called 'petit bourgeois'. Antor himself had taught in Hohoe and in schools throughout the Gold Coast before entering politics.[74] Kodzo Ayeke had worked with the Customs Department and as a teacher. Their material interests and their world-views were not always those of the average peasant farmer. However, this did not prevent the TC from exploiting the price issue or from trying to mobilize rural support through the TNFU. As in Ashanti, Nkrumah was accused of bleeding the cocoa farmers for corrupt purposes.

The party remained deeply ambivalent on the issue of how the existing relationship with the Gold Coast ought to be amended and this became steadily more apparent as Ghanaian independence approached. The NLM leadership was

in favour of maximum devolution of power to the Regions, while the NPP favoured a measure of regional autonomy. The TC leaders were conscious that the achievement of unification with French Togoland had always been the raison d'être of their party. Moreover, this ideal still had a resonance amongst the generation that could remember the unity that prevailed in German times. Yet they were equally aware that many Togolanders had forged close ties with the Gold Coast, which made it unwise to insist too forcefully upon secession. The extent of confusion was exposed in 1954 when Antor was criticized for assuming his seat in the Legislative Assembly, thereby calling into question the separatist principles of the party.[75] Increasingly, the TC leadership looked to the federal formula as a means to reconcile continuance of the Gold Coast connection with Togoland unification. Thus, S.G. Antor, Kodzo Ayeke and Reverend F.R. Ametowobla affixed their signatures to the opposition Proposals For a Federal Constitution in 1955. The Proposals enumerated certain Federal responsibilities and reserved all other powers for the Regions. The document also proposed that Togoland receive 10% of cocoa revenue, as against 35% for Ashanti and 27.5% for the Northern Territories, which was more or less equal to her share of production.[76] In 1956, the TC found itself adopting contrary positions almost simultaneously. For the purposes of the plebiscite in May the party urged voters to choose separation from the Gold Coast, bringing the party into conflict with the NPP. But in the July elections, the TC rejoined the NPP in the opposition camp, and endorsed Kofi Busia as joint leader. Their objective in this instance was to capture a share of political power at the centre.

The CPP, which held most of the cards, did not have to engage in such political acrobatics. It openly acknowledged that Togoland had not received its fair share of resources in the past, but argued that neither outright separation nor federalism would help to correct the imbalance. That could only happen if there was a strong central government managed by a party that was in tune with the aspirations of all parts of the country. One of the ironies of dyarchy is that it was Nkrumah rather than the colonial administration that benefitted from the change

of accent to 'welfare and development' after the War. Nkrumah inherited the first colonial development plan, but the took most of the credit. The apparent liberality of the dyarchy constrasted with the extreme frugality of the inter-war years and contributed in no small measure to the creation of the Nkrumah myth. Striking a slightly less noble pose, Nkrumah could also promise tangible rewards in return for political support. In order to demonstrate good faith and to place the considerable Government reserves on display, Nkrumah made available a special grant of £1 million for development in Trans-Volta Togoland in 1953. This money was to be spent in co-operation with the Trans-Volta Togoland Council.[77] Nkrumah further promised that his Government would implement a series of important development projects, most notably the construction of a bridge over the Volta at Adomi and a trunk road linking Senchi with Bawku in the north.[78] These highly symbolic projects were supposed to cement the bonds of unity east and west of the Volta.

The TC accused Nkrumah of political chicanery and in 1953 claimed to have intercepted a 'Most Secret' document, in which the British and Nkrumah plotted to win over Togoland by showering it with development funds.[79] Whatever the authenticity of the document, the Nkrumah administration in practice made little effort to conceal its tactics. Its political message was blunt: whereas the unificationists could only complain about past neglect, the CPP was in a position to offer Togolanders an immediate and tangible improvement in living conditions. The CPP was also able to capitalize on the feelings of deprivation that ran deep in a number of the non-Ewe areas, where most of the cocoa was grown but where amenities were especially scarce. To that extent, the CPP picked up on the TU tradition. Finally, as the TC courted the chiefs, the CPP turned to the youth whose own aspirations were focussed on education and employment prospects then opening up in the Gold Coast.

When the parties met on the electoral battle-ground, their forces were evenly matched. In the 1954 contest, the CPP and the TC won three seats each in constituencies which lay wholly or partly within Southern Togoland.[80] Two years later, the tally was unchanged, although the CPP increased its share from 48.1% to 52.6% of the poll. Prior to that, the parties had campaigned for their preferred options in the 1956 plebiscite. On this occasion, the voters were asked to choose between union with the Gold Coast and separation from it pending the ultimate determination of the future of the Territory. On this occasion, the CPP was greatly assisted by the fact that the United Nations had decided not to count the votes of the Northern and Southern sections separately. The integration option received the assent of 79% of voters in the North. In the South, the separation option carried the day with 55% of the vote. When the totals of North and South were added together, however, the result was a clear majority of 58% in favour of integration.[81] (See Table 2.3)

In the next Chapter, where the focus narrows so as to take political events in Likpe into view, further consideration will be given to these results. The reactions of the leadership and the rank-and-file of the Togoland Congress to defeat in the plebiscite and incorporation into Ghana is addressed in Chapter Four.

Table 2.3:

The 1956 Plebiscite Results By District Council Area

Area	Integration	Separation	Total
(a) **Northern Togoland:**			
Mamprussi	17,870	3,429	21,299
Dagomba	28,083	6,549	34,632
Gonja	3,166	2,729	5,895
sub-total:	49,119	12,707	61,826
percentage:	79%	21%	100%
(b) **Southern Togoland:**			
Buem-Krachi	28,178	18,775	46,953
Kpandu	8,581	17,029	25,610
Ho	7,217	18,981	26,198
sub-total:	43,976	54,785	98,761
percentage:	45%	55%	99%
Grand Total:	93,095	67,492	160,787
Percentage:	58%	42%	100.00%

(Source: J.S. Coleman, "Togoland", pp.72-73).

2.3. Conclusion:

The phenomenon of the unification movement is considerably more complex than it at first appears. To explain it in terms of a deeply felt desire for reunion on the part of the Ewe people would be consistent with the public statements of figures such as Daniel Chapman and Sylvanus Olympio. But, while previous writers have acknowledged the problem, they have generally failed to explain why it was that so many Ewes spurned the appeals of the All-Ewe Conference. This is the conundrum that this Chapter has attempted to resolve. It has been argued that the ambiguities coursing through Togoland politics reflect the genuinely contradictory legacies of British administration. On the one hand, British Togoland was sucked into the economic orbit of the Gold Coast and swept up in the new political currents which animated the colony during the Depression years. On the other hand, as Kwaku has previously argued, the British were niggardly in their funding of economic development and social amenities. Educated Togolanders, and others who travelled west to find work, were constantly made aware that they were the poor relations. To add insult to injury, it was Gold Coasters (usually Ewes) who seemed to reap most of the benefits associated with the expansion of the Togoland cocoa industry. To paraphrase Gerald Awuma, the Togolanders were in danger of being supplanted in their own homes.

Although the dimensions of the problem were immediately obvious, there was more than one possible remedy. While Awuma, Asare and Dumoga were prepared to endorse closer integration as a means to level out the inequalities, which were after all related to the uncertain future of the Territory, there were others who regarded any relationship with the Gold Coast as potentially parasitic. On such a view, Togolanders might only experience a genuine improvement in living standards if they broke the cord that bound them to the

Gold Coast while there was still a chance. After 1954, as international support began to wane and as new allies appeared inside the Gold Coast, the Togoland Congress leadership began to concede the possibility of an ongoing relationship as long as it was on federal terms and was not at the expense of Togoland reunification. This was a significant concession and one which later made it difficult to re-activate secessionism.

Footnotes to Chapter Two:

1. The most convincing account of the Ewe and Togoland problems is that of Claude Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), chapters 2 and 3. More detailed studies are those of D.E.K. Amenumey, "A Political History of the Ewe Unification Problem", Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1972, now published as The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1989); and I.E. Aligwekwe, "The Ewe and Togoland Problem: A Case-Study in the Paradoxes and Problems of Political Transition in West Africa", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1960. See also J.S. Coleman, "Togoland", International Conciliation, DIX, September 1956; L. Adam, Het Eeenheidsstreven Der Ewe (Leiden: Afrika-Instituut, 1952) J-C. Pauvert, "L'Évolution Politique des Ewé", Cahiers d'Études Africaines, II, 1960; B.W. Hodder, "The Ewe Problem: A Reassessment", in C.A. Fisher (ed.) Essays in Political Geography, (London: Methuen, 1968). Two other studies which touch specifically on the Ewe are David Brown, "Politics in the Kpandu Area of Ghana, 1925-1969: A Case-Study of the Influence of Central Government and National Politics Upon Local Factional Competition", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham, 1977; and K. Kwaku, "The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: A Case-Study of the Volta Region (Ghana) Since 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975. A recent history, written in Ewe, which deals in part with the unification question is that of Osofo E.K. Paku, Togo Nutinya Tso 1482 Vasede 1980 (Lomé: Editions Haho, 1984).

2. The United Nations dimension is explored in detail in the works of Coleman, Amenumey and Aligwekwe, cited above.

3. The Northern Districts were Northern Mamprussi, Southern Mamprussi, Kusasi, East Gonja, East Dagomba and Krachi.

4. David Brown, "Anglo-German Rivalry and Krepi Politics, 1886-1894", Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, XV, 2, 1974, p.208. In the context of that article and the discussion here, Krepi refers to the Ewe areas north of and including Peki. In its more restricted usage it refers to Peki proper.

5. See Togoland, Foreign Office Handbook, No.117, January 1919, pp.22-23. See also, Martin Staniland, The Lions of Dagbon: Political Change in Northern Ghana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975), pp.66-74

6. Quoted in D.E.K. Amenumey, "The Pre-1947 Background to the Ewe Unification Question", Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, X, 1969, p.70.

7. On British objectives with respect to German territory, see Peter Yearwood, "Great Britain and The Repartition of Africa, 1914-19", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XVIII, 3, October 1990.

8. Octaviano Olympio, President of Committee on Behalf of Togoland Natives, to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, dated 12 December 1919, P.R.O., CO 724/1, "Official Correspondence". The National Congress of British West Africa invoked the right to national self-determination in support of the Ewe cause. See David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p.384.

9. On later boundary adjustments see R. Bagulo Bening, "The Ghana-Togo Frontier, 1914-1982", Afrika-Spektrum, XVIII, 2, 1983. This article essentially summarises the content of a single file at the Ghana National Archives. For the original material, see GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/199 "Togoland: Partition of Between British and France".

10. GNA (Ho), RAO/C2073, "Togoland: A History of the Tribal Divisions of the District of Misahuhe and of the Sub-Districts of Ho and Kpandu", compiled by R.S. Rattray, District Political Officer, undated.

11. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Togoland - Trade of", "Report on Conditions of Trade in Togoland" (Confidential), dated January 1923.

12. Donna J.E. Maier, "Slave Labor and Wage Labor in German Togo, 1885-1914", in Arthur Knoll and Lewis Gann (eds.), Germans in the Tropics: Essays in German Colonial History, (N.Y., Westport, London: Greenwood Press: 1987), p.77.

13. This is clear from a minute addressed to the Commissioner of the Eastern Province, dated 6 March 1922. See GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Area Togoland - Trade of".

14. M.B.K. Darkoh, "An Historical Geography of the Ho-Kpandu-Buem Area of the Volta Region of Ghana: 1884-1956", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Ghana, 1966, pp.83-84. On the German economic achievement more generally, see his "Togoland Under the Germans: Thirty Years of Economic Development (1884 to 1914)", in two Parts in Nigerian Geographical Journal, X, 2, 1967 and XI, 2, 1968. Also, Peter Buhler, "The Volta Region of Ghana: Economic Change in Togoland", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1975 (available as an Ann Arbor University Microfilm); and Arthur Knoll, Togo Under Imperial Germany, 1884-1914: A Case-Study in Colonial Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

15. This point was made by the French Commissioner. See within GNA (Accra) ADM 39/1/214 "Mandated Togoland - Trade of", enclosure entitled "The Economic Position of British Togoland", dated 1921.

16. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Togoland - Trade of", Major F.W.F. Jackson, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, to the Acting Colonial Secretary, Accra, 20 December 1921.

17. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Togoland - Trade of", Major F.W.F. Jackson, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, to the Acting Colonial Secretary, Accra, 9 June 1922,

18. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Togoland - Trade of". See "Report on Conditions of Trade in Togoland" (Confidential), dated January 1923.

19. Darkoh, "Historical Geography", p.143. See also GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/205, "Roads - Ho and Kpandu District"; ADM 39/1/215 "Ho-Adidome Road"; and ADM 39/1/220, "Ho-Senchi Road - Construction of".

20. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/229 "Togoland Roads, General", Major F.W.F. Jackson, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, to Record Officer, Ho, 13 October 1922.

21. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/214, "Mandated Togoland - Trade of". A. Durham Mackenzie, for Acting Comptroller of Customs, Accra, to Colonial Secretary, Accra, dated 27 January 1923; and Captain Lilley to Record Officer, Ho, dated 22 September 1921.

22. Kwaku, op. cit., p.105.

23. P.R.O., CO 96/691/6541, Comments of Acting Secretary for Native Affairs on a letter from the Governor of French Togoland, October 1929.

24. The following companies were listed as needing notification of the closure of the Wegbe-Atabu road in April 1929: F.& A. Swanzy; Millers Ltd.; African and Eastern Trading Corporation; H.B.W. Russell & Co. Ltd.; Crombie Steedman & Co.; W. Bartholomew & Co.; Commonwealth Trust Ltd.; Anglo-Guinea Produce Company Ltd.; CFAO; J.J. Fischer & Co.; Pickering and Berthoud Ltd.; G.B. Ollivant; Frames Agency; Union Trading Company; J. Schaad; John Walkden & Co.; Henry Werner; SCOA; and the Basel Mission Factory. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/205 "Roads - Ho and Kpandu District".

25. GNA (Ho), DA/D78, "Handing Over Report By Captain Lilley, O.B.E., District Commissioner, to D.N. Walker", 1938.

26. GNA (Accra) ADM 39/1/312, "Food Control", A.K. Dzodzomenyo, Agricultural Overseer, Ho to the District Commissioner, Ho, 25 July 1945.

27. Welch, op. cit., pp.48-50. For a more detailed account of the Church, see E.E. Grau, "The Evangelical Presbyterian Church (Ghana and Togo), 1914-1946: A Study in European Mission Relations Affecting the Beginnings of an Indigenous Church", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1964 (available on Ann Arbor University Microfilms).

28. Amenumey, "A Political History", p.75.

29. John Holt Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.825 file 536 (ii) "Gold Coast Cocoa Pool", report on the cocoa holdup from District Agent, Hohoe, dated 24 March 1938.

30. Coleman, op. cit., p.15.

31. There were 12,405 people from Togoland, many admittedly from the North, in the Gold Coast cocoa areas in 1931; Beverly Grier, "Cocoa, Class Formation and the State in Ghana", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Yale University 1979, p.123.

32. On the cocoa holdups, see R. Howard, "Differential Class Participation in an African Protest Movement: The Ghana Cocoa Boycott of 1937-38", The Canadian Journal of African Studies, X, 3, 1976; R. Southall, "Polarisation and Dependence in the Gold Coast Cocoa Trade, 1897-1938", Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, XVI, 1, 1975; and G.M. Austin, "Capitalists and Chiefs in the Cocoa Hold-ups in South Asante, 1927-1938", International Journal of African Historical Studies, XXI,1, 1988.

33. In 1933, the price for cocoa in Hohoe fell from 4s.9d. to 3s.6d., which was attributed to price rigging. Although there is a reference to a holdup in 1933 in the Togoland Annual Report for that year, I have no further details on this episode. On the 1937/38 holdup, see John Holt
Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.825 file 536 (ii) "Gold Coast Cocoa Pool", report on the cocoa holdup from District Agent, Hohoe, dated 24 March 1938.

34. Amenumey, "The Pre-1947 Background", pp.70-71. Also Amenumey, The Ewe Unification Movement, chapter 1.

35. Welch, op. cit., pp.65-66.

36. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Second Session, First Part, 20 November 1947 - 16 December 1947, p.324. After 1942, French West Africa switched its allegiance from Vichy to De Gaulle, but many wartime controls persisted.

37. Muchmore papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.414, Petition from the chiefs of Fiokpu to the Anglo-French Working Party on the Issue of a Conventional Zone, dated 9 October 1949.

38. One M.M. Apaloo, a trader, told the Joint Working Party on the Conventional Zone that it was the trading community which suffered from the frontier restrictions. Muchmore papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.414.

39. See "Anglo-French Working Party" (Principles of Operation), Muchmore papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.414.

40. See United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Second Session, First Part, 20 November to 16 December 1947 (Supplement), "Memorandum of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France on the Petition of the All-Ewe Conference to the United Nations", pp.25-36.

41. Notes on a meeting with Anlo chiefs and others, Keta, 1 November 1949. Muchmore papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. s.414,

42. Notes on a visit to Achimota to discuss Ewe affairs with Reverend Baeta, E. Amu and others on 25 October 1949. Muchmore papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS. Afr. s.414.

43. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/169, "Proceedings At First Session of Joint Council for Togoland Affairs", statements of Mr. Anonene,from Atakpame in French Togoland, and Mr. Sinclair, the representative of the Gold Coast Government, Fourth Sitting of Joint Council for Togoland Affairs, 8 August 1952.

44. United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952: Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Second Part, Supplement No. 2, p.47.

45. Speech by Sylvanus Olympio to the Trusteeship Council, 8 December 1947, in United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Second Session, First Part, November/December 1947, p.328.

46. The AEC was a front organization and never acted as a political party or contested elections. The CUT performed this function in French Togoland.

47. For the attempted reconciliations, see GNA (Ho), DA/D113/S.0155, "Togo Union", resolutions of a meeting between the TU, CUT and AEC held at Hohoe on 26 September 1948; GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/651, "Togoland Union and Togoland Association For the United Nations Association - Statement of Objectives and Reasons", minute dated 2 August 1950; and Welch, op. cit, p.89-90.

48. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/676, "Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland", "A Petition from the Togoland Union on the Enlarged Joint Anglo-French Consultative Commission for Togoland", undated (1950).

49. GNA (Ho), DA/D113/S.0155, "Togo Union", note of a convention between PTP and TU, dated 21 May 1950.

50. P.R.O., CO 96/809/31614, "Togoland Administration", extract from Political Intelligence Summary, Copy No.39, dated 9 February 1949,

51. GNA (Ho), DA/D113/S.0155, "Togo Union", resolutions of a meeting between the TU, CUT and AEC held at Hohoe on 26 September 1948.

52. Welch, op. cit., p.87.

53. GNA (Ho), DA/D.113/S.0155, "Togo Union", a letter from Gerald O. Awuma, c/o United Nations Association, London, to the Colonial Secretary, undated. On the personal complaints of Awuma, see Welch, op.cit., p.87; and United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Fourth Session, January/March 1949, pp.315-317.

54. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Second Session, First Part, 20 November to 16 December 1947 (Supplement), "Memorandum of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France on the Petition of the All-Ewe Conference to the United Nations", p.28.

55. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/456, "Handing Over Notes", Handing Over Notes for Ho Sub-District From C.M. Weatherburn, A.D.C. to A.V. Cameron, A.D.C., September 1950.

56. R.A. Kea, "Akwamu-Anlo Relations, c.1750-1813", Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol.X, 1969. On the depredations of the Akwamu, see Hans W. Debrunner, A Church Between Colonial Powers: A Study of the Church in Togo, (London: Luttersworth Press, 1965), chapter 2. On the Peki, see C.W. Welman, The Native States of the Gold Coast, 1: Peki, (London: Dawsons, 1969). See also C.M.K. Mamattah, The Ewes of West Africa: The Anlo-Ewes and Their Immediate Neighbours, (Keta: Volta Research Publications, undated), Volume I.

57. See the statement of Lilley to the 35th session of the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1938, in PRO file CO 96/746/31103.

58. Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Togo, (Metuchen, N.J. and London: Scarecrow Press, 1987), p.52; GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216, "Kpandu Native Affairs", Ho Native Scholars to Major Jackson, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, April 1922.

59. It was estimated in 1947 that there were 150 lorries operating regularly in Southern Togoland and that these mostly belonged to Gold Coasters. Colonial Office, Togoland Report for The Year 1947, pp.36, 48.

60. Article V stated that: "No native land may be transferred except between natives without the previous consent of the public authorities, and no real rights over native land in favour of non-natives may be created except with the same consent."

61. Colonial Office. Togoland Report for The Year 1937, p.60.

62. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/190 "Transfer of Native Lands", H.C. Ellershaw, District Commissioner, Kpandu to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, 6 January 1938.

63. Awuma claimed that an assassination squad had been formed to liquidate himself, Dumoga and F.Y. Asare. See G.O. Awuma, Ho to S.G. Antor at the United Nations, Lake Success, 5 June 1951. See also the complaints in the letter by Kofi Dumoga, Presbyterian School, Anfoega-Akukome, to G. Awuma, dated 25 May 1951. Both are contained in GNA (Accra) ADM 39/1/676, "Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland".

64. GNA (Ho), RAO/C705/TA24 "Congress of British Togoland", "Commentary on Mr Antor's Statement to the Trusteeship Council", undated. Antor himself claimed that he was not a member of the Togoland Union, but instead headed the Togoland Youth Association.

65. See the Resolution contained under Petition from the Togoland Union, dated 12 January 1951 (T/Pet.6/224 - T/Pet.7/181), United Nations Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Eighth Session, 1951 (Annexes), pp.105-106.

66. Coleman, op. cit., p.35.

67. The revealing disclosures are contained in P.R.O., CO 554/1032 "Togoland Administration".

68. Welch, op. cit., p.92.

69. Arden-Clarke described one meeting with the CPP Ministers in the following terms: "After listening to a diatribe about British imperialism, I suggested that in the case of Togoland there seemed to be quite a lot of Gold Coast imperialism and imperialism was not necessarily a bad thing! I am glad to say that Gold Coast imperialism has won the day and that British Togoland is now an integral part of independent Ghana." Quoted in Welch, ibid., p.117.

70. On politics in Ashanti and the Northern Territories at this time, see Jean-Marie Allman, "The National Liberation Movement and the Asante Struggle For Self-Determination, 1954-1957", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1987; and her article, "The Youngmen and The Porcupine: Class, Nationalism and Asante's Struggle For Self-Determination, 1954-57", Journal of African History, XXXI, 2, 1990; also Paul Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics of Regionalism in Northern Ghana (London: Longman, 1979).

71. The claim that farmers wanted a free market is made by Coleman, op. cit., p.36. For evidence to the contrary, see A.C. Russell, Secretary to the Governor, to General Secretary of Togoland National Farmers Union, Hohoe, 26 October 1954, GNA (Ho), DA/C.31/CG.47/SF1, "Cocoa Industry".

72. Alan Burns, Governor of the Gold Coast, to Mr. Dawe, Colonial Office, London, 6 December 1942, P.R.O., CO 96/776/31467 (Secret). Note the revealing minute attached: "So much for Mandates!" See also the statements made by Antor before the Trusteeship Council at the Seventh Session, 23rd Meeting, 10 July 1950, Official Records, pp.185-191.

73. The election manifestoes of the NPP consisted of very little more than demands for development spending in the North. See Ladouceur, op. cit., p.117.

74. C. Bartels (ed.), Ghana Who's Who, 1972-73, (Accra: Bartels Publications, 1972), p.323.

75. An item in the Spectator Daily, 22 July 1964, enclosed in GNA (Ho), RAO/C749/TA33 "Future of Togoland Under British Trusteeship".

76. Proposals For A Federal Constitution For An Independent Gold Coast and Togoland (Kumasi, 1955), p.12.

77. Coleman, op. cit., p.39.

78. Library of Congress, Africa Division, pamphlet entitled "Address by the Honourable the Prime Minister Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, to the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council at Ho on the 24th August, 1954."

79. See 'Most Secret' Politics in Togoland: The British Government's Attempt to Annex Togoland to the Gold Coast, (New York: Contemporary Press, undated). See also Welch, op. cit., pp.105-6.

80. The CPP won Akan-Krachi, Buem and Kpandu South. The TC won Ho West and Kpandu North. Reverend Ametowobla won Ho East as an independent, but was closely allied to the Congress.

81. On the conduct of the plebiscite, see GNA (Ho), files DA/D115-119.

MAP 2 : LIKPE AND ENVIRONS



Map Three: An Ethno-Linguistic Map of Ghana



Source: Kwamina Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana, p.16

Chapter Three:

"The Bakpele Are Not Ewe": The Invention of Tradition and The Politics of Unification in Likpe, 1945-1957

Having mapped out the contours of the unification debate on a large canvas, the focus now shifts to some of the finer local detail. This Chapter operates on two levels. Firstly, the object is to flesh out a number of the arguments that were advanced in the previous Chapter. In particular, I aim to show how the realities of integration, and British policy more generally, put pressure on the Bakpele to define themselves in relation to their Ewe neighbours. An analysis of politics within a minority community such as Likpe is a necessary corrective to the hitherto exclusive concern with the Ewe. At another level, the Chapter evaluates a specific contention advanced by J.S. Coleman with respect to the 1956 plebiscite, namely that the unification struggle was merely the aggregation of localized factional disputes. The implication is that Togolanders had not yet developed a consciousness that transcended the local community. In the case of Likpe, it will be argued, a broadening of horizons and the deepening of local divisions were in fact opposite sides of the same coin - one that was minted in the first instance by the Gold Coast administration.

3.1 Factionalism in Likpe

3.1.1. The Issue of Localism

In the numerous studies which have explored community politics in Africa, what has often been commented upon is the remarkable capacity of communal divisions to reproduce themselves in a slightly mutated form over time. The unexpected pace of decolonization typically required politicians to harness large, and often isolated rural populations, at a stroke. It is understandable, therefore,

that the first political parties latched themselves onto existing political collectivities, whose principal object was to prosecute rivalries at the local level. A bargain was often struck, according to which political leaders could call in pre-packaged blocs of voters, while local leaders were promised assistance in the pursuit of their objectives.[1] This model of centre-local politics has acquired wide currency and it is not therefore surprising to encounter it in studies of Togoland politics. Writing shortly after the 1956 plebiscite, J.S. Coleman expressed his doubts as to whether the poll really provided an accurate guide as to the state of public opinion. He noted that the plebiscite administrators studiously avoided interpreting the options to the voters. This allowed the politicians to concentrate upon matters not strictly connected with the plebiscite. When he examined the results more closely, Coleman found a distinctive pattern:

> "The predominance of local issues is ... suggested by the rather striking pattern of voting revealed by the plebiscite results. In 61 per cent of the 344 wards, which were the primary electoral units, voting tended to be overwhelmingly for or against integration. There were many instances, for example, where even within one Local Council Area, one ward voted overwhelmingly for union... and a contiguous ward voted overwhelmingly for separation... Thus it is possible to question the accuracy of the plebiscite results as a reflection of the will of the British Togolanders on the fundamental issue of union with the Gold Coast."[2]

David Brown has so far conducted the only detailed local study. Although he emphasizes the fluidity of factional alignments, and is not unmindful of the debate over the merits of unification, he nevertheless portrays the chieftaincy dispute in Kpandu as the primary filter through which Togoland affairs were sifted.[3] In a sense, there is nothing surprising in the discovery that local issues were salient; nor does that make Togoland unusual. But where civil society is well-developed, one would expect national politics to create new foci of political allegiance cutting across local divisions. It is important to probe this matter further since if Coleman was correct, the case that was made out in the previous Chapter may be beside the point.

The plebiscite results can, in fact, be read in a number of different ways. While the pattern identified by Coleman is clear enough, one should also note that there was more than a three to one ratio of votes cast in seven of the sixteen Local Council Areas: namely, Adaklu, Dutaso, Yingor, Anfoega, Gbi-Hohoe, Nkonya and Krachi. These clearly did represent concentrations of support for the Togoland Congress (TC) or the Convention People's Party (CPP), regardless of the local divisions that existed within these communities (and these were often quite substantial). There is, moreover, a discernible pattern to this distribution. Leaving aside Krachi, these were precisely the communities that had most resolutely resisted British administrative policy. Likpe was the one 'rebel' community that failed to rally decisively to one party or the other. The Bakpele villages pulled in opposite directions, yielding a configuration of results identical to that identified by Coleman (see Table 3.3 below). Yet, as will become clear, the political behaviour of the Bakpele in the period before 1957 owed relatively little to 'traditional' sources of cleavage.

Table 3.1:

Plebiscite Statistics For Southern Togoland By Local Council Area

Area	Union	Separation
Adaklu	185	1,861
Anyigbe	2,063	1,092
Asogli	1,586	4,049
Dutaso	1,720	6,405
Yingor	1,663	5,574
Ablode	1,287	2,828
Akpini	2,287	4,861
Anfoega	2,459	109
East Dain	2,001	5,560
Gbi-Hohoe	547	3,667
Biakoye	2,210	1,957
Buem	3,127	4,315
Likpe-Lolobi	1,027	2,114
Nkonya	3,511	591
Akan	8,299	6,837
Krachi	10,004	2,861
Total:	43,976	54,785

(Source: United Nations Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, pp.184-191)

3.1.2. The Discourse of Politics in Likpe

Like many other Ghanaian communities, Likpe has a tortuous history of factional conflict. Typically, divisions have remained dormant for years at a time, only to be rekindled by the death of a chief or an event of equal magnitude. In the intervening period, the dispute is kept in storage through conflicting interpretations of history that circulate within an oral medium as well being preserved in personal archives. British administrators were often baffled by both the intensity and longevity of seemingly unimportant disputes, without realizing that their predecessors had often helped to sow the seeds of discord. One exasperated District Commissioner summed it up when he commented of the Bakpele that

> "the majority of them are delightful people, but extremely obstinate."[4]

This is a sentiment that has been shared by administrators up to the present day.

There are two major categories of cleavage within Likpe. The first revolves around competing interpretations of what one might loosely call the 'Likpe constitution'. Like other peoples within the Central Togo cluster, the Bakpele consist of a group of 'original' inhabitants who amalgamated with later groups of settlers. The inhabitants of the modern villages of Todome and Bakwa claim to be autocthonous. Their foundation myths recount that they came out of the ground near their present location.[5] Most of the other villages are inhabited by people who claim to have migrated to their present site from Atebubu, in what is now the Brong-Ahafo Region. The traditions tell of how the settlers came upon the indigenes while searching for land and dependable water supplies. Both sides were apparently surprised to discover that they spoke a mutually intelligible language. The Bakwa/Todome people, who were vulnerable in spite of their mountain hide-out, reputedly welcomed the newcomers and offered them land. The two groups then agreed to merge, probably in the belief that there would be greater safety in numbers. They were later joined by smaller bands of migrants.

An agreement is said to have been hatched at the time which was supposed to govern the relationship between the different sections of the community. The Bakwa/Todome people allegedly agreed that the newcomers should provide a chief, and even presented them with a stool, but insisted that they should select a man in place of their leader, Clemefi, who was a woman. From that time, the head of the village of Mate was simultaneously the Okakple (or headchief) of all the Bakpele. The Todome chief, as the 'landowner', became the Mankrado of Likpe, with responsibility for the enstoolment of a new Okakple.[6]

These traditions are not necessarily accurate in historical detail. What is important is that they have provided the central frame of reference for local political actors. Two lines of division radiate from the 'Likpe constitution'. Under the first, the Bakwa/Todome people have periodically pitted themselves against the rest of Likpe. They have guarded their own distinct traditions and even to this day speak a slightly different version of the Sekpele language. The Bakwas have periodically disputed the right of Mate to monopolize the Paramouncy, alleging that the later arrivals were usurpers. Whereas this amounts to a repudiation of the 'constitution', successive Todome chiefs have sought to enlarge their prerogatives with reference to it. Thus, in the 1930s the Todomehene claimed that as Mankrado he was entitled not only to enstool a new Okakple, but also to select the candidate.[7]

Secondly, an incumbent Okakple has often diverged from the other chiefs on the correct interpretation of the 'constitution'. Whereas the Okakple has in recent times sought to assume the mantle of Paramount Chief in the Akan mould, the other chiefs have insisted that according to Likpe custom the headchief is merely first amongst equals. They have further asserted their right to discipline an Okakple who has overstepped the mark. The ultimate sanction of destoolment

has been deployed against an Okakple on three occasions this century. Traugott Soglo was destooled in 1914, following a series of altercations over his drinking habits. Interestingly, the final straw came after he insulted the other chiefs for having permitted their people to celebrate the expulsion of Germany from the territory. He was restored to office in 1919 and then destooled again in 1925. His brother suffered the same fate two years later.[8] Other destoolment actions have failed, usually because an incumbent Okakple has managed to tap other lines of division.

Each of the original Bakpele villages of Todome, Mate, Avedzeme and Bala, has also suffered from fierce clan rivalries, mostly to do with competition for chiefly office. Repeatedly, these disputes have resulted in schism and the formation of new villages. A precedent was established in the nineteenth century, when the Bakwa people broke away from Todome and founded a separate settlement.[9] German colonial rule unleashed new sources of friction, which led to this pattern being repeated. Thus, in Bala the leader of the village drumming group was introduced to the German Commissioner, Dr. Grüner, as the chief because the inhabitants were afraid to tell him that their stool was unoccupied. Osei duly received a helmet and a feather and these symbols of authority passed to his son. Some years later, the brother of the previous chief returned from the Gold Coast and laid claim to the stool. Captain Lilley adjudicated the dispute and decided in favour of the incumbent, since he was in possession of the appropriate symbols of office. The aggrieved supporters of the rival candidate seceded and set up a rival village at Kukurantumi in 1927.[10] The breakup of Avedzeme is a rather more complex affair. The Vute clan had already left to form a separate village in the 1880s and its chief had received a helmet and feather from the Germans. Later, however, the Vutes rejoined Avedzeme in order to alleviate the burden of compulsory labour, which the Germans levied equally on all the villages regardless of population. The Basio clan, which claims to be a distinct immigrant community, was also forced by the Germans to join that village. In 1939,

following a chieftaincy dispute in Avedzeme, the defeated clan together with the Vutes and Basios seceded and founded a new settlement at Agbozome. Shortly thereafter, another clan broke off from Avedzeme and established a third village at Koforidua.[11]

Finally, Mate itself has not been immune to such disputes. Oral traditions record that the stool was traditionally occupied by a candidate from either of two major clans in that town. During the period of German rule, the Kalelenti clan refused the stool three times because nobody wished to carry out the onerous duties then imposed on the chiefs. In 1932, when the stool became vacant, the Kalelentis demanded the right to provide the next Okakple but were opposed by the Kalegato clan, which insisted that they had forfeited any claim to the stool. The settlement made by District Commissioner Gutch re-affirmed the principle of rotation and acknowledged that it was the turn of the Kalelenti clan: Nana Boke Akototse III was duly enstooled the following year.[12] As we shall see in Chapter Four, this was not the end of the matter. By the 1940s, then, the four original settlements had spawned additional villages at Bakwa, Kukurantumi, Agbozome and Koforidua. Their formation appears to be unrelated to pressure on land, although that was to become one of the distinguishing features of Likpe in the second half of the century.

Secession did not signal the end of clan disputes, since the new villages had to find their niche in the 'traditional' hierarchy that was institutionalized by the British. In each case, the chief of the original village retained seniority, and the other chiefs were expected to approach the Okakple through him. The reluctance of rebel chiefs to subordinate themselves to their rivals has often strengthened the hand of an Okakple in his dealings with the 'wing' chiefs.

Figure 1:

The Political Structure of Likpe, as of 1945

Headchief:	Matehene (Okakple)			
Sub-chiefs:	Todome	Avedzeme	Bala	
Village chiefs:	Bakwa	Agbozome	Koforidua	Kukurantumi

3.1.3. The Schisms of the 1940s

At any one time, there has been a potential for conflict and the building of alliances along more than one axis. When Likpe entered a period of unprecedented political turmoil in the 1940s, however, a different set of allegiance was superimposed upon the existing grid. British efforts to rationalize their administrative structures provided the spark for the political conflagration that ensued. Although there was plenty of combustible material available within Likpe, the fuel for the conflict was imported from outside.

3.1.3.1. Boundaries and Identities

When one examines the oral traditions of the Bakpele, what is striking is a fundamental lack of consensus about some of the most basic elements of their pre-colonial history. This may reflect genuinely different origins and experiences. However, what counts as 'tradition' has very often been modified and indeed invented in order to service the concerns of the present.[13] A good example of this is the divergent accounts of the migration from Atebubu. According to one version, the Bakpele reached Notsie in what is now Togo and were involved in the flight of the Ewe from that town. According to the alternative version they turned westwards before they ever reached it. The Notsie episode is the central myth of common origin binding the Ewe people. Debrunner was of the opinion

that its occurrence in places like Likpe signalled a desire to associate with a dominant cultural tradition.[14] This is probably correct and yet there are curious fragments of evidence that do suggest historical links with the east. Bakpele names such as Oloto and Allo suggest a Lagos connection at some time.[15] Indeed, the stool name of Soglo which is borne by an Okakple of the Kalegato clan is quite clearly of Dahomean origin. When some Bakpele traditions claim descent from East Africa, an earlier migration from more easterly parts of West Africa may be implied.[16] Be that as it may, what is of interest here is the failure of any one version of the past to achieve hegemonic status. The historical confusion can in turn be traced to influences from the nineteenth century (and modified in the twentieth) which have pulled the Bakpele in opposite directions.

In the nineteenth century, the Bakpele undoubtedly had trading links to the south, but their more intimate political contacts were with Buem. Like the Buems, the Bakpele were probably paying tribute to the Kwahu Dukomans and they later joined their neighbours when they rose in revolt. When the Asante invaded in 1869, the Bakpele fled to Akposso. After the withdrawal of the Asante forces, the Bakpele returned and assisted the Buems in inflicting retribution on the Kwahus.[17] A more powerful Buem state emerged out of the conflict, but the precise nature of its relationship with Likpe is unclear. The oral traditions of the Akan section of Buem refer to the formation of a confederacy, headed by Nana Aburam of Buem-Borada, that embraced the Lefana, Akan, Akpafu, Lolobi, Bowiri and Likpe.[18] Although this is not directly confirmed by Likpe traditions, the latter do recall instances of close co-operation with Buem. If the Bakpele were ever subordinate to Buem, this ceased to pertain under German rule. In 1907, when Governor Zech detached five smaller communities from Buem, the Bakpele had already ceased to owe any allegiance to the Borada stool.[19] Links with Eweland were never as intimate. Before reaching their final place of settlement, the Likpe migrants had clashed with the Gbis over access to water resources in the Hohoe area. The Bakpele did join Peki and Kpandu forces on an expedition to

punish the Taviefes in 1888, but they never accepted the claims to overlordship that were made by Peki, or any other Ewe division for that matter.[20]

German colonial rule wrought a substantial transformation in these arrangements. Ewe cultural penetration was spearheaded by the Christian missions. The Basel Mission which was active in the early years withdrew from the Buem area rather than give in to official pressure to replace instruction in Twi and English with a combination of Ewe and German.[21] Both the Bremen Mission and the Catholics relied upon Ewe as a medium of instruction and the language of the liturgy. Debrunner has contrasted the receptivity of the minority enclaves interspersed amongst the Ewe, such as Avatime, with the negative reaction of the minorities further north - notably Buem, Bowiri, Akpafu, Santrokofi, Achlo and Likpe. The latter had all come to rely upon Twi as a lingua franca.[22]

Language may have constituted a barrier to conversion in the early days, but the Bakpele adapted more readily to the workings of the Churches than did the Buems. In 1898, the Okakple Nana Soglo I sent his two sons to be educated at the administrative headquarters at Misahöhe, from where they were referred to the mission station at Amedzofe. Martin Soglo remained there for some time, returning to Mate as a teacher in 1905.[23] Two years previously, the first school in Likpe had been opened by Peki teachers from the Bremen Mission. They were followed shortly thereafter by the Catholics. The competition for converts was often intense and continued after the expulsion of the German missionaries and the creation of the Ewe Presbyterian Church (E.P.C.) in 1927.

Significantly, the rival Churches found supporters amongst different factional constituencies. Thus, the clans who seceded to form Agbozome were Catholic, leaving Avedzeme as a Presbyterian enclave. Similarly, in Mate the Kalelentis embraced Catholicism, while the Kalegatos affiliated to the E.P.C.. The founding of new schools was always a valuable bargaining counter for the Churches. The schools played a most significant role in helping to spread the Ewe language. As a result, the Bakpele have acquired a particular facility with Ewe. A recent study observed that:

> "In the central area, which borders on the Ewe to the south but not the north, Ewe is learned mainly in school, except perhaps amongst the Likpe, some of whom learn it at home... It is thought to be spoken by around 75% among each of the Bowiri, Siwu, Sele and Likpe speaking communities, with the Likpe speaking it best."[24]

By contrast, Twi retains a firm hold amongst the Buem, where it is spoken by the Akan section as a first language and by the Lefana as a second language.

The appeal of Ewe also resided in the fact that it was the language of trade. The period of German colonial rule brought more sustained economic linkages with the Ewe areas to the immediate south and east. The Bakpele laboured on public works alongside their Ewe neighbours and were rewarded with an extension of the main Palimé-Kpandu road. However, most produce (consisting at first of rubber and palm-kernels) was headloaded to Palimé via Woate, Fodome, Gbledi, Kuma-Bala, Kuma-Tokpli and Kusuntu.[25] Palimé was also the distribution point for an expanding range of consumer goods. The economic consequences of the partition of Togoland have already been dealt with in the previous Chapter. The Bakpele were amongst the beneficiaries of the expansion in cocoa production referred to there. Unlike the Buems, they did not alienate their land to Ewe migrant farmers, except to a limited extent in the vicinity of Bakwa. There was little land to start with, apart from which many Bakpele were impressed, while working as farm labourers in the Gold Coast, with the wealth to be derived from

cocoa cultivation.[26] The pioneer farmers extended their cocoa holdings on an annual basis through to the 1950s, by which time land was starting to become a scarce resource. One survey conducted in the Jasikan area in 1959, which included neighbouring Lolobi, recorded complaints about a shortage of suitable land on which to plant cocoa. In subsequent years, researchers drew attention to a mounting food deficit which was related to the land squeeze.[26a] There are no figures for land utilization within Likpe itself. But the figures for cocoa purchases in the 1950s, before smuggling became entrenched, suggests that new plantings had begun to tail off by the 1950s (See Table 3.3). That would be compatible with the oral evidence to the effect that the Bakpele were experiencing difficulties in acquiring access to adequate as well as contiguous land on which to plant cocoa.

As in the Gold Coast, cocoa profoundly altered the economic landscape. During the 1930s, consumer goods from the expanding town of Hohoe filtered through to Likpe via Fodome. The Bakpele desired more direct contact and in 1939 they constructed their own road from Mate to Hohoe. Thereafter, the United Africa Company, G.B. Ollivant and a number of smaller traders opened branches of their stores in Mate itself.[27] As already indicated, Palimé was the principal victim of these developments. Brokers ceased purchasing cocoa for Palimé-based firms, while other Bakpele relied on the Hohoe market for the purchase of their wants.[28] This did not signal the demise of all cross-border exchange. On the contrary, trade was opened up between the Bakpele and their Danyi neighbours perhaps for the first time. Danyi farmers smuggled their cocoa into Mate and crossed back with consumer goods which were unavailable in French Togoland - a pattern that was later to be repeated in reverse.

Table 3.2:

Cocoa Purchases in Hohoe District (including Likpe), 1947-1957 (tons)

Year	Hohoe	Total for British Togoland	Hohoe as % of Total
1947/48	3,264	19,960	16.3%
1948/49	5,195	26,458	19.6%
1949/50	4,336	24,625	17.6%
1950/51	4,392	24,635	17.8%
1951/52	3,722	23,838	15.6%
1952/53	3,892	27,909	13.9%
1953/54	2,812	21,856	12.8%
1954/55	3,260	22,071	14.8%
1955/56	4,065	27,657	14.7%
1956/57	3,983	31,782	12.5%

(Source: Cocoa Marketing Board, Annual Report and Accounts, various editions)

The impact of these developments upon the consciousness of the Bakpele was contradictory. While Likpe revelled in its newfound prosperity, some people resented the economic and cultural ascendancy of the Ewe. These were matched by similar expressions of 'nativism' in Buem, which provided much of the early support for the Togo Union. The decision of the British authorities to press on with its amalgamation policy brought matters to a head.

3.1.3.2. The Amalgamation Question

The amalgamation policy originated in a desire to cede greater responsibility to the chiefs of Togoland. The underlying objective was to create viable Native Authorities, which would operate their own courts, raise their own taxes and manage their own services. In the straitened conditions of the 1930s, this would relieve some of the pressure from an overburdened colonial state. The policy was linked to ideas about indirect rule, although the latter was applied only haltingly in the Gold Coast. Southern Togoland posed special problems because, outside of Buem, there was no tradition of political centralization. An essential starting point was, therefore, to merge the 68 autonomous Division into more manageable units.[29] The Divisional chiefs in a given locality were to be encouraged to unite under the leadership of one of their number. Then a State Council would be established with powers to settle constitutional disputes, to make bye-laws and to preside over Treasuries funded by local rates.[30] Each Divisional chief would sit on the State Council, but would also retain his own court. The courts of the sub-Divisional chiefs would, however, be closed.[31] Although the local administration wanted swift results, the District Commissioners were expected to observe a set of additional guidelines. Amalgamation was to be voluntary and required the unanimous consent of all the sub-chiefs in a community. The States had to be large enough and geographically contiguous. Furthermore, amalgamation would only receive recognition if 'binding native customs' had been performed. Finally, the heads of the new States were to be treated as first amongst equals and would not therefore become full Paramount Chiefs. This meant that they would not be able to interfere in the internal affairs of the constituent Divisions.[32] The administration promised that greater efficiency would result from amalgamation and hailed the reform as an antidote to the German legacy of political fragmentation.

As early as 1924, the Ho District Commissioner had suggested postponing the recognition of new Headchiefs until the number of Divisions could be reduced.[33] But it was not until 1929 that the policy was pursued in earnest under the enthusiastic direction of Captain C.C. Lilley. By 1931, as many as 44 Divisions had been amalgamated into four new States. The least artificial of these was Buem, the core of which had survived German rule. The others were Awatime, consisting of ten Divisions; Akpini, led by the Kpandu chief and comprising 19 Divisions; and Asogli, which was centred on Ho and embraced 14 Divisions.[34] By the time of his retirement in 1938, Lilley was able to report that only 14 Divisions remained unaffiliated to a State.[35] Despite his confident pronouncements of success, there were already some rumblings of disquiet within the administration. It was admitted that the original guidelines had not been properly adhered to. Large numbers of people had been brought into States against their will, and the Headchiefs had begun to claim powers which they were never intended to possess. Shortly after the departure of Lilley, the Commissioner of the Eastern Province suggested that the implementation of the policy had in fact been misguided.[36]

The shortcomings of the amalgamated States were not lost on the Divisions which had resisted the blandishments of Captain Lilley. In 1944, there were ten of these: namely Nkonya, Santrokofi, Anfoega, Tsrukpe, Goviefe, Abutia, Adaklu, Gbi, Ve and Likpe.[37] In 1941, seven of them submitted a petition to the Governor, in which they pointed out that to join a State meant subordinating themselves to an alien Paramount Chief. Instead they wanted to set up a Joint Divisional Council in which the Presidency would rotate. There was some sympathy for their predicament, but the authorities withheld consent for fear of how the already amalgamated Divisions might react. In 1945, a petition along the same lines was despatched to Governor Burns, who voiced his concern that the mistakes of south-eastern Nigeria (where the warrant chiefs policy had culminated in the 1929 Aba riots) were being repeated in Togoland.[38] Once again

the unamalgamated Divisions were simply advised to attach themselves to an existing State. Nevertheless, a breach had been made in the administrative wall and this grew wider as the decade progressed.

3.1.3.3. The Eruption of the Atando Dispute

The Divisions which opposed amalgamation did so for different reasons. The Ewe communities of Gbi, Ve and Anfoega declined to come under the umbrella of Kpandu, which each of them regarded as a rival.[39] The Nkonya, on the other hand, refused to co-operate on the grounds that they were not Ewe but a Guan people. In Likpe, there was less resistance to the principle of amalgamation, but there was substantial disagreement when it came to choosing a home. Whereas one section of the community supported amalgamation with an Ewe State, another wished to rekindle old associations with Buem. In the early phases, the chiefs of Todome and Bakwa backed a plan to amalgamate under Gbi-Hohoe. When this was blocked by the other chiefs, the Todomehene persuaded the Okakple to throw in his lot with the Akpini State. This was vigorously opposed by the chiefs of Bakwa, Bala and Avedzeme and was ultimately scuppered by Lilley, who argued (erroneously) that the Bakpele were a 'Twi-speaking division' which belonged with Buem.[40] The chiefs of Todome and Bakwa, posing as the defenders of Likpe autonomy, successfully resisted any move in that direction. The stalemate continued into the 1940s, when the Okakple Boke Akototse III revived the idea of some form of association with Gbi. The greater receptivity of the authorities provoked vigorous complaints from Nana Agya Mensah II, the dynamic young chief of Avedzeme. When the Assistant D.C. held a meeting in 1947 to discuss the question, it was Agya Mensah who spoke most forcefully against union with Gbi:

> "The Sub-Chief was most vehement in his opposition to amalgamation with Gbi. He cited the old Likpe legend of atrocity committed by the Pekipons (ie. Gbis) on a Likpe woman some seventy years ago. It is interesting to record that the recounting of this tale drew sympathetic murmurs even from the Head Chief's party. He went on to say that the Likpes and Buems were brothers, that the Likpe Division should amalgamate with Buem and that the Head Chief was courting disaster within the Division by his present attitude."[41]

The debate between Agya Mensah and Nana Akototse illustrates the very different constructions that could be placed on the Bakpele past. Agya Mensah invoked a longstanding distrust of Hohoe, which was compounded by jealousy at the newfound prosperity of that town. He also reminded the Bakpele of their historical associations with Buem. Nana Akototse, on the other hand, argued that union with Gbi made more sense because of growing commercial contacts and the fact that the Bakpele were proficient in the Ewe language.[42] The rest of Likpe was forced to decide between these positions, each of which contained an element of truth. The D.C. himself believed that the historical evidence favoured Agya Mensah:

> "The original Likpes came from Atebubu, Gold Coast, crossed to Nuatja, and returned to their present area. Association with the Buems has been long and intimate. It is clear that the Likpes have much greater affinities, racially and linguistically with the Buems than the Gbis."[43]

His superiors, however, concluded that the weight of numbers favoured Nana Akototse. While Agya Mensah could only claim the support of Agbozome, the chiefs of Mate, Bakwa, Todome, Koforidua and Kukurantumi were all prepared to back the Okakple.[44] Abandoning their earlier insistence on full amalgamation, the authorities agreed to the creation of an Atando Native Authority embracing Likpe, Ve and Gbi, in 1949. The presidency of the Atando N.A. was to rotate between the three Headchiefs and there was to be no State Council. But the N.A. would be expected to raise its own finances through a levy imposed on its citizens.

No sooner had the Atando N.A. been inaugurated than Agya Mensah formed a Likpe Grand Council to co-ordinate resistance to the new arrangements. He then set about widening his base of support. The imposition of local taxation was an obvious issue that lent itself to political mobilization. The leaders of the Grand Council claimed that taxation heralded a return to the depredations suffered under German rule and that the revenue would benefit Hohoe rather than Likpe. The prosperity of Hohoe was attributed to its parasitic relationship with Likpe and other cocoa growing communities. Amongst the specific grievances that were listed was the failure of the Gbis to contribute anything towards the construction of roads leading into that town:

> These Gbis opposed very strongly to the opening [sic] of any motor roads from Likpe to Hohoe ie. the Likpes were forced to stop with the Likpe-Hohoe road via Bakwa at the outskirts of the town of Hohoe. Again the Ayoma-Hohoe road via Likpe-Kukurantumi was to be constructed by the towns that lie on the road without any assistance from the Gbis. The people of Likpe solely had to be responsible for the Hohoe-Likpe road via Likpe until as recently as 1949 when the Government took it up."[45]

It is significant that Agya Mensah also began to phrase his objections in the language of ethnicity. Borrowing a leaf from Captain Lilley's book, he asserted that the Bakpele were essentially an Akan people. The Bakpele had to resist the temptation to assimilate with the numerically and economically dominant Ewe, with whom they had little in common. His attack is worth quoting at length, if only for its hyperbole:

> "The people of Likpe are from time immemorial traditionally and historically an Akan tribe which was once part and parcel of the Ashanti kingdom and still retains intact customs, tradition, chieftaincy, constitutional practices, language etc., of the Akans of the Ashanti to this day and which are inimically and diametrically opposed to those of the Ewes... Among the people of Likpe [and] the Ewes the only Uniformity that exists is the accident of colour. The dissimilarity is as great as that which exists between a Greek and a Swede or a Bulgarian to a Dutchman or an Ashanti to a Hawsa [sic] or a Fanti to Ewe man."[46]

Agya Mensah and the Okakple fought their battle on several levels. On the symbolic plane, they adopted different chieftaincy titles. While the Okakple was content to refer to himself as *Togbe* in the Ewe manner, the Avedzeme chief

insisted on the Akan variant of *Nana*. The Okakple knew that the authorities would have to back him and adopted an intransigent stance in the belief that rest of Likpe would fall into line. Agya Mensah, on the other hand, exploited the idiom of legitimate resistance, accusing Akototse of behaving in a manner that was autocratic and alien to Bakpele tradition. Evidence of their efforts to mine the rich seam of factionalism can also be found in the alliances that were forged. Since the Bala chief supported Akototse, it was easier for Agya Mensah to prise Kukurantumi away from loyalty to the Okakple. The Agbozome chief rallied to Akototse, but there were clan divisions within the village which Agya Mensah could exploit to his own advantage.

The authorities did throw their weight behind Nana Akototse, albeit reluctantly.[47] Nevertheless, the Grand Council succeeded in disrupting the workings of the Atando N.A. through a campaign of non-payment of taxes and more direct assaults on the loyalist chiefs. By early 1950, Nana Sekyere I of Agbozome and Nana E.Y. Amoah IV of Bakwa had been forced to flee their villages, and Nana Komla Dihie of Todome was precariously balanced.[48] All three lost face for having endorsed the Atando scheme. In April, Grand Council supporters marched on Mate with the intention of destooling Nana Akototse himself, but were turned back by a detachment of Police.[49] Nana Agya Mensah demonstrated his cunning by seeking to enstool someone from Bakwa as the new Okakple, thus exploiting an old source of grievance. At the time, Mate people were subjected to physical assault and a blockade was imposed on the northern approaches to the town.[50]

The authorities, acknowledging the trouble that Agya Mensah could foment, decided to make an example of him. He was arrested and prosecuted on charges of undermining the lawful standing of the Native Authority. To their embarrassment, the case reached the West African Court of Appeal, where it was

dismissed. Agya Mensah emerged from jail with the status of a hero and more pugnacious than ever. The Grand Council similarly played on the treatment that was meted out to Nana Agyeman I of Kukurantumi. He had been assaulted by the Native Authority Police in February 1951, while resisting arrest on charges akin to those of Agya Mensah.[51] Gradually, the authorities came to the conclusion that initial doubts about the wisdom of including Likpe in Atando had been well-founded. They therefore looked to the Coussey proposals as an excuse to abort the experiment. When Agya Mensah petitioned the Trusteeship Council, he was informed that Likpe would almost certainly be united with Buem, Krachi, Nkonya and Santrokofi in a new District Council. The Likpe Grand Council had, it seemed, triumphed over both Nana Akototse and the British.

For a time, it appeared that the union of Likpe, Gbi and Ve might survive in the form of a Local Council attached to a Northern District Council. However, a proposal along these lines from the Atando N.A. provoked strong opposition from the minority communities north of Hohoe. Their case echoed that of the Grand Council:

> "We have no grudge whatsoever against the Ewes as a race. We, however, feel correctly that our identity as an ethnic group should ever be preserved and not confused. We deplore that paragraph in the Joint Anglo-French Memorandum... which described us as 'a few lesser peoples (the Buems, Likpes, Santrokofis, Akpafus, Bowiris and Nkonyas of British Togoland and Akpossos of French Togoland) who are not Ewes but whose interests are so confused with those of the latter that they cannot be excluded from consideration from the Ewe problem.' This statement clearly denies our identity as a race and this loss of identity has cost us dearly in matters of educational Scholarship, where because we are regarded as Ewes, whatever Scholarship is granted to Ewes is assumed to benefit us equally."[52]

While the Togoland Congress was moderating its hostile stance towards the Gold Coast Ewe, the minority communities were becoming more conscious of their relative deprivation vis-a-vis the Ewe as a whole. The local government reforms that followed the Coussey Report enshrined ethnic criteria in the new

administrative structures. The Atando N.A. was dissolved. While Gbi received its own Local Council under the Kpandu District Council, Likpe and Lolobi were fused to create a new Local Council attached to the Buem-Krachi District.

The only major issue which remained to be resolved was the fate of the chiefs of Bakwa, Todome and Agbozome. Although the Grand Council dropped its charges against Nana Akototse, it insisted that the destoolment proceedings against the other chiefs be recognized. In 1955 the authorities agreed to establish a Commission of Enquiry. During the proceedings, Nana Amoah IV of Bakwa announced that he was no longer contesting his destoolment, but the Todome and Agbozome chiefs were finally cleared of the charges levelled against them.[53] Here ended the Atando affair. In seeking to interpret its significance, one is bound to ask whether it was simply a manifestation of deeper factional currents in Likpe. Certainly Agya Mensah played the factional card when it suited him, but he met with only partial success. Most of the chiefs remained loyal to the Okakple, which is why three of them had to be removed. Agya Mensah had to steer his way around clan rivalries in Bakwa, Todome and especially Agbozome if his coup was to have any chance of success. Similarly, all the clans in Mate were solidly behind Nana Akototse. But most importantly, Agya Mensah never lost sight of what the dispute was really about: that is, equipping the Bakpele with an identity that was meaningful in the changed circumstances of the 1940s. The growth of new patterns of ethnic alignment in the colonial period is well attested to in research covering diverse parts of he continent.[54] Although British Togoland was not a colony, many of the same influences can be identified: especially commerce and the Churches which privileged one language, Ewe, at the expense of the rest; and new boundaries within which communities competed for attention. Although Agya Mensah invoked an Akan heritage that was deeply rooted in history, this was little more than an audacious fabrication. that only had an appeal against the backdrop of integration with the Gold Coast.

3.2. Likpe and The Politics of Togoland Unification

3.2.1. Atando and The Surfacing of Party Divisions

There was some chronological overlap between the Atando affair and the first stirrings of party politics in Likpe. By 1949, Nana Akototse was already active in the Togoland unification movement, while interviews would suggest that the CPP first surfaced in 1950.[55] In time, the Atando Native Authority came to be regarded by the British administration as a key unification stronghold. In 1951, the credentials of S.G. Antor were dismissed in the following terms:

> "Mr. Antor represents nothing but a handful of political adventurers in the town of Borada and the Atando Native Authority area."[56]

Within Likpe, it was Mate and Bala which provided the most consistent support for the TC after 1951. On the other side, the Grand Council citadels of Avedzeme, Kukurantumi, Bakwa and Agbozome gave their enthusiastic backing to the CPP. The leading party stalwart in Likpe was none other than Nana Agya Mensah who, like Nkrumah, had emerged from prison triumphant over the British. In January 1954, Agya Mensah led a delegation to F.Y. Asare, then Ministerial Secretary for Local Government and Housing and Member of Parliament for Buem. The object was to persuade Asare to support the enstoolment of the Grand Council nominees in Agbozome and Bakwa, and to secure recognition of one Nicholas Soglo as Mate chief.[57] The fact that Agya Mensah and the others were campaigning for the re-election of Asare facilitated such an approach, although Asare himself had not the weight to pull off such a result. Later, when the 1956 plebiscite took place, Likpe divided down the middle, as demonstrated in Table 3.3. The pattern of results is broadly consistent with the divisions created by the Atando affair and raises the question of whether there was a transfer of loyalties from one theatre of competition to the other.[58]

Table 3.3:

Voting in the Likpe-Lolobi Council Area in the 1956 Plebiscite

Ward	Union	Separation
Lolobi Kumasi	83	599
Lolobi Ashiambi	34	309
Likpe Mate	49	532
Likpe Bala	37	280
Likpe Kukurantumi	354	14
Likpe Todome }		
Likpe Bakwa }	304	188
Likpe Avedzeme}		
Likpe Agbozome }	166	192
Likpe Koforidua }		
Total:	1,027	2,114

(Source: United Nations Trusteeship Council. Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, p.189)

This question demands two answers. The first is that while there was indeed a spillover from one arena to the other, this was initially because the Atando and unification issues raised the same bone of contention, namely the relationship between the Bakpele and their Ewe neighbours. The major protagonists were already involved in territorial politics before the Atando dispute reached a

crescendo. Agya Mensah recalls that he took an early interest in Gold Coast politics. He was first of all a member of the United Gold Coast Convention in Accra and then joined the CPP when it broke away in 1949.[59] Equally, Nana Akototse had been involved in the Togoland unification movement from the early stages. In 1950, he was a signatory to the Natural Rulers resolutions which signalled the birth of the TC as a political party.[60] It is striking that neither Nana Agya Mensah nor Nana Akototse appear to have invoked party support during the time that the Atando contest was at its most intense. It was only after the Native Authority had been dissolved that Agya Mensah made his approach to F.Y. Asare.

As has already been seen, Agya Mensah objected to the Atando N.A. because he claimed that it placed the Bakpele in a compromising position with respect to Hohoe. Equally he felt that a united Togoland would merely entrench Ewe hegemony, whereas the latter would constitute just a minority within a greater Gold Coast. Conversely, Nana Akototse approached Atando and the unification questions from the same basic assumption that the relationship between the Bakpele and the Ewe was symbiotic. His involvement within the Native Authority, of which he was twice the President, reinforced this perception. In Hohoe he came into contact with leading unificationists, such as S.G. Antor and A.K. Senoo who especially valued his support at a time when many of the chiefs were still wavering. It was Nana Sekyere who helped to make the alliance a lasting one. His membership of the Southern Togoland Council since 1949 is proof that he too exhibited an early interest in the politics of the Trust Territory. Forced to flee from Agbozome as a consequence of the Atando affair, he settled in Hohoe and married the daughter of Togbe Gabusu, the Gbi Headchief. The latter was greatly influenced by Senoo and Antor, who hailed from Hohoe and Logba respectively. Nana Sekyere came to occupy a prominent position in the TC front line, serving as both the Vice-Chairman and Vice-President of the party.[61] Whereas other minority communities defected to the CPP in the 1950s, the Atando connection cemented a loyal band of unificationists within Likpe.

Secondly, while ethnicity was an important catalyst, it was rapidly transcended by other considerations as the debate over the future of Togoland opened up. The CPP captured the imagination of the younger and more educated sections of the community who saw their own class aspirations mirrored within the party. A surprising number of Bakpele were either ex-servicemen or had lived and worked in the Gold Coast, which meant that they tended to keen to abreast of current events. The populist image of the CPP was deeply seductive, but support for integration was also based on a shrewd appreciation of where the best interests of the territory lay. The Gold Coast was more richly endowed than Togoland, while French Togoland appeared foreign and somewhat provincial. Although Agya Mensah was a chief, the breadth of his horizons was typical of his generation. At least one District Commissioner was impressed by the figure he cut:

> "This individual is an educated young man and frequent visitor to Accra, who quoted at length from the Coussey Report and Abraham Lincoln."[62]

The most influential element within the TC was the collection of so-called 'German scholars', who were an identifiable element in most communities in Togoland. These were older men who nurtured some memories of German rule and had often supported the Togo Bund in the 1930s. Some of the TC activists had even been interned for their pro-German sympathies during the Second World War. Their assessment of British rule was generally unflattering, although they rated the French even lower down the evolutionary scale of rulers - an interesting inversion of colonially inspired racism. Their goal was to reconstruct the golden age of a united Togoland as it had existed in German times.

The balance of influence between the youngmen and the scholars varied from one village to another, tilting the political scale in one direction or the other. In

the words of Nana Soglo Allo III:

> "The old German educated people were *Ablode* [supporters of unification]. Mate had many of these people and so was strongly Ablode unlike Kukurantumi, Bakwa and Avedzeme."[63]

Frank Tsaku, the most committed CPP supporter in Hohoe, made a similar observation about that town.[64] Where the youngmen were preponderant, the CPP performed most successfully. Not surprisingly, these tended to be the same villages where the chiefs had been weakened by destoolment actions. Yet there was inevitably some reshuffling of political alliances following the Atando saga. Some older men, who had endorsed the Grand Council campaign could not bring themselves to rally behind the CPP. Conversely, there were youngmen in Mate and Bala who subscribed to the goal of integration with the Gold Coast. On the whole, realignment in the mid-1950s tended in favour of the TC. Whereas Nana Akototse was in a minority over Atando, the TC won the upperhand in Likpe as a whole. Todome, which had previously expelled its chief, was one village where the TC was able to reverse the flow. The party fought to ward off the opposite scenario in Mate. There Nicholas and Victor Soglo (later Nana Soglo Allo II and III respectively) clashed with their father and other senior members of their clan, who were committed unificationists.[65] Mensah Lemboe of the rival Kalelenti clan, who was destined to become one of the greatest foes of Nana Soglo Allo III, was drawn into the ranks of the CPP alongside the brothers and became one of the most articulate advocates of the CPP cause.

3.2.2. The Levels of Political Debate

It remains to comment upon the mechanisms through which, and also the enthusiasm with which, ordinary Bakpele were drawn into the political fray. The tempo of Togoland politics was sustained at a consistently high level as a consequence of successive elections (in 1954 and in 1956) and the periodic tours of the United Nations Visiting Missions. These ensured that territorial politics never went off the boil and regularly infiltrated the local arena. The political rally

was the most effective medium of political communication: it provided good entertainment and an adept speaker could use the opportunity to draw subtle links between the concerns of the community and the 'unification versus integration' issue. Those whose sympathies lay with the TC were fortunate in that Hohoe, an ideal location for public meetings, was within comparatively easy travelling distance. The CPP was unable to hold its rallies in Hohoe without incurring the wrath of the chief and elders and even running the risk of physical injury.[66] The party faithful therefore needed to travel further afield, to Jasikan or Kpandu, in order to satisfy their diet of politics. On the other hand, the CPP was better funded and generally better organized. Consequently, it could lay on vehicles and travelling speakers, who brought the CPP message direct to the villages. On one occasion in the early 1950s, Kwame Nkrumah spoke at a rally in Bakwa, a performance which President Hilla Limann was to repeat three decades later .

It would have been surprising if the Bakpele had completely compartmentalized local issues from Togoland affairs. But what is noteworthy is the extent to which the messages disseminated by the party machines were received, reproduced and embellished by activists at the village level. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 give the reasons why respondents said they supported either unification or integration. Ethnic considerations were accorded a distinctly limited significance. This is partly because ethnicity ceased to provide a useful guide to political action. Whereas Nana Agya Mensah was suspicious of things Ewe, by the mid-1950s. he belonged to a party which had a significant Ewe following and which was engaged in a bitter struggle with Ashanti sub-nationalism. If Nana Agya Mensah and others were disorientated, they did not let it show. Instead, they restored the ethnic card to the pack and concentrated on the benefits that they believed would flow from full political integration. This illustrates the rapidity with which the political arena was expanding at this time.

Most of those who backed the reunification option referred to the historical fact that the Togolands had previously comprised a single territorial unit. There was a curious *non sequitur* in this line of reasoning, but it was one that was shared by the party leadership which never explained why it was so important to reconstruct a territory which Europeans had invented which had only existed for a period of some thirty years. A number of respondents also recalled the apprehension that if British Togoland had been integrated with the Gold Coast, the French would have had an excuse to absorb their section of Togoland into the Empire.[67] This echoed warnings issued by Antor and the leadership of the party. The TC apparently had less success with the argument that, since Togoland had hitherto suffered from its relationship with the colony, there would be advantages to a looser relationship in future. The CPP activists in Likpe merely replied that since French Togoland was an impoverished territory, the wealthier British section would end up subsidizing its development. On the other hand, if they opted for integration, Togolanders could legitimately claim a share of the substantial resources at the disposal of the CPP administration in Accra. The Bakpele could also have their cake and eat it, since the French Togolanders might be persuaded to join the fold at a later date.

The CPP made important political capital out of its professed commitment to economic development and social welfare. The Bakpele were especially susceptible because, like many of the minorities, they had been doubly disadvantaged: first by being part of Togoland and then by their reluctance to accept the terms of amalgamation. On the first score, it was the Bakpele rather than the authorities who had constructed the road between west Likpe and Hohoe. In the mid-1940s, Nana Akototse had tried to build another road across the mountain to Danyi, but had to abandon the scheme because the administration would not help with the rock-blasting that was required. On the second score, the authorities had decided on a punitive approach. The

unamalgamated Divisions had been denied the right to establish their own Treasuries or to raise local taxes, imposing narrow limits on their capacity for self-help.[68] This briefly changed when Likpe joined Atando, but the Grand Council campaign against taxation hardened the attitude of the authorities once more. At the end of 1949 when a teacher petitioned the District Commissioner about the state of the roads in the area, he received the following terse reply:

> "The first question which arises is what are the Likpe people prepared to do to help themselves? Do they pay their taxes to their Native Authority? If so, have they approached their Native Authority for assistance? If the Native Authority can give them a grant will they turn out and give a hand to make the money go further? Government cannot do everything. It has this year taken over the Likpe-Mate road. How can Government control the weather?"[69]

Nana Agya Mensah may also have been correct to argue that the principal beneficiary of the Atando setup was not Likpe but Hohoe. By 1951, Hohoe could boast a water supply, a new hospital and St. Francis Teachers Training College.[70] Likpe had little to show for its involvement, apart from a Government agreement to maintain the Hohoe road.

Those communities which had held out longest against the amalgamation policy were conscious that they had been excluded from many of the fruits of post-war development. The CPP exploited this grievance both by playing the minorities off against the Ewe majority (where appropriate) and by promising a substantial injection of funds into those communities that rallied to the party flag. This explains why most of the 'rebel' communities delivered their votes to Nkrumah en masse. This aspect of the political equation has hitherto received little attention.

The contrasting experiences of Anfoega and Hohoe illustrated the lasting significance of the choices that were made. Like Nkonya, Anfoega converted to the CPP at an early date and was handsomely rewarded.[71] Hohoe remained loyal to Antor and suffered the consequences. It never became the Regional

capital, although it was the logical choice for commercial and geographical reasons. In the words of Kwaku:

> "By 1960, Anfoega had a Teacher Training College, a government supported Church hospital, a secondary school, local council offices, a tarred main street, post office and a police station... The roads leading into Hohoe were among the worst in the Region. The stretch from Golokwati to Hohoe was so gutted and dusty that the dust was popularly referred to as *'Antor atama'* (Antor's snuff)."[72]

Naturally, the CPP urged the Bakpele to follow the precedent of Anfoega and Nkonya rather than Hohoe.

Within Likpe itself amenities were channelled almost exclusively towards CPP villages. When Nkrumah visited Likpe, he promised Bakwa the money for a health centre, which would have been more conveniently sited in Mate. The most bizarre use of patronage was the tarring of the road that from one end of Kukurantumi to the other. As Table 3.5 would suggest, most people who supported the CPP did so because they believed that benefits would flow from closer association with the Gold Coast. This was not merely a question of access to amenities. Many of the younger Bakpele aspired to some type of paid employment, which they were unlikely to gain under conditions of reunification, since they did not speak French. A buoyant Gold Coast, on the other hand, held out interesting prospects. Yet the Bakpele were not entirely mercenary in their approach to politics. Many felt a genuine attachment towards the Gold Coast which was every bit as real as the Togoland nationalism of the 'German scholars'. It is significant that so many respondents mentioned the achievement of independence as the factor that led them into the integrationist camp.

Table 3.4:

Responses to the Question: "If You Supported Unification, Why Did You Do So?"

Reasons	Number	Percentage
1. British and French Togoland used to be one	34	85.0
2. Similarity between the Bakpele and the Ewe	0	0.0
3. Difficulties created by the frontier	3	7.5
4. Lack of development/exploitation of Togoland	2	5.0
5. Other	1	2.5
Total:	40	100.0%

(Survey of Likpe, 1986)

Table 3.5:

Responses to the Question: "If You Supported Integration With the Gold Coast, Why Did You Do So?"

Reasons	Number	Percentage
1. The Bakpele are not Ewe	1	1.0
2. French Togoland was a poor territory	4	3.9
3. Integration with Gold Coast would enhance development	52	50.5
4. Would achieve independence more quickly	45	43.7
5. Other	1	1.0
Total:	103	100.1

(Survey of Likpe, 1986)[73]

Although the CPP appeared to build on a firmer base, the TC held a slight edge in the electoral contests that took place in Likpe before 1957. A CPP Member of Parliament was elected for the Buem constituency in 1954 and again in 1956 (see

Tables 3.6 and 3.7), but the TC had the upperhand in Likpe itself. This was largely because it commanded greater influence in the more populous towns of Mate and Bala. The TC might have extended its base of support were it not for the robust tactics employed by the CPP. In Bakwa, TC sympathisers were fined by the chief and elders, while in Kukurantumi they were driven out of the village. Despite the safeguard of a secret ballot, *Ablode* supporters in Bakwa claimed was the *juju* was used to drive them out of the Congress.[74] The atmosphere was more relaxed in villages where the TC was preponderant. A policy of neutrality was pursued by the Todome chief, and even Nana Akototse avoided forcing his opinions upon Mate. It is possible that he was too ill to do so: in 1955, before the plebiscite was held, Nana Akototse finally died.

Table 3.6:

The 1954 Election Result By Local Council Area in the Buem Constituency

Area	Votes Cast	F.Y. Asare (CPP)	A.K. Odame (TC)
Buem	3,598	2,116	1,482
Biakoye	2,411	1,435	976
Likpe-Lolobi	2,276	966	1,310
Nkonya	2,764	2,585	179
Total:	11,049	7,102	3,947

(Source: GNA (Ho) DA/D117 "Togoland Plebiscite: Villages and Wards")

Table 3.7:

The 1956 Election Result, Buem Constituency

Votes	F.Y. Asare (CPP)	A.K. Odame (TC)	W.W. Antwi
16,017	9,449	6,273	295

(Source: Gold Coast Gazette, 28 July 1956)

3.3. Conclusion:

The Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem, which followed a United Nations Mission in 1952, commented on the state of political awareness as follows:

> "The Mission saw keen political battles being fought by the various political parties using modern campaign techniques... One feature of the work of the present Mission was the large number of communications received on the unification question. The total was 2,899... In one center the Mission received within a few minutes 325 such communications."[75]

This impression of political vitality is confirmed by the record from Likpe.

In the 1930s, there was already a vocal minority within the community which harked back to the German era and was punished by the administration for its temerity. After the War, however, political awareness was more evenly spread. In the first instance, sectionalism was an important spur to political action. While northern Ewe teachers were spearheading opposition to Anlo penetration, the Bakpele engaged in a struggle to define the terms of their own identity. Nana Agya Mensah was a fervent critic of Ewe cultural and economic imperialism, of which Hohoe was the most immediate symbol, and looked instead towards the Akan heartland. Togbe Akototse, on the other hand, viewed the Ewe influence as essentially benign and perceived closer links with Hohoe as being in the best interests of the community. In all of this, it is difficult to identify the replay of established factional cleavages outlined by Coleman. What was enacted was not the same old scenes with slightly different props: British administrative policy had entirely rewritten the script.

Over time, ethnicity was subsumed by weightier questions about the fate of Togoland once the Gold Coast received its independence. The attitudes of the Bakpele seem to reflect the calculations of pork-barrel politics (or 'belly politics') that is familiar from studies of rural Africa. This might be taken as evidence for a

highly localized field of political vision, but even on this apparently secure ground one has to exercise caution. If the Bakpele and others took an avid interest in roads, schools and hospitals (as opposed to ideological debate, which usually comes back to those issues anyway), that was because they had seen precious little of these facilities since the assumption of British rule. The minorities had fared worse than most, precisely because they had refused to co-operate with the amalgamation policy on the grounds of being distinct from the Ewe. There is therefore a strong thread of continuity from the local political struggles of the 1930-40s (to which even Buem was not immune) through to the 1950s.

Footnotes to Chapter Three:

1. In the case of Ghana, see John Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Adrian Antoine, "The Politics of Rice Farming in Dagbon, 1972-1979", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1985, which deals with the ongoing Abudulai-Andani dispute; Ivor Wilks, Wa and the Wala: Islam and Polity in Northwestern Ghana, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For a similar studies on Nigeria, see J.D.Y. Peel, Ijeshas and Nigerians: The Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom, 1890s-1970s, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

2. J.S. Coleman, "Togoland", International Conciliation, DIX, September 1956, p.74-76. see also Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp.121-123.

3. David Brown, "Politics in the Kpandu Area of Ghana, 1925-1969: A Case-Study of the Influence of Central Government and National Politics Upon Local Factional Competition", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1977, especially section three. In his study, Brown endorses the approach of Dunn and Robertson towards centre-local relations.

4. H.C. Ellershaw, Acting District Commissioner, Kpandu to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, 13 December 1930, GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216, "Kpandu Native Affairs".

5. Captain Lilley reported the following amusing episode: "In April 1927 making the boundary whilst at Mate I sat one evening with the Likpes whilst they recounted their history. I was told that Mate meant the teacher and they came from Atebubu. I asked the chief of Bakoa [sic] where he came from and he replied 'out of the ground'. Mr. Koranteng nearly fell off his chair with merriment." GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216, "Kpandu Native Affairs", a minute by Lilley dated 19 March 1931.

6. This summary is a synthesis of the often conflicting Bakpele traditions. See L.M. Anyomi, "History of the Likpe People", B.A. Long Essay, Department of History, University of Ghana, 1979. Also the evidence contained in GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216 "Kpandu Native Affairs".

7. District Commissioner Gutch, having listened to extensive evidence on both sides of the Mate stool dispute, concluded that: "The reason for the discrepancies in the evidence produced for the Kale Gato tribe is obviously that the Subchief of Likpe Todome who has 'his own axe to grind' is trying to take advantage of the disagreement between Kale Gato and Kale Lenti families in Mate in order to acquire for himself a greater say in the election and installation of the Headchief than is his by right." GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216 "Kpandu Native Affairs", "Likpe Stool Dispute: Findings of Mr. John Gutch in the Enquiry Held at Likpe Mate on 17th - 20th September 1932", p.1.

8. L.M. Anyomi, op. cit., pp.57-60.

9. Ibid., p.19.

10. Ibid., pp.53-54.

11. Ibid., pp. 54-56. Also interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 16 October 1986; and contents of file in his possession, labelled "Agbosome Affairs".

12. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/216 "Kpandu Native Affairs", "Likpe Stool Dispute: Findings of Mr. John Gutch in the Enquiry Held at Likpe Mate on 17th - 20th September 1932".

13. For other African parallels, see Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Africa", in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

14. Hans Debrunner, A Church Between Colonial Powers: A Study of the Church in Togo, (London: Luttersworth Press, 1965), p.5.

15. The Allo name, which is associated with the Kalegato clan, may be a corruption of Addo. Indeed, it is sometimes rendered as such. Addo was one of the early rulers of Lagos, with connections to Benin. The Oloto chief in Lagos is one of the Idejos, who claim to be the original inhabitants of Lagos. See P. Cole, Modern and Traditional Elites in the Politics of Lagos (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1975), pp.13-14.

16. The East African tradition is mentioned by Anyomi, op. cit., p.2. She also refers to a tradition that links the Bakpele to Ketu in what is now Yorubaland.

17. Debrunner, op. cit., p.18.

18. GNA (Accra) ADM 39/1/567 "Buem State Native Affairs", enclosure entitled " A Brief History of the Twi Peoples of the Buem State", by S.D.O. Afari, Buem State Secretary, 1945.

19. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/212 "Buem Division Native Affairs General", enclosure of a note by Zech from Jasikan, dated 7 August 1907.

20. Anyomi, op. cit., pp.40-41. Debrunner, op. cit., p.19.

21. Debrunner, op. cit., p.109.

22. Ibid., pp.134-135.

23. Anyomi, op. cit., pp.46-47.

24. M.E. Kropp Dakubu and K.C. Ford, "The Central-Togo Languages" in Kropp Dakubu (ed)., The Languages of Ghana, (London: Kegan Paul International/ International Africa Institute, 1988), p.124.

25. The present Okakple of Likpe has memories of headloading rubber to Palimé, during what must have been the early years of the British administration. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 20 August 1986. Also interview with Nana Mensah Ambor II, Abrani, 14 March 1986. This was one of the two principal routes between the coast and the interior. M.B.K. Darkoh, "An Historical Geography of the Ho-Kpandu-Buem Area of the Volta Region of the Volta Region of Ghana, 1884-1956", M.A. thesis, University of Ghana, 1966, p.56.

26. During the German period, people from Likpe began working on cocoa farms in the Worawora area and then crossed into the Gold Coast, where they continued with the same work. After the war, they returned to Likpe. Interview with Nana Mensah Ambor II, Abrani, 14 March 1986.

26a Cocoa Research Series, An Economic Survey of Cocoa Farmers in the Jasikan Area of Trans-Volta Togoland, (University of Ghana), 1957, p.18. One writer described the food situation as 'critical'. See C. Dorm-Adzobu, "The Impact of Migrant Ewe Cocoa Farmers in Buem, the Volta Region of Ghana", Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical Association 16, 1974, p.52..

27. Interviews with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 20 August 1986; Godwin E.Y. Yawotse, Bala, 2 May 1986.

28. One broker said he switched from a French firm to buying for Gold Coast firms because prices were higher. After 1947, the farmers were bound to sell to licensed buying agents of the CMB. Interview with Matthew Kodjo Akorli, Abrani, 14 March 1986.

29. GNA (Ho), DA/D78 "Handing Over Notes by Captain Lilley, O.B.E., District Commissioner, to D.N. Walker", 1938.

30. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/646 "Buem State Native Affairs", a Minute by T.R.O. Mangin, Chief Commissioner of the Colony, dated 9/4/1946.

31. According to Lilley, since each sub-Divisional Chief hitherto had his own tribunal, there had been some 234 tribunals in the District in 1920. GNA (Ho), DA/D78 "Handing Over Notes by Captain Lilley".

32. See GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/545 "Amalgamation of Divisions in Togoland Under British Mandate", "Memorandum on Amalgamation in British Togoland, 1944"

33. The D.C. noted: "...I am now making enquiries as to which Chiefs are willing to come under their old Liege Lords once again." See GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/545 "Amalgamation of Divisions in Togoland Under British Mandate", E. Mansfield, District Commissioner, Ho to Commissioner of Eastern Province, Koforidua, 5 June 1924.

34. Colonial Office, Togoland Annual Report For the Year 1931, p.11.

35. GNA (Ho), DA/D78 "Handing Over Notes by Captain Lilley".

36. "I feel that the idea of amalgamating various divisions has somehow and somewhere gone wrong... I feel that to have made one chief paramount over all the others who have hitherto been independent is unsound and must lead to friction for a very long time" GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/305, "Quarterly Reports - Kpandu District", letter from the C.E.P., Koforidua to D.C., Kpandu, dated 8 February 1939.

37. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/545 "Amalgamation of Divisions in Togoland Under British Mandate", see "Memorandum on Amalgamation in British Togoland, 1944".

38. P.R.O. CO 96/780 file 31458/6, a letter from Governor Burns to G. Creasy, Colonial Office, London, dated 9 December 1944.

39. In 1942 steps were taken to destool the Anfoega Headchief because he expressed his willingness to come under the Akpini State. Resentment against Chief Dagadu of Kpandu was pronounced in Ve, since the former had managed to out-manoeuvre both Captain Lilley and the Ve Headchief in forming an Akpini State. See GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/545 "Amalgamation of Divisions in Togoland Under British Mandate", a letter from the Acting D.C., Kpandu, to the Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, 15 August 1943. See also Brown, op. cit., pp.33-37.

40. GNA (Ho) DA/D78 "Handing Over Report by Captain Lilley".

41. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", J. Green, Assistant D.C., Kpandu to Senior D.C., Ho, 1 October 1947.

42. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", a letter from Togbui Akototse, Mate to the Senior D.C., Ho, 14 August 1947.

43. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", J. Green, Assistant D.C., Kpandu to Senior D.C., Ho, 1 October 1947.

44. The Bala chief had made it clear he did not want amalgamation in any form. The Kukurantumi chief had said he too was against amalgamation, but was prepared to back the Headchief. See GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", Acting Senior D.C, Ho to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Koforidua, 15 October 1947.

45. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", "A Memorandum By the Likpe Grand Council in the Matter of the Secession of the Likpe Divisions From the Atando Native Authority", Todome, dated 24 April 1951.

46. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", "A Further Declaration of Likpe Grand Council in the Matter of Secession of Likpe Division From the Impractical Artificial Atando Native Authority Order", Todome, 12 August 1951.

47. This almost certainly did not represent the high regard in which they held the Headchief. Captain Lilley observed of him that "The present Headchief is an elderly man and not very bright". GNA (Ho) DA/D78 "Handing Over Report by Captain Lilley".

48. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", Quarterly report, Kpandu District, April-June 1950.

49. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", Quarterly report, Kpandu District, April-June 1950. Amongst the destoolment charges on which Nana Akototse stood accused were that he had failed to consult his sub-chiefs and that he had allowed Gbi linguists to pour libation to Likpe stools. See the Gold Coast Express report of 30 March 1950.

50. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", Quarterly report, Kpandu District, April-June 1950.

51. Nana Agyeman had repeatedly avoided being issued with a warrant to appear before the Native Authority Court. When a case of assault was brought against him at the Hohoe Magistrates Court, the Native Authority Police took the opportunity of his appearance to arrest him for the old case.

52. GNA (Ho) DA/240 "Local Government", see "A Resolution of the Buem State, Santrokofi and Nkonya Divisions Scholars Union to the Select Committee on Local Government", dated 10 June 1950.

53. Nana Sekyere survived because although he admitted to being circumcised, which was a taboo for traditional office-holders, this had not been included in the list of charges. See GNA (Ho), DA/D314 "Likpe Native Affairs", letter from the Government Agent, Jasikan, to Regional Officer, Ho, 13 May 1955.

54. Recent research that leans in this direction is J.D.Y. Peel "The Cultural Work of Yoruba Ethnogenesis", in E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman (eds.), History and Ethnicity, ASA Monograph no. 27 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989); and the contributions to Leroy Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1989).

55. There is some conflict of evidence here, which reflects the element of local pride. According to Nana Agya Mensah, the Togoland Union made its appearance in Likpe during 1948 and in 1950 he established the first CPP branch in Avedzeme, from where it spread to Kukurantumi and Bakwa. The former head of the CPP branch in Kukurantumi, on the other hand, claims that the party began in that village in 1949 and was followed by Avedzeme. Interviews with Nana Agya Mensah, Avedzeme, 19 February 1986; and G.Y. Abiti, Kukurantumi, 12 March 1986.

56. GNA (Ho), RAO C.705/TA24, "Commentary on Mr. Antor's Statement to the Trusteeship Council", by John Dixon, Senior D.C., Ho; also at GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/676.

57. GNA (Ho) DA/D314 "Likpe Native Affairs", letters from F.Y. Asare to Minister of Justice, 27 January 1954; and Government Agent, Jasikan, to Regional Officer, Ho, 13 March 1954.

58. The vote was less than three to one only in Todome, Agbozome and Koforidua. See Welch, op. cit., p.122, footnote 73.

59. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah, as above.

60. GNA (Ho) RAO/C705 file TA24 "Congress of British Togoland", see copy of "Memorandum From the Congress of the Togo Natural Rulers...", Borada, dated 28 December 1950.

61. GNA (Ho) RAO/C705 "Congress of British Togoland", letter from S.G. Antor, Secretary-General of Togoland Congress to Senior D.C., Ho , 5 February 1951.

62. GNA (Ho) DA/D133 "Likpe Native Affairs", D. Palmer, Assistant D.C., Kpandu, to Chief Commissioner of the Colony, Cape Coast, 19 July 1950.

63. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 16 October 1986.

64. Interview with Frank Tsaku, Hohoe, 14 October 1986.

65. Nana Soglo cited this as one of the reasons why he chose to spend so much time outside Likpe. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 10 February 1986.

66. Interview with Frank Tsaku, as above.

67. Interview with Nichodemus Oloto, Mate, 28 March 1986.

68. GNA (Ho) DA/240, "Local Government", see "Memorandum From the Independent State of Anfoega to the Select Committee on Local Government", dated 1 July 1950.

69. GNA (Ho), DA/D313 "Likpe Native Affairs", Senior D.C., Ho, to E.M. Kudroga, undated.

70. GNA (Accra), ADM 39/1/658, "Addresses and Memorials By Chiefs of the Atando Native Authority", Welcome Address from Togbui Akototse III, President of Atando Native Authority and others to Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, dated 7 January 1951.

71. In the words of the Headchief, Togbe Tepre Hodo III, who became a CPP stalwart: "To us independence and integration represented the only solution and alternative to British neglect and all hopes for development funds." Quoted in Ken Kwaku, "The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: A Case-Study of the Volta Region (Ghana) Since 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975, p.190. According to Welch, a land dispute with Vakpo (which had unificationist leanings) partially explains the behaviour of Anfoega. Welch, op. cit., p.92.

72. Ibid., pp. 190-194.

73. There are distinct problems with structured questions of this kind, most notably that certain possibilities are precluded. However, these questions were selected following several 'dry-runs', after which certain alternatives were dropped and other common responses were built in.

74. One *Ablode* supporter in Bakwa, who was forced to switch parties, claimed that juju had been used to kill his child. Interview with A.K. Dzarson, 25 January 1986. Also interview with G.Y. Abiti, Kukurantumi, 12 March 1986.

75. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem, Official Records, Eleventh Session, 1952, Supplement no.2, p.45.

Chapter Four:

"The Parties Have Fought And Settled It":

The Triumph of the Integrationists in Likpe, 1956-1969

In the two years preceding the 1956 plebiscite, British Togoland was finely poised between the advocates of unification and of integration. The rout of the Togoland Congress (TC) that followed could not easily have been predicted, but was comprehensively achieved by the end of the decade. The Convention People's Party (CPP) established a monopoly of power at every level of government, from the Local Councils through the Regional administration to the central government. The unification movement never recovered from the blow, although traces of its support base remained at the time of the inauguration of the Second Republic. This Chapter seeks to account for this turn of events using a combination of evidence drawn from the Regional and local levels. The chronological span is extensive and somewhat unconventional. It is customary to approach Ghanaian politics using the chronological markers provided by the First Republic (1957-66),[1] the military inter-regnum (1966-1969) and the Second Republic (1969-1972). However, it is more convenient for the purposes of the argument to commence with the aftermath of the 1956 plebiscite and to conclude on the elections of 1969.

4.1. A Post-Mortem of the Unification Movement

In the wake of the 1956 plebiscite and the election of that year, the Togoland Congress was left in a greatly weakened position. The leadership had constantly assured the party faithful that victory was within their grasp. The majority vote in favour of integration and the refusal of the United Nations to consider the Southern figures separately brought the first rude shock. When the CPP won a decisive victory over the combined opposition parties in the subsequent election, and even increased its share of the poll in Southern Togoland, the full implications became obvious for the first time: the Trust Territory was to be

absorbed within the Gold Coast and on the terms of the CPP. The Congress was left with the choice of raising the stakes or trying to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage.

In the first instance, the party inclined towards compromise. As has been noted, the leadership had already reconciled itself to the principle of a continuing association with the Gold Coast. As early as 1954, unificationists had offered federalism as an acceptable basis on which to ground such an association:

> "There is a middle way. A middle way which will be acceptable to the Ewes as well as the non-Ewes; the inhabitants of the British half and those of the French half of Togoland. And what dictation cannot achieve, compromise will. That way is federation."[2]

During the plebiscite campaign, the leadership sought to win over wavering voters with an assurance that links with the Gold Coast would not be severed if the 'No' option triumphed:

> "In casting your vote, therefore, vote solidly for separation from the Gold Coast pending Unification of the two Togolands. Unified Togoland shall seek a relation with self-governing Gold Coast after Unification and Independence. The statement that Togo shall at all cost go under French rule, is hundred per cent untrue."[3]

Once the results were known, unificationists again exhibited their flexibility. In February 1957 a number of prominent chiefs from Akpini, Asogli, Gbi and Likpe sent petitions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. They repeated their misgivings about the way the vote was counted, but signalled their willingness to abide by the result on condition that they were granted a separate Regional Assembly.[4] In another petition, several Buem chiefs concurred with this demand, but revived the idea of excluding the Gold Coast Ewes (and possibly those of Togoland) from any such Region.[5] The TC leaders were said to be working on their own proposal for Regional autonomy as late as two days after independence.[6]

With the benefit of hindsight, one might argue that Antor and his colleagues gravely miscalculated in linking arms with the other opposition parties and

associating with their Proposals For A Federal Constitution.[7] The TC might have made a case for special treatment on grounds of the unique status of the British Togoland and the need to lure French Togoland into a political union. By making common cause with the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the party placed its feet firmly in the enemy camp from the stand-point of the CPP. The latter spurned the federal option, arguing that it would prove both costly and divisive.[8] The political deadlock, manifested in the opposition boycott of the Bourne Commission and the Achimota Conference, was what persuaded the British Government of the need to organize a fresh round of national elections in 1956.[9] Victorious at the polls, the CPP was hardly likely to concede to the opposition what it had withheld until then. Nevertheless, there were sufficient signs of flexibility early in 1957 for the path of compromise to seem a viable one. The CPP conceded the formation of Regional assemblies and interim bodies were established pending the report of the Regional Constitutional Commission. For their part, the opposition parties agreed to co-operate in hastening the final stages to independence.

But there was also an section within the unification movement which favoured more resolute opposition to what was interpreted as the unwarranted annexation of Togoland. As Independence Day approached, plans were set in motion to foment a crisis that would compel the United Nations to reconsider its earlier ruling on integration. By February 1957, armed gangs were reportedly gathering in the bush in different parts of the Region. Towards the end of that month and in early March, the Police discovered secret military camps and caches of explosives in the vicinity of Alavanyo (bordering Nkonya, where a Forest Reserve had been created in 1931) and Hodzo (north-east of Ho). In the days leading up to and including Independence Day, there were violent clashes between militant *Ablode* supporters and the Police in the towns of Jasikan, Kpandu and Hohoe.[10] The role the Congress leadership in these proceedings is unclear. In Parliament, Antor denied the existence of a plot and rather than defend the use of force, he focussed on alleged Government mishandling of the affair.[11] Antor and Kodzo Ayeke

were brought to trial and sentenced to six year terms of imprisonment, but were later acquitted on appeal.[12] Regardless of who was responsible, the consensus is that the militants were poorly organized and clearly no match for a Government which could call on the Police and the Armed Forces.[13] The United Nations was not tempted to intervene and the incidents only presented Nkrumah with the ideal opportunity to deal with the unificationist menace as he saw fit.

The abundant literature dealing with the First Republic is virtually unanimous about the creeping authoritarianism of the Nkrumah regime. There is, however, some disagreement as to whether the source of intolerance lay in the character of the CPP as a party and the personal defects of Nkrumah, or in an over-reaction to security threats that were genuine enough.[14] In Trans-Volta Togoland, the behaviour of the CPP was arguably a symptom of insecurity. Although the Alavanyo incident was resolved with comparatively easily, the Government remained extremely sensitive to the threat of secession. Not all harassment was initiated from above. Thus, it was the chiefs who levied fines upon TC members in the Buem towns of Borada, Jasikan and Ahamansu after independence.[15] Nevertheless, the riots did help to set in motion a cycle of official repression which was repeated periodically until the fall of Nkrumah in February 1966. In the immediate aftermath of the riots, the authorities swooped down upon unificationists in towns and villages throughout the Region. By early April, 355 people had been arrested and many of these were put on trial. The Peace Preservation Order remained in place in some areas until 1959. With the passage of the Preventive Detention Act in 1958, it became that much easier to deal with 'subversives' - a category which grew ever wider.

The clamp-down on the opposition parties, which regrouped as the United Party (UP) in November 1957, was assisted by a tighter administrative grip imposed on the Regions. After the Regional Constitutional Commission reported in 1958, the Government diluted the powers of the proposed Regional assemblies, effectively reducing them to an advisory rôle.[16] The UP boycotted the elections, which

enabled the CPP to capture the assemblies and then to wind them up the following year. To add insult to injury, the Government obliterated the most visible legacy of the Trusteeship period when it abruptly changed the name of Trans-Volta Togoland to the Volta Region in 1959.[17] The mechanisms through which the CPP established its grip over the Volta Region were much the same as in other parts of the country. The Regional Commissioner, who together with the District Commissioners became the principal locus of power, was a political appointee whose loyalties lay to central government in Accra.[18] He was selected on the basis of his ability to detect and to snuff out political dissent before it reached dangerous levels. The rules of the game were set in 1958 when Krobo Edusei, who had already demonstrated his talent for a rough-house mode of politics, was appointed Acting Regional Commissioner. He made no secret of his willingness to use force in dealing with the unification movement. Thus he informed a gathering of civil servants that:

> "... for sometime the government has been concerned with reports reaching Accra that there are in this region - particularly in the Ho, Kpandu and Buem-Krachi districts - elements engaged in lawlessness and acts of subversion aimed against the state of Ghana and her citizens... and the government has determined on swift and effective action to [deal with] lawlessness and intimidation. That is why I have come here with the instructions from the Cabinet to take whatever action is required - including if necessary the use of unorthodox methods - to restore peace and re-establish public confidence in TVT."[19]

Before long, opposition Members of Parliament were complaining about the indiscriminate arrest of supporters and the destoolment of chiefs who were sympathetic to the unification cause.[20] There were two noteworthy casualties in 1958. The Gbi Chief, Togbe Gabusu IV, was forced into exile and was subsequently proclaimed destooled.[21] The Government also took advantage of a long-standing chieftaincy dispute in Ho to depose the pro-unification Dome chief and transfer the stool to the rival Bankoe clan.[22] There are striking parallels with the way in which the Nkrumah regime manipulated traditional politics in Ashanti and in the North.[23] Ironically, the success with which the regime stifled dissent in the Volta Region merely contributed to its sense of insecurity in the longer term. Under the threat of detention, many unificationists moved beyond

the boundaries of the state to Togo, where they remained a potential threat for as long as the government there was prepared to back subversion.

A year after Ghanaian independence, there was little cause for immediate concern. It appeared as if Nkrumah might even resolve the reunification issue through a process of negotiation. In 1958, the Comité de l'Unité Togolais (CUT) under the leadership of Sylvanus Olympio abandoned its boycott of the electoral process and won a sweeping and unexpected victory at the polls.[24] Olympio had always stood out as the most articulate spokesman for the Ewe and Togoland unification causes, while exhibiting a distinct lack of enthusiasm for membership of the French community. The CPP embraced members who had once worked alongside Olympio and who remained favourably disposed towards him. Partly for this reason, the Nkrumah regime contributed material assistance to the CUT campaign effort in 1958.[25]

As has often been noted, Olympio and Nkrumah entertained very different political expectations.[26] Whereas Nkrumah was hoping for full political union, Olympio was unwilling to submerge the sovereignty of Togo in a new state where Ghanaians would be numerically preponderant. Nkrumah did not improve his chances of success when he publicly speculated that Togo might become the seventh Region of Ghana. Olympio, who was unwilling to look beyond the formation of a customs union, opted for complete independence from France in 1960. Nkrumah then unwisely attempted to coerce him into reconsidering his position. He sealed the border at the end of that year, explaining that this course of action was necessary in order to bring home to Olympio the folly of perpetuating such an artificial boundary.[27]

By this time, the delineation of the frontier had become a bone of contention in itself. After 1957, communities the length of the border solicited the aid of their respective governments in a bid to displace stranger farmers from what they claimed were their lands. The truth was that many communities, including

Likpe, had land on the wrong side of the frontier which they had been allowed to farm as a result of an Anglo-French accord. In the Krachi district, Adele farmers from French Togoland who had farmed for decades in the vicinity of Dadiase, Breniase and Shiare were harassed by the resident population. The Akposso similarly tried to expel Buem farmers living on the Togolese side of the border.[28] These cases illustrate the naivety of portraying border peoples as the innocent victims of state rivalries: the reality is that these communities have as often manipulated uncertain national frontiers to their own advantage. Nkrumah preferred to settle these border disputes within the framework of a political union rather than negotiate on the demarcation of the frontier. Once Olympio opted for independence, the possibility of an amicable settlement evaporated and the frontier was established as an additional irritant in relations between Lomé and Accra.

In 1960, the Nkrumah regime began to suspect the Togolese of plotting the secession of the former Trust Territory. In January informers infiltrated a meeting held at the Togolese border town of Yikpa, a few miles to the south of Likpe, which confirmed these suspicions. The Government planned to arrest the Ghanaian participants once they crossed the border, but was thwarted when the Togolese provided political asylum. Amongst those who accepted the offer was Reverend Ametowobla, the Member of Parliament for Ho West. A renewed bout of detentions ensued, which led to another flood of refugees over the frontier. By June the refugee population numbered 800 in Palimé alone.[29]

The following year, events took a further twist when a power struggle within the CPP led to the defection of Komla Gbedemah from the ruling party. Gbedemah had not only been instrumental in building the CPP into an effective national machine, but had also made it a credible force within Eweland. Although the split is generally regarded as ideological, it also marked the intensification of ethnic rivalries within the regime. Gbedemah was accused of corruption along with a number of party stalwarts and was stripped of his Finance Portfolio. He

responded with an attack in Parliament on the creeping authoritarianism of the regime and then retreated into exile.[30] In subsequent years, the authorities alleged that he was plotting the overthrow of the Government with the backing of Kofi Busia and the Togolese government.[31]

In January 1963, Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in a military coup in which many African leaders and external observers detected the hand of Nkrumah. The incoming Grunitzky regime was even less likely than the CUT to endorse political union, but there were early signs that it might be willing to expel the dissidents on its soil.[32] More cordial relations between the two regimes were symbolized in the reopening of the frontier. But, although the exchanges never became quite as acrimonious, the honeymoon soon ended in recriminations over the frontier, Togolese import duties and the methods used by the Nkrumah regime to stamp out the rising tide of smuggling.[33] Thus, the CPP regime remained vulnerable on its eastern flank until the end.

To the authorities, the proliferation of subversive material inside the Volta Region suggested a co-ordinated campaign to provoke internal disorder. The leaflets that circulated contained two potentially explosive appeals. Firstly, they combined the traditions of the unification movement with the personal authority of Komla Gbedemah - a blend that would have seemed incongruous before 1960. Secondly, they appealed to the chiefs as the bearers of popular legitimacy. Although most of the chiefs protested their loyalty to the CPP, there was some evidence of restiveness by 1964 when even the President of the House of Chiefs complained about neglect of the Region.[34] These two elements were fused in a letter (attributed to an 'Ewe-Togo Democratic Union') urging the chiefs to take a stand against Nkrumah:

> "Togbiwo and Nananom. Rather tell him in no equivocal terms to release all Ewe and Togolese detainees forthwith, restore Komla Agbeli Gbedemah to his right position of the right-hand of power, remove the Ghana-Togo frontier at once, and ensure full Equality and Freedom to Ewes and Togolanders. Without these, back us to overthrow him and his godless gang."[35]

In this case, the Regional administration swiftly instructed the chiefs to surrender all copies of the letter for destruction.

Growing suspicion of Ewe loyalties (usually taken to include the minorities) underlay patterns of recruitment into the highest offices of Government and state. Following the disgrace of Gbedemah, F.K.D. Goka from Tongu was ushered in to serve as Minister of Finance, a post which he lost in 1965. F.Y. Asare (the Member of Parliament for Buem) was stripped of his portfolio and charged with corruption in 1964.[36] Joseph Kodzo was elevated to the Cabinet, but he represented the Akan-Krachi constituency in the north of the Region. After 1965, no Ewes were included in the Cabinet.[37] Following a series of bomb blasts, assassination bids and rumours of coups, Nkrumah also embarked upon a systematic purge of the security services. This began with the Police in 1962 and culminated in the dismissal three years later of Major-Generals Otu and Ankrah, the Chief of Defence Staff and his Deputy respectively.[38] The purges were not always damaging to Ewe officers. For example, J.W.K. Harlley became Chief Commissioner of Police following the dismissal and detention of E.R.T. Madjitey.[39] Nevertheless, the growing tendency for Nkrumah to rely upon Northerners and people from his Nzima homeland only heightened Ewe concerns at a time when the sympathies of the Volta Region were under close scrutiny.

The basic insecurity of the Nkrumah regime, which induced it to lash out at real and imaginary opponents, does not imply that the unification movement had recaptured the political initiative. On the contrary, its political infrastructure collapsed under the full weight of Government pressure. After 1961, the leadership was either in exile (like Reverend Ametowobla) or in detention (like Antor). The political vacuum at the local level was filled by the ruling party even in areas that had been most stubbornly *Ablode* . The most striking reversal took place in Kpandu North, the constituency that had been the virtual fiefdom of S.G. Antor. After his detention in the wake of the 1961 railway strike, the seat was

declared vacant and one of the small core of CPP activists in Hohoe, Frank Tsaku, was elected unopposed to fill it.[40] This seizure of the Congress headquarters invited comparison with Wenchi where the seat of Kofi Busia similarly fell to the ruling party. The ecstatic CPP branch assured F.Y. Asare in triumphalist tones that Hohoe would undergo a conversion every bit as profound:

> "...Hohoe shall be what Wenchi now is in the Brong-Ahafo Region - an impregnable stronghold where all knees shall bow [sic] in support of the Government, and within their bounds, opposition shall be lost in 'oblivion'".[41]

The CPP entrenched itself at every tier of government, choking off opposition access to resources and rewarding individual and community loyalties through the dispensation of patronage - although this tended to shrink over time. United Party supporters were left without protection or the means with which to fight back. Throughout the Region, therefore, they broke ranks and defected to the enemy. The breakup of TC networks was assisted by the enforced exile of key activists at the town and village level. The *Ablode* forces were scattered not just because Togoland unification appeared too distant a goal to strive for, but ultimately because the fundamental objectives were somewhat hazy. The contrast here with some of the more successful African separatist movements is instructive: whereas the Eritreans harboured a historic sense of grievance towards Amharic Ethiopia and were prepared to take up arms to restore their independence, Togoland unificationists lacked an evocative image of the past (at least, for those below the age of sixty) or a compelling vision of the future. In that sense, 'greater Togoland' ceased to define a realistic imagined community. Having made these general observations, it may be helpful to elaborate with reference to Likpe.

4.2. The Ascendancy of the Convention People's Party in Likpe

4.2.1. Coercion From Above, Desertion From Below

Political developments inside the Volta Region were played out in microcosm within Likpe. Following the plebiscite and election of 1956, pro-*Ablode* chiefs and elders such as Nana Komla Dihie of Todome were associated with the olive-branch petitions to the Secretary of State. At the same time, local activists were involved in more militant tactics. The Parliamentary statement by Ako Adjei to the effect that it was people from outlying villages who had attempted to disrupt the independence preparations at Jasikan, is confirmed by sources in Likpe.[42] They tell of an appeal (the origin of which is unclear) for ex-servicemen to convene at Jasikan.[43] In the riot that ensued on 4 March, at least one man from Mate was seriously injured. This was followed by a Police raid on Likpe to round up the culprits and destroy bush encampments like the one discovered at Alavanyo.[44] In consequence, a number of leading TC members were arrested. G.K. Kumesi, the Mate party Chairman received a prison sentence of 18 months, while Henry Kwashigah (the Secretary) received 6 months.[45] Further arrests followed in 1959 and the next year still more rounded up after the infiltration of the meeting at Yikpa.[46] The success with which the authorities uprooted the Congress in Likpe owed much to the willingness of CPP loyalists to expose individuals who remained intransigent. By 1959, the CPP in Likpe was able to boast that 'Cipipification' was almost complete:

> "With reference to records of Branches in this Likpe Division we can assure and we hope the government will highly appreciate the rapid and healthy growth of C.P.P. on this healthy soil of Likpe Division. The only grit in the oil as far as the whole Division is concerned is at Likpe Koforidua but we can guarantee that it is no hard nut to crack. We are operating hard to convert that town with its chief into C.P.P. members."[47]

The prison sentences imposed upon elderly men such as Kumesi and Kwashigah (former members of the Togo Bund) broke their political will. They ceased to

wield much political influence thereafter. Their colleagues who fled to Togo mostly lapsed into political inactivity. In the words of one Mate man who spent his exile quietly farming in the vicinity of Akposso Badou and later Palimé:

> "Everybody was on his own. We only greeted each other. We had no meetings on Ghanaian affairs."[48]

These were often years of personal loneliness for the Bakpele who were forced to remain in exile. When they returned after the 1966 coup, it was often with the firm intention of avoiding political entanglements. Those who chose to remain in Likpe had little option but to recant and to enrol in the ruling party. Although pioneer CPP members raised their eyebrows at the influx of former unificationists into their ranks, this was regarded further up the party hierarchy as a measure of achievement.

The prevailing climate of fear was, therefore, a crucial factor behind the collapse of opposition within Likpe. Yet it is equally important to appreciate that the CPP did win the argument over the national question. The victory of the CPP merely hastened the displacement of a generation that had been born around the turn of the century by a younger group of political actors, mostly born after 1920. In fact, the real significance of the incarceration of Kumesi and Kwashigah was that it closed off a competing source of political ideas and reserved centre-stage for the new men.

Even if the regime had not resorted to compulsion, the tide was steadily turning. The single most important reason was a shift in the political economy of the sub-region. For most of the century, an ability to expand cocoa cultivation on family lands had conferred on the Bakpele a measure of economic independence. But, having settled alongside the Togo mountain range for reasons of security, they suffered from a potential shortage of farming land. By the early 1960s, it became increasingly difficult for local farmers to acquire sufficient land on which to plant new cocoa and coffee. Even in Buem, the legendary abundance of forest land was becoming a thing of the past.[49] To compound matters, both Kukurantumi and Bakwa lost cocoa land in the early 1960s as a result of litigation

with their neighbours.[50] The foreclosure of cocoa farming left paid employment as the most attractive alternative for talented young men from the community. Many Bakpele trained as teachers and sold their skills in other parts of the Region or further afield.

It is at this time that Likpe produced its first cohort of University graduates, a number of whom penetrated the ranks of the Ghanaian intellectual elite. Ray Kakrabah-Quarshie from Agbozome progressed from the Likpe-Mate Roman Catholic Junior/Senior School to the O'Reilly Educational Institute in Accra. From there he gained entry to the prestigious Adisadel College in Cape Coast. In about 1958 he entered the University of Ghana, where he became General Secretary of the National Union of Ghanaian Students in 1961. In later years, he made a reputation for himself as a writer and founder member of the Progress Party.[51] J.K. Kafe, who originated from the same village, attended St. Augustine's College in Cape Coast until 1956 and then entered the University of Ghana. He later studied at London University and in due course became Librarian at the University of Ghana.[52] The career of Dr. Obed Asamoah, who embarked on a career as a lawyer, is outlined in greater detail below. These individuals served as role-models for others who were to follow in their footsteps. In the early 1960s, they were fairly inconsequential within community politics, but their insertion into the Ghanaian intellectual milieu represented a further significant step in the political integration of Likpe.

The triumph of integrationist ideology needs, however, to be distinguished from the ascendancy of the CPP as a party. There were undoubtedly a good many Bakpele who were members of the CPP because they identified with what it stood for. These individuals had usually enlisted in the CPP in the early 1950s. But the party did gain genuine converts at a later stage. What seems to have impressed people most about the CPP was its commitment to a rapid transformation of the socio-economic environment - often involving the very 'gigantomania' which has evoked such critical comment from economists.[53]

Although the functions of the state expanded under dyarchy, some of most important initiatives came to fruition after independence. Of some significance was the Adomi bridge over the Volta, which was completed in early 1957. It provided a direct road link between the Volta Region and Accra for the first time.[54] It is well-known that the Volta Lake caused considerable dislocation and yet it made a deep impression on the Bakpele who had to endure none of the inconvenience.[55] In the educational field, the First Republic witnessed a significant expansion of secondary schools and Training Colleges.[56] Although none was physically located in Likpe, it was at last possible to acquire a decent education without leaving the Region. The perception that rapid improvements were possible, which contrasted so obviously with the incremental model of progress embodied in colonial ideology, helps to explain some startling changes of political position. The son of G.K. Kumesi, who might have been expected to harbour a special grudge against the ruling party, articulated a common response:

> "Even though Nkrumah defeated our party, the way he started our development projects, we saw he was going to do something good for us."[57]

Nevertheless, a large section of the community embraced the CPP for more mercenary reasons. A recurring theme during interviews was the contrast between political alignments before and after independence. In the early days, it was noted, people joined parties out of political conviction, whereas personal expedience took precedence after 1957. The instrumentality of rural politics is a theme that is familiar from the research of Maxwell Owusu.[58] Although he interprets it as the persistence of an Akan political culture forged within pre-colonial Akan polities, this is less applicable to Likpe where traditional authorities never commanded access to economic resources such as land. The most obvious reasons are more compelling.

On the one hand, the departing colonial power never established an effective local government machinery, which might have enabled rural communities to

sustain their own development objectives autonomously of the state. The Local and District Councils which were established after 1951 arose from the wreckage of the Native Authorities. The councils of Trans-Volta Togoland were shackled by many of the problems that are familiar from other parts of the country: including shortages of finance and fierce local rivalries which were often a hangover from the amalgamation period. Although the Likpe-Lolobi Council was more solvent than most others in the Region,[59] its overall impact was limited. More effort was expended on the choice of a Council headquarters than on development priorities. The adjustment of local government boundaries after independence merely created further confusion.60 In 1959, the Likpe-Lolobi area was subsumed within a Buem Local Council and then, following the 1961 Local Government Act, a Buem-Krachi District Council was formed. The new set-up was unpopular, not least because of the distance between Likpe and the District headquarters. Although the Councils were brought under close CPP control, the basic lack of finance (exacerbated by the reduction of block grants) virtually paralysed their operations. The Town Development Committees enjoyed more popular support, which is one reason why they too were brought under party control, but their strength lay in mobilizing labour rather than money. The Committees could assume responsibility for some operations, but in the final analysis state support was required in order to build better roads, construct bridges, and service village health centres. Thus, it was only natural that the Bakpele should solicit assistance from the centre - approaching it through the party hierarchy or, as often, short-circuiting it altogether.

The rules of the political game were unambiguous. If the Bakpele resisted the CPP, they would be cut off from state resources; if they embraced the ruling party, they could expect sympathetic consideration. In a characteristically blunt speech in 1959, the District Commissioner was explicit:

> "Whether you are C.P.P. or U.P. or whatnot, our aim is one i.e. to develop Ghana. Here I wish to tell you to always vote for the right person and since this is the C.P.P. Government you will be doing yourselves a not inconsiderable harm if you vote for a U.P. man as his voice could never be heard anywhere... and here I wish to stress most emphatically the two important steps to be adopted and these are (a) persuasion and (b) force"[61]

The point was driven home by the differential treatment extended to villages in Likpe. Those with a good party record were rewarded for their fidelity: Bakwa finally received the health centre that Nkrumah had promised; Kukurantumi became the headquarters of a new cocoa district; and Avedzeme was the recipient of a water supply (which later broke down). The peoples of Mate, Todome, Bala and Koforidua knew that they had been slighted and understood what was required to remove the stain on their record.

On the other hand, internal constraints on the local economy heightened the attractions of employment by the state. Even the United Ghana Farmers Co-operative Council (UGFCC), whose parasitism has been fully demonstrated by Beckman, was a mixed blessing in the sense that it provided some local employment.[62] As always, party connections were the key to rewards. The Secretary of the Mate branch, a school teacher with solid CPP credentials, recalled the cynicism of the period:

> "The attraction of the CPP was that Nkrumah recruited lots of people into the C.M.B., where they were given cars and so on. Many were also able to join the Police... Many teachers left the classroom to become spraying superintendents of the C.M.B. and were each given a car."[63]

It is certainly remarkable how many former *Ablode* activists changed their political spots. For example, in September 1964 when the Likpe CPP met to discuss Bakpele nominations for the newly created Biakoye Parliamentary seat, it did so under the chairmanship of Nana Komla Dihie of Todome and in the presence of Nana Sekyere of Agbozome.[64] Both had played an active rôle in the TC less than a decade before. Predictably, in the light of its previous orientation, the most striking conversions took place in Mate. The dynamics of this town are considered in more detail in the next section.

Of course, the expansion of the state realm came at some cost to the cocoa farmers, given that the fiscal base of the Ghanaian state depended so heavily on hidden taxes siphoned off by the Cocoa Marketing Board.[65] Yet it was comparatively easy for farmers along the eastern frontier to take advantage of higher Togolese prices. In 1962, a CPP Branch Secretary from New Ayoma drew attention to co-ordinated coffee smuggling at Kute:

> "If you go to Kute-Buem you will see young girls and boys from Akposso in Republic of Togo carrying loads of coffee to the Republic of Togoland [sic] in day time from 10am-2pm every day and lorries too loading them from towns in Eastern Buem to Kute-Buem"[66]

From Likpe, cocoa and coffee was headloaded over the mountain to the Danyi villages. In an effort to impose tighter controls, the regime created a presumption of smuggling where it could be shown that a suspect was moving his/her crop in an easterly direction. Moreover, the border was formally sealed for much of the period after 1960. But these measures were only as effective as the Border Guards (who fell under the Police until 1964) who enforced them.[67] Most smugglers were masters of the local terrain, unlike the Guardsmen. Moreover the latter had their own stake in the burgeoning underground economy. One report in January 1964 observed that the closure of the frontier was consistently violated by officials

> "It is believed that the police are not at all eager to have the border opened, owing to the loss of revenue they would suffer. For a 'consideration' it is quite possible to get one's car across the frontier either way - during dark hours."[68]

The same principle operated along the maze of bush paths connecting villages on either side of the frontier. Potentially, therefore, farm owners could enjoy the best of both worlds: namely access to some of the benefits of state expenditure together with the rewards of their labour and that of their workers.

4.2.2. The Politics of the Likpe Stool Dispute

In 1955, Nana Boke Akototse III eventually died. Over the next two years, the selection of a successor was buried beneath the struggle over the future of British Togoland. Once the Nkrumah regime had eliminated the UP challenge, and the

unification movement began to unravel, chieftaincy politics returned to the local agenda with a vengeance. This has to be emphasized because it amounts to a reversal of the order of significance conventionally attributed to national and local issues within the rural arena.

In theory, there should have been little scope for controversy. The Gutch Enquiry of 1932 had established the principle that the Paramouncy rotated between the Kalegato and the Kalelenti clans in Mate. Since Nana Akototse was of the Kalelenti clan, the next Okakple should of rights have emanated from Kalegato. In practice, not everybody was disposed to accept the Gutch interpretation, which provided the occasion for a prolonged constitutional crisis.

A Regent by the name of Daniel Setu was appointed from the Kalelentis who sought to enstool a candidate from the same clan, arguing that the selection of a new Okakple was the prerogative of the Mate clan heads alone. The chiefs of the other villages were unlikely to endorse such an interpretation of the 'Likpe constitution' and on 7 December 1957 they convened a meeting at Todome. This reaffirmed the rotatory principle and called on the Kalegato clan to nominate a new chief.[69] The favoured candidate was Nicholas Soglo, a contractor who had been living outside the area for some time, and who was mentioned in the previous Chapter in the context of a deputation to F.Y. Asare. Both sides then proceeded to lobby central government for recognition.

In 1958, the Nkrumah regime was intervening openly in chieftaincy affairs. Nicholas Soglo had impeccable CPP credentials and so was enstooled in January 1959 with the title of Nana Soglo Allo II. At this point, the Mate branch of the CPP, which had hitherto embraced the youngmen of different clans, split down the middle. The CPP branch executive, which was dominated by members from the lower end of the town, initiated a campaign to undermine the authority of the new Okakple. In May 1959, the first substantial CPP rally in Mate was marred when the executive tried to bar Nana Soglo from the proceedings.[70] From the

early months of 1960, members of the Kalelenti clan and their sympathisers withheld all recognition from the chief. Amongst other things, the communal labour organized by the Town Development Committee was disrupted because the Kalalentis refused to obey the 'gong-gong' of the Okakple. The rebels calculated that a collapse of communal labour would rebound on the Okakple at a time when the District Commissioner was insisting on the importance of community self-help. Nana Soglo counter-attacked by encouraging the youngmen from the upper half of the town to form a rival CPP branch.[71] A war of words ensued between rival branches seeking to discredit each other in the eyes of higher authorities. Nana Soglo held a slight edge in that a number of his fiercest opponents were tainted with *Ablode* connections. In a letter to his opponents, which was intended for the eyes of the administration, he observed that:

> "... the said Chairman and his Executive has all along been fallaciously trying to label all Loyal Party members in ward C.1. as being members of the erstwhile 'Ablode'. An act which we abhor in very strong terms; in that Likpe Mate which frankly speaking was once an 'Ablode's' stronghold [of] which Clemence Sraku was the Secretary, but being a blood relative to the local Chairman William Agbodo has been made Secretary for Mate branch C.P.P.... the said Chairman and his Executive are erroneously trying to paint this picture as a means to satisfy their selfish end, namely to see if that would help them to win a feud on a Chieftaincy [matter]..."[72]

Nana Soglo Allo II retained the confidence of Government, but in December 1960 he died in mysterious circumstances. It was alleged that his wife, a member of the Kalelenti clan, had poisoned him. The succession dispute now entered a new and even more bitter phase. The Kalelentis argued that according to the rotatory system, it was their turn to propose a candidate for the vacant stool. But when Nana Komla Dihie convened another meeting of the Likpe Traditional Authority, the chiefs took a dissenting view. They ruled that since the Kalelentis had repeatedly refused to acknowledge Nana Soglo as Okakple, they could not now invoke the Gutch formula.[73]

Surprisingly, this decision was upheld by Jospeh Lemboe, the elderly Kalelenti clan-head who wished to avoid another damaging schism. His sense of fair play

was not, however, shared by other senior figures in the clan and he was stripped of his clan title. In the confusion that ensued, rival candidates were enstooled. The Kalelentis, who were still in possession of the stool, held a ceremony investing S.Q. Mantey, a school teacher, with the title of Nana Akototse IV. The Kalegatos enstooled Victor Soglo, the brother of the deceased chief. Once again, the authorities were forced to make a ruling and they came down on the side of Soglo, who was gazetted as Nana Soglo Allo III in August 1961. This decision was justified on the grounds that only two of the Likpe chiefs, namely those of Koforidua and Agbozome, had backed the Mantey claim.[74] But it is likely that other considerations intruded as well. Nana Soglo believes that it was his long-standing attachment to the CPP, at a time when Mate was under the thrall of the TC, which was decisive.[75] He belonged to that generation of Bakpele whose horizons extended further than the boundaries of the Region. He had risen to the rank of Inspector in the Gold Coast Police and had spent most of the intervening years in distant locations like Tamale. The CPP was therefore his natural home. Nana Soglo also felt that his selection owed something to Government fatigue with Bakpele politics. As a Policeman with a tough reputation, he was seen as the candidate most likely to succeed in restoring order.[76] Although the regime had formerly exploited divisions, the stress was now on communal harmony.

The campaign of the Kalelenti clan leaders did not peter out after the installation of Nana Soglo. Instead they conspired to undermine his standing in the eyes of the Bakpele and the Government. In 1962, they preferred destoolment charges against Nana Soglo, claiming that he had defiled the stool and had then refused to carry out the appropriate purification ceremonies.[77] This followed an incident in which he had been detained by the Togolese authorities on suspicion of spying, and had been forced to carry night-soil during the period of his incarceration. Reference to this episode was an attempt to outrage the sensibilities of the Bakpele and to portray the Okakple as someone who held tradition in contempt. The real motive was obvious to all and the campaign failed to win the backing of the rest of Likpe.

The Kalelentis held one remaining trick up their sleeve, which was to outbid the Soglo faction in expressions of fealty to *Osagyefo*. In 1960, the District Commissioner made a significant concession to the factional strife in Mate when he recognized the existence of separate party branches for East and West Mate. The following year, there was a concerted drive in both sides of the town to register new party members. Although the exercise lost some momentum in subsequent years, by 1964 Mate could claim the second largest party membership in Buem District (See Table 4.1).

In the process, the older CPP strongholds like Bakwa were left behind. Furthermore, in a cunning effort to swim with the latest ideological currents, S.Q. Mantey gave up his teaching post at the Catholic Mission in Dzelukope and enrolled at the Ideological Institute at Winneba.[78] From there, he kept up a steady stream of correspondence in which he professed his unswerving loyalty to the CPP and disputed the credentials of Nana Soglo. Not to be outmanoeuvred, the Kalegato faction dispatched the Secretary of the East Mate branch to the Ideological Institute as a counter-weight. Nana Soglo himself appointed a Regent and took up employment as a security officer on the Mines, obtained it would seem on the strength of his party connections.[79]

Table 4.1:

Ranking of the CPP Party Branches in Buem District

By Size, as of 31 October 1964

Ranking	Town	Number of Cards
1	Jasikan	912
2	Likpe-Mate (total)	721
3	Nkonya-Wurupong	410
4	Okadjakrom	325
5	Borada	295
6	New Ayoma	289
7	Akaa	271
8	Likpe-Kukurantumi	230
9	Santrokofi-Bume	221
10	Kwamikrom	216
16	Bakwa	185
42	Likpe-Koforidua	61
43	Likpe-Bala	61
44	Likpe-Todome	44
45	Likpe-Agbozome	35
53	Likpe-Avedzeme	16

(Source: "The Convention People's Party (Buem District Branch): Annual Delegates Conference, Okadjakrom, Programme, 1964)[80]

Over time, it became apparent that the Government was unlikely to abandon Nana Soglo. Indeed the Mantey faction was making powerful enemies in the Regional administration as a result of its efforts to play one set of officials off against the other. In 1962 District Commissioner J.R. Dabo wished to pursue an action for libel following an accusation that he had a personal interest in protecting the Okakple.[81] Evidence that the patience of the authorities had finally snapped came in 1963 when the Cabinet, acting on the advice of the

Regional Commissioner, issued an order prohibiting Thaddeus Agbowoada (the new clan head) from entering within a 30 mile radius of Likpe.[82]

Early in 1964, the frustrated Kalelenti clan leaders resolved to follow precedent by seceding from Mate altogether. The District Commissioner intervened to prevent the removal of building materials from the town, while the employers of Mantey (who was then at the Catholic Mission) were asked to exert pressure on him to abandon the plan.[83] Mantey denied that the intention to build a new town was in any way related to the stool dispute. Instead, he claimed, it was simply a question of farmers wanting to move closer to their land.[84] The Regional Commissioner, who had no difficulty seeing through this line of defence, commented that:

> "If Mantey is honest with himself, he will admit that it is only his aggrieved clan, that is in the stool dispute that now cunningly group and style themselves into Likpe Abrani farmers."[85]

Nevertheless, the Mantey faction did have one factor working in its favour. The site for the proposed town was located further away from the frontier than Mate, which reduced the ease of smuggling. Members of the clan, calling themselves the "Mansaketu Farmers", pointed out that since their lands were located to the west, they were breaking the law every time they brought their cocoa eastwards to Mate for sale. Since it was as well to hang for a sheep as for a lamb, there was an incentive to smuggle rather than sell cocoa in Mate. In a petition requesting a separate UGFCC buying centre, a thinly veiled threat to do so was dangled in front of the administration:

> "Instead of the 54/- cocoa price per load at Mansaketu therefore, the Mansaketu farmer loses 10/- for the farm labourer, 2/- for conveyance to Mate and so reducing the actual price per load of cocoa, 54/- to 42/- as far as the Mansaketu farmers are concerned... we are on our own and on behalf of the entire farmers on the lands mentioned above petitioning the Council once again this year, that a sealing station and therefore a society of the United Ghana Farmers' Council be opened for us... as we have unanimously decided on the date of this petition to risk the conveyance of cocoa towards the east Ghana-Togoland border, an act which is really illegal, suspicious and telling on us as patriotic farmers of Ghana."[86]

The "Mansaketu Farmers" appreciated that if they received the buying centre, they would have succeeded in eliciting *de facto* recognition for a separate village. The Mantey faction won this particular argument. Despite the misgivings of the Regional administration, the Kalelentis

and allied clans demolished their homes in Mate in 1965 and founded Abrani close to Kukurantumi on the Hohoe-Kute road. As their chief, they selected S.Q. Mantey who was henceforth known by his stool title of Nana Akototse IV. Amongst those who chose to remain in Mate was the family of Joseph Lemboe, which was rewarded with the creation of a separate Mate stool.[87] The act of secession turned out to be a grave miscalculation in the longer term. Although Mantey continued to play the CPP card in the hope that the Government would reverse its decision, it was questionable whether somebody who did not live in Mate could ever become Okakple. Nana Soglo insisted that the Kalelentis had forfeited their claim to the Paramouncy once and for all, a view which was widely shared in the community. The Kalelentis were not to know that the tenure of the Nkrumah regime was itself about to be rudely terminated. A couple of months after the foundation of Abrani, the Armed Forces and Police seized power and dismantled the structures of one-party rule.

4.3. The Rebuff of the Unificationists

4.3.1. The Aftermath of the Coup

When the Nkrumah regime was toppled with such comparative ease, the Bakpele were as surprised as anybody else. Most personal and community objectives had been premised on the continuation of the CPP in office. The media, in its reportage of successive assassination attempts, had succeeded in creating an image of Nkrumah as a leader who was indestructible. The elaborate mythology was swept away in a matter of hours. In the midst of the uncertainty that replaced it, most Bakpele applied the lesson they had learned after independence:

namely, the importance of climbing aboard the latest bandwagon without delay. Much as former unificationists had sidled into the CPP, party members now pretended they had never identified with the fallen regime. In March 1966 local figures who had appeared on CPP platforms, and who had traded in the verbal currency of socialism and Nkrumahism, organized a public meeting in support of the coup. Party cards and records were publicly burned (probably for reasons of self-preservation) and an effigy of Nkrumah was buried in the Mate cemetary.[88] Similarly, the chiefs of Likpe and Lolobi, who had been conspicuous in CPP activities, greeted the coup effusively:

> "They [the CPP Government] seemed to believe that they werea special breed divinely ordained to remain in office for ever and ever and so lording it over us by preaching virtues and practising vices. But by the Grace of God, the Army and the Police's timely action has liberated us to breath the Air of Freedom once more. We appreciate and fully support for the 'Coup de Grace' befitting that Satanic Regime of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana for ever."[89]

Sensing an opportune moment, they went on to request assistance in the fulfilment of eight development projects, some of which had previously been turned down by the Nkrumah Government.

The most blatant opportunism was exhibited by the chief and elders of Abrani. They were aware that the National Liberation Council (NLC) was examining chieftaincy affairs very closely with a view to reversing the anomalies introduced by the Nkrumah regime. In April 1966, Agbowoada petitioned the NLC, claiming that Nana Akototse had been deprived of the Paramouncy which was rightly his, only because Nana Soglo was a CPP apparatchik.[90] This was followed by a petition requesting a Commission of Enquiry, in which it was claimed *inter alia* that Nana Soglo had been a Government spy and that Nkrumah had rewarded him, on his release from Togo, with a job at the State Mining Corporation.[91] These appeals understandably fell on receptive ears. In July, the Regional Administrative Officer agreed that there were grounds to appoint such a body, since the Gutch formula had apparently been violated.[92] In May 1967, Agbowoada was permitted to return to Likpe, and in July a Chieftaincy

Committee was appointed to look into the related questions of who was entitled to occupy the Likpe stool and whose prerogative it was to approve a candidate.[93]

Nevertheless, it is worth recording that there were some long-standing party members who declined to renounce their affiliations in spite of the prevailing atmosphere. In many cases, they had been dismayed at the decision to by-pass the CPP branches and to appoint someone from Anlo to fill the Biakoye seat. Yet they had invested too much in the CPP to abandon it that easily. When it came to the destruction of party documents, the Chairman and Secretary of the Mate branch ran a personal risk by concealing the membership book and their party cards. Equally, Nana Soglo made no attempt to conceal his own political record and this proved to be his salvation. When the Siriboe Chieftaincy Committee convened, it rapidly transpired that Nana Akototse IV had attended the Ideological Institute and had repeatedly paraded his party loyalty. The Chairman was outraged at this blatant attempt to mislead the NLC and before he could decide in favour Nana Soglo, Nana Akototse withdrew from the hearings. He continued, however, to dispute the legitimacy of Nana Soglo and it was not until 1970 that an abortive effort at reconciliation was made.

Many others who disowned the CPP did so out of fear. The pendulum had swung back and most Bakpele felt they had no option but to follow its trajectory. On the other hand, those individuals who had taken refuge in Togo or who had stopped short of joining the CPP were presented with an opportunity to level some old scores. Once the dust had settled, however, what was open to question was their capacity to rebuild a derelict *Ablode* structure.

4.3.2. Interpreting the 1969 Elections

The observation that is most commonly made about the period spanning the 1966 coup and the return to civilian rule in 1969 is that the process of transition brought latent ethnic tensions closer to the surface.[94] This was partly inherent in

the nature of the coup, since the inner circle of conspirators was overwhelmingly Ewe whereas the latter represented but a minority within the Army and Police.[95] When the NLC was constituted, three of its seven members were Ewes: namely Lt.-Colonel Kotoka, J.W.K. Harlley and A.K. Deku. Within the first year, rumours began to circulate to the effect that the Ewe and Ga members were manipulating the environment to the advantage of their ethnic constituencies. Conversely, the unsuccessful coup that killed Kotoka appeared to contain elements of an Akan backlash.[96] Once the transition to civilian rule began in earnest, a fresh spate of rumours began to circulate. While Akwasi Afrifa, who replaced Ankrah as Chairman of the NLC, was suspected of favouring Kofi Busia, Harlley and Deku appeared to back the political ambitions of Komla Gbedemah. The divisions, which threatened to tear the NLC apart, hastened the process of military withdrawal.

The pattern of voting in the 1969 election is also interpreted in ethnic terms.[97] While the Progress Party under Busia swept Akan constituencies across the country, it won only two seats in the Volta Region, both of which were located in the north. On the other hand, the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) won almost half of its seats within the Volta Region, but failed to capture a single constituency in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo or Central Regions.[98]

The ethnic interpretation is valid as far as the election as a whole is concerned. A series of local electoral studies has confirmed that the NAL was indeed damaged by its close association with the Ewes.[99] But what is usually overlooked is that within the Volta Region the PP could lay as valid a claim to the Ewe mantle as NAL itself. Prominent *Ablode* politicians returned to the political fray and while they avoided advocating secession, they did reopen the debate about the terms on which Togoland had been incorporated. In the Constituent Assembly, S.G. Antor and A.K. Odame proposed a motion to restore at least the name of Trans-Volta Togoland, and there were hints that this was merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg.[100] When new parties began to coalesce, Antor, Odame and

Kofi Dumoga aligned themselves with the Progress Party. M.K. Apaloo, who had previously represented the Federated Youth Organization in Anlo and had made common cause with the TC, preferred to join the United Nationalist Party under the leadership of Joe Appiah. These figures (with the exception of Dumoga who did not stand) were hopeful of reactivating support bases in their former constituencies. After all, they could claim to have made personal sacrifices in standing up to Nkrumah. In their eyes, Gbedemah was politically vulnerable because he had been instrumental in building the CPP. In a free electoral contest, there was every reason to expect the PP to at least share the honours in the Volta Region.

On polling day, NAL swept the board in those constituencies which were not Akan-speaking. Antor stood in East Dayi, which was substantially the same constituency as he had won by a margin of more than 6,000 votes in 1956. On this occasion, he received less than 20% of the poll, which was all the more humiliating because the victor was a virtual novice.[101] In Buem, which had been shorn of Biakoye, A.K. Odame hoped to reverse his earlier defeat at the hands of F.Y. Asare, but cornered only 36% of the vote (see Table 4.2). In Anlo constituency, the PP candidate attracted a derisory vote while M.K. Apaloo was convincingly beaten into second place. Even the two northern seats of Krachi and Nkwanta were won by the PP on the narrowest of margins.[102] In sum, some of the foremost Ewe (and minority) politicians were delivered a stinging rebuff by the electorate of the Volta Region.

Table 4.2:

The 1969 Election Result in Four Constituencies

Candidate	Party	Votes	Winner
1. Biakoye:			
S.K. Aboagye	PP	1,900	
Obed Asamoah	NAL	8,834	NAL
T.C.Y. Adibo	UNP	103	
C.K. Amoah	PAP	663	
R.Y. Empreh	Independent	929	
2. East Dayi :			
D.K. Avoke	NAL	11,775	NAL
A. Bwatsy-Alog	UNP	122	
S.G. Antor	PP	2,941	
3. Buem:			
Alex K. Odame	PP	3,590	
C.K. Nayo	NAL	5,778	NAL
A.K. Ekpe	UNP	94	
A.S.K. Donkor	PAP	621	
4. Anlo :			
K. Ahiabor	PP	156	
R. Seglah	NAL	5,062	NAL
M.K. Apaloo	UNP	1,707	

(Source: Legon Observer, 5 September 1969)

There were two basic reasons for this outcome, each of which bears on the underlying theme of national integration. On the one hand, Antor and his associates were blamed for having marginalized the Region in national politics. When they raised the Togoland question, they were accused of disinterring something that had been laid to rest to the satisfaction of almost everybody. Although former TC activists tried very hard to breathe life back into their party

networks, the most influential members had either died or were by now too old to engage in politics. Within the Volta Region, at least, the PP rekindled memories of a past that people preferred to put behind them. On the other hand, NAL seemed to promise a fresh start. The party is sometimes portrayed as a slightly mutated version of the defunct CPP Yet it is significant that some of the CPP stalwarts held aloof from NAL. Frank Tsaku, the former Member of Parliament for Kpandu North, declined to join the party because he regarded Gbedemah as a traitor.[103] Similarly, Nana Agya Mensah kept his distance on the grounds that he knew the limitations of the NAL leadership.[104] In fact, much of the success of NAL can be attributed to the selection of candidates who had no political record and were therefore without blemishes. These were younger men, who were characterised by higher levels of educational attainment than their opponents (see Table 4.3). Dr. Obed Asamoah, who stood successfully for the Biakoye constituency, was a case in point. He had been born at Likpe-Bala in 1936 and was one of the Bakpele who travelled outside the Trust Territory for his education. He attended Achimota school and then proceeded overseas for his University education, returning to Ghana with a Doctoral degree. Like the other NAL candidates, he was not weighed down by a political record. Between 1960 and 1962 he had worked as a lawyer and had then lived overseas for the remainder of the Nkrumah period. It was only after the 1966 coup that he returned to take up employment in the Law Faculty at the University of Ghana.[105] Asamoah first entered the limelight following his election to the Constituent Assembly, where he played an active part in proceedings.[106] He initially gravitated towards the so-called Third Force, but later opted for NAL and was selected as the candidate for the Biakoye constituency.

Table 4.3:

The Background of NAL Candidates Elected Within the Area of Former British Togoland in 1969

Name	Age	Seat	Education	Profession
V.K.D. Akude	n.a.	Ho-East	n.a.	n.a.
F.K. Adinyira	46	Ho-West	Achimota College Paris University, Wisconsin University (M.A.)	lecturer
C.K. Nayo	42	Buem	London University	teacher
S.K. Osei-Nyame	32	Akan	Achimota College University of Ghana	lawyer
T.K. Agadzi	n.a.	West-Dayi	n.a.	n.a.
Dr. O. Asamoah	33	Biakoye	Achimota London University Columbia University (Ph.D.)	lawyer/ academic
D.K. Avoke	36	East-Dayi	University of Ghana	lecturer

(Source: Moses Danquah, The Birth of the Second Republic, pp. 197-110)

The NAL candidates belonged to the first wave of Togolanders that fitted comfortably into the higher echelons of the Ghanaian elite. The southern Ewe had long being producing businessmen and professionals whose own class interests lay in the preservation of Ghanaian territorial integrity (detailed research into the making of an Anlo bourgeoisie is long overdue). They were now joined by the latest intake from the interior. Indeed the Ghanaian elite as a whole shared a common outlook on most essentials, as Dr. Asamoah himself noted in the context of the elections:

> "With the exception of the insignificant parties theoretically committed to a policy of socialism, the manifestoes issued by the parties that contested the elections are quite similar. This is not an accident nor is it unique with Ghana. It is because for a number of reasons there is a large measure of agreement about the ends of contemporary Ghanaian society and the means by which they can be achieved... The P.P. and the main opposition parties which contested the election were movements built around leaders whose ideas were hardly dissimilar."[107]

While Asamoah displayed a keen interest in Pan-African causes, he never exhibited much sympathy for the unification movement.[108]

A vote for NAL therefore amounted to a collective effort to harvest the fruits of political integration. The paradox is that the Volta Region suffered greater marginalization because of a failure by NAL to attract comparable support in other parts of the country. Yet it has to be said that this was not for want of trying. The party fielded candidates in 139 out of a possible 140 constituencies,[109] but suffered from a widespread perception of ethnic exclusiveness. In the process, both the northern Ewe and the minorities were tarred with a negative stereotype that derived from the high profile of the southern Ewe in commerce, the professions and in state institutions.

The broad trends outlined above do not tell quite the whole story. The success of Dr. Asamoah in the Biakoye constituency also owed a lot to a meticulous campaign on his part. Since his return to Ghana, he had worked hard at building his local contacts. In the words of Yaw Twumasi:

> "O.Y. Asamoah... built a personal political machine, in a constituency where the electorate is of four different ethnic stocks, through his services as a lawyer and frequent week-end visits while lecturing at Legon: it is arguable that he too could have won for any one of the contending parties."[110]

In fact, the Biakoye constituency was even more heterogeneous than Twumasi suggests, since it encompassed Bowiri, Nkonya, Akpafu, Santrokofi, Lolobi and Likpe.[111] The Bakpele overwhelmingly backed Asamoah as the 'local boy', although a minority of unificationists transferred their allegiance to the PP. But since Likpe provided too narrow a base, Asamoah had also to establish his credentials in neighbouring communities. He was aided by the fact that the

larger Nkonya vote was split between two local candidates. Moreover, Nkonya had always prided itself on its CPP traditions, which placed a barrier in the path of S.K. Abogaye, the PP candidate. In the event, Dr. Asamoah won the seat with more than 70% of the votes cast and so became the first person from Likpe to enter Parliament.

4.4. Conclusion:

The poll that opened the way to the Second Republic put the seal on a process of integration that had begun in the 1920s, in that it finally closed the door on the separatist option. Initially, the administrative union of British Togoland and the Gold Coast facilitated economic exchange and social mobility between the two territories. Over time, this contributed to a sense of traversing a common path, a metaphor that is borrowed from Benedict Anderson. Yet in the post-war period more than one 'imagined community' competed for hegemonic status. The vision of a united Eweland foundered early on as a result of the clash of material interests between the Gold Coast Ewe and the farmers, traders and teachers of Togoland. Far more seductive was the vision of a reunified Togoland. This had a resonance amongst an older generation who bore German names, could speak the language and who (surprisingly enough) looked back on the German colonial period as a golden age. It also appealed to Togolanders whose life experiences constantly reminded them that the Trust Territory was disadvantaged by comparison with the colony. To return to the travelling metaphor, the unification movement gathered support by warning Togolanders that they were in danger of being forced to carry the luggage of the entire party. The third vision was that of a united Ghana that would finally erase the ambiguous status of British Togoland. The CPP promised to reapportion the load that had been unfairly distributed by the British and gave an assurance that the fruits of independence would be reached much more quickly if Togolanders would only link arms with their Gold Coast and follow the alternative route.

It was shown in Chapter Three how the Bakpele became deeply implicated on either side of the unification debate. Although local concerns were never entirely supplanted, the political struggle never amounted simply to a modified version of old factional disputes. This Chapter, the last in the section, has further argued that, while the coercive tactics of the Nkrumah regime destroyed *Ablode* networks, the movement was already on the retreat. The 'German scholars' literally died out, while many Bakpele aspired to employment opportunities that were presented by the Ghanaian state. Furthermore, the middle belt of the Volta Region had begun to produce its own intellectual and (to a lesser extent) business elite which could compete for power and influence on the national stage.

Yet the Nkrumah years also witnessed a growing cynicism about the pursuit of politics. It was in this context that local factionalism took the form of fierce competition for the ears of the regime. In other words, the loss of a meaningful political agenda fomented the outpourings of factional conflict that had been muted in the 1950s. Finally, although the 1969 elections have generally been examined in the light of heightened ethnic awareness, a quite different construction is possible The pattern of results represented a crushing defeat for the former unificationists as well as a desire to return to the mainstream of national politics. These are conclusions which cut against the grain of much of the extant research.

Footnotes to Chapter Four:

1. This is in spite of the fact that Ghana did not become a Republic until 1960.

2. GNA (Ho) RAO/C.749 "Future of Togoland Under British Trusteeship", "The Alternative to Integration", issued by The Combined Forces Against Integration, dated 24 July 1954. There were reports at that time that Gerald Awuma and the CPP branch in Ho had defected to the federation side.

3. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner For the Trust Territory of Togoland Under British Administration, Addendum, annex IV, p.5.

4. GNA (Ho) RAO/C.749/TA33, "Future of Togoland Under British Trusteeship", "Resolution of Chiefs and Elders of Southern Togoland Under United Kingdom Trusteeship to the Secretary of State for the Colonies", dated 16 February 1957. This resolution was signed, amongst others, by Togbe Gabusu IV of Gbi, Nana Sekyere of Likpe and John Amanie of Buem-Borada. Also Resolution of Chiefs and Elders in Kpandu and in Akpini Local Council Area, Southern Togoland Under British Administration, to Secretary of State for the Colonies", dated 24 February 1957.

5. GNA (Ho) RAO/C.749/TA33, "Future of Togoland Under British Trusteeship", "Resolution of Chiefs and Elders of Buem-Krachi of Togoland (Southern Section) Under British Administration to the Secretary of State for the Colonies", undated. This was signed once again by John Amanie and by Daniel Setu of Likpe-Mate.

6. See Matchet's Diary in West Africa, March 16 1957, p.244.

7. On the constitutional debate, see Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-60, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), chapter 6 and 7.

8. In his autobiography, Nkrumah pointed out the "cost of operating such a system in a country of just under 92,000 square miles with a population of five million people". Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1959), p.198. See also his comments on Togoland unification in chapter 23. The CPP claimed that the opposition was not interested in federalism so much as in gaining power at the centre. Austin, op. cit., p.327.

9. Austin, op. cit., pp.301-307.

10. For the details, see the statement by Ako Adjei, the Minister of the Interior, in Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 1 May 1957, columns 119-128.

11. See his contribution to the debate on a motion to approve the Government handling of the crisis. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 1 May 1957, columns 144-156.

12. Claude Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa, (New York, Cornell University Press, 1966), p.136. Their acquittal did not of itself furnish proof of innocence since it was a result of misdirections to the jury by the trial judge. Austin, op. cit., p.381.

13. See, for example, the description in Austin, op. cit., p.372.

14. In a much quoted passage of his autobiography, Nkrumah referred to the need for a "temporary benevolent dictatorship" to deal with an opposition that was "violent, waspish and malignant". See for example Austin, op. cit. p.371, who nevertheless attributes much of the blame to the behaviour of the opposition leaders. Perhaps the most savage attack on Nkrumah was launched by Henry Bretton in The Rise And Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule In Africa (London: Pall Mall, 1966). Almost as critical is Trevor Jones, Ghana's First Republic, 1960-1966 (London: Methuen, 1976). A more structural explanation for the behaviour of the CPP regime would take into account the class position of those who led the party. Rathbone has argued that those attracted to the CPP banner were an aspirant class whose upward mobility was blocked by the proto-bourgeoisie of the United Gold Coast Convention. Having gained control of the political gateway to accumulation, they in turn provoked a backlash from an aspirant class in Ashanti which found its own route to accumulation blocked. See Richard Rathbone, "Business Men in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949-1957", Journal of Development Studies, IX, 3, 1974; and "Parties' Socio-Economic Bases and Regional Differentiation in the Rate of Change in Ghana", in Peter Lyon and James Manor (eds.), Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth (Leicester University Press, 1983). For a defence of Preventive Detention by someone who was closely involved in its introduction and implementation, see G. Bing, Reap The Whirlwind: An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana From 1950 to 1966 (London: MacGibbon and Lee, 1968), especially chapter 7.

15. In Borada, thirteen party members had to pay fines ranging from two to twelve bottles of schnapps plus five sheep each. At Ahamansu, the head of the French Tsevie community was threatened with expulsion from his land unless he paid a fine of two live sheep, nine bottles of schnapps and a bottle of whisky. GNA (Ho) RAO/C.749 "Future of Togoland Under British Trusteeship", Senior Superintendant, Ghana Police, Ho, to Regional Officer, Ho, 21 May 1957.

16. Austin, op. cit., pp.378-380.

17. Antor in a speech in Parliament threatened secession over the issue. See Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 6 August 1959, cols. 1411-12.

18. The capacity of the centre to control its subordinates was often a problem. On the politics of Regional administration, see Richard Crook, "Bureaucracy and Politics in Ghana: A Comparative Perspective", in Peter Lyon and James Manor (eds.), op. cit., *passim*; and Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-1966: Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), chapters 4 and 5.

19. A speech to a gathering of civil servants in Ho, 16 September 1958, quoted in K. Kwaku, "The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: A Case-Study of the Volta Region (Ghana) Since 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975, p.255. Krobo Edusei was also responsible for the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act

20. See the contributions of Antor and M.K. Apaloo in the debate on the Togoland (Assimilation of Law) Bill. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, First Series, Volume 12, 1958, columns 597-608.

21. Kwaku, op. cit. p.194.

22. Barbara Callaway, "Local Politics in Ho and Aba", Canadian Journal of African Studies, IX, 4, 1970, p.134-5. This article contains many inaccuracies and should be treated with caution.

23. Every pro-NLM chief in Ashanti, except the Asantehene himself, was destooled. Austin, op. cit., p.378. In Dagbon, considerable pressure was placed upon the Ya Na Abudulai to switch allegiance from the NPP to the ruling party. His willingness to do so, removed the need to depose him. Martin Staniland, The Lions of Dagbon: Political Change in Northern Ghana, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), chapter 8. Also Adrian Antoine, "The Politics of Rice Farming in Dagbon, 1972-1979", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1985, pp.44-45

24. The CUT won 29 out of a total of 46 seats, as against 10 for the PTP of Grunitzky, 10 for the UCPN and 4 for independent candidates. Samuel. Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Togo (Metuchen and London: Scarecrow Press, 1987), p.87.

25. E.O. Saffu, "Nkrumah and the Togoland Question", Economic Bulletin of Ghana, XII, 2/3, 1968, p.38. See also Dennis Austin, "The Uncertain Frontier: Ghana-Togo", Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 2, 1963.

26. Welch, op. cit., p.141. See also Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.203-211; W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and The New State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 81-87.

27. Report of a speech by Nkrumah in Ho in West Africa, 31 December 1960, p.1486.

28. Details are contained in GNA (Ho), RAO/C854, "Ghana/Togo Land Border Incidents".

29. By the end of 1961, the total refugee population numbered 6,000. Saffu, op. cit., p.42.

30. Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp.406-7; and Trevor Jones, op. cit., p.126.

31. See Ghana, Exchange of Notes Between the Governments of Ghana and Togo (Accra: African Affairs Secretariat, undated). An interesting insight into these events can be gained through the files of the West Africa Committee, Edinburgh University Mss., Box 1.

32. The messages were however conflicting. See West Africa, 2 February 1963, p.123.

33. Saffu, op. cit., p.44.

34. Kwaku, op. cit, p.267.

35. A letter from the Ewe-Togo Democratic Union to the Chairman and Members, Volta Regional House of Chiefs, Ho, dated 15 June 1962 (copy in my possession).

36. For details of the corrupt dealings of F.Y. Asare, see Ghana, Report of the (Jiagge) Commission into the Assets of Specified Persons, 1969, Volume V., pp.1-28.

37. D. Smock and A.C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, (New York and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975), p.236.

38. Neither was an Ewe. Otu came from Akwampim, while Ankrah was a Ga. The latter were preponderant within the officer corps and came, even more than the Ewe, under suspicion. Nevertheless, Kotoka was believed to be in danger of losing his command of the Second Brigade by the time of the 1966 coup following allegations of ethnic favouritism levelled against him. On these events, see Simon Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), pp.143-48. This follows closely on Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp.195-201.

39. Baynham, op cit., p.231.

40. Antor won over 70% of the vote in the 1956 election.

41. Quoted in Kwaku, op. cit. p.195.

42. See the statement by Ako Adjei, the Minister of the Interior, in Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 1 May 1957, columns 124.

43. Interview with Nichodemus Oloto, Mate, 28 March 1986.

44. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 May 1986.

45. Interviews with Amatus Adela, son of G.K. Kumesi, Mate, 16 January 1986; and Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 15 February 1986.

46. Interview with Nichodemus Oloto, as above.

47. Likpe Division CPP Branch, Mate, to Minister of Local Government, dated July 1959 (copy in my possession).

48. Interview with Matthew Kodzo Akorli, Abrani, 14 March 1986.

49. Even if land had been available, it is not certain that the expansion of cocoa would have continued. There is some evidence to suggest that cocoa farmers in West Africa have preferred, at a certain stage of capital accumulation, to invest in education and transport rather than more cocoa. See, for example, J.D.Y. Peel, Ijeshas and Nigerians: The Incorporation of a Yoruba Kingdom, 1890-1970s, (Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapter 7.

50. Affidavit signed by K. Akpator, 29 May 1963; and J.R. Dabo, District Commissioner Jasikan, to Nana Komla Dihie, Regent of Likpe Traditional Area, dated 8 November 1962 (copies in my possession).

51. These biographical details are drawn from Ghana Who's Who, 1972-73 (Accra: Bartels Publications, 1972), pp. 378-379.

52. Ibid., pp.422-423.

53. An early critique of the Nkrumahist development strategy, which aroused some controversy, was that of Elliot Berg, "Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in the Ivory Coast", in P. Foster and A. Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and The Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971). For a more sympathetic account, see Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978). This is also true of R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969).

54. "A Saddle for the Volta", West Africa, 16 February 1957, p.153.

55. On the social consequences of the Volta Lake, see Leo Barrington, "Migration and the Growth of a Resettlement Community: Kete-Krachi, Ghana, 1962 and 1969", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1972; Robert Chambers (ed.), The Volta Resettlement Experience (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970); R.M. Lawson, The Changing Economy of the Lower Volta, 1954-67: A Study in the Dynamics of Rural Economic Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

56. By 1965, the Volta Region had 12 secondary schools and seven Training Colleges. Ghana Year Book, 1965, (Accra: Daily Graphic) p.133-6, 144.

57. Interview with Amatus Adela, as above.

58. Maxwell Owusu, The Use and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.88-92.

59. The Greenwood Commission noted that the revenue in the Likpe-Lolobi Council was 21s. per head, which was the fourth highest. Ghana, Report of the Commissioner for Local Government Enquiries, June 1957, (Accra: 1960), p.30.

60. For the shortcomings of local government, see Amonoo, op. cit., pp.157-177. Also John Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), chapter 7.

61. "Brief Notes Arising out of the District Commissioner's Visit to Mate on Thursday 27th August 1959 to Inaugurate the Seven-Man Village Committees in the New Likpe State" (copy in my possession).

62 BjÖrn Beckman, Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976). The audit reports of the Farmers' Council in the Likpe-Kukurantumi District drew attention to possible fraud. GNA (Ho), DA/CMB 52, "C.M.B. General (Circulars)" and AUD/c.808 "United Ghana Farmers' Council Co-operatives: Hohoe District".

63 Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 20 January 1986.

64. "The Likpe Traditional Area CPP Meeting Minutes on the Nomination of a Probable Candidate For Appointment as M.P. for the Newly Created Biakoye Electoral District" (copy in my possession)

65. See BjÖrn Beckman, "Ghana, 1951-78: The Agrarian Basis of the Post-Colonial State", in J. Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams (eds.), Rural Development in Tropical Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1981).

66. GNA (Ho), RAO/C854/J39 "Ghana/French Togo - Land Border Incidents", letter from the CPP Branch Secretary, New Ayoma, to the District Commissioner, Jasikan, dated 12 February 1962.

67 After 1964, the Border Guards were placed directly under the Office of the President. Baynham, op. cit., p.135. Following the 1966 coup, they were restored to Police control. Robert Dowse, "Military and Police Rule", in Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (eds.), Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana (London: Frank Cass, 1975), p.24.

68. Edinburgh University Mss., West Africa Committee, Box 1., "Confidential report on Ghana, January 1964". For some of the background, see "Cocoa Smuggling - Some Reasons", C.M.B. Newsletter, no.45, August 1970.

69. GNA (Ho) DA/D314 "Likpe Native Affairs", "The Likpe Traditional Authority Council Meeting Held at Likpe Todome Under the Presidency of Nana Komla Dihie (Kyidomhene) on the Seventh December 1957".

70. "Vote of Thanks - Convention People's Party Rally, Likpe Mate, 3rd May, 1959, Moved By Nana Soglo Allo II", (a document in my possession).

71. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 15 February 1986.

72. A letter from CPP members in Mate to Chairman, Buem Constituency CPP, Okadjakrom, undated (copy in my possession).

73. L.M. Anyomi, "A History of the Likpe People", B.A. Long Essay, Department of History, University of Ghana, 1979, pp.61-62. The Kalelentis reportedly refused to participate in the burial of the dead chief.

74. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", letter from District Commissioner, Jasikan to Regional Commissioner, Ho, dated 18 August 1962.

75. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 10 February 1986.
76. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 10 February 1986.

77. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", letter from B.K. Clemefi, Mankrado of Mate, and others to Nana Soglo Allo III, dated 4 July 1962. The original stool, which was apparently a fetish rather than a proper stool remained in the possession of the Kalelenti clan. Anyomi, op. cit., pp.62-3.

78. The Ideological Institute was opened in 1961. It offered courses in Marxism-Leninism and in Nkrumahism. It had difficulty attracting suitable students and in 1964 was apparently forced "to advertise in the newspapers inviting minor party officials and workers in the integral wings to attend courses without loss of salary". This was the very year that S.Q. Mantey enrolled. See Jones, op. cit., pp.60-61.

79. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 May 1986.

80. I am grateful to Mr. Emilson Kwashie, the former CPP Secretary in East Mate, for access to the remaining party records.

81. The Regional Commissioner agreed that there was grounds for such an action, but declined to forward the matter to the Attorney-General. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs".

82. See correspondence in GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs". Restrictions were later placed upon the movements of Mantey himself. Anyomi, op. cit., p.62.

83. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", letter from Secretary to Regional Commissioner, Ho, to General Manager, Roman Catholic Mission, Dzelukope, dated 15 May 1964.

84. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", letter from S.Q. Mantey to General Manager, Catholic Mission, Dzelukope, dated 25 May 1964.

85. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", Minute by the Regional Commissioner on letter from S.Q. Mantey to General Manager, Catholic Mission, Dzelukope, dated 25 May 1964.

86. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", a petition from the Mansaketu Farmers on the subject of the approval of a UGFCC society at Abrani, dated 11 June 1963.

87. Mensah Lemboe, who later became the Matehene, was one of the first CPP enthusiasts in that town. He was also the son of Joseph Lemboe. The Mate stool was henceforth quite separate from the Paramouncy, which also resided in Mate.

88. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 March 1986

89. "A Welcome Address By the Chiefs and People of Likpe Lolobi to the District Administrative Officer for Jasikan District on His Visit to Likpe Mate on Thursday 23rd June 1966", (copy in my possession).

90. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", petition by Thaddeus Agbowoada to NLC, dated 6 April 1966.

91. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", "Application For a Constitutional Commission of Enquiry into the Likpe Paramount Stool Dispute", dated 20 June 1966.

92. GNA (Ho) RAO/C1236/C/TA66/4 "Likpe Traditional Affairs", minute by Regional Administrative Officer dated 13 July 1966 and R.A.O. to Secretary to NLC, dated 22 July 1966.

93. Ghana, Local Government Bulletin, 14 July 1967.

94. Smock and Smock, op. cit., pp.239-242. Robert Dowse, "Military and Police Rule", in Austin and Luckham, op. cit. On the NLC period, see also Robert Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (London: Methuen, 1972).

95. The composition of the inner and outer circles of coup plotters is examined in Baynham, op. cit., chapter 8.

96. Smock and Smock, op. cit., p.240.

97. Ibid., pp.242-246. One analysis after the election suggested that the Ewe rallied to NAL because they had been made to fear the consequences of an Akan victory. See Max Assimeng, "The Electoral Panorama", The Legon Observer, IV, No. 18/1, 5 September 1969, p.4.

98. For a complete list of the election results, see Moses Danquah, (ed.), The Birth of the Second Republic (Accra: Editorial and Publishing Services, undated), pp.125-127 ; and Legon Observer, Special Post-Election Issue, IV, No. 18/1, 5 September 1969.

99. John Dunn, "Politics in Asunafo", p.198; J.A. Peasah, "Politics in Abuakwa", p.226; Maxwell Owusu, "Politics in Swedru", pp.255; Mark Graesser, "Politics in Sekyere", p.286, all in Austin and Luckham, op. cit..

100. Ghana, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly: Official Report, 13 February 1969, columns 795-801. Also R. Luckham and S. Nkrumah, "The Constituent Assembly - A Social and Political Portrait", in Austin and Luckham, op. cit., p.104.

101. According to Frank Tsaku, D.K. Avoke fought an adroit campaign, exposing the flaws in the character of his opponent. As a result, Antor received little support even in Hohoe. Interview at Hohoe, 14 October 1986.

102. In Krachi, B.K. Mensah won by only 718 votes. Coincidentally, R.K. Mensah won by 719 votes in Nkwanta. Danquah, op. cit., p.125.

103. He was also unimpressed by the overly academic orientation of the NAL candidates. Interview with Frank Tsaku, Hohoe, 14 October 1986.

104. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah III, Avedzeme, 19 February 1986.

105. These details are to be found in Moses Danquah, op. cit., pp.107-108.

106. Luckham and Nkrumah, in Austin and Luckham op. cit., *passim*.

107. Dr. Obed Asamoah, "Policy Differences Between Government and Opposition", Legon Observer, V, 23, November 1970, pp.7-8.

108. Asamoah was a regular contributor to the Legon Observer on topics such as Namibia and South Africa.

109. Yaw Twumasi, "The 1969 Election", in Austin and Luckham, op. cit., p.160.

110. Ibid., p.157.

111. Ghana Gazette, 19 September 1969.

Part Two: Economic Crisis and the Spectre of National Disintegration, 1969-1981

During the 1970s, many of the factors that had assisted long-term integration ceased to be operative or at least declined in significance. The physical infrastructure of the country deteriorated noticeably, the state ceased to act as a provider of services or as an attractive source of employment, while the living standards of the majority of Ghanaians declined markedly. The second part of this thesis assesses the impact of these developments upon national integration, using Likpe once more as a case-study. Chapter Five examines renewed challenges to the territorial integrity of the Ghanaian state posed by smuggling and secessionist activity. Chapter Six then considers whether there is any evidence for a conscious withdrawal from the state nexus.

Chapter Five

Smugglers and Secessionists: The Political Economy of the Frontier 1969-1981

During the 1970s, Governments repeatedly warned of threats to national sovereignty posed by secessionists, allegedly sponsored by the Eyadema regime in Togo, and smugglers operating along the length of the frontier. Although neither element was entirely new, they did resurface at a time when the Ghanaian state was finding it increasingly difficult to monitor the activities of its citizens. It is comparatively easy to examine the impact of secessionism, which is attempted in the second section of the Chapter. Smuggling poses greater methodological problems, not only because it is notoriously difficult to quantify, but also because its political meaning tends to be oblique. Whereas the aims of a secessionist are self-evident, it is less easy to penetrate the mind of a smuggler. At one level, smuggling can be viewed simply as a form of criminal activity. Yet the definition of crime is inherently ideological. Moreover, if law is the point of contact between state and society, persistent criminality may be construed as a

challenge to officially sanctioned norms of behaviour. Before probing these matters more deeply, it is necessary to establish the context within which the debates about smuggling and secessionism were conducted. This context is also relevant to the issues dealt with in the Chapter that follows.

5.1. Establishing the Context

5.1.1. Ethnicity and the Politics of Exclusion

Following the inauguration of the Second Republic in 1969, the Volta Region found itself pushed towards the margins of power. In the two Cabinets formed by Kofi Busia, the Region was not represented, although it is fair to note that there were only two Progress Party (PP) Members of Parliament from which to choose. It was more particularly the actions of the regime which raised suspicion that the Region was being punished for its support of NAL. The PP made much play of its rural development programme and yet expenditure in the Volta Region actually declined. The length of new roads constructed in the Region fell from 72 miles between 1967 and 1969, to 30 miles in 1969/70 and one-and-a-half miles in 1970/71. Again, whereas Government-financed community water projects virtually doubled in the Busia years, the rate of construction in the Volta Region fell by 30%.[1] Ethnic partiality also intruded into the apportionment of civil service and military positions. Although Nkrumah had become increasingly wary of the Ewe in the 1960s, many people from the Region did benefit from the expansion of state employment during his term of office. Others received appointments or promotions under the NLC. The export of skilled manpower was a hallmark of the southern sector of the Region, where inadequate land resources were compounded by the adverse effects of the Volta Lake.[2] In February 1970, the Busia regime embarked on a purge of the civil service and the Police, ostensibly to reverse previous acts of nepotism. It transpired that a disproportionate number of the 568 people to be dismissed were Ewes.[3] Belief in the existence of a vendetta was reinforced when leading Ewe officers, notably

Brigadier Amenu, Lt.-Colonel Kattah and Brigadier Ashley-Lassen, were removed from positions of military command to which their seniority entitled them.[4]

When the military struck for a second time in January 1972, Colonel Acheampong recited a long list of Government misdemeanours which justified the coup.[5] This included recklessly stirring up ethnic animosities. Acheampong referred to the lessons of Nigeria, which had only recently emerged from a bruising civil war, and pledged the National Redemption Council (NRC) to the eradication of tribalism at all levels of society.[6] It is noteworthy that the coup was planned and executed by a small coterie of mostly Ewe officers.[7] When the membership of the NRC was finally stabilized, three of its nine members were Ewes from the Volta Region - namely Majors Selormey, Agbo and Brigadier Ashley-Lassen, who was also appointed Chief of Defence Staff.[8]

The junta governed in a more or less collective fashion until 1974, when signs of internal dissension began to surface. The forced retirement of Alphonse Kattah, who Acheampong perceived as a security threat, was resented by other Ewe officers.[9] Then in December 1974, Ashley-Lassen was retired and replaced as Chief of Defence Staff by Colonel Okai, whose relations with his Ewe colleagues and superiors had always been fraught.[10] Finally, in October 1975, Acheampong announced the formation of a Supreme Military Council (SMC), consisting of himself, the Chief of Defence Staff, the four Service Commanders and the Inspector-General of Police.[11] Of these, only the head of the Border Guards, Brigadier Utuka, originated from the Volta Region and he was an unknown quantity. Rather than accept a position on a downgraded NRC, Selormey and Agbo resigned and were summarily retired from the Armed Forces. The following month, the regime claimed to have uncovered an Ewe plot, involving Kattah and Captain Kojo Tsikata, in which all the members of the SMC with the exception of Utuka were to have been executed.[12] Those who failed to escape to

Togo were arrested and became the subject of a show trial that dominated the state media over most of 1976.[13]

Kofi Awoonor, who was amongst those found guilty of complicity, claims that the Acheampong regime was gripped by an 'Ewe psychosis' at this time.[14] This may exaggerate the strength of the reaction, but it is clear that Acheampong distrusted his Ewe counterparts enough to exclude them from the inner sanctum of what was by then a full-blown military regime. The implications of these developments will be amplified in the Chapter that follows.

5.1.2. A Decade of Decay

The second backdrop was provided by the escalating economic crisis of the 1970s. The deeper structural causes thereof, if indeed they were structural,[15] lie beyond the scope of the thesis; yet its manifestations are highly germane to what follows. It is legitimate to speak of a crisis in at least three senses. Firstly, and most transparently, the productive sectors of the economy wilted under prolonged exposure to misconceived economic policies. For the greater part of the colonial period, cocoa had served as the principal engine of economic growth. This was because the farmers had assiduously reinvested their profits in transport, commerce and more cocoa. The vitality of rural capitalism owed relatively little to the agency of the state, given that colonial officials were worried about the adverse social consequences.[16] Post-war development strategy was premised upon a more active role for the state, which could only be funded out of higher taxes on cocoa. As has already been noted, this precipitated an awakening of Asante sub-nationalism and, in a more ambiguous manner, heightened the alienation of the Togoland farmers. The collapse of world cocoa prices in the early 1960s, brought home to the Nkrumah regime the inherent instability of an economy which was dependent on the vicissitudes of the external market. Ghanaian socialism amounted in effect to an ambitious attempt to break out of this dependency, by constructing an industrial base under the

direct control of the state.[17] Thus, the position of the state within the Ghanaian political pantheon had risen from watchdog to the *fons et origo* of national development.

Paradoxically, this required even heavier taxes upon cocoa, which in the long-run helped to kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. The farmers either diverted their energies from cocoa or took advantage of the opportunities for smuggling.[18] Both The National Liberation Council and the Busia regime adopted hesitant steps to recast the relationship between the state and the cocoa economy. Some enterprises were sold off, but for the most part the statist structures of the First Republic were perpetuated. The retreat of the farmers from official marketing channels in fact increased at the turn of the decade and added momentum to the onset of economic decline. In the 1970s, Ghana suffered from acute shortages of foreign exchange that starved state industries of vital spare parts and raw materials. Consequently, the production of most consumer goods collapsed, thereby removing one of the remaining incentives to cash crop producers.

At this juncture, the crisis of production became intertwined with the second dimension of the crisis, namely the shrinking fiscal base of the state. Falling cocoa production (at times mitigated and at other times compounded by the level of world prices) eroded state revenues, while subventions to loss-making industries consumed much of the revenue that remained.[19] (See the Appendix to this Chapter) As a result, the state ceased to perform the minimal preconditions for economic growth - those which even the minimalist state of the colonial era had fulfilled. The road and rail network were not adequately maintained, thus choking the commercial arteries linking town and countryside. Rural producers, who should in theory have benefited from rising urban food prices, in practice found it difficult to market their crops. Conversely, they had to fall back upon local substitutes for many of the consumer goods that ceased to be available on the open market.[20]

Governments aimed to compensate for the failure of state intervention at the level of production, by tightening controls over the sphere of distribution as well - what one might call the 'Tar Baby effect'. The history of price control is one of increasingly draconian measures designed to frustrate the logic of a market that was constricted by endemic shortage.[21] The unforeseen hitch was that - and this is the third manifestation of the crisis - the coercive apparatus of the state was itself becoming less dependable as an instrument of social control. One consequence of the revenue squeeze was that the wages and salaries of state employees fell conspicuously behind the cost of living. To make ends meet (and where possible to enrich themselves) state functionaries at all levels engaged in graft. This inflicted damage upon bureaucratic norms and values, a point to which I shall return in the context of border controls.

Yet, the cycle of decay did not end there, since corruption also became entrenched at the very core of the Government apparatus. Whereas the NRC was initially credited with a sense of purpose, the deterioration that set in after 1974 was accompanied by declining standards of probity at the centre. Acheampong and other members of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) were able to amass personal fortunes and to reward their favourites by controlling limited access to import licences and essential commodities.[22] The Rawlings putsch of 4 June 1979 was followed by harsh reprisals against corrupt officials, but the environment which bred this mode of behaviour was never seriously addressed. The 'housecleaning' exercise was designed to reimpose moral standards almost out of context, whereas *kalabule* had a clear rationality which was understood by everyone concerned.[23] Consequently, many of the public statements and deeds of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council teetered on the margin between naivety and disingenuity. The attempt to further tighten state controls in the midst of scarcity made it almost inevitable that *kalabule* would breed anew during the Third Republic.[24] One of the essential points to grasp about the 1970s is that

those who were closest to the locus of power typically had most to gain from the perpetuation of the crisis.

All parts of Ghana were affected, but the lessons of independence were drawn especially starkly in the Volta Region. As noted in Chapter Two, one of most powerful arguments against reunification with French Togoland in the 1950s had been the comparative poverty of that territory. In the 1970s, Togo underwent an economic boom, fuelled by rising production and better phosphate prices.[25] This made it feasible for the Togolese authorities to increase development spending and since the base of the Eyadema regime lay outside of Lomé, much of it was channelled into the rural areas - even if the north was the principal beneficiary. At a time of infrastructural decay in the Volta Region, the Togolese were building roads that linked the key administrative and commercial centres to the outlying areas. Across the border from Likpe, the Danyi villages were acquiring the outward symbols of development, such as tarred roads, schools and welfare centres, alongside less tangible manifestations of improvement such as falling mortality rates.[26] The proximity of these communities, undergoing opposite experiences, raises question about the impact upon political consciousness in the Volta Region.

5.2. TOLIMO and the Secessionist Chestnut

Curiously, the unification question remained in abeyance during the tenure of the Busia regime, although the Aliens Compliance Order and tighter Ghanaian frontier controls continued to disfigure relations with the Togolese Government.[27] In 1972, the incoming Acheampong administration restored links with the Eyadema regime. Both sides hailed rapprochement as the comradeship that was natural between military men. The fruits of co-operation were to be freer movement of goods and people. In March 1973, the leaders signed a one-year agreement establishing a Permanent Joint Commission, which was mandated to harmonize policies with respect to "political, scientific, legal, social and cultural

affairs".[28] Then in April a ceremony was held to mark the reopening of the frontier post at Aflao, which Eyadema welcomed (somewhat optimistically) as the first step towards the effective removal of an artificial colonial boundary.[29] In many ways, the statements of intent echoed the ameliorative measures explored by the Anglo-French Joint Working Party in the late 1940s. Both sides had something to gain from closer co-operation on boundary issues. The Togolese, who maintained an open-door trade policy, stood to profit from the re-export of imported commodities. The Ghanaians, on the other hand, expected the Togolese to help stamp out the rampant smuggling which characterised the Busia years. As an early signal of good faith, the Togolese authorities swooped down upon currency traders operating out of Lomé.[30]

Even as rapprochement was taking place, the unification movement was stirring back to life after more than a decade of hibernation.[31] In November 1972, the National Liberation of Western Togoland (TOLIMO) came to sudden prominence with a petition to the Organization of African Unity. It accused successive Ghanaian regimes of having acted in bad faith towards former British Togoland and asserted the right to reunite with the Togolese Republic.[32] The Ghanaians were further embarrassed in February 1974 when TOLIMO members greeted Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, with placards and a petition as he passed through Togo. TOLIMO argued that the United Nations had a moral duty to organize a fresh test of the popular will in the Volta Region, on the grounds that there had been irregularities in the conduct of the 1956 plebiscite, and that the expressed wishes of the Ewe had been ignored.[33] They were gambling on the likelihood that, having reflected on the post-colonial experience, the majority would welcome a second chance to sever the link with Ghana.

The Acheampong regime might have preferred to ignore TOLIMO were it not for two additional items of information that it managed to glean. The first was that TOLIMO was seeking the backing of Ewe chiefs on both sides of the frontier,

who had been meeting on a regular basis since 1969.[34] Like Nkrumah, the NRC was conscious of the political influence that was exercised by the traditional authorities in spite of their formal loss of power. Secondly, Ghanaian intelligence revealed that the Togolese authorities had a hand in financing the activities of TOLIMO. In subsequent years, the Togolese were unabashed in making irredentist claims upon Ghanaian territory. In January 1976, for example, The Times carried a Togolese advertisement which urged Acheampong "to show his statesmanship and restore Togo as she was before
the Europeans got to work."[35]

The Togolese were incapable of seizing Ghanaian territory by force of arms, but Acheampong was alert to the trouble that might be aroused amongst a disaffected populace. The NRC reacted with a familiar combination of carrots and sticks. In March 1973, in an echo of the Yikpa episode more than two decades earlier, the authorities infiltrated a secret meeting held in Palimé and arrested a number of chiefs as they were returning to the Region.[36] They were treated leniently because the NRC wished to avoid creating martyrs if possible. In August 1975, the Government suspected that many of the TOLIMO activists were losing their stomach for political exile and granted them an amnesty, which was later extended into January of the following year. Finally in March 1976, the NRC introduced a new Decree which outlawed TOLIMO and prescribed a fine not exceeding ¢5,000, imprisonment not exceeding five years or both, for attending a TOLIMO meeting or shouting its slogans.[37] Thereafter, TOLIMO activists were left in little doubt about the treatment they would receive if they fell into the hands of the authorities. As had been the case in the late 1950s, many found it preferable to take up exile in Togo rather than court political risks at home.

At the same time, the Government sought to drive a wedge between TOLIMO and its potential constituency. To this end, Operation Counterpoint, an elaborate propaganda exercise carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, was launched in 1976. A high-level team toured all parts of the

Region in an effort to discredit TOLIMO and to let it be known that the SMC had no intention of reopening the unification question. A crucial supporting rôle was performed by senior chiefs in the Region, who were assiduously cultivated by Acheampong. His two most influential allies were the President of the Volta Region House of Chiefs, Togbe Adja Tekpor VI of Avatime, and the Paramount Chief of Anlo, Togbe Adeladza II. They were probably the instigators of a resolution passed at an emergency meeting of the House of Chiefs in March 1976, which distanced the House from the actions of some chiefs and endorsed Government measures to handle the secessionist threat.[38] The alliance with Adja Tekpor was later renewed when he was recruited to serve on the Ad Hoc Committee on Union Government. As the pressure mounted, it ceased to be possible for chiefs to maintain their silence. Throughout the Region, therefore, they competed in exhibitions of loyalty, both to protect themselves from destoolment and where possible to win favours from the centre.

In the final analysis, secessionism failed to gain momentum for reasons that had less to do with Government repression than with inherent weaknesses in TOLIMO as a political organization. First of all, it was damaged by its associations with the unification movement. Most of its leaders had been active at some point in the Togoland Union or the Togoland Congress: the list of names includes S.G. Antor, A.K. Odame, Kofi Dumoga, G.O. Awuma and Albert Simpson.[39] The first two had recently been rebuffed by the voters, as we have seen, and their credibility was now at an even lower ebb. During the Second Republic, Antor and Dumoga had accepted the posts of Ambassador to Togo and Dahomey respectively and therefore incurred much of the blame for the discriminatory policies of the Busia administration. The Acheampong regime was quick to exploit these facts. For example, Utuka delivered a speech in October 1977 which played on the hypocrisy of the leadership:

> "The leaders of this Movement are few, and are only seeking their own selfish interest. Some of these leaders like C.K. Dumoga and I.B. Bawa to mention only a few, have been involved in government of this country at one time or other... It is rather interesting to note that these leaders did not raise a finger about the status of the part of the Volta Region which they now seek to secede, during their political days... Now that these people are no longer in government, they have suddenly realized that the results of the 1956 plebiscite should be called into question. Their treachery, arrogance and lust for power and to cause confusion in Ghana are now clearly manifested."[40]

There was an obvious truth here which was not lost upon people within the Region. Acheampong took the matter a step further, alleging that TOLIMO was an instrument in a PP plot to foment civil disorder and thereby to topple the NRC.

TOLIMO also fell victim to the structural flaws which had first split the unification movement. Initially, it treated the reunification of the Ewe people as the major priority.[41] But this had little resonance amongst the minority communities north of Hohoe who were asserting their ethnic distinctiveness. In 1975, the Togolese Government intervened to install a set of more malleable leaders who had not been involved in the old unification movement. They were younger and drawn to a much greater extent from the minorities such as Buem.[42] When the ousted leadership declined to abide by the change, a schism erupted within TOLIMO which was never fully repaired. In the south of the Region, where integrationist ideas had always held precedence, neither set of claimants enjoyed much confidence. The Anlos and their neighbours furnished such a prominent sub-section of the Ghanaian professional, intellectual and military elite that they could only lose from union with a Francophone country - especially one which was dominated by Northerners. It is not surprising, then, that Selormey, Agbo and Ashley-Lassen were as hostile to secessionism as was Acheampong himself. Robert Kotei once made an unsubstantiated and ultimately implausible claim that Komla Gbedemah was in league with the Chief of Staff of the Togolese Armed Forces to reunify the Togo and the Volta Region under his Presidency.[43] Otherwise, what is noteworthy is the conspicuous absence of southerners from the ranks of the secessionist movement.

Finally, TOLIMO was heavily dependent upon financial and moral support provided by the Togolese authorities. As evidence of their complicity mounted, the Acheampong regime adopted a more bellicose posture towards Togo. In the speech already referred to, Utuka issued a thinly veiled threat against the Eyadema regime:

> "We shall cut ruthlessly through and devastate any country which makes a false move with military precision, and cause total havoc in less than a few hours. we have the capacity to strike hard."[44]

The proximity of Lomé to the border made such a threat plausible enough and, following an attempted coup that same month (which was apparently staged from Ghanaian soil), Eyadema began to waver. According to Brown, he halted TOLIMO plans to launch guerrilla incursions (which Utuka had registered knowledge of) and even went as far as to prevent that organization from holding rallies in Palimé.[45] Without Togolese backing, and without sustained contact with potential supporters inside the Volta Region, TOLIMO withered on the vine.

In retrospect, the attention that was centred on TOLIMO appears disproportionate to the threat it posed. TOLIMO failed to revitalize the networks of the unification movement of which it was but a pale reflection. In Likpe, at least, the secessionist scare seems to have been treated with an air of detachment. It is not merely that TOLIMO failed to get its message across, but also that it misread the mood in the Region. As great as the privations undoubtedly were, decades of integration had forged ideologies, material interests and mere habits of mind which imparted some consistency to the structures of the nation. Whatever its shortcomings, the educational system still served as an important medium for disseminating images of what it was to be Ghanaian. Equally, the structures of the Evangelical Presbyterian and Catholic Churches functioned as bonding agents when other institutional links were slackening. And finally, while the daily newspapers became increasingly difficult to acquire in remoter areas, radio remained an important channel of communication between centre and periphery. Through radio, it was possible to keep abreast of current affairs,

which assumed the character of high theatre as the decade drew to a close.[46] The radio also enabled ordinary people to participate in a series of national rituals that confirmed their membership of something much larger. These included the simple pleasures of listening to sport and the weekly lotto results.[47] Most of the radios that were available in the 1970s could only pick up signals from the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and although batteries became scarce towards the end of the decade, they were freely available in Togo.[48] In short, the Bakpele and others continued to participate in an imagined national community.

5.3. The Political Economy of Contraband

In his Preface to the 1972 edition of Bandits, Eric Hobsbawm posited Ghanaian cocoa smuggling as an African variant upon the phenomenon of social banditry.[49] By the latter he meant forms of criminality that are condoned amongst communities whose way of life is threatened by the encroachment of capitalism and its accomplice, the modern state. As a rear-guard action of the peasantry, it belongs with other more overt forms of social protest.[50] This lead has never been followed for a number of sound reasons. Chief amongst these is the historical evidence that production for the market was not imposed upon, but adopted enthusiastically by the Ghanaian peasantry. Also by the time of the First World War, most of the country was locked into a reasonably effective system of administration that extinguished the conditions under which widespread banditry might thrive. There are nevertheless certain aspects of the model which it would be useful to explore here. Firstly, it is worth considering whether smuggling was perceived as a legitimate act of defiance within a border environment. Secondly, it is worth considering whether an increase in smuggling presaged the breakdown of existing patterns of economic integration, the restoration of moral economies spanning the frontier, and re-incorporation into Togolese commercial circuits. It is helpful to begin with a closer examination of official perspectives.

5.3.1. The View From the Centre

It is most unusual for Governments to admit that smuggling constitutes anything other than a criminal act, since to do otherwise invites questions about state legitimacy. At the same time, Governments are often defensive about the levels of crime since these can expose how patchy their control really is. It is particularly true of African Governments that they typically claim to possess more effective control than they in fact command. In the case of Ghana, the widening gap between rhetoric and reality, together with the periodic efforts to realign the two, provide a valuable insight into the interactions between the state and its citizens.

Interestingly, the Acheampong regime began by accentuating the dimensions of smuggling. This was partly because there was a great deal of it during the early 1970s, which was not easily concealed. According to one estimate, about 93,000 tonnes of cocoa, or more than a fifth of the crop, was illegally marketed outside Ghana in 1970/71. The figure for the Volta Region is 14,000 tonnes or more than 50% of the crop.[51] These figures are no doubt inflated, but even if we adopt the lower estimate of 31,000 tonnes for Ghana as a whole, the volume is still considerable. There was also a leakage of consumer goods in the early 1970s, which one report itemised as follows:

> "Although there are many articles involved in smuggling, the main ones include cocoa, matchets, wigs, soap, sugar, refrigerators, television sets, radiogrammes, vehicle spare parts, textiles, prints, suiting materials, footware, cosmetics, gold and diamonds. Others are sardines, corned beef, drinkables, perfumes, and cigarettes. Most of such articles are produced in Ghana, while others are not."[52]

More importantly, the Acheampong regime required a justification for holding on to power. From the start, the NRC staked its claim to legitimacy on the urgency of economic reconstruction. The Operation Feed Yourself Programme was wheeled out as the heavy artillery in the 'economic war' that was declared.[53] The anti-smuggling campaign was slightly less strategic, but it enabled the NRC to project an image of itself as both dynamic and patriotic. Acheampong made

repeated references to the damage inflicted by smuggling, such as the inability of the state to finance adequate social services and physical infrastructure. Smuggling later served as a convenient excuse for shortages and the failings of Government policy more generally.

During the first four years of NRC rule, smugglers featured regularly in the press and in official speeches as profiteers who were prepared to sacrifice the welfare of the nation on the altar of their own self-interest. On this view, their acts were profoundly anti-social. An editorial from the The Daily Graphic in 1974 captures the tone of moral outrage which permeated official discourse at this time:

> "Nothing can justify smuggling: the impulse is generated by a perverted state of mind which sees money as an end in itself, just as it is with all dirty business deals. Smugglers are criminals pure and simple, and in view of the special situation of our country, their activities are wholly treasonable... Short of the capital punishment, it seems the next best thing is to send all smugglers summarily into detention - lock them up and throw the keys away."[54]

A genuine search for root causes was comparatively rare. Although the level of cocoa prices was sometimes mentioned as a disincentive to farmers, it was nevertheless assumed that Government alone was qualified to judge matters of equity - and it had delivered its verdict.

If smuggling was anti-social, it followed that the authorities were justified in adopting tough measures to deal with it. It is worth underlining the note of confidence which accompanied the rhetorical assertions of state power. The tone was set in February 1972 when the NRC proclaimed that:

> "The National Redemption Council is dismayed by the high incidence of smuggling now prevalent in the country. It is indeed a pity that in the present state of our economy certain ungrateful members of our society still indulge in this act of economic sabotage. The National Redemption Council has therefore instituted immediate action to arrest the situation. All members of the public are being informed that the routes for smuggled goods both in and out of Ghana are now under strict surveillance. Anyone caught smuggling will be severely dealt with."[55]

In July of that year, the NRC passed a Subversion Decree which prescribed the death sentence for trafficking in timber, gold and diamonds, and a prison sentence of not less than 15 and not more than 30 years for the smuggling of

cocoa.[56] Cases that arose under the Decree were to be tried by special Military Tribunals set up in each Region, the judgements of which were not subject to appeal. In the border Regions, the Commissioners threatened even harsher penalties. Thus the Brong-Ahafo Regional Commissioner threatened to evict the residents of 13 border villages, while Major Habadah in the Volta Region (apparently in ignorance of the wording of the Decree) declared that the Government was willing to enforce the death penalty against anybody who was caught smuggling cocoa.[57]

A hard line would scarcely have been credible if the NRC had not simultaneously taken action to improve border surveillance. The Border Guards, who had recently absorbed employees from the former Field Agricultural Survey, suffered from a poor public image and a lack of morale. They received much of the blame for the rampant smuggling of the Busia period, because of inefficiency but also on account of alleged corruption. The NRC judged that the crux of the problem was the lack of a professional ethos within the unit. Consequently, it was transferred from Police control to the Armed Forces, where it was accorded an equivalent status to the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Border Guards were later broken up into three battalions, located at Ho, Dormaa-Ahenkro and Bolgatanga, alongside three independent operational companies.[58] The first Commander of the Border Guards was Colonel John Kabore, who was succeeded by Brigadier F.W.K. Akuffo and by Brigadier E.K. Utuka. The Guardsmen henceforth received the same pay, conditions of service and facilities as personnel in the other services. They were also subject to equivalent standards of training and discipline, which were to be inculcated at a new training school at Kpetoe in the Volta Region. These reforms were accompanied by a clear message that abuses within the unit would no longer be tolerated. In 1972, the Guardsmen were warned that:

> "All smuggled goods impounded will be traced to their source and the routes mapped out. When this has been done, all law enforcement agencies on these routes whose duty is to check the smuggling will also be severely and summarily dealt with. Action against the personnel of such law enforcement agencies will include instant dismissal."[59]

Nor was this an entirely idle threat. Between January and August 1975, Utuka dismissed a total of 68 Guardsmen and they were joined by 30 others at Aflao in October 1976.[60]

Nevertheless, it became increasingly obvious as the decade progressed that Government rhetoric was seriously at odds with reality. Far from diminishing, smuggling activity was booming. In the case of cocoa, there was a rise both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the total crop (See Table 5.1). There was also a significant leakage of minerals. Thus Togo exported CFA 114.9 million worth of diamonds in 1977 in spite of the fact that she had no mines of her own.[61] These facts were bound to cause some embarrassment to a regime which had placed so much emphasis upon a 'no-nonsense' approach. This in part explains the link that began to be drawn in 1976 between smuggling and secessionism. The SMC claimed that smuggling in the Volta Region was politically motivated. In 1977, Utuka openly accused the Togolese authorities of conspiring to weaken Ghana economically:

> "... smuggling activities along the borders of Ghana, and into and from Ghana is [sic] centrally organized, planned, co-ordinated, directed and financed by the Togo Government against Ghana. This is a fact. It is sad and unfortunate that some Ghanaians are being used as front men."[62]

In the Operation Counterpoint campaign of 1976, the issues of smuggling and secession were explicitly coupled. At the launch of the campaign at Ho in June, the audience sat under large banners which read: "Operation Counterpoint: Anti-Secession, Anti-Smuggling, Anti-Hoarding, Anti-Profiteering".[63]

The linkage was not without its problems however, since rampant smuggling could be interpreted as widespread support for secession, which was precisely what the regime was eager to deny. The SMC squared the circle by claiming that secessionists from outside were taking advantage of the basic ignorance of border peoples. The task of the authorities was therefore to 'educate' the latter about the consequences of their actions. The secessionist thesis could not, of course, account for the more substantial traffic in cocoa over the Ivorian frontier or for

smuggling into Upper Volta. Utuka, however, insisted in 1977 that most contraband escaped through the eastern frontier, and especially through Aflao.[64] Given the proximity of that town to Accra, this was not a preposterous statement.

Table 5.1:

Estimated Losses of Cocoa Through Smuggling ('000 tonnes)

Year	Production	To Ivory Coast	To Togo	Total	As % of Production
1970/71	413	18	16	34	8.2
1971/72	454	21	18	39	8.6
1972/73	407	14	7	21	5.2
1973/74	340	9	5	14	4.1
1974/75	376	16	5	21	5.6
1975/76	396	21	8	29	7.3
1976/77	320	21	5	26	8.1
1977/78	271	38	8	46	17.0
1978/79	265	29	5	34	12.8
1979/80	281	32	8	40	14.2
1980/81	254	31	8	39	15.4

(Source: E. May, Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 69 and 79; D. Bovet and L. Unnevehr, Agricultural Pricing in Togo, pp.25, 58).

Significantly, the fierce opposition that the Acheampong and Akuffo regimes encountered owed a lot to their perceived collusion in the second economy. The AFRC later charged that they had been responsible for the proliferation of economic crimes in the wider society. The 'housecleaning' of the first Rawlings administration was in essence an attempt to enforce laws which often already existed on the statute book, but which had been flouted by previous administrations. Once again, little attention was paid to whether they were equitable or even enforceable. The AFRC revived the stereotype of the smuggler as either a social parasite who should be shown no mercy, or as an ignorant

villager who could only be properly educated through the judicious use of force. Those unfortunate individuals who were apprehended received severe, and frequently summary, punishment. Yet the AFRC returned power to the politicians without proving what a concerted exercise of state power could achieve on a more permanent basis.

Smuggling and a host of other economic crimes returned to the public agenda during the Third Republic. In Parliament, MPs made two significant admissions which departed from orthodoxy. The first was that the state was effectively powerless to manipulate conditions in the border areas, not least because its own officials were unreliable. The MP for Buem, Monica Atenka, observed that the Border Guards were often dependent upon the goodwill of the communities they were supposed to police:

> "My observations are that there have not been proper accommodation arrangements for the Border Guards in some areas. They are left to stay with the rural folks, some of whom are themselves smugglers. I wonder how a Border Guard can arrest and efficiently prosecute his landlord or any member of his landlord's extended family."[65]

It was noted that the longer the Guardsmen remained in one community, the greater their opportunity to insert themselves into smuggling rings.[66] The alternative was to rotate the Guards more rapidly, but this risked forfeiting access to local intelligence. The authorities generally preferred to post the Border Guards to a locality for an extended period of time, with the attendant consequences.

The second admission was that an ethos of smuggling was deeply rooted within rural communities. Border peoples were now portrayed as cunning manipulators of their environment. A sense of revelation is evident in a speech by the M.P. for Dormaa in 1980:

> "Now we get a situation in which the farmers and the Border Guards have combined to cheat the nation. For, without the assistance of the Border Guards... the farmers alone could not smuggle any significant quantity of cocoa out of the country. Both the smugglers and the guards have found smuggling a very lucrative enterprise. It is alleged that for every bag of cocoa which the guards get across the border, they collect something like ¢200 from the owner of the cocoa, that is the farmer, while the farmer earns not less than ¢1,000 which, of course, is far more than the ¢240 which he gets in Ghana, and which is not paid promptly by the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board."[67]

It was acknowledged, therefore, that there was more to smuggling than mere ignorance and that the advantage lay with the border communities rather than the state. Since they could not be brought to heel, the politicians considered means of coaxing them into compliance with the law. In a debate on cocoa producer prices in November 1980, nine out of the ten MPs who spoke, stressed the importance of an immediate increase and a number did so on the grounds that smuggling could be checked in no other way.[68] After a prolonged delay, the Limann administration responded a year later by tripling producer prices.

5.3.2. The View From the Frontier

5.3.2.1. Smuggling as a form of social protest

It is more difficult to expose community attitudes towards smuggling since, as Kotey observed in the case of Buem, this is an inherently sensitive line of enquiry.[69] When community leaders spoke publicly on the issue it was invariably to condemn smuggling outright. It was always understood that while the authorities were often unable to monitor frontier traffic, they were still capable of punishing acts or merely threats of defiance. The fear of retribution means that the views expressed during interviews have also to be treated with caution. The argument that follows is based partly upon evidence derived from formal interviews, and partly upon less structured discussions and participant observation in Likpe.

In 1972, a reporter from The Daily Graphic investigated perceptions of smuggling in the Volta Region, in the wake of a tour by Lt.-Colonel Takyi, the Deputy Executive Chairman of the CMB. He observed that while the chiefs and people generally concurred on the negative consequences of smuggling, they were also overtly critical of the behaviour of state agencies:

> "At Hohoe, Kadjebi, Ahamansu, Nkonya, Likpe-Kukurantumi and its surrounding towns and villages, the farmers state that they are less to blame for the smuggling. They stressed that the Border Guards should be held responsible for their indulgences. The wicked act of some Secretary Receivers who never pay the farmers promptly but rather divert the money to some other uses was also cited as a cause of smuggling. Very often the question asked by the man in the street is: 'What are the Border Guards doing?'"[70]

During 1985/86, the same points were repeated by the Bakpele, looking back over the previous decade. It was recalled that the Border Guards used to encourage villagers to smuggle, and would then shift the burden of guilt onto the community. Another common complaint was that outsiders used Likpe as a transit point, thereby helping to earn it a bad reputation. Significantly, these were both defensive postures which conceded the point that smuggling was undesirable. However, it would be inadvisable to leave the matter there since less submissive attitudes were also encountered. For example, Nana Agya Mensah of Likpe-Avedzeme challenged the terms of the debate in characteristically forthright manner:

> "I would say the name [of smuggling] is wrongly applied. You blackmail a man to charge him. Farmers aren't given their due price. Last year the price was 16% of the world price [sic]. When I produce anything, I have the right to send it to any market. But you force me to send it over there [to Togo]. This is legalized robbery of the farmers. You give me a name to blackmail me because you don't give me my rights."[71]

This was an atypical response, but one has to admit the possibility that it represented the tip of the iceberg.

By probing attitudes towards smuggling more deeply, it is possible to expose a vein of political criticism, which is otherwise mostly concealed. In a survey conducted throughout Likpe in 1986, respondents were asked to express an opinion on the major factors that contributed to the smuggling of cocoa, the leading item of illicit commerce.[72] The results, which are summarised in Table

5.2, are of particular interest because they are at variance with the official interpretations and at least one other survey.[73] Whereas the latter have tended to stress the lure of black market profits, the Bakpele interpretation laid the emphasis upon push factors.

The disparity between cocoa prices was not inconsequential, and indeed prices were a source of considerable grievance in Likpe. Between 1970/71 and 1981/82 real producer prices fell by about 40%, as a consequence both of high taxes and the overvaluation of the currency (see Table 5.3). The Acheampong regime had reversed the devaluation measures of the Busia regime and then proceeded to print money when faced with budgetary constraints. Yet it insisted on maintaining a favourable rate of exchange against the dollar. While the SMC denied that Ghanaian farmers were disadvantaged by comparison with their Togolese or Ivorian counterparts, official calculations were invariably based on official rates of exchange that bore little relationship to effective rates (see Table 5.4). Whereas cocoa farmers in the interior had to choose between accepting the official price or deserting cocoa for alternative crops, those who lived along the border could always seek better prices in neighbouring countries (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.2:

Responses to Question: "What Has Been the Main Reason For Cocoa Smuggling In Recent Years?

Reason	Number	Percentage of Total
(1) Higher Togolese prices at black market rates	52	18.4%
(2) People have farms on both sides of border	6	2.1%
(3) The lack of goods	122	43.2%
(4) Shortcomings of buying system	55	19.5%
(5) Other:	10	3.5%
(6) Don't know	38	13.4%
Total	281	100.1%

Table 5.3:

Trends in Cocoa Producer Prices, 1970/71-1980/81

Year	Nominal Producer Price (¢ per tonne)	Rural Consumer Price Index (1970=100)	Real Price Index
1970/71	293	100.00	100.0
1971/72	293	108.94	91.8
1972/73	366	118.97	105.0
1973/74	436	139.60	106.6
1974/75	560	164.29	116.3
1975/76	597	209.20	97.4
1976/77	747	330.77	77.1
1977/78	1,333	720.48	63.1
1978/79	2,667	1,258.68	72.3
1979/80	4,000	2,004.38	68.1
1980/81	4,000	3,229.19	42.3
1981/82	12,000	6,761.70	60.6

(Source: World Bank. Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review, January 1985, p.63)

Table 5.4:

Trends in Black Market Exchange Rates, 1972-1981

Year	(1) Official/Effective Rate (Cedis per $)	(2) Black Market Rate	(3) (2) divided by(1)
1972	¢1.28	¢1.68	1.3
1973	¢1.15	¢1.50	1.3
1974	¢1.15	¢1.73	1.5
1975	¢1.15	¢1.98	1.7
1976	¢1.15	¢2.88	2.5
1977	¢1.15	¢9.12	7.9
1978	¢2.75	¢8.95	3.3
1979	¢2.75	¢15.61	5.7
1980	¢2.75	¢16.70	6.1
1981	¢2.75	¢26.26	9.6

(Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook, various editions; Ernesto May, Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.127)

Table 5.5:

The Rewards of Cocoa Smuggling Into Togo

Year	Ghana Price (¢/tonne)	Togo Price (CFA/tonne)	Black Market Togo Price(¢/tonne)
1970	293.80	88,000	523.12
1971	300.47	93,000	538.81
1972	360.92	93,000	588.03
1973	385.04	93,000	564.19
1974	484.47	95,000	675.92
1975	577.90	115,000	783.56
1976	679.15	120,000	1,055.54
1977	976.78	130,000	2,795.70
1978	1,601.40	150,000	4,632.04
1979	3,308.10	200,000	8,347.46
1980	3,936.30	220,000	17,232.23
1981	5,333.50	220,000	14,914.72

(Source: Ernesto May, Exchange Controls and Parallel Market Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.129)

In the case of the Volta Region, however, the smuggling of cocoa has to be viewed in the context of a mounting crisis of reproduction. Production underwent a dramatic decline in the 1970s due to disease and the age of the trees. Apart from the familiar threat of capsids and (to a lesser extent) swollen shoot, black pod exacted a heavy toll on the crop. Whereas one expert felt able to proclaim in 1968 that fungal diseases were a minor hazard,[74] within a couple of years an agricultural officer was reporting a serious outbreak in the Dodo-Amanfrom District:

> "I have to report that I visited a lot of the farms reported to have been attacked by black pod at Bethel, Zida village at Dodo Salem, Pusuopu and other villages and discovered to my horror that the disease had indeed caused an immense havoc which was bound to affect the crop and reduce considerably the output this current season. In most of the farms not a single healthy pod can be seen on the cocoa trees and the attack has spread on to the small immatured pods and cherrelles to a degree that not even a load of cocoa, as I noticed it, can be obtained from each farm."[75]

In the course of the decade, the disease spread southwards and was endemic in the Likpe-Kukurantumi cocoa district by 1980. Furthermore, the stock of trees in the Volta Region was generally older than in other parts of Ghana, as can be guaged from Table 5.6. Whereas over 5% of farms in the 1970s were below eight years old in the Ashanti and Eastern Regions (where cocoa was first adopted), the comparable figure for the Volta Region was under 2%. The majority of farms were clustered at the other end of the scale. Although no specific figures for Likpe exist, the earlier adoption of cocoa there would suggest a less favourable age profile than in the more northerly sectors of the Region.

Table 5.6:

Results of National Cocoa Survey, 1970-79: Age Distribution of Cocoa Farms (in percentages)

Region	0-7 years	8-15 years	16-30 years	over 30 years	Total
Volta	1.8	4.7	66.4	27.0	99.9%
National	9.1	17.7	57.5	15.7	100.0%

(Source: Cocoa Board Headquarters, Accra)

Black pod and ageing trees combined to produce falling yields and by extension, a steep decline in cocoa incomes. This process might have been offset by new plantings, but the decisive fact about much of the Region, especially Likpe, was a shortage of forest land.[76] Furthermore, as the pioneer farmers passed away, the existing income from cocoa was spread more thinly throughout the community. Under the Bakpele system of patrilineal inheritance, all the children are eligible to receive a share of the estate. In the case of cocoa, the farms may be physically divided, although they are commonly placed under the control of an eldest son who manages them on behalf of other members of the family.[77] In either event, the cocoa income was dispersed more widely than before. With few other sources of income, the low producer prices offered by the CMB imposed an intolerable burden upon families. This explains why smuggling is popularly associated in Likpe not so much with accumulation as with hardship.

Table 5.7:
Cocoa Purchases and Smuggling Between the Volta Region and Togo 1969/70 to 1981/82 (tonnes)

Year	Regional Purchases	Togo Purchases	Estimated Togo Production	Estimate of Smuggling
1969/70	20,540	23,188	10,000	13,188
1970/71	15,104	27,878	10,000	17,878
1971/72	10,107	29,361	9,358	20,000
1972/73	21,839	18,604	9,700	8,904
1973/74	14,261	16,000	9,161	6,839
1974/75	13,754	14,000	9,000	5,000
1975/76	13,257	18,000	9,000	9,000
1976/77	9,223	14,000	9,000	5,000
1977/78	7,369	17,000	9,000	8,000
1978/79	5,980	13,000	8,000	5,000
1979/80	4,776	16,000	8,000	8,000
1980/81	1,496	16,000	8,000	8,000
1981/82	1,683	11,000	8,000	3,000

(Source: D. Bovet and L. Unnevehr,.Agricultural Pricing in Togo, p.25, 58; Cocoa Board, Accra; Gill and Duffus, Cocoa Statistics, April 1981 and November 1989)[78]

Table 5.8:

Cocoa Purchases in Likpe-Kukurantumi District, 1977/78-1984/85 (tonnes)

Societies	1977/8	1978/9	1979/80	1980/1	1981/2
(a) Likpe:					
Kukurantumi	179	113	69	12	16
Abrani	91	76	40	8	16
Nkwanta	90	44	55	12	7
Bakwa	39	18	30	8	4
Bala	67	25	24	8	5
Mate	72	32	34	10	6
Koforidua	130	41	39	5	17
Agbozome	175	58	57	4	17
(b) Lolobi:					
Kumasi	355	143	198	13	25
Ashiambi	161	61	119	4	9
Hunyeasem	118	42	58	4	9
(c) Akpafu:					
Sokpo	76	48	48	6	8
Adorkor	213	115	92	3	18
(d) Buem:					
Old Baika	294	222	225	12	26
New Baika	115	79	75	5	9
Total:	2,175	1,117	1,163	112	192

(Source: Cocoa Board, Regional headquarters, Hohoe)

Given that the sums of money involved were frequently minuscule by 1980, it was often the other failings of the state which were decisive. After the 1966 coup, cocoa purchasing had been contracted out to licensed buying agents of the CMB, but there was a return to unitary purchasing in the 1977/78 season to remedy

alleged inefficiencies.[79] However, the Produce Buying Division was dogged by many of the same shortcomings as its predecessor, the UGFCC. The Secretary Receivers were accused of manipulating the scales and of embezzling funds, which resulted in the farmers being issued with chits. Long delays typically ensued before the farmers received payment. During interviews, many older farmers contrasted state purchasing unfavourably with the activities of the old buying firms, in spite of memories of the 1930s holdups. One farmer from Agbozome explained the difference as follows:

> "I was an agent for the UAC and GBO at Kute. I hate the chit and cheque system because the small-scale cocoa farmer has to travel for a few cedis whilst in the colonial days you were paid on the spot cash and could buy your needs even there from their own stores. Or during the off-season, you could credit the goods or ask for a cash advancement so that the cocoa farmer was at no time in need. Where are those facilities today when the Secretary Receivers have either tightened or loosened the weighing scales to cheat the poor cocoa farmer of a few kilograms for their personal benefit?"[80]

In more prosperous cocoa-growing Regions, a sudden influx of cocoa beans could leave a buying centre short of money. This ought not to have been a problem in the Volta Region and yet non-payment was a common enough experience. Furthermore, in parts of Buem the derelict state of the roads and bridges often meant that the buying centres were virtually inaccessible.

As is clear from the last quotation, the old buying firms had previously doubled up as wholesalers and retailers of essential commodities. The spread of cocoa cultivation was historically associated with new patterns of consumption: manufactured soap, sugar, roofing sheets and cloth all entered the domestic sphere as necessary goods which were readily obtainable at the village level. In the 1970s, there was a severe contraction in the supply of consumer goods, which resulted from the collapse of local industries and the shortage of foreign exchange. The state-owned Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC), virtually ceased operations in Likpe. The GNTC and the expatriate firms (which continued with a greater or lesser degree of state participation) retained stores in Hohoe, but their shelves were regularly empty. The few goods in circulation passed through the hands of a fortunate minority with the right connections. By

contrast, the markets on the Togolese side of the border were always well-stocked. Since the cedi was not convertible at official rates, the Bakpele who visited the Danyi markets needed to cross the border with goods that would earn the requisite CFA francs. Cocoa was always certain of finding a buyer, but coffee, plantain and palm-nuts served the same purpose. The result was a reversal of the patterns of trade that had been current until the 1950s, when the villagers of Danyi used to headload their wares into Likpe on market days.

According to a popular Bakpele interpretation, then, it was the bad faith and incompetence of the authorities rather than the greed of border peoples that was ultimately responsible for smuggling. This was the very point that Nana Agya Mensah made more explicitly. Nevertheless, local attitudes were tinged with a degree of ambivalence. The Bakpele had never relished the prospect of throwing off the yoke of state power. Rather, the periodic requests for a Police station suggests that the state was regarded as the repository of certain valuable functions.[81] The real complaint of Nana Agya Mensah was that the state had ceased to perform its side of the bargain, while insisting that the farmers keep to theirs. As a staunch CPP loyalist, he believed that the rot had begun with the overthrow of Nkrumah and that the solution lay in a return to the path pioneered by the CPP.[82] Needless to say, his vision was decidedly statist in orientation. Others were more inclined to blame Nkrumah, but they too hoped for the restoration of a symbiotic relationship with the centre. Smuggling did not therefore denote a rupture and indeed it may have contributed to the political quiescence of the Volta Region. That is, it helped to alleviate hardship through non-political means and limited the potential appeal of secession.

Moreover, while smuggling was widely accepted as legitimate response under very difficult circumstances, it was not condoned by all sections of the community. A number of interviewees deprecated smuggling as socially irresponsible and ventured the opinion that it might have been tackled more effectively if only the authorities had sought the co-operation of the chiefs.[83]

Assuming that this was an honest expression of opinion, it illustrates once again the remarkable level of civic consciousness exhibited by the older generation. However, it is also indicative of the tensions that began to emerge in the wake of the crisis of reproduction.

In Likpe, as in most parts of the Region, smuggling took the form of small quantities of goods headloaded across bush tracks rather than truckloads of contraband driven through border posts. It was standard practice for ordinary farmers to carry their crops to market in Danyi as the need arose. Nevertheless, the decline in cocoa output reinforced the importance of bulking operations. A number of traders specialized in the buying of small quantities of cocoa and coffee and then hired the services of carriers. Those who were most intimately involved in the smuggling complex were strangers and the landless youth of both sexes. Larger towns such as Hohoe had small communities of strangers, often Nigerians, who oiled the wheels of the black market.[84] In farming areas, there were concentrations of Togolese nationals. Some some had bought land or had taken long-term possession of pledged farms. Successive governments blamed pledging for smuggling, on the grounds that Togolese farmers were less likely to sell to the CMB. Thus, in 1973 Colonel Nyante, then the Regional Commissioner, recommended that the CMB should provide the money with which Ghanaian farmers could reclaim their lands.[85] In the context of a land squeeze, the indigenes themselves stood to gain from anti-smuggling measures that would have the effect of displacing these strangers. It is not necessary to elaborate on this aspect here, since little land had in fact been alienated in Likpe.

There was nevertheless a stranger population in Likpe, mostly Kabres from northern Togo, who performed the bulk of the work on the cocoa farms. In her 1956 survey of the Jasikan area, McGlade discovered that the *kotokunu* labour contract was almost universal. The labourers were paid a fixed price per load, which typically amounted to less than the one-third share characteristic of the *abusa* system.[86] Her assessment was that this was a historical relic that survived

in the Volta Region chiefly because of its proximity to an abundant supply of cheap Togolese labour.[87] In 1969 the Aliens Compliance Order provoked a mass exodus of foreign nationals from the Region, yet the *kotokunu* system remained in place. A relative shortage of labour did produce more favourable terms in Likpe, since the labourers could threaten to seek new employers. Whereas a *kotokunu* labourer in the mid-1950s was paid about 13% of the producer price, thirty years later the going rate was 20%.[88] Moreover, the farmers needed to offer additional inducements such as trees which could be felled to tap palm-wine on a share-crop basis. Still, the labourers were not sheltered from the effects of the downward trend in production and prices. Their response was to minimize their labour inputs, which may explain why the farmers started to complain about the laziness of their work-force at this time. Whereas labourers had previously weeded twice a year, by the turn of the decade they were reluctant to do so without additional rewards. The poorer standards of farm maintenance may have been partially responsible for the spread of black pod disease.[89] In 1982/83 the Chief Farmers of Likpe and Lolobi began to meet in order to fix a standard payment for a minimum performance of tasks.[90]

The labourers were concerned not only about the level of their cash income, but also about the form in which it was delivered. Since most visited their home areas at least once a year, they needed a regular supply of CFA francs, which would not be forthcoming if the farmer sold to the CMB and sometimes even if he did not. Many labourers therefore under-declared the harvest and then proceeded to market the difference secretly. Illicit buyers (often strangers) visited the farms and bought cocoa at a price which lay somewhere between the black market and CMB. prices. At a time when many cocoa farms were under joint family ownership, effective supervision was difficult to maintain. Several Bakpele farmers reported having to dismiss their workers for theft.[91] This would appear to have been part of a wider pattern. Thus, in 1972 a chief in the Jasikan district told of how a Togolese national living in the Dodo-Amanfrom area bought stolen cocoa beans, dried them and then recruited Kotokili youths to

carry them to Togo.[92] There are also hints of that similar practices occurred elsewhere in Ghana. During a Parliamentary debate on smuggling in Brong-Ahafo in 1980, for example, one M.P. attributed the bulk of smuggling in his constituency to the activities of Zabarimas and other foreign nationals.[93] Once it is understood that the farm-owners were often as not the victims of smuggling, their ambivalence towards its existence is easier to comprehend.

The chiefs and members of the older generation also became concerned about the effects of smuggling on social cohesion. Most younger farmers did not have land upon which to plant new cocoa and there were limits to the ability to earn an income from food crops. Some villages had low-lying lands which were suitable for rice cultivation and these now began to be farmed more intensively, especially by the women. People from Mate, for example, rented land as far away as Bakwa. Nevertheless, Likpe was running a food deficit by the late 1970s, at which time Anyomi observed:

> "The Likpes, who depended on cash crops such as cocoa and coffee, have little farming land now and thus cultivation of food crops has reduced considerably. Likpes, who were formerly supplying Hohoe markets with rice, yams, plantains and cocoyams are now buyers of these items from the people of Danyi in Togo and from Hohoe markets."[94]

Whereas urban employment had lured talented young Bakpele away from the community in the 1960s, high inflation and low wages had closed off that exit. Many young men left for Nigeria, where they were able to make a living out of the opportunities created by the oil boom. Those who remained either turned to non-agricultural work such as blacksmithing and tailoring, or to petty smuggling. The local establishment looked upon the latter with some misgivings, since it seemed to loosen the bonds of family control. Young men were reluctant to go to farm when they could make more money from contraband. The majority simply hired out their carrying services, but some acquired the means to finance their own operations. This often involved the purchase of cocoa beans stolen from other members of the community. Another source of concern was that the

earnings tended to be spent on 'wee' and alcohol, in the absence of other forms of entertainment.[95] If there was a sub-culture associated with smuggling, as posited by Rathbone via Hobsbawm,[96] it was specific to the younger men and women. Members of the older generation, who were often pillars of the Catholic or Presbyterian Churches, complained instead of the indolence of youth. In 1986 one old man, who prided himself on having planted his own cocoa as early as 1914, attributed the decline of yam production not to land shortage but to work-shyness on the part of the young men:

> "The youngsters have refused to do any yam farming out of laziness. And if we the old ones make yam farms, the young ones will steal."[97]

At one level, this was a merely familiar symptom of the generation gap, but it was also grounded in the reality that young men who derived their incomes from smuggling acquired a greater measure of independence. It is the perception of moral decay that accounts for puzzling statements to the effect that chiefs should have been asked to play a more active rôle in the campaign against smuggling.

Finally, the evidence from Likpe does not suggest the emergence of a new moral economy spanning the frontier. Although the Bakpele did frequent the Danyi markets more regularly than before, what is more striking is the extent to which the community turned in upon itself. Togolese goods were notoriously expensive and there were limits to the supply of commodities which could be exchanged. Consequently, there was a revival of local crafts which had all but died out before the crisis struck. Bakpele women were able to supply a cheaper substitute for manufactured soap using cocoa waste and palm oil.[98] Similarly, the art of blacksmithing, which had hitherto seemed doomed for extinction, staged a sudden recovery. Blacksmiths produced their own hoes and acquired a steady trade in the repair of cutlasses which local farmers could not afford to replace. There was also more work for local tailors. The considerable level of local self-sufficiency ensured that the Palimé nexus did not recover its former importance. Nor did the new pattern of trading relations seem to foster more intimate social contacts across the frontier. Although more Bakpele may have

married from Danyi and further afield than ever before, this was far from normal practice. If anything, the Bakpele assessment of their Togolese neighbours became less favourable. A common complaint was that people who carried goods to market were often asked to return at a later date to receive payment. When the Bakpele smuggler returned, the Togolese buyer would feign ignorance of the transaction or threaten to inform the Togolese border guards, which might result in a sound beating. As indicated before, it is important to recognize that border communities often deploy the coercive power of the state at the expense of each other.

5.4. Conclusion:

During the 1970s, scenarios which did not appear overly optimistic at the time of independence began to look strangely misconceived. The comparative dynamism of the economy and the efficacy of the bureaucracy, each of which had attracted favourable comment, turned out to be ephemeral in the longer term. Although the greater prosperity of the Gold Coast had strengthened the hand of integrationists at an earlier phase, a reversal of fortunes did not reshape political loyalties to any meaningful extent. For a brief moment, the appearance of TOLIMO seemed to portend the reopening of the unification question. Yet what is most noteworthy about TOLIMO is its complete failure to capture the imagination of people in the Volta Region. It will not be necessary to raise the Togoland question again.

The growth of smuggling presents greater problems of interpretation. It demonstrated two things: the willingness of border peoples to violate the law and the inability of the state to do anything very much about it. But smuggling was always double-edged. It exacerbated the fiscal crisis of the state and the foreign exchange squeeze, but it also functioned as a safety-valve. Smuggling eased the shortage of essential goods, permitted some farmers to maintain their incomes and provided a source of earnings for the unemployed youth.

Smuggling might conceivably be interpreted as an expression of social banditry were it not for the ambivalence displayed towards it by many of the farmers, who were on the receiving end of theft. The attitudes displayed by the Bakpele may not be aberrant, since another study carried out at Dormaa in 1976 found, to the surprise of the student concerned, broad support for the anti-smuggling campaigns of that time.[99] As for the youth, smuggling was in some sense an alternative to the modes of political expression that were familiar to their parents. Thus, successive generational layers in Likpe exhibited significantly different responses to the public realm.

Statistical Appendix to Chapter Five:

Table 5.9:
Ghana's External Trade Position, 1972-1981 (¢ million)

Year	Imports	Exports	Balance of Trade
1972	393.3	564.4	+171.1
1973	525.9	730.4	+204.5
1974	943.7	840.9	-102.8
1975	909.3	928.3	+19
1976	991.7	960.9	-30.8
1977	1,193.3	1,166.1	-27.2
1978	1,681.8	1,580.6	-101.2
1979	2,344.2	2,736.9	+392.7
1980	3,103.6	3,157.8	+54.2
1981	3,041.0	2,924.0	-117.0

(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1984, pp.54-56)

Table 5.10:
Production of Major Commodities, 1972-1981

Year	Cocoa ('000 tonnes)	Cereal Crops (kg.)	Starchy Staples (kg)	Gold (kg.)	Diamonds ('000 carats)
1972	407.0	723.5	6,133.3	22,522.0	2,658.8
1973	340.0	764.1	6,866.7	22,688.2	2,306.8
1974	376.0	863.1	7,979.7	19,097.5	2,571.7
1975	396.0	671.5	5,452.3	16,295.1	2,336.2
1976	320.0	689.4	4,442.5	16,494.2	2,282.9
1977	271.0	639.0	3,995.0	14,957.2	1,946.8
1978	265.0	540.0	4,105.0	12,504.7	1,422.8
1979	281.0	780.0	3,927.0	11,093.8	1,225.6
1980	254.0	674.0	4,349.0	10,981.0	1,149.2
1981	220.0	725.0	4,114.0	10,595.3	836.2

(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1984, pp.5-7; World Bank, Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review, January 1985, p.63)

Table 5.11:
Revenue and Expenditure, 1971/72-1981/82 (¢ million)

Year	Revenue	Expenditure			Balance
		Recurrent	Development	Total	
1971/2	435.4	430.7	103.8	534.5	-99.1
1972/3	391.7	449.1	96.0	545.1	-153.4
1973/4	583.6	569.2	169.3	738.5	-154.9
1974/5	804.8	875.4	286.1	1,161.5	-356.7
1975/6	814.8	997.4	441.2	1,438.6	-623.8
1976/7	1,074.6	1,308.0	637.2	1,945.2	-870.6
1977/8	1,539.1	2,322.2	695.4	3,017.6	-1,478.5
1978/9	2,187.8	3,334.5	759.8	4,094.3	-1,906.5
1979/80	3,026.1	4,076.8	594.7	4,671.5	-1,645.4
1980/1	3,279.1	6,329.3	1,390.0	7,719.3	-4,440.2
1981/2	4,545.0	7,917.0	927.0	8,844.0	-4,229.0

(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 1984, p.34)

Footnotes to Chapter Five:

1. D. Smock and A.C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, (New York, Elsevier: 1975), pp.248. The theme of neglect is also very much to the fore in the thesis by Ken Kwaku entitled "The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: A Case-Study of the Volta Region (Ghana)", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975

2. David Brown disputes the contention of Dennis Austin that the Volta Region is barren and that this explains the pattern of out-migration. See his, "Sieges and Scapegoats: The Politics of Pluralism in Ghana and Togo", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXI, 3, 1983, p.440. However, the salient point is surely that it is the southern portion of the Region that is poorly endowed.

3. Smock and Smock, op. cit., pp.246-247

4. Kattah was removed as Commander of the First Brigade and posted to India as a Military Attaché. He was then brought back to Ghana to face charges of theft. Ashley-Lassen was removed from his position of head of the Air Force and sent to the Indian Defence College. Valerie Bennett, "Epilogue: Malcontents in Uniform - The 1972 Coup d'Etat", in D. Austin and R. Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, (London: Frank Cass, 1975), pp.303-304.

5. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp.230-231.

6. Acheampong said: "I watched the seed of tribal conflict being slowly sown by the actions of the Busia regime, and with the blood of our Nigerian brother to warn us, I acted to nip the threat in the bud." Quoted in Smock and Smock, op. cit., p.249. The Government planned to ban the word 'tribe' from all official documents and even to abolish tribal names as surnames. Chazan, ibid., p.235.

7. The chief coup planners were Majors Baah, Agbo and Selormey. Bennett, op. cit., pp.305-306.

8. The NRC in 1972 consisted of Acheampong, Baah, Agbo, Selormey, Ashley-Lassen, Colonel Erskine, Commodore Quaye, Brigadier Beausoleil and J.H. Cobbina.

9. Kofi Awoonor, The Ghana Revolution: Background Account From a Personal Perspective, (New York, Oases Publishers: 1984), pp.55-56.

10. Ibid., pp.56-57.

11. The SMC now consisted of Acheampong (from Ashanti), Utuka (from Likpe, Volta Region), Beausoleil (West Indian father and Ghanaian mother, born at Tafo), Akuffo (from Akropong), Djang (from Nandom in the then Upper Region), Okai (born in Akim) and Ako, the Inspector-General of Police. The NRC remained in existence as the Committee of Commissioners.

12. Evidence of Corporal Goka, reported in The Daily Graphic, 8 June 1976.

13. The most detailed account of the trial and its background is that of Awoonor, op. cit.. Although he denies the existence of an Ewe plot, he gives clear evidence to the effect that Ewe officers harboured a grievance against Acheampong. Some of those who were accused of involvement in the plot were allegedly annoyed at having been excluded in spite of involvement in both coups. See evidence given in the trial of Sowu and Von Backustein, reported in The Daily Graphic, 31 August 1976. This is consistent with the tone of the Awoonor book.

14. Awoonor, op. cit., p.60. Indeed, he goes further and attributes this to a general state of mind in Ghana.

15. One structural explanation for the crisis, that suggested by dependency theory, is evaluated and persuasively refuted in R. Price, "Neo-Colonialism and Ghana's Economic Decline: A Critical Assessment", Canadian Journal of African Studies, XVIII, 1, 1984.

16. Polly Hill is most often associated with the rural capitalism thesis. The book which has become a minor classic is The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). More recent research by Gareth Austin has investigated the phenomenon more closely. See his thesis, entitled "Rural Capitalism and the Growth of Cocoa-Farming in South Ashanti to 1914", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1984; also "The Emergence of Capitalist Relations in South Asante Cocoa-Farming, c.1916-33", Journal of African History, XXVIII, 1987; and "Capitalists and Chiefs in the Cocoa Hold-Ups in South Asante, 1927-1938", The International Journal of African Historical Studies, XX1, 1, 1988. The lukewarm response of the colonial authorities in the early part of the century, due largely to their over-estimation the importance of mining, is dealt with in the introduction to G. Kay (ed.), The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A Collection of Documents and Statistics, 1900-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Most recently, Anne Phillips has argued that the colonial authorities repeatedly sought to block the spread of rural capitalism because of the anticipated effects on social cohesion and political order. See The Enigma of Colonialism in Ghana: British Policy in West Africa, (London: James Currey, 1989).

17. The reasons for the adoption of this strategy and for its failure are analysed in T. Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978). See also R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969) Insofar as the Nkrumah Government exhibited an interest in agriculture, it was in the form of state farms which contributed little to production. Peasant cultivators were effectively ignored.

18. It was the time-delay, inherent in the nature of the crop, which accounts for the surprising fact that Ghanaian cocoa production peaked at 549,000 tonnes in 1964/65, when real prices were falling.

19. After the slump of the early 1960s, prices slowly improved after 1965 and then dramatically so after 1976.

20. For a positive assessment of local coping mechanisms, see M. Posnansky, "How Ghana's Crisis Affects a Village", West Africa, 3306, 1 December 1980.

21. K. Ansa-Asare, "Legislative History of the Legal Regime of Price Control in Ghana", Journal of African Law, XXIX, 1985.

22. The most detailed account of corruption during the Acheampong years is provided by Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979, (Accra, Tornado Publications: 1980), especially chapters 3 and 4.

23. This is illustrated by the no-doubt apocryphal story of the person who bought a tin of canned fish from a trader and returned to complain that the contents were bad. The trader remarked incredulously that the fish was for selling and not for eating.

24. On the AFRC episode, many of the details of which remain obscure, see B. Okeke, 4 June: A Revolution Betrayed (Enugu and Oxford: Ikenga Publishers, 1982); K. Yankah, The Trial of J.J. Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution (Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1986); and Kofi Awoonor, op. cit..

25. S. Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Togo, second edition, (Metuchen and London: Scarecrow, 1987), p.3

26. The Danyi area came to be characterised by unusually low rates of infant mortality, which was partly a consequence of an improved health infrastructure. See P. Vimard, "The Decrease in Infant Mortality on the Dayes Plateau (South-West Togoland) From 1930 to 1976", in African Historical Demography Volume II, Proceedings of a seminar held in the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 24 and 25 April 1981, pp.761-776.

27. The Togolese had closed the border to non-Togolese in protest against the Aliens Compliance Order. The Busia regime had itself tightened the border controls as part of its policy of restricting imports. David Brown, "Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XVIII, 4, 1980, p.587.

28. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 31 March 1973.

29. See the report in The Daily Graphic, 2 April 1973.

30. At this time, the official rate was CFA 200 to ¢1, but the latter was trading at CFA 115. See The Daily Graphic, 14 April 1973.

31. The rest of this section draws heavily upon Brown, "Borderline Politics", who alone has carried out detailed research on TOLIMO.

32. Decalo, op. cit., p.155. Brown, ibid., p.583-584.

33. See "Livre Blanc Sur la Réunification du Togo", Revue Française d'Études Politiques Africaines, No. 121, Janvier 1976.

34. Brown, "Borderline Politics", pp.598-599.

35. The Times (London), 13 January 1976, p.13.

36. Brown, "Borderline Politics", p.599.

37. The Daily Graphic, 2 March 1976.

38. Togbe Adja Tekpor led a number of delegations of support to Acheampong. For details of the resolution, see The Daily Graphic, 16 March 1976.

39. Brown "Borderline Politics", pp.588-590.

40. See the text of his speech, entitled "Let's Beat Smugglers and Saboteurs", The Daily Graphic, 18 October 1977.

41. Brown "Borderline Politics", p.589.

42. Ibid., p.589-590.

43. Brigadier Kotei was giving evidence at the trial of Kojo Botsio, John Tettegah and others. See The Daily Graphic, 31 October 1973. Shortly thereafter he became a member of the NRC.

44. "Let's Beat Smugglers and Saboteurs", The Daily Graphic, 18 October 1977.

45. Brown "Borderline Politics" p.593.

46. Several people in Likpe recounted that it was by means of the radio that they received the sudden news of the execution of Utuka. In this case, political theatre had a distinct air of tragedy about it.

47. In rural communities such as that of Likpe, where other facilities are limited, lotto forecasting has always been a favourite leisure activity.

48. In December 1975, Togbe Dagadu of Kpandu commended the Government for having made cheap but reliable radios available, but suggested to Brigadier Kotei that it would help if the batteries were available too. See The Daily Graphic 18 December 1975.

49. E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (first edition), (London: Penguin, 1972), p.14.

50. The links between banditry and social protest are explored in the introduction to D. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London: James Currey, 1986).

51. This is a conversion of the figures given in long tons by Ashok Kumar, "Smuggling in Ghana: Its Magnitude and Economic Effects", Universitas, II, 3, March 1973, table 3, p.127. The figures are mistakenly reproduced in Brown, "Borderline Politics", table 1, p.587.

52. "Smuggling: The Base of Ghana's Economy", The Daily Graphic, 24 July 1974.

53. I explored some of the features of Operation Feed Yourself in an M.A. dissertation entitled "Rural Producers and the State in Ghana, 1972-1979", School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 1984.

54. Editorial in The Daily Graphic, 26 February 1974.

55. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 26 February 1972.

56. See The Daily Graphic, 19 July 1972. An amendment of 1977 brought the smuggling of fertilizer, maize, and kola nuts within the scope of the Decree.

57. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 2 September and 9 October 1972.

58. Ghana 1977: An Official Handbook (Accra: Information Services Department, undated), p.50.

59. A release from the Press Secretary of the NRC, The Daily Graphic, 26 February 1972.

60. The Daily Graphic, 16 August 1975 and 13 October 1976.

61. Decalo, op. cit., p.xviii. Also "Togo: Local Wall Street", West Africa, 26 March-1 April 1990, pp.505-506.

62. "Let's Beat Smugglers and Saboteurs", The Daily Graphic, part 2, 19 October 1977, p.5.

63. See the photograph of the rally in The Daily Graphic, 30 June 1976.

64. Utuka ventured a figure of 90% for the amount of smuggling through Aflao. See The Daily Graphic, 24 September 1977.

65. Contribution by Monica Atenka, PNP Member of Parliament for Buem, Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, Volume II, no.8, 1 December 1979.

66. This point was raised on separate occasions by Nana Akuoku-Sarpong, PFP Member of Parliament for Asante-Akim North, and by J.B. Grant, PNP Member for Ahanta. See Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, Volume IV, 11 November 1980 and 26 November 1980

67. Contribution by Dr. S.A. Manson, PFP Member of Parliament for Dormaa, Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 11 November 1980.

68. See the debate on the producer price of cocoa, Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, Volume IV, 26 November 1980.

69. R.A. Kotey, Competition Between Cocoa and Coffee: A Case-Study, I.S.S.E.R., Legon, Technical Publication Series, no.29, 1972, pp.3-4.

70. "Cocoa Smuggling in the Volta Region: We Must Discourage It", The Daily Graphic, 6 October 1972, p.10.

71. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah, Avedzeme, 19 February 1986.

72. Before the survey was finally put into operation, a trial questionnaire was used, as a result of which some options were excised and others included. This is why the 'other' category is not as big as it might otherwise have been.

73. Compare these results with a similar survey carried out in 1977 by V.K. Nyanteng, The Declining Ghana Cocoa Industry: An Analysis Of Some Fundamental Problems, I.S.S.E.R., Legon, Technical Publication Series, no.40, 1980, p.26. Over 90% of his respondents cited low prices or better prices in neighbouring states. The weakness of this survey is that shortages were not apparently taken into account.

74. Ministry of Agriculture files, VORADEP, Ho, "Cocoa - General Correspondence", enclosure of extracts of a paper given by Dr. J.A. Asomaning to International Conference on Agricultural Research Priorities for Economic Development in Africa, April 1968.

75. Ministry of Agriculture files, VORADEP, Ho, "Cocoa - General Correspondence", report on black pod disease in Dodo-Amanfrom District by Senior Agricultural Officer, Jasikan Zone, dated 24 August 1971.

76. One researcher described the food situation in Buem as critical'. C. Dorm-Adzobu, "The Impact of Migrant Ewe Cocoa-Farmers in Buem, the Volta Region of Ghana", Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical Association, 16, 1974, p.52.

77. I am grateful to J.K. Torddey and Mr. Agblobi of Likpe-Mate for explaining the Bakpele inheritance system.

78. It is impossible to estimate the level of smuggling with any high degree of accuracy, since basic data on production is not available for either the Volta Region or Togo. The method adopted here has been to calculate actual Togolese production using data on acreage, yields and median age of trees, and then plotting the results against actual purchases. Figures given by the World Bank make it possible to do this for the period until 1972/73. Thereafter, there is no hard evidence. If we were to assume that the tree stock was the same in 1981/82 as it had been in 1972/73 and then calculated the yield at about 300 kg/ha, Togolese production would have stood at about 4,700 tonnes by the end of this period. However, by 1981 only 44% of trees in Togo were over 38 years old and there would have been some new plantings. If we calculate the yield of one half of the trees at 300kg/ha and the other half at 700kg/ha, then we come to a higher figure of 8,000. This probably underestimates Togolese production, which may have stayed level at 9,000 or 10,000 tonnes in the early 1980s. The figures should therefore be treated as a high estimate of smuggling

79. Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board At Work (Accra: CMB, 1977), p.68.

80. Interview with Daniel Kosi Adjiman, Agbozome, 11 August 1986.

81. Thus, in their earliest dealings with newly appointed officials after the 1966 coup, the chiefs of Likpe finished their list of appeals with the following: "To crown all the requests, we strongly feel that a permanent Police Station is built here to cater for the people in this Area. Hohoe is too far for a nearest Police Station. The land has been offered free of charge to the old Government and it has already acknowledged the acceptance of the land for the building." Contained in welcome address to the Jasikan District Administrative officer, dated 23 June 1966.

82. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah, as above.

83. Interview with F.M. Aniewu, Kukurantumi, 12 March 1986. The Likpe chiefs were also on record as demanding even tougher measures than provided for in the Subversion Decree in order to combat smuggling. See report in The Daily Graphic, 12 December 1974.

84. The Yoruba traders have been most closely studied by J.S. Eades. A paper of his which touches on smuggling is "Strangers and Traders: Yoruba Migrants, Ethnicity, and the State in Northern Ghana", EIDOS Winter school, Sociology of Development Research Centre, University of Bielefeld, January 1990.

85. Ministry of Agriculture files, VORADEP, Ho, "Cocoa - General Correspondence", Colonel E.O. Nyante, Regional Commissioner, Ho, to U.K. Hackman, Executive Chairman of CMB, Accra, dated 19 July 1973. Nothing was, in fact, done until 1986.

86. An Economic Survey of Cocoa Farmers in the Jasikan Area of Trans-Volta Togoland (researched and written by C. McGlade), University College of Ghana, Economics Research Division, Cocoa Research Series, No.3, 1957, pp.5-11.

87. Ibid., p.11

88. Ibid., p.8.

89. The Cocoa Services Division in 1986 was arguing that black pod was largely due to the inefficient brushing of the farms, which contributed to excess humidity. Interview with Mr. Kudroha, Senior Technical Officer, Cocoa Services Division, 23 June 1986.

90. Up until then, different rates prevailed - which was to the advantage of the labourers. Since the farmers felt that the labourers did not maintain the farms adequately, the Chief Farmers agreed that they should receive one-fifth of the value of the crop unless they weeded twice annually in which case they were eligible for a one-third share. Interview with Mr. Agblobi, Chief Farmer, Mate, 14 September 1986.

91. Interview with Winand Aniewu, Kukurantumi, 12 March 1986.

92. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 6 October 1972.

93. Contribution of T. Broni, PFP Member of Parliament for Asutifi, to debate on "Evacuation and Smuggling of Cocoa in Brong-Ahafo", Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 11 November 1980.

94. L.M. Anyomi, "History of the Likpe People", B.A. Long Essay, Department of History, University of Ghana, 1979, p.66.

95. 'Wee' is the Ghanaian term for marijuana.

96. Hobsbawm, op. cit., p.14.

97. Interview with Emmanuel Osiboe, Mate, 9 March 1986.

98. The soap was produced by burning cocoa pods and then boiling the ash. Palm oil was then seemingly added to the residue. Fieldnotes on discussions with traders at Mate market, 20 June 1986.

99. J. Osei-Kwadwo, "The Attitudes of Cocoa Farmers in Dormaa District Towards Cocoa Smuggling", B.A. Long Essay, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 1976.

Chapter Six:

Limits of the Exit Option: Bakpele Reactions to A Beleaguered State

Having disposed of the issues relating to territorial sovereignty, it remains to consider some of the other ways in which the relations between community and state were coloured by the crisis. Naomi Chazan has offered an interpretation that is helpful in anchoring the discussion that follows.[1] She describes a dialectical process in which the deflation of state power is counterbalanced by the revival of alternative structures at the local level. Decay and renewal are the leitmotifs. This raises two issues which will be addressed in greater detail below. The first concerns the extent to which people in peripheral communities like Likpe may be judged to have disengaged from national affairs. The second centres on the ability of what one might call the 'informal political sector' to substitute for formal governmental institutions. There is an obvious parallel here with the preceding Chapter in that both explore aspects of withdrawal from the state.

6.1. Expectations in Retreat

6.1.1. The Promise of Development Revisited

In the early 1970s, debate in the Volta Region focussed more squarely than ever on a perceived lack of development by comparison with the rest of southern Ghana. This was not entirely a figment of the imagination, as is clear from some basic indicators. One study carried out in the mid-1970s placed the Region sixth on a scale of development, although it was the third largest in terms of population.[2] The Region had the fewest consumers of pipe-borne water in 1970 with the single exception of the Upper Region.[3] Only the Brong-Ahafo, Northern and Upper Regions had a smaller number of doctors and dentists.[4] And while the Volta Region was renowned as a net exporter of skilled manpower, it ranked

only fifth with respect to school attendance.[5] These were largely the legacies of British trusteeship, although opinion was as inclined to blame the vagaries of post-independence politics. In an article published in the Legon Observer late in 1969, for example, one author attributed the problem to the vindictiveness of Nkrumah.[6] This article captures the acute sensitivity over the balance of national power in 1969, a condition that was inflamed by the subsequent actions of the Busia regime.

The coup of January 1972 was welcomed in the Volta Region, as was the inclusion of three Ewe officers on the National Redemption Council (NRC).[7] The honeymoon endured for as long as two years primarily because of the skill with which the NRC massaged popular expectations.[8] It breathed life back into the Nkrumahist vision of state-led development, which had been under attack since 1966, and placed renewed emphasis upon closer Regional balance. Four initiatives impinged directly upon the Volta Region. The first was the Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) programme which was supposed to effect an agricultural revolution by means of a mixture of direct state intervention and incentives to private commercial and peasant farmers. The Volta Region, embracing as it did a unique range of ecological zones, was potentially a major beneficiary of the programme. Secondly, the NRC announced the formation of Regional Development Corporations (RDCs), whose role was to invest in agricultural, commercial and industrial ventures in the absence of adequate private capital. The RDCs were to exploit resources outside of the urban centres, and to that extent were expected to contribute towards a more even pattern of development. The VRDC was established in July 1973.

Thirdly the NRC rehabilitated the decentralization proposals which had been advocated by the Mills-Odoi Commission as far back as 1967.[9] The Busia regime had failed to implement the structural reforms that were implicit in the 1969 Constitution, so as to deny the opposition a foothold at the local level. At the time of the coup, local government remained under the direction of appointed

management committees, whose loyalty to the centre could be assured.[10] The Acheampong regime proposed creating 58 new District Councils that would serve as the foundations of a new administrative structure. Seven of these were to be located in the Volta Region. The District Councils, which would ultimately be elected, would be entitled to funding from the Regional Councils. They would in turn manage a wider range of services through a subordinate tier of Local Councils. A step towards making the District Councils financially viable was taken in 1974, the year the new structure was put in place, when the NRC agreed to pay the wages and salaries of all local government staff.[11]

At a durbar in Ho in July 1972, Acheampong also announced a series of infrastructural projects which central government planned to implement in the Volta Region.[12] The most noteworthy was a tarred trunk road running from Ve-Golokwati through Hohoe and Jasikan to Papase, that would ultimately be extended to Bimbilla in the Northern Region. Further south, there were plans to connect Asikuma and Kpeve through Peki. The combined result would be to place the Jasikan and Krachi Districts within easy reach of the Regional capital and within a day's reach of Accra. In addition, the NRC proposed to tar all roads that ran adjacent to the frontier with Togo. This was primarily intended to facilitate surveillance, but it might also be expected to benefit many isolated communities. Finally, Acheampong proposed that any town with a population of greater than 2,000 people should be eligible to receive a piped water supply, while shallow wells with pumps would be installed in less populous communities.[13]

The immediate effect of these announcements was to revive an interest in what the state had to offer. This was manifested in the flowering of voluntary and development associations, whose principal aim was to attract Government support for one project or another.[14] Equally indicative were the efforts of leaders of thought within the Region to solicit the goodwill of the NRC. The President of the Regional House of Chiefs, Togbe Adja Tekpor VI of Avatime,

used the occasion of the visit by Acheampong's to Ho to demand careful consideration of Regional needs.[15] The following month, some 300 leading citizens met at Ho to discuss the formation of a Regional association that could both mobilize resources within the Region and advise the administration on its development priorities.[16] The Volta Region Development Association (VORDA) was formally inaugurated in January 1973 under the benevolent gaze of Major Habadah, the Regional Commissioner. The association was headed by an eminent selection of intellectuals and former politicians from the Second Republic, notably Dr. G.K. Agama (former leader of the Parliamentary Opposition), Sam Okudjeto and Dr. Obed Asamoah.[17] Its ability to function as a pressure-group was, however, impaired by the breakaway of a rival Volta Youth Association (VOYA) in August 1973. The latter received the assent of a newly appointed and possibly unwitting Regional Commissioner, Colonel E.O. Nyante. During the next year, as the rival associations vied for favour they competed in denouncing the secessionist movement and in expressing fulsome approval of Government policy.[18] The Ewe members on the NRC were no doubt reassured pleased by these exhibitions of loyalty, but they were also embarrassed by the in-fighting. The efforts at mediation by Brigadier Ashley-Lassen were rewarded in December 1974 when VORDA and VOYA merged to form a single Volta Development and Youth Association (VODYA).

The gulf between popular expectations and the performance of the Acheampong regime was, however, apparent by the time the Supreme Military Council (SMC) took office in October 1975. Much of the blame can (as has already been pointed out) be attributed to corrupt practices sanctioned at the highest levels of government. At the end of 1975, for example, work on the Hohoe-Papase road was reported to be at a standstill since the contractor had received an advance and was unwilling to complete the project:

> "The ¢6 million 45 miles Hohoe-Dodi-Papase road... was awarded on contract to an Accra-based contractor in 1972. But the job which was scheduled to be completed last year is still at its initial stages. Not even 30 per cent of the contract has been completed. That contractor moves his workers to the road to do a 'ghost' job only when a Regional Commissioner or a member of the government is to visit the site. The PWD officials say it's unlikely the contractor will be able to complete the contract even when given another five years."[19]

This report which appeared in a state-owned newspaper merely hinted at the inviolability of the contractor, but it is possible to be more specific. Colonel John Kabore, who was appointed Regional Commissioner in January 1974, brought pressure to bear upon defaulting contractors in different parts of the Region.[20] He was suddenly removed from office in October 1975, it is alleged, because his excessive zeal had inconvenienced Acheampong who had a personal interest in the firm responsible for work on the road.[21]

Nevertheless, it is possible to overvalue the significance of corruption as an independent variable. As indicated in the previous Chapter, corrupt practices were themselves embedded in structural economic conditions and were merely reinforced by the state controls that proliferated to cope with the crisis. In the Volta Region, the OFY programme notched up some early successes, even if those who reaped the rewards were commercial farmers (including members of the regime)[22] rather than the peasants. In the grasslands that lie between Kpandu and Hohoe there was an expansion of mechanized rice and maize farming. But an analysis of the relevant Ministry of Agriculture files reveals that the early expansion of output had stalled by the mid-1970s. The reports of agricultural officers contained regular complaints about the scarcity of tractor parts, the dearth of farm credit, an inadequate supply of fertilizers and the difficulty of transporting crops to market.[23]
Each of these factors was inextricably bound up with the economic environment of the time.

Local government reforms foundered for a similar complex of reasons. The Acheampong regime hesitated to implement the promised reforms for fear of

infiltration by an increasingly strident opposition movement. Harris has argued that the failure to establish the Regional and Local Councils was in fact conducive to a more productive relationship between the District Councils and the unofficial fourth tier of Town/Village Development Committees.[24] The real problems began when galloping inflation eroded District Council finances, inflating costs and rendering proper planning virtually impossible. As the Councils cut back on expenditure, so evasion of local taxes became more widespread. The resultant vicious circle was highlighted an editorial in The Daily Graphic during 1977:

> "Many local authorities do not make enough revenue so they cannot provide amenities, and because the people do not see the amenities they dodge the payment of levy... We hope the local government authorities do see, as we see, the clear evidence of apathy amongst most of the people towards their local authorities and their systems. The old sense of belonging to this or that local authority has evaporated; most rural folk have simply stopped thinking of the existence of 'our council'"[25]

When the Government finally decided to open the District Councils to elections in 1978, popular alienation was manifested in a very low turnout.[26] Finally, the VRDC never raised sufficient capital to embark on large investment projects, and so was reduced to trading in essential commodities.[27] During the Second Republic, the VRDC became the centre of a corruption scandal involving the allocation of cement.

6.1.2. Reactions to Military Kleptocracy

The years during which Acheampong presided over the SMC were characterised by more overt challenges to military rule. These culminated in the palace coup led by Lt.-General Akuffo in July 1978 and ultimately in the complete overthrow of the SMC a year later. Against the background noise of urban protest, the gentler hum of Regional politics has largely gone undetected. What is of concern here is how communities in the overwhelmingly rural Volta Region reacted to the course of events.

A surface reading of Regional politics might suggest that the warnings of an ethnic backlash, as expressed by the writer in the Legon Observer, were in danger of being brought to life. The Acheampong regime raised the spectre of Ewe 'tribalism', which David Brown attributes mostly to a search for scapegoats.[28] While there is much truth in this, the spectre was not entirely without substance. By the mid-1970s, a section of the Ewe elite, especially within the military, was couching its opposition to Acheampong in ethnic language. It should be clear from earlier Chapters that the Ewe had never really been forged into an ethnic community. Hence this period witnessed some more or less conscious efforts at defining the terms of Ewe ethnicity. An example would be The Ewes of West Africa by C.M.K. Mamattah, which was published in Ewe and English around 1977.[29] The work combined an eclectic mixture of oral traditions with a catalogue of the individual and collective achievements of the Ewe people. Significantly, it also emphasized the close links that existed with minority communities.[30] It embodied a potentially subversive strain in its assertion that the Ewe people constituted a single cultural unit as far east as the Nigerian frontier. This echoed the claims of the erstwhile Ewe unification movement. Yet the author distanced himself from the secessionist cause. Insofar as the book contained a central thesis, it was that the active participation of the Ewe in national life was crucial to the future prosperity of Ghana: all that was demanded was equal treatment:

> "The Ewes are skilled mechanics and born administrators. Without their borrowed skill for constructional work... Ghana would have remained the poorer in development. The Ewes must not be allowed to secede: if that ever happens, Ghana without them can never stand as a nation... The Ewes in Ghana are the cream of Eweland: they have built Ghana into the edifice she is today and they must remain a part and parcel of Ghana, pricking up the conscience of the State of Ghana to develop their Volta Region into a showpiece."[31]

At one level, this was a restatement of the desire to be accepted back into the national fold. At a deeper level, it contained a coded message to the Ewe and their neighbours to close ranks.

A book which casts further light on the politicization of ethnicity is the personal account of the Acheampong years by Kofi Awoonor. It deals primarily with the disaffection of the Ewe within the military and his own involvement in an alleged coup plot.[32] Although the Region was actually over-represented in Government after June 1977, when Captain Joy Amedume joined E.K. Utuka on the SMC, both the reshuffle of 1975 and the trial of the plotters the following year reinforced ethnic strains within the military. Like Brown, Awoonor stresses the element of scapegoating, but his account is distinctive for the objective quality it attributes to ethnic stereotypes:

> "In 1975, the Ewes were the most logical candidates [for scapegoating]: notorious coup-makers, they express the most democratic tendencies within the national structure. Coming as they are from traditions of fierce democracies, and representing a sizeable percentage of both the intellectual and antimilitary establishment sensibilities in the country, they are tailormade for the first line of victims for a tottering and economically bankrupt regime"[33]

In the final analysis, the idea that there was a unified Ewe voice proved as contentious as in the late 1940s. Ethnic discourse acquired some currency in the barracks, but while the military structure was not quite hermetically sealed it was sufficiently impermeable to absorb and to muffle most internal tensions. Where it is possible to identify a wider Ewe grouping, it turns out to revolve around ties of friendship and kinship centred on a single town, namely Keta.[34] During the 1970s, the Anlo Ewe still predominated in the upper echelons of the civil service, the professions and the military. This was a source of some pride to people from that area. Thus Mamattah wrote:

> "Contemporary times have produced a massive upsurge of well educated men and women and may be regarded as the age of excellence for the Ewes as a whole in all walks of life: business executives, consultants, skilled artisans, architects, graduate teachers, jurists, administrators, politicians, medical personnel, diplomats, linguistic experts, industrialists, traders, spiritualists, sportsmen and sportswomen, creative geniuses etc. etc. exist galore."[35]

If one considers a list of the leading public figures drawn from the Volta Region from 1966 onwards, the overwhelming dominance of the Anlos is indeed striking (See Table 6.1). Major-General Utuka and Major Agbo were the only two

personalities who did not hail from Keta and the area to the immediate north of the lagoon. Since Agbo was from Peki, it is possible to identify only one individual from former British Togoland who gained access to the highest public offices. The middle and northern sectors were better represented in the civil service, the legal profession and in academia, as a result of a process of incorporation which gained momentum in the 1960s. But even here the Anlos were preponderant. When Kofi Awoonor acknowledges a 'vague sense of group solidarity', he is arguably highlighting an Anlo rather than a specifically Ewe trait.[36]

Table 6.1:

The Origins of Eminent Public Figures From the Volta Region, 1966-1979

Name	Position	Place of Origin
Lt.-Gen. E.K. Kotoka	NLC Head	Fiaxo, Anlo
A.K. Deku	NLC Member	Denu, Anlo
J.W.K. Harlley	NLC Member	Anyako, Anlo
M.K. Apaloo	Member of Constitutional Commission	born in Togo, from Anlo
Komla Gbedemah	Leader of NAL	born Nigeria, from Anyako, Anlo
Major Selormey	NRC Member	Dzelukope, Anlo
Major Agbo	NRC Member	Peki
Brigadier Ashley-Lassen Chief Defence Staff	NRC Member	born Nigeria, from Anlo?
Major-General E.K. Utuka	SMC Member	Likpe
Rear-Admiral J. Amedume	SMC Member	Anlo
F.K. Apaloo,	Chief Justice	Keta, Anlo
Brigadier A. Kattah	Focus of successive coup plots	Wuti, Anlo
Captain K. Tsikata	Participant in successive coups	Keta, Anlo

(Source: Ghana Who's Who, 1972-73; Mamattah, The Ewes of West Africa, Volume One)

This pattern is significant because it helps to explain the lukewarm, and occasionally hostile, attitude displayed towards Ewe ethnic entrepreneurship inside the Volta Region. In the central and northern districts, there was a widespread feeling that southern politicians and administrators had pursued their sectional interests without regard to the rest of the Region. The evidence of uneven development was abundantly obvious to anybody who travelled from one end of the Region to the other. The main roads were fairly good as far as Hohoe, but thereafter they deteriorated markedly. Beyond Hohoe there were no tarred roads, despite the fact that Buem produced the only important cash crop in the Region. The existing dirt roads were virtually impassable at times of the year due to the rains and the damage inflicted by heavy lorries. Early in 1972, for example, it was reported that lorry drivers had abandoned the stretch from Hohoe to Jasikan via west Likpe because of pot-holes that were eight feet deep in places.[37]

In 1970, the Regional Chief Executive, A.S. Kpodonu (an Ewe from Ho), was confronted with demands for a separate Region embracing the Jasikan and Krachi Districts.[38] These demands subsided when the incoming NRC took up the many of the requests of the northern districts with respect to infrastructure. However, in the scramble to capitalize on the more conducive political climate, intra-Regional tensions surfaced once again. Kwaku argues that VORDA and VOYA divided along class lines: that is, professionals and intellectuals controlled VORDA, whereas businessmen preferred to form their own pressure group. According to Kwaku, VOYA saw private investment as the key to Regional development and an expansion of employment opportunities, whereas VORDA advocated long-term planning in association with the Regional bureaucracy.[39] However, there would appear to have been more at stake. The VORDA leadership claimed in a public advertisement in 1974 that although it had established a Keta branch, VOYA had no presence in the north of the Region.[40] The VOYA leaders, on their side, denied that their organization was a cover for

southern hegemony. The intensity of debate on this score is an indication that sectional affiliations were indeed salient. This would also be consistent with the contrasting visions of Regional development outlined by Kwaku. It is understandable that individuals drawn from the relatively deprived northern sector should have favoured direct state intervention. By contrast, southern businessmen like Hope Yormekpe (the Vice-President of VOYA) were more likely to favour an entrepreneurial approach, which might reconcile the development of their home areas with personal strategies of accumulation. Again, it may not be coincidental that when the rift was healed in 1974, the President of VODYA had a foot in both camps. That is, V.W.K. Agbodza was a highly successful businessman, but originated from Kpandu in the middle of the Region.[41] Even then, the alliance failed to last and for the rest of the decade there was no effective organization that could lobby for the Region as a whole.[42]

Several of the minorities were acutely sensitive about appeals to Ewe unity, following a renewed bout of disputes over chieftaincy. From the start, Acheampong treated the chiefs as a bridge between the centre and the rural population. In 1972, they were restored to a one-third share of the seats on the reconstituted local government management committees. In due course, Acheampong also came to rely on the Regional House of Chiefs to rally opinion against secession. But chieftaincy affairs remained shrouded in a great deal of confusion, the origins of which go back to British policy.

Membership of the Houses of Chiefs was intended for Paramount Chiefs, defined as chiefs who were not subordinate to any other stool - except in Ashanti where the position of the Asantehene was unique. In the Volta Region there were three Paramouncies whose status was not in dispute: those of Anlo, Peki and Krachi. In addition, there were the heads of the amalgamated states who came to be regarded as Paramount Chiefs, although that had never been the original intention: these were the chiefs of Buem, Ho, Kpandu and Avatime. Finally, there were the former Headchiefs who had refused to join the amalgamated states,

even if they later consented to join a Native Authority. They were not formally subordinate to any other stool and therefore qualified as Paramount Chiefs. However, the communities which had amalgamated under British pressure were resistant to such an interpretation. The aspirant chiefs, on the other hand, argued that because they were ethnically distinct, they were entitled to separate representation. Although the exact timing is unclear, it is around this time that reference to membership of a common Guan culture became popular amongst the Central Togo minorities. The Nkonya had long been classified as part of the Guan language group. Now the Bakpele and their neighbours asserted that they too were Guans. The foundation of a Guan Historical Society, with the active participation of some chiefs and intellectuals from the Region, needs to be seen against this background. So too do the first attempts to translate Biblical texts into the Lelemi and Sekpele languages.

In 1973, the Government established the Volta Region Chieftaincy Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of Nana Agyeman Badu in order to ascertain who were Paramount Chiefs according to customary law and who was therefore entitled to sit in the House of Chiefs. The Report was never released because of the controversy surrounding its findings. Nevertheless, an Executive Instrument of 1974 did grant the Headchiefs of Likpe, Gbi, Tapa, Anfoega, Santrokofi, Ve and Nkonya the right to membership of the House of Chiefs.[43] The ongoing debate surrounding their status ensured that the issue of ethnic identification remained emotively charged.[44]

A more likely channel for popular discontent than ethnicity was the nationwide campaign, directed by students and professional groups, to return the country to civilian rule. It was their pressure that forced Acheampong to frame the Union Government proposals and to submit them to a referendum in 1978. The outcome appeared to prove that Ghanaian civil society was still very much alive, and yet much is obscure about the scope of rural participation. It is possible to identify people from the Volta Region in the ranks of the Association of Recognized

Professional Bodies (ARPB), the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), the People's Movement For Freedom and Justice (PMFJ) and the Front For The Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD).[45] It is less easy to gauge the reaction of the majority of its citizens. The fact that 56% of eligible voters in the Region chose to abstain in the referendum can certainly be interpreted as a lack of support for the 'Unigov' proposals. Equally, it may signify a lack of interest in the entire political process.[46] There is evidence that some communities treated the referendum not so much as a chance to expel Acheampong as to hold him to his earlier promises. In the months leading up to the poll, Peki was reassured that the tarred road linking Kpeve and Asikuma would be completed, while Hohoe was granted its wish to secede from the Kpandu District.[47] Acheampong was also careful to mollify the residents of Kpandu with promises of a new hospital and a nurses training school.[48] This was in addition to the financial and other incentives offered to specific rural notables, who could (or so the SMC believed) deliver the vote. The turnout clearly indicates a degree of scepticism about the ability of Acheampong to deliver on its promises. Nevertheless, if there is any validity at all to the voting figures, and this is admittedly questionable,[49] they suggest that substantial numbers of people may have repaid the anticipated debt to Acheampong. The set of results least favourable to the SMC recorded a 49% 'Yes' vote. Although substantial doubts must remain, such behaviour would be consistent with a deep-seated cynicism towards politicians and soldiers alike. It may be helpful at this juncture to narrow the focus once again.

6.2. The Bakpele and the Shrinking State

6.2.1. Major-General Utuka and the Education of Likpe

By January 1972 the Bakpele, like so many others in the Volta Region, were disillusioned by their experience of the political process. It seemed that on each occasion they had been presented with a choice, they had ended up drawing the short straw. The election of Dr. Obed Asamoah to Parliament in 1969 seemed at first to present grounds for optimism, but it quickly became apparent that he was

powerless on the opposition benches. The Regional Chief Executive, A.S. Kpodonu controlled the lines of communication to Government and he made it abundantly clear that communities who supported the opposition could not expect favourable consideration. The Bakpele had constructed their own Likpe Secondary School (LISEC) without Government assistance, but they required official recognition if it was to be staffed with paid teachers. Kpodonu refused to co-operate unless the Bakpele transferred their allegiance to the Progress Party.[50]

To make matters worse, Dr. Asamoah was politically neutralized in 1971 by virtue of his involvement in a corruption trial. He was charged on twenty-two counts of deceit and one of abetment in the submission of fraudulent claims for compensation to the Volta River Authority.[51] The fraud had been perpetrated by Mensah Lemboe, the Matehene, while he was employed in the Lands Department. As a lawyer, Asamoah had countersigned the photographs accompanying the compensation claims and was thereby implicated. At the time the military struck in 1972, the trial was still in progress. When the court did make its ruling in February of that year, Asamoah was actually acquitted, although Lemboe and five others received prison sentences. By this time, however, the political circus had moved on. Asamoah returned to private legal practice, after which his influence in Regional affairs was effectively limited to his membership of VORDA.

The Likpe Traditional Council, perceiving a change in the political climate, despatched telegrams of support to the NRC and to the new Regional Commissioner.[52] Attention then focussed on turning the broad promises of the regime to maximum advantage. In the first instance, the strategy was to appear enthusiastic about self-help. Towards the end of 1972, a reporter commented favourably upon the communal development efforts of Likpe-Abrani and contrasted this with the lack of activity in Hohoe, a comparison which was no doubt popular.[53] However, the Bakpele were competing with communities that

were more populous and frequently had powerful patrons on their side. Consequently, Likpe had little to show for the first years of military rule.

With time, the Bakpele became aware of a new star in the firmament, in the guise of Brigadier E.K. Utuka. He had been born in Mate in 1937, which meant that he was still only 35 years old when Acheampong seized power. He had attended Sandhurst and had then served with the Ghana Army during the Congo crisis.[54] He was commissioned as a Second-Lieutenant in July 1961.[55] By the time of the coup, Utuka had risen to the rank of Lt.-Colonel in command of the Second Battalion at Takoradi.[56] At this stage he did not land a political appointment, but was placed in charge of the Teshie Military Academy and then in 1973 was sent abroad to the Royal College of Defence Studies. By this time, he already commanded some influence. Nana Soglo Allo III was, for example, employed by the Cocoa Marketing Board in 1973 on the strength of his recommendation.[57] A more substantial plea for help soon centred on the Likpe Secondary School. LISEC was due to be absorbed into the state system in 1974, following years of lobbying. But recognition was abruptly withdrawn by Colonel E.O. Nyante, the Commissioner For Education and Culture, and conferred upon the Worawora Secondary School to which town the teachers were diverted. The ostensible reason was that the LISEC facilities fell short of the required standard. The Bakpele allege, however, that Nyante had acquired rice farms in the vicinity of Worawora during his tour as Regional Commissioner.[58] Since only one school could be absorbed that year, Nyante had responded to pressure from his adopted community. Alarmed by this unwelcome and unexpected development, Nana Soglo sent a cable to Utuka in Britain, urging him to intercede. Although Utuka did not deliver an immediate victory, he did pay for the installation of an electricity plant at LISEC, allowing the school to be absorbed into the state system in 1976.[59]

At the beginning of 1975, Utuka succeeded Fred Akuffo as Commander of the Border Guards and later that year was appointed a member of the SMC. The

Bakpele now had one of their sons in the very engine-room of government, something which (it was noted with some glee) Hohoe had never achieved. This was all the more significant because Utuka was the only representative from the Volta Region serving on the ruling council. For the first time, the idiosyncratic style of the Acheampong regime seemed likely to benefit Likpe. Pressure was exerted upon Utuka from all sides of the community. The young men looked to him to secure them employment with the Army or the Border Guards. Others approached him for financial help to enter trade or to acquire a vehicle plying one of the routes to Hohoe. The community as a whole wanted better roads and improved social amenities. Everybody was aware that Utuka could meet these requests only by abusing his official position. This worried some people, but the rules of the political game had changed. Since every other official seemed to derive the maximum advantage from his position, it was only sensible for Utuka to do the same. Major Agbo was held up as a model for Utuka to emulate. If Agbo had secured a tarred road for Peki, it was argued, then surely Utuka had at least a right, and maybe even a moral duty, to do his best for Likpe which had waited so patiently and for so long.[60]

At first, Utuka appeared to vindicate the faith that had been placed in him. He was credited with some achievements that possibly had little to do with him. The tarring of the Hohoe-Kute road via east Likpe had been planned as early as 1972. Equally, Mate was large enough to qualify for the installation of a water supply, although maybe that work would never have started without his personal intervention. It steadily became apparent, however, that there was the world of difference between the adoption of a project and its eventual realization. In Likpe, as in the rest of the Region, official projects repeatedly stalled through shortages of basic materials and naked corruption. The water supply project proceeded very slowly until Utuka was dismissed from office, after which it was taken off the books.[61] Similarly, the east Likpe road was tarred as far as Likpe-Nkwanta, the first village after Hohoe, after which work ground to a halt. Many people in Likpe were inclined to blame Utuka himself for these failures. At

the very least, he was regarded as being too timid. The following observation is typical:

> "Utuka wasn't bold enough. In Peki, Agbo is praised more than the Paramount Chief, but what does Mate have to show for Utuka being in Government?"[62]

Others were rather less charitable. Utuka had acquired a reputation as one of the more corrupt members of the Acheampong regime. As head of the Border Guards, he was uniquely placed to profit from smuggling activities. As Chairman of the National Food Distribution Committee, he controlled access to essential commodities.[63] It was common knowledge that his own wife had accumulated a personal fortune by trading in these very commodities. The negative image of Utuka fed back into the local arena where they provided an explanation for the obvious lack of movement on the development front. Utuka was suspected of being too absorbed with his personal affairs to care much for the welfare of his people. Although he was reputedly very wealthy, there were few signs of his opulence in Likpe. This merely seemed to demonstrate that his heart was not really in the community.

On the occasions when Utuka did exercise his personal influence, he exposed himself to the charge of partiality. He was accused by the youth of paying excessive attention to the chiefs and elders. In the rest of Likpe, he was perceived as showing special favour to Mate people. On one occasion, Utuka offended the inhabitants of Bakwa when he threatened to withdraw his assistance in the construction of a bridge because of what he regarded as a lack of village co-operation. The young men of Bakwa were especially aggrieved at his unwillingness to assist them in the search for employment, forcing many of them to leave for Nigeria. The echoes of longstanding village conflicts are readily apparent:

> "There are differences of opinion about Utuka in Likpe. Uyuka was more interested in Mate and the other towns than Todome and Bakwa. Some young boys wanted to get into the Army, but only the Mate boys got in."[64]

Although the temptation to blame Utuka was great, a more disturbing possibility slowly dawned on the community: namely that state apparatus was beyond the manipulation even of those who wielded formal power. Utuka should have been able to apply effective pressure for the completion of the border road between Hohoe and Kute, in his capacity as head of the Border Guards and as an influential member of the SMC When he broached the issue, it transpired that the contract had been awarded to a mistress of the Regional Commissioner, Colonel Amevor. The latter reputedly warned Utuka that he should drop the issue or Likpe would be blacklisted from future development projects.[65] The road was never completed and it would appear that the contractor was never brought to book.[66] Aside from corruption, state agencies were frequently incapable of performing the basic tasks assigned to them. Without a modicum of bureaucratic rationality, it was not possible to exploit the proximity to state power that Utuka clearly enjoyed. By the time of the Union Government referendum, the Bakpele had lost faith in Utuka and were more sceptical than ever about the pursuit of politics. In July 1978, a couple of weeks after Acheampong was forced to resign, Utuka was himself dismissed from office and retired from the Armed Forces. The overthrow of the Akuffo regime on 4 June 1979 was followed by the arrest of Utuka and others who had held governmental posts since 1972. On 16 June, Utuka received no more than a summary trial and was then executed alongside Acheampong at Teshie firing range, his place of work during the early days of the ousted regime.[67]

Following the seizure of his assets, the Bakpele began to suspect that Utuka was not as personally corrupt as had previously been believed. Surprisingly, his property outside Likpe turned out to be less extensive than everyone had assumed.[68] Consequently, the neglect of Likpe could not be as confidently attributed to his personal greed: instead, it reflected the built-in irrationality of the system.

The Rawlings takeover of June 1979 and the campaign to restore efficiency and probity to the state machinery were observed with some interest. The new regime argued that it was necessary to make an example of individuals who had abused their official positions. Despite the genuine shock surrounding the death of Utuka, the Bakpele apparently agreed (see Table 6.2). The community also turned out to vote in the 1979 elections, albeit with diminished optimism. In order to understand this apparent willingness to resume participation in the rituals of national life, it is necessary to expose the inner workings of community politics at this time.

Table 6.2:

Responses to the Question "What is Your Opinion on the Coup of June 4 1979 and the Events That Followed?"

Options	Number	Percentage
1. Coup was unjustified:	5	1.70%
2. Coup was justified, but need not have been so bloody:	134	46.70%
3. Both the coup and the shedding of blood were unavoidable:	148	51.60%
Total:	287	100.00%

(Source: Likpe survey, 1986)

6.2.2. The Myth of Local Autonomy

In the view of Naomi Chazan, what was distinctive about the 1970s was the withdrawal of many communities from an unresponsive state into more local theatres of political activity, where common values and agreed rules persisted.[69] Although her schema is distinctly plausible, not least because of what is known about the durability of local attachments, Chazan does not marshal any direct evidence in support of her thesis. Rather, it is a model derived inductively from a

functionalist logic. Withdrawal from the state has to be demonstrated empirically and in the absence of a corpus of local studies for this period, it would be wise to exercise caution. The evidence from Likpe that is presented here offers only qualified support for the Chazan thesis.

It is true that there were structures in Likpe that assumed an importance far beyond what was sanctioned by the state. Firstly, chieftaincy remained a significant focus of identification. Although the Bakpele did not possess a deeply rooted chiefly tradition stretching back to the nineteenth century or before, British policies assisted in the creation of a tradition. Ghanaian chiefs were forced to disgorge the bulk of their powers during dyarchy and after independence.[70] In 1959, the chiefs forfeited direct representation upon local councils. The year before, the Local Courts Act denied them the authority to preside over local disputes. Deprived of executive and judicial responsibilities, the chiefs were left as little more than figureheads whose primary function was to act as spokesmen for community interests. Yet within Likpe, as in the rest of the country, the institution lost none of its legitimacy. Indeed, the 1950s was a period when many new chiefly traditions were being introduced. Nana Soglo Allo II and his brother, Nana Soglo Allo III imported the entire panoply of Akan chieftaincy, including wing titles and linguists. This was of more than merely symbolic importance, as the chiefs sought to fill the space vacated by the state. Concerned about levels of petty crime, and conscious of the limitations of the Police based in Hohoe, older members of the community looked to the chiefs to enforce respect for property and to uphold local values. Writing in 1979, Anyomi identified a hierarchy of unofficial 'courts' in Likpe, ranging from the clan level to the court of the Okakple himself.[71] These to some extent substituted for the formal structures of Police and judiciary.

Secondly, the Town Development Committees (TDCs) proved their indispensability as instruments of community development. The TDCs trace their origins back beyond the adult literacy campaigns of the early 1950s.[72] In Likpe,

as elsewhere, they carved out a niche in community development in competition with local authorities. According to Amonoo, they accounted for approximately 46% of total expenditure on community development projects between 1957 and 1962.[73] In recognition of their vitality, Nkrumah brought the TDCs under party control in 1962, after which the bulk of development work at the village level was channelled through them.[74] After the 1966 coup, the TDCs were subjected to close political scrutiny, but managed to escape incorporation into the formal local government structure.

By the end of the 1970s, there was widespread dissatisfaction in Likpe with the performance of the Jasikan District Council, which raised local taxes but did little in return for the villages. The distance from Jasikan, compounded by transport bottlenecks, meant that Likpe was effectively cut off from the headquarters. A longstanding debate about the traditional affiliations of the Bakpele was reopened in 1979, when a number of chiefs insisted that Likpe should join the newly created Hohoe District.[75] When the District boundaries were not redrawn, the Bakpele withdrew their support from the Jasikan District Council and concentrated their attention on the TDCs. The latter performed a great deal of routine but essential maintenance work on school buildings, market stalls and roads by means of weekly communal labour. The TDCs also endeavoured to carry out more ambitious development projects, some of which were specific to the villages and others of which were of general concern. The Likpe Secondary School was the most impressive monument to local initiative. Its construction was funded partly through additional levies, contributed by the Bakpele resident outside as well as inside the community, and partly through the assistance of the Canadian High Commission. The TDCs and the chiefs usually co-operated closely, although there were bound to be occasional disputes over territory. The chiefs beat gong-gong on behalf of the TDCs in order to ensure maximum turnout at communal labour, and they enforced penalties for absenteeism. The chiefs in turn derived much of the credit for the completion of projects that were planned and executed by the TDCs.

These were genuine innovations that arose as a response to the incapacitation of the state. Nevertheless, withdrawal did not provide a real solution to the manifold problems confronting the Bakpele. One reason is that, contrary to the views of Chazan, there was surprisingly little agreement upon the rules of the political game within the community. To the wider world, the Bakpele often presented a united face, but old antagonisms continued to play themselves out on the local stage. This was true of the Likpe stool dispute that was examined in Chapter Three. Following an aborted reconciliation effort in 1970, relations between the village of Abrani and the Okakple were virtually severed. Nana Akototse IV refused to recognize Nana Soglo Allo III as Okakple and the latter, in turn, would not allow him to take his place on the Likpe Traditional Council without having sworn an oath of allegiance. In 1973, the Likpe Scholars Union was invited to arbitrate but neither side was prepared to compromise.[76] A durbar held in February 1978 to celebrate the promotion of Utuka to the rank of Major-General was disrupted when Nana Soglo refused to allow the Abranihene and his entourage to enter Mate.[77] To complicate matters, a second front was opened in Mate itself. As noted in Chapter Three, a section of the Kalalenti clan which had consented to the enstoolment of Nana Soglo remained in Mate and was rewarded by the creation of a separate stool. The first Matehene was Mensah Lemboe who was imprisoned in 1972 for his part in the Volta River compensation fraud and then destooled. When he emerged from prison, he denounced the creation of Mate stool as a subtle ploy to monopolize the Paramouncy within the Kalegato clan. The Lemboe family thereafter set its sights on the Likpe stool. Other chiefs within Likpe themselves suspected that Nana Soglo was aiming to rise above his position of *primus inter pares*. In 1979, the Abranihene sent a circular to the other chiefs accusing Nana Soglo of behaving dictatorially. The Benkum division, comprising the villages of Todome and Bakwa, took the cue and demanded a right to secede from Likpe and to link up with Hohoe instead.[78]

Local politics was also poisoned by a revival of the Agbozome dispute which had been smouldering since Nana Sekyere abandoned the unification cause and returned to live in his village. The Vute clan had refused to accept him back as chief. Yet Nana Sekyere had solicited the backing of the Basio clan and had thereby secured the endorsement of Government. When the Likpe stool dispute erupted, Nana Sekyere and the Basio clan heads supported the claims of S.Q. Mantey, while Vute clan rallied to the cause of Nana Soglo Allo II. When Nana Soglo Allo III succeeded, he repaid this debt by lobbying central government for the recognition of the Vute clan head as a chief in his own right.[79] At this point, the Basio clan severed its alliance with Nana Sekyere and sought a similar status for its own head. In November 1970, the Likpe Traditional Council approved the enstoolment of Nana Udzu Kakpeyi II and requested his recognition by government as Basiohene. In May 1974, Nana Kakpeyi was officially gazetted as a chief alongside Nana Osei Akoto IV of Vute clan.[80] The result was a great deal of confusion over the ranking of the three chiefs within Agbozome. The Vute and Basio clans believed that they had established complete autonomy (although they inhabited the same village), whereas everybody else accepted the seniority of the Agbozome chief. Matters came to a head when Nana Sekyere I died and was succeeded by Nana Sekyere II in 1974. The newly gazetted Basiohene and Vutehene refused to recognize Nana Sekyere II despite the mediation efforts of the Likpe Traditional Council.

The conflict within Agbozome is significant because it illustrates a dependence on the arbitraments of the state. The competing factions extended their struggle beyond Likpe for the reason that there was simply no agreed procedure for reaching a binding settlement within the community. The Ghanaian state not only presided over a set of arbitration procedures, but on a more mundane level it commanded access to all the documentation pertaining to the case.[81] The state monopoly over information, adjudication and in the final analysis force, propelled local actors towards the centre.

As early as February 1975, Nana Soglo petitioned the House of Chiefs to seek the withdrawal of recognition from the chiefs of Vute and Basio.[82] The Basiohene, in particular, fought back with a great degree of acumen. On the one hand, he turned the fashionable myth of Guan origin back upon the Likpe Traditional Council, claiming that his people were a neglected minority. In 1976, he submitted a declaration to the following effect:

> "On 27 November 1974, Traditional Council voted to withdraw recognition of Basiohene for failing to support a constitution for Agbozome drawn up by Omanhene and his people. That all the chiefs who voted at the meeting on that occasion were of Guan origin... That on the basis of the divisions which make up Likpe today, Basio is not a clan but an Akan minority group, and Likpe is predominantly Guan... That on the basis of the above that since the Guans form the dominant part of Likpe and the Basios are an Akan minority who are always being oppressed..."[83]

On the other hand, the Basiohene enthusiastically endorsed the Union Government proposals in a brazen attempt to extract favourable consideration from the Acheampong regime. Since Major-General Utuka was personally close to Nana Soglo, it was necessary to adopt this more circuitous route to the centre. Although he could not adduce any evidence to prove the disloyalty of his opponents, Nana Kakpeyi endeavoured to sow the seeds of doubt. His tactics are clear from the following letter which was addressed to Nana Soglo, but clearly intended for government consumption:

> "May I explain that since my recognition by this Government in 1974, my people and myself have looked towards the present Government as our Redeemer and we would continue to follow and obey the wishes of this Regime. Hence we voted YES decisively despite persuasions from the opposite side. We made up our minds long ago to accept the Union Government Concept instead of the Party System. I hope that you are aware that I personally suffered under the latter system when one of your Lawyers went to see the P.P. Regional Commissioner at Ho to stop forwarding my form for Gazetting to the Castle... Furthermore, barely a week after the Referendum, your favoured Chief Nana Kofi Sekyere II and his associates caused the arrest of our people by the Hohoe Police "[84]

The reference to the Police is significant in this context. When the Likpe Traditional Council impeded the Vutehene and the Basiohene from exercising their customary rights, they successfully took the case to court. At the end of 1978, Nana Soglo Allo III was defeated and left with a substantial bill for legal

costs.[85] Throughout this protracted struggle, the courts, the Police and the central administration were all involved and helped to determine the final outcome.

By contrast, the one institution that was supposed to embrace all sections of Likpe was greatly enfeebled by the end of the decade. Abrani and many of the residents of Agbozome were in rebellion against the Likpe Traditional Council, whilst secessionist rumblings emanated from Todome and Bakwa. Given that Nkwanta was a stranger village, owing allegiance to Bakwa, one can conclude that as much as half of Likpe was pulling away from the control of a Council which was regarded as too firmly in the grip of Nana Soglo Allo III.

These political fissures inevitably impaired the ability of the Bakpele to assume the full burden of development that had been shed by central government and the Jasikan District Council. In such a deeply divided village as Agbozome, the activities of the TDC were continually disrupted by the outbreak of hostilities. In Likpe as a whole, the principal occasion for fund-raising was the annual Easter rally held in rotation between the villages. During the decade under consideration, every single rally was marred by the refusal of one or more of the villages to participate in proceedings.[86]

Recurrent bouts of conflict were not of course the only factor in the equation. As importantly, the economic environment interposed barriers between the Bakpele and the fulfilment of their objectives. Economic involution meant that it was more difficult than ever for members of the community to contribute funds on a regular basis. The collapse of wages and salaries similarly made it impractical for Bakpele working outside to send cash home. The Bakpele who went to work in Nigeria often earned higher incomes, but were to some extent beyond the call of the community. Thus, the raising of funds for a specific project was typically a protracted affair. The community would struggle to meet a target, only to see the savings consumed by the inflationary spiral. This helped to engender a sense of

demoralization. The Bakpele knew that they could maintain roads and school buildings through communal labour, but that they could not realistically embark on more ambitious development projects without external assistance. The Ghanaian state may have been an unlikely candidate by 1980, but it nevertheless served as a gateway to other, richer pastures. Following the success with LISEC, the Bakpele regarded the foreign embassies and aid agencies as potentially the juiciest pickings. By the early 1980s, therefore, the Bakpele were not merely relying upon their own efforts, but actively seeking new alliances outside the community: local autarchy was never considered as a serious option.

6.2.3. The 1979 Elections Revisited

In the light of the evidence presented thus far, it is easier to solve the riddle of why it was that Ghanaians bothered to participate in the 1979 elections at a time when government apparently had so little to offer. Those who have examined the elections have failed to agree on the level of enthusiasm for the exercise. Where Richard Jeffries detected 'keen interest', Naomi Chazan found evidence of mass alienation.[87] There is even some confusion over the rate of participation. According to the figures produced by Chazan, the number of voters considered as a percentage of the total electorate fell from 47.25% in 1969 to about 32% in 1979. Using the same census reports and electoral statistics, David Brown concludes that the rate of participation had barely changed.[88] In the absence of details of the size of the electorate, it is not possible to compare rates of participation in Biakoye constituency. Nevertheless, one can deduce that there was only a slightly lower turnout by comparison with 1969, which deserves some explanation.[89]

Within Likpe, a willingness to participate was due to an interplay between two factors. The first was an awareness of continuing dependence upon resources (political rather than economic) that were still in the gift of the state authorities. To abstain from the elections risked losing ground to rivals within Likpe and

competitors outside it. Secondly, rival political parties did appear to pose some alternatives.[90] The Bakpele were presented with three major options. They could vote for the United National Convention (UNC). This combined the appeal of Parliamentary candidate from Likpe, namely Dr. Obed Asamoah, with the personal attractiveness of Willie Ofori-Atta as Presidential hopeful. Alternatively, the Bakpele could support the Popular Front Party (PFP), which had a historical link with the unification movement and with the Progress Party. Thirdly, they could vote for the Peoples' National Party (PNP), which sported a national image and openly proclaimed its descent from the defunct Convention People's Party.[92] The associations of these three major parties were sufficiently varied to inject a measure of interest into the campaign.

The PFP campaign in Likpe faced the most serious obstacles. The candidate was unfamiliar and could no longer count on the defunct Togoland Congress networks. Furthermore, the Busia era was far from a fond memory. This partly explains why the Bakpele recoiled from the Akan banner at the same time as they disassociated themselves from the Ewe tag: both had brought political misfortune. To be Guan was to be non-aligned. Nevertheless, since it was widely believed that the PFP would win, many people were keen to fall on the right side.[92] This partly explains the respectable performance of the party in several constituencies. The most surprising feature of the election was the grudging support extended to Dr. Obed Asamoah. The latter could count on the votes of his kinsmen in Bala and Kukurantumi, as well as the endorsement of Nana Soglo in Mate. But the rest of Likpe was hesitant. Many voted for Dr. Asamoah half-heartedly, taking the view that "the devil you know is better than the angel you don't".[93]

The 1979 results mirrored the pattern of the Second Republic, when established political figures were humbled. On this occasion, Sam Okudjeto and R.K. Mensah lost the seats they had captured in 1969, while G.K. Agama only narrowly defeated someone recently out of University.[94] The PNP capitalized on the desire

for yet another fresh start, by selecting more youthful candidates with a clean slate, precisely as the NAL had done a decade before. Dr. Asamoah was himself the victim of this trend. In the assessment of Nana Agya Mensah:

> "Almost all Likpe supported the PNP even though Dr. Asamoah was from our area. It was not because we thought it was the old CPP, but because we wanted something new. We wanted to build a new thing together."[95]

Most importantly, the disloyalty of the Bakpele reflected the learning experience of the Utuka years. The Bakpele were now alert to the limitations of patronage politics. Although politicians might make promises, it was understood that the likelihood of their delivering the goods was decidedly limited. This was due not just to duplicity on the part of the politicians, but also to the unpredictability of the state machinery. One reason why the PNP was attractive was that it promised to follow the best precedents of the Nkrumah regime, which had (during its more constructive moments) left a mark on the Region - even if the prominence of Imoru Egala was a reminder that the CPP had always manifested a seamier side.[96] Despite the observation of Nana Agya Mensah, many respondents stressed the CPP lineage of the PNP as the decisive consideration in their decision to vote for that party. With echoes of the 1950s, one informant emphasized that party loyalty came first:

> "Dr. Amoah [from Nkonya] was the candidate, so I had to vote for him. I would never vote for anyone who is not in my party."[97]

For this reason, Nana Agya Mensah and others tried to persuade Dr. Asamoah to enlist with the PNP. His failure to do so lost him many votes in Likpe, and ultimately cost him the seat (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3:

The Results of the 1979 Election in Biakoye Constituency

Candidate	Party	Votes Received
Dr. Kwabena Adjei	PFP	3,363
Dr. Kwadjo Amoah	PNP	4,026
Dr. Obed Y. Asamoah	UNC	4,010
S.S.S. Atta	TFP	170
B.D.Y. Nyame	ACP	397
S.K. Yirenkyi	SDF	1,570

(Source: Legon Observer, 27 July 1979, p.264)

Although many Bakpele were prepared to wear party tee-shirts and to sing party songs, enthusiasm for the poll was tempered. The disappointments of the previous decade had nurtured a vein of cynicism. For many people, the gifts of free palm-wine and food were what the election was really about, since nobody could be confident of what would follow.[98] David Brown identified a 'bingo mentality' in the Region, in which voters reckoned hey had nothing to lose by participating and stood a remote chance of reaping a windfall.[99] This explanation advances our understanding of Bakpele political behaviour. Since there was no alternative to involvement in the state nexus, there seemed little point in abstaining from politics.

6.3. Conclusion:

During the course of the 1970s, confidence in the public realm reached its lowest ebb. During the Nkrumah years, the Bakpele had become accustomed to the idea that politics was about unlocking access to a relatively well-endowed state. At the time, the promises had consistently outstripped the benefits that actually accrued to the community. Yet this was a comparative success-story against what

was to follow. Under the Busia regime, the Bakpele found themselves pointedly excluded from access to public resources. The advent of the NRC was greeted with approval, but the military state soon revealed itself to be an unreliable partner. Just as conditions were becoming acute, Major-General Utuka was catapulted into the front line of the SMC. Ultimately, though, even Utuka was unable to cut through bureaucratic inertia or escape the tug-of-war between the coteries of special interests.

The Bakpele, like the other minorities, found it expedient to redefine the terms of their identity. A neutral Guan label was more attractive than association with a notional Ewe community or an Akan ethnic bloc. The former had taken them for granted, while the latter were unable to see them as anything other than extensions of the Ewe. Although fission might be mistaken for a shrinkage of the political arena, in reality the Bakpele found little succour in the so-called 'exit option'. As noted above, Chazan has presented no real evidence for a withdrawal from the state. In fact, a large corpus of local research, which has dwelt on the divisiveness of local arenas, makes the scenario an unlikely one. Chazan is right to highlight the vitality of parallel institutions, but is mistaken in believing that these could be self-contained. In Part One of this thesis, it has been argued that local politics was not simply an extension of local factional squabbles. That should not blind one to the fact that factionalism has been an ongoing feature of local politics and has given the state a toe-hold at the periphery.

Footnotes to Chapter Six:

1. Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982, (Boulder, Westview: 1983), chapters 2 and 11. Also "Ghana: Problems of Governance and The Emergence of Civil Society" in L. Diamond, J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume 2: Africa, (London: Adamantine Press, 1988); and "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988). The 'exit option' has received its most convincing exposition in Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, (London: Heinemann, 1980).

2. A study by K.B. Dickson quoted in D. Smock and A.C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p.209.

3. C.K. Brown, "The Ghanaian Rural Youth: Resource for Social Development", Ghana Social Science Journal, V, 1, May 1978, p.35.

4. Ibid., p.33.

5. Smock and Smock, op. cit., p.209. However, in 1970-71, the Volta Region had the fourth highest number of secondary schools, that is a total of 18. See E.E. Ekuban, "Post-Independence Development in African Education With Particular Reference to Ghana", Ghana Social Science Journal, III, 2, November 1976.

6. Educat (pseudonym), "Gbedemah, the NLC, Busia and the Volta Region", Legon Observer, IV, 22, 24 October - 6 November 1969, pp.6-11. See also the riposte by Ignoramus, "The Rest Vs. Volta? - A Reply to Educat", Legon Observer, IV, 24, 21 November - 4 December 1969, pp.6-11.

7. Brown inaccurately refers to there being two Ewe members of the NRC and, more understandably, counts Utuka as an Ewe. See David Brown, "Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XVIII, 4, 1980, p.601, footnote 1.

8. On the early economic nationalism of the NRC, see Maxwell Owusu, "Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military: The National Redemption Council in Ghana", Africa Today, XXII, 1, 1975; and Donald Rothchild, "Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972-78", Comparative Politics, XII, 4, July 1980.

9. D.J. Harris, "Comprehensive Rural Development and the Rural Environment: A Study in Conflict", African Administrative Studies, XXVI, 1986, pp.169-170. 4; and "Central Power and Local Reform: Ghana During the 1970s", in P. Mawhood (ed.), Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa, (Chichester: John Wiley, 1983), pp.203-206.

10. Harris "Central Power", pp.207-8.

1. Ibid., p.213.

12. See text of the speech in The Daily Graphic, 29 July 1972.

13. Some months later when Regional Commissioner Habadah broached the subject again, the population requirement was revised upwards to 4,000. See The Daily Graphic, 14 October 1972. In 1970, there were 17 towns in the Region which met that criterion. E.J.K. Xexemeku, "Urbanization Trends and Housing Development in the Volta Region", in N.D. Sodzi (ed.), Volta Region: Plans, Projects and Prospects, Proceedings of a seminar on the economic development of the Volta Region, December 1983, p.37.

14. Ken Kwaku, "The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: A Case Study of the Volta Region (Ghana) Since 1920", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975, pp.283-284.

15. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 22 June 1972.

16. Kwaku, op. cit., p.284.

17. Ibid., pp.290-291.

18. For the flavour of the dispute, see "Full Text of Statement Made By the Volta Youth Association", (advertisement) in The Daily Graphic, 3 September 1974; and "Press Statement By the Volta Regional Development Association", The Daily Graphic, 18 September 1974, p.18.

19. See the Regional Diary in The Daily Graphic, 5 November 1975.

20. Kabore was reported as warning dilatory contractors that their works would be ceded to the VRDC. See The Daily Graphic, 23 April 1974, p.6.

21. Interview with Mr. Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 20 January 1986.

22. It was common practice for Regional Commissioners to establish farms with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture. Amongst those who did so were Colonel Nyante, Colonel John Kabore and later Lt.-Colonel Amevor.

23. During 1986, I had the opportunity to peruse the Ministry files, then located at the offices of the VORADEP in Ho. The observations made here convey the general sense of disillusionment. More specific complaints can be found in the weekly situation reports.

24. Harris "Central Power", pp.214-215.

25. Editorial in The Daily Graphic, 13 April 1977.

26. The turnout was 25.8% of registered electors, according to David Brown, "The Political Response to Immiseration: A Case Study of Rural Ghana", Genève-Afrique, XVIII, 1, 1980, p.61. Oquaye cites a lower figure of 18.4% nationally and 15.3% for the Volta Region, excluding Tongu District Council Area. Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979, (Accra: Tornado Publications, 1980) p.82.

27. A.Y. Fekpe, "The Volta Regional Development Corporation", in Sodzi op. cit., p.37.

28. David Brown "Sieges and Scapegoats: The Politics of Pluralism in Ghana and Togo", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXI, 3, 1983, *passim*.

29. C.M.K. Mamattah, The Ewes of West Africa: Volume One, The Anlo-Ewes and Their Immediate Neighbours (Keta: Volta Research Publications, undated).

30. Ibid., p.58.

31. Ibid., p470-474.

32. See Kofi Awoonor, The Ghana Revolution: Background Account From a Personal Perspective, (New York, Oases Publishers: 1984), especially pp.48-60.

33. Ibid., p.60.

34. Awoonor illustrates the importance of face-to-face and blood relations very well. when he writes: "Brigadier Alfonse Kattah Kodzo Kattah was born in Keta, a product of Keta Roman Catholic School, of an old Anlo family from Whuti whose ancestry stretches to Xi, and with whom I later discovered my family was connected with blood. I was told I have to call him 'grandfather'" He also mentions that he went to the Keta Presbyterian Mission School with Kojo Tsikata. See Awoonor, ibid., pp. 48, 63.

35. Mamattah, op. cit., pp.445-456.

36. Awoonor, op. cit., p.60.

37. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 24 March 1972.

38. Ministry of Agriculture Files, VORADEP, RAO/VR/30 "Meetings", Speech delivered by Mr. A.S. Kpodonu, Regional Chief Executive at a meeting of Regional Heads of Department.

39. Kwaku, op. cit., pp. 283-285.

40. "Full Text of Statement Made By the Volta Youth Association", The Daily Graphic, 3 September 1974; "Press Statement By the Volta Regional Development Association", The Daily Graphic 18 September 1974, p.18.

41. V.W.K. Agbodza also became President of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce.

42. Brown, "Borderline Politics", p.603.

43. This was the Chieftaincy (Membership of Regional House of Chiefs) Instrument, 1974.

44. This sensitivity had been demonstrated some years previously when the delimitation of constituencies became an issue. The chiefs of the Buem and Krachi Districts argued that ethnic boundaries were as important as the consideration of numbers. "Petition Against Petition of Chiefs and People of Kpandu District", copy signed by Nana Soglo Allo III, dated 5 August 1968 (copy in my possession). The inclusion of the Bakpele within the Guan community has been legitimized by the Guan Historical Society. See Guan Research Papers (Journal of the Guan Historical Society of Ghana), Volume One, undated.

45. For the details of civilian opposition to Acheampong, culminating in the Union Government referendum, see Chazan An Anatomy, chapter 8; and "Politics in a 'Non-Political System: The March 30 1978 Referendum", African Studies Review, XXII, 1, 1979. See also Maxwell Owusu, "Politics Without Parties: Reflections on the Union Government Proposals in Ghana", African Studies Review, XXII, 1, 1979 and D. Hitchins, "Towards Political Stability in Ghana: A Rejoinder in the Union Government Debate", African Studies Review, XX, 1, 1979.

46. A concise breakdown of turnouts in successive polls can be found in David Brown, "Immiseration", p.62-63. For national trends, see Naomi Chazan, "The Anomalies of Continuity: Perspectives on Ghanaian Elections Since Independence", in F. Hayward (ed.), Elections in Independent Africa (Boulder and London, Westview: 1987), p.82.

47. Brown, "Immiseration", p.72 footnote 23.

48. Oquaye, op. cit., p.86.

49. These figures are highly suspect in view of the fact that two conflicting sets of results were issued. Chazan, An Anatomy, p.264-266.

50. Interview with Mr. Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 April 1986.

51. The trial can be followed through the pages of the daily newspapers. See editions of The Daily Graphic for 7 January and 5 February 1972.

52. Copies of these telegrams are in my possession.

53. See "Regional Diary" in The Daily Graphic, 29 November 1972.

54. For a pen portrait of Utuka, see The Daily Graphic, 16 October 1975, p.7.

55. Simon Baynham, The Military And Politics In Nkrumah's Ghana (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p.120.

56. Valerie P. Bennett "Epilogue: Malcontents in Uniform - The 1972 Coup D'Etat", in D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds.), Politicians And Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-1972, (London: Frank Cass, 1975), p.312, footnote 12.

57. There is no suggestion of impropriety here. The application was merely refereed by Utuka, who was at that time in charge of the Military Academy.

58. Interview with Mr. Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 April 1986.

59. Interview with Mr. Emilson Kwashie, 25 April 1986.

60. This contention was made several times in interviews. On the other hand, Nana Soglo Allo III pointed out that the Peki road had been planned by Nkrumah, but was scrapped by Busia. There was nothing underhand about its re-adoption by the NRC. Interview, 20 August 1986.

61. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 20 January 1986.

62. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 April 1986.

63. According to Mike Oquaye, supplies from the Food Distribution Corporation intended for the Cocoa Marketing Board were first sold to middlemen who then resold the food at profit to the CMB. Some of these profits were used to fund the Union Government campaign. The signature of Utuka is to be found on one such deal. See M. Oquaye, op. cit., p.23.

64. Interview with Oscar Kugblenu, Bakwa, 28 January 1986.

65. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 25 April 1986.

66. Amevor received a twenty year prison sentence from the People's Court. Oquaye, op. cit., p.145. He was released in 1991.

67. There was a great deal of pathos connected with his death. There were reports of his reciting strange 'incantations' up to the point of his execution. These would have been incomprehensible to everybody present, since Utuka was speaking in Sekpele. The one exception was the military chaplain who administered the last rites. By some coincidence, he too was from Likpe.

68. Apart from his family home at Mate, Utuka owned a house at Tema which had been built after 1975, as well as another uncompleted house at the Airport Residential Area and a building plot at Hohoe. He also owned four vehicles, including a Mercedes Benz he bought while he was in Britain. See the appendices to Kojo Yankah, The Trial of J.J. Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution (Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1986). It may well be true that Utuka used his powers to assist in the enrichment of others but accumulated relatively little for himself. After the death of Utuka, his widow made enquiries about where his supposed fortunes might be found, but these were never recovered. Mrs. Utuka continues to live a modest lifestyle. I owe this inside information to Robert Alloh.

69. Chazan, An Anatomy, pp.63-64.

70. Nothing of substance has been written on Ghanaian chieftaincy in recent years. But for a useful overview, see Kwame Arhin, Traditional Rule in Ghana: Past and Present (Accra: Sedco, 1985), Chapter 6. See also H. Silver, "Going For Brokers: Political Innovation and Structural Integration in a Changing Ashanti Community", Comparative Political Studies, XIV, 2, July 1982.

71. L.M. Anyomi, "History of the Likpe People", B.A. Long Essay, Department of History, University of Ghana, 1979, pp.28-30.

72. Interview with Sam Quist, TDC Chairman, Mate, 29 August 1986.

73. Benjamin Amonoo, Ghana, 1957-1966: Politics of Institutional Dualism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), p.155.

74. Ibid., p.145.

75. Anyomi, op. cit., p.64.

76. Ibid., p.63.

77. Ibid., p.iii.

78. Ibid., p.65.

79. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 16 October 1986; a letter from Nana Soglo to the Prime Minister, dated 21 September 1971, in "Agbosome Affairs" (a file kept by Nana Soglo Allo III).

80. Ghana, Local Government Bulletin, 31 May 1974.

81. Although Nana Soglo himself kept a substantial archive of his own.

82. "Agbosome Affairs", letter from Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, to Registrar, Volta Region House of Chiefs, dated 7 February 1975.

83. "Agbosome Affairs", "Statement in the matter of statutory declaration by Nana Udzu Kakpei II (Basiohene) of Likpe Agbozome in the Likpe Traditional Area", dated 3 June 1976.

84. "Agbosome Affairs", Nana Udzu Kakpeyi II (Basiohene), Agbozome, to Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, dated 1 May 1978.

85. "Agbosome Affairs", A.K. Gukunoo, Barrister at Ho, to the Registrar, Likpe Traditional Council, dated 6 December 1978.

86. Anyomi, op. cit., p.iii.

87. Richard Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979", African Affairs, LXXIX, 316, 1980, p. 407; Naomi Chazan, "The Anomalies, pp.79-81.

88. Chazan, "The Anomalies", table 3.1, p.82; David Brown, "Immiseration", p.62.

89. This conclusion is based on a calculation of the turnout as compared with the likely size of the electorate. The eligible electorate in 1969 was about 37% of the total population. The corresponding estimate for 1979 by David Brown is slightly higher. Since he did not have the benefit of the 1984 Census, and since there was apparently a high rate of adult out-migration in the Biakoye constituency, it seems preferable to rely on the lower estimate. The following pattern then emerges: in 1969, the total population of Biakoye constituency was 43,284, of whom about 16,015 would have been eligible to vote. Given that 12,348 voters chose to do so, we may calculate that the rate of participation was 77%. In 1979, projecting backwards from the 1984 Census, the population would have stood at around 47,374 and of these 17,528 would have been eligible to vote. Since 12,536 people did vote, the participation rate would appear to have been in the order of 71.5%. Although this figure is slightly lower, it is well above the national average and respectable by the comparison with most democracies. For the population statistics, see Ghana, 1984 Population Census of Ghana: Preliminary Report, (Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, undated). See also Brown, ibid.

90. As argued by Jeffries, op. cit., *passim*.

91. On the PFP see "Speech by Mr. B.J. Da Rocha on the Outdooring of the National Popular Party, Accra 2 January 1979"; as regards the PNP see "Manifesto of the People's National Party". Both of these are contained in the political ephemera collection of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London.

92. In one case a former CPP enthusiast reported that he had voted for the PFP He explained that he had done so because he thought the latter would win. He subsequently defected to the PNP when a different result was declared. Interview with Marcus Goodman, Agbozome, 6 February 1986.

93. Interview with Teddy Ofori, Bakwa, 28 January 1986.

94. David Brown, "Immiseration", p.66. Several of the members of Parliament in the Second Republic were reported to have taken out large business loans. See The Daily Graphic, 25 and 27 March 1972.

95. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah, Avedzeme, 19 February 1986.

96. Interview with G.Y. Abiti, Kukurantumi, 12 March 1986.

97. Interview with Anthony Anyageh, Agbozome, 5 February 1986.

98. Several informants said that they voted PNP because they liked palm-wine and the palm-tree was the symbol of that party.

99. David Brown, "Immiseration", p. 62.

Part Three: Revolution, Reform and The Re-engagement of Likpe, 1982-1986

The Third Republic may one day be seen as a watershed in modern Ghanaian history. In 1979, well-wishers of the incoming Limann administration hoped that any such claim to historical significance would rest on the proven viability of democratic institutions. What is likely to be remembered is the economic dislocation and political alienation which culminated in the second military takeover of Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings on 31 December 1981.

The deepening crisis did not give rise to separatist tendencies in the Regions. It did produce discontent in the towns, which translated into support for the initiatives of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). By 1982, there was a perception that drastic surgery could no longer be avoided. To that extent, 'revolution' represented something other than a mere political slogan, although the precise meaning thereof was sketchy and ultimately became the subject of rancorous debate. The countryside was strangely quiescent. Yet the PNDC had no hope of negotiating a way out of the impasse it had inherited without establishing a *modus vivendi* with the peasants who fed the towns and produced the cash crops that oiled the wheels of the national economy. The Rawlings regime was fortunate in that rural communities, such as Likpe, were every bit as keen to keep the channels of communication open - an important point which follows on from the argument in Part Two. The last two Chapters deal with efforts to define the common ground.

Over recent years, the diversion of the 'December 31st Revolution' from its originally somewhat meandering course has spawned a fierce debate between the PNDC and its critics. Whereas the latter have claimed the Revolution was quite simply betrayed, Rawlings and his allies insist that the change of direction was a necessary adaption to stubborn realities. Insofar as alternative models of integration are at issue, this debate falls within the remit of the thesis. Chapter

Seven examines renewed efforts to eradicate smuggling, while Chapter Eight explores the reaction of the Bakpele to the political initiatives pushed in their direction.

Chapter Seven:

The Political Economy of Social Control:Smugglers, Social Mercenaries and State Power in Likpe

Much of the literature on the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) deals with questions of popular participation: how extensive it was in 1982 and whether it was abridged or expanded in subsequent years. This is understandable given the early pre-occupation with 'people's power'. What is often missed is that, from the moment of its inception, the Revolution was also about tightening the bonds of social control. In the border zones, the PNDC struggled to choke off the flow of illicit trade, for which many of the ailments of the country were blamed. The Government borrowed some of the coercive tactics of its predecessors and, when these did not work, it invented a few of its own. Yet, state coercion was never regarded as an entirely satisfactory solution. It had a poor record and it risked alienating the very 'people' in whose name the Revolution had been declared. The regime tried to carry border peoples with it. This Chapter deals with the shifting balance between coercion and co-operation. Because smuggling is so closely bound up with the wider economic environment, it is desirable to devote some space to the debate over recovery strategies.

7.1. Economic Crime and 'Peoples' Power' in 1982

7.1.1. 1982: A Year of Indecision

Revolutions tend to occur when political systems are at their most vulnerable, as a result of war or internal crises. For this reason, many people considered Ghana ripe for revolutionary change, even if they had their doubts about a process that

was initiated by the military.[1] The context of the December 1981 coup was a steady deterioration of the economic environment. Domestic manufacturing had plummeted to 63% of 1977 levels and to below 25% of capacity utilization.[2] More than 70% of the vehicle fleet was off the roads because of a lack of spare parts. Both were a consequence of the foreign exchange squeeze, which was in turn related to falling cocoa exports. Production of the crop was estimated at only 220,000 tonnes in 1981/2, compared to a peak of 571,000 tonnes in 1964/5 and 396,000 tonnes in 1975/6, and much of this was smuggled out of the country. Finally, at a time when national food consumption regularly outstripped production, limited surpluses remained locked up in the countryside for want of transport.[3] It is symptomatic of the erosion of rural-urban exchange networks that food prices were a driving force in the inflationary spiral, which was manifested in a price rise of 120% in 1981.[4]

The Limann regime, which had won the 1979 elections without tabling a plan of action, was seized by paralysis. The subsequent outbreak of ideological and generational feuding within the ruling party inhibited President Limann from taking decisive action once the reins of power were in his hands. The haphazard character of decision-making is amply illustrated through the example of the cocoa industry. Despite Parliamentary pressure in favour of a producer price rise, it was not until 1981 that the Government acted. Limann then raised the price from ¢120 to ¢360 per load (or from ¢4,000 to ¢12,000 per tonne). But having rejected the devaluation conditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for fear of a political backlash, the Government was unable to sustain the increase. With the world price hovering at around ¢5,000 per tonne at official rates of exchange, the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) incurred deficits that ran to ¢7 billion by the end of 1981.[5]

The crisis impinged most directly upon wage and salary earners in the urban centres. Although backyard gardening provided some relief, the majority were fully at the mercy of the market. The PNDC therefore attracted its most loyal

following amongst students, lower civil servants, workers and of course soldiers, all of whom looked to the regime to deliver them from their predicament. The one person who managed to straddle these diverse urban constituencies was Flt-Lt. Rawlings. To the annoyance of the PNP, Rawlings declined to absent himself on a course overseas and, in spite of his own enforced retirement, remained in touch with his base amongst the lower ranks.[6] At the same time, he circulated within the radical political milieu centred on the University of Ghana. The Legon campus had witnessed a flowering of Marxist political organizations and study groups since 1979, the most important of which were the June 4 Movement (JFM) and the New Democratic Movement (NDM).[7] Despite their differences, they shared the view that the crisis was a structural consequence of peripheral capitalism which inhibited genuine development and spawned a parasitic comprador class.[8] These ideas had some impact on Rawlings who consented to become the Chairman of the JFM.[9]

The PNDC was composed in such a way so as to reflect a broad spectrum of urban interests. Ethnicity was dismissed as a matter worthy of public attention, although the regime did develop some awareness of the need for an informal balance. The seven member council consisted of four military men and three civilians, including a trade unionist and a priest.[10] Apart from Rawlings, two other members of the JFM were represented on the PNDC.[11]

In order to harness the political energy generated by the coup, Rawlings called in early January for the formation of Worker's and People's Defence Committees (P/WDCs) at the workplace and in each community. Yet when it came to the countryside, the PNDC operated from a base that was almost as narrow as that of its military predecessors. Since the rural response was guarded, a priority of the PNDC was to implant itself in the villages by means of the PDCs. Not since the days of the CPP had a serious effort been made to establish permanent political structures at that level.

The uneven depth of revolutionary fervour coloured the behaviour of the regime during the first year. The PNDC wanted to ease the plight of its urban constituency, but the economic environment was not so easily transformed. Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, later observed of economic policy in 1982 that it was "essentially a holding action aimed at containing the ravages of the crisis".[12] Like Limann, Rawlings had assumed office bereft of a reasonably coherent economic strategy. In what was essentially a firefighting exercise, the regime concentrated on reining in inflation and restoring some order to public finances. With a deficit of ¢8 billion looming, it was forced to suspend the budget for the entire public service in March and to implement emergency financial measures. The revised mini-budget of May aimed to instil greater financial discipline in the public sector and to widen the tax net. Furthermore, in an effort to curb inflation, the PNDC withdrew the ¢50 notes from circulation and introduced the Akuafo Cheque to replace cash payments to cocoa farmers.[13]

Since neither of these measures brought much relief, the PNDC was forced back upon short-term expedients. Perhaps unconscious of the assumptions it was making, the regime defined 'economic crime' in a way that often discriminated against rural producers.[14] With echoes of 1979, market women were accused of creating artificial shortages which enabled them to charge inflated prices. In January, Rawlings urged traders to reduce their prices, on the grounds that ordinary people could no longer afford essential goods, threatening direct action if they failed to comply. Price controls were imposed on a range of essential commodities, including most basic foodstuffs. These controls were enforceable by the Police as well as the PDCs.[15] Although the worst excesses of 1979 were not repeated, many market women were victimized for selling too high. Because control prices were unrealistic, traders had little option but to flout the regulations. If they ceased trading, they exposed themselves to the charge of hoarding or deliberately blocking the supply of food to the towns.[16] Their only

other option, since profit margins were typically narrow, was to depress the price they paid to the farmers.[17]

It was not uncommon, however, for traders to find themselves in the weaker bargaining position. One concrete example of how price control operated comes from Ve-Hoeme, near Hohoe. The official PDC newspaper, Nsamankow, reported that traders and farmers had deserted the local market to avoid price controls. The paper bemoaned the fact that traders visited the farms to purchase foodstuffs at higher prices which were then passed on to urban consumers. Without a hint of irony, the report presented PDC efforts to force people back into the official market as a defence of "oppressed and exploited" farmers.[18]

The PNDC committed the same order or error in its handling of smuggling, which is the real concern of this Chapter. As has been noted in Chapter Five, an awareness of the futility of crude coercive measures had begun to dawn on the politicians of the Third Republic. But what seemed like a willingness to compromise with potential criminals was an anathema to the revolutionary zealots of 1982. Their contention was that smuggling was a social disease that had to be eradicated at all costs. In the words of Rawlings:

> "Smuggling has become the number one enemy of our country. Cocoa is smuggled. Rice is smuggled. Maize is smuggled. Imported tractors and bicycles are smuggled. The smuggling does not only reduce our foreign exchange earning, but also increases our import bill... The unpatriotic Ghanaian smuggler has created a situation where Government's ability to provide such essential goods as kerosene, cloth, cutlass, drugs etc. has been greatly hampered, because we have to import not only for our local population, but also for our neighbours who get it through smuggling. No nation can afford this. And unless we put a decisive stop to it, our efforts at national reconstruction and transformation of the economy will be seriously undermined."[19]

A predisposition to deal firmly with offenders was shared by representatives of diverse ideological tendencies within the regime. Rawlings visited the Volta Region early in September and promised "drastic revolutionary measures" to eliminate smuggling, because of the havoc it had inflicted on the national

economy.[20] Similarly Chris Atim inaugurated the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) in February, with an injunction to the PDCs to pay particular attention to the border towns "through which real damages to the national economy are perpetrated".[21] Later in the year, he announced that People's Tribunals were to be established in every border town in order to expedite the punishment of offenders.[22] The message was repeated by government officials at every available opportunity. Going further than most, the Brong-Ahafo Regional Secretary pronounced that smugglers would be shot and their farms forfeited to the state.[23] In short, the arrival of the PNDC heralded a return to what one might call the machismo of state power.

Although the theme of social control (paradoxically enough) establishes a continuity between the Revolution and its antecedents, the PNDC did add a distinctive gloss of its own. On the one hand, the regime believed it could effect a dramatic improvement in the performance of state agencies through consciousness-raising. The Border Guards were under a cloud because of the rampant smuggling of the Third Republic. Their failings were partly blamed on the venality of senior officers. On the other hand, the Defence Committees came to be seen as a means to instil higher levels of political awareness into the Armed Forces (including the Border Guards) and Police.[24] Yet the Commander of the Border Guards felt compelled to point out that it was physically impossible for 3,000 Guardsmen to properly monitor traffic along a frontier of 49,600 km.[25] This was clearly a valid submission and in order to assist the Guards, the Army and the Police Task Force were despatched to the border areas. On the other hand, Government aimed to secure the active collaboration of border peoples. This was not an entirely original thought. In 1976, Utuka had mooted a plan to form 'people's anti-smuggling teams' in border villages, while the PNP had advocated vigilante squads.[26] There is no evidence that they were ever operational. By contrast, the PNDC was aiming to place considerable responsibility on the shoulders of the PDCs. Rawlings made this explicit in his first major speech on the subject of the PDCs:

> "... we are asking for local Defence Committees at all levels of our national life - in the towns, in the villages, in all our factories, office and work places and in the barracks. There is an immediate task for these committees, that of defending this Revolution and ensuring the exposure of saboteurs. Especially in the border areas, we are requiring people to form Defence Committees to begin to assist Border Guards and Police to guard our borders."[27]

This was repeated in the first set of PDC Guidelines:

> "The PDCs are to expose all smugglers, black marketeers, hoarders and profiteers, and criminals of all shades and categories, and organise the people to deal with such saboteurs, with revolutionary discipline."[28]

An in-built advantage of the PDCs was that they were supposed to be firmly rooted in their respective communities. This meant that they would be privy to local secrets about the identity of smugglers and their preferred routes.

The billion cedi question (to appropriate a phrase) was whether border folk could realistically be expected to undercut their own livelihoods. By reading between the lines of official reports and the utterances of Government officials, it is possible to distil two sets of answers to this question. The first assumed a clear social division in the countryside between peasant farmers, on the one hand, and rich farmers, traders and transport owners on the other. It also assumed that these rural accumulators had the principal stake in contraband. This owed something to the folklore about 'big men' who regularly sent truckloads of smuggled goods through official check points under the beneficent gaze of the Border Guards. The leadership of the INCC (and later the National Defence Committee) reckoned that ordinary peasants would relish the opportunity to expose the powerful minority who had consistently exploited them.

Secondly, Government strategy was premised on the belief that it was possible to educate peasant smugglers about the harmful consequences of their actions. The difficulty here was that the PDCs had little to offer on top of appeals to patriotism. The PNDC was most reluctant to grant cocoa farmers higher prices at a time when public finances were already in a state of disarray and when devaluation was still a taboo subject. To have stabilized prices at 1981/2 levels, the PNDC would have needed to raise nominal producer prices in line with

inflation. Instead, it sought to lower them still further. Rawlings assisted seven national farmers' associations to amalgamate into an umbrella body, the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (GAFACO-OPS), and then tried to persuade its leaders to accept a reduction in price for the coming season.[29] The rationale was that Limann had tripled prices in expectation of a devaluation that never came. The Chairman of the PNDC was politely rebuffed, but the newspapers later carried reports of farmers voluntarily accepting price cuts in the national interest. This had all the hallmarks of a clumsy attempt at stage-management.[30] In the event, the 1981/2 price was left unchanged, while the cost of farm inputs was raised.[31] The latter was justified on the grounds that a minority of farmers benefited from subsidies and that it was a small sacrifice to make in view of the concession on prices.[32] The net effect was to depress cocoa incomes still further. The introduction of the Akuafo Cheque, which replaced cash payment to cocoa farmers during the 1982/83 season was hailed as a boon for farmers who had been issued with chits whenever the buying agents ran out of cash. But this was not underpinned by an adequate spread of banks in the rural areas.

As was noted in Chapter Five, critical shortages of consumer goods became the key factor in the smuggling equation during the 1970s. In 1982, there was talk of selling goods directly to border communities, but this was beyond the capacity of the PNDC at the time.[33] A proposal for a chain of People's Shops was incorporated into the December statement on economic policy, but it was not activated until 1983.[34] In the final analysis, therefore, the PNDC did very little in its first year to ameliorate the conditions that gave rise to smuggling.

7.1.2. A Qualified Success: The State and PDCs in Likpe

In November 1982, Likpe briefly dominated the national headlines when it was revealed that CMB purchases had risen sharply since the start of the new cocoa season. Whereas the CMB had purchased a total of 191 tonnes in the Likpe-Kukurantumi district during the 1981/82 season, the haul for the first two

weeks amounted to 317 tonnes. In the neighbouring New Ayoma district, the CMB had bought 90 tonnes as against 72 tonnes.[35] These statistics belonged to a wider pattern, insofar as Regional purchases rose from 1,683 tonnes in 1981/82 to 3,776 tonnes the following crop year (See Table 7.3).[36] In the case of coffee, purchases during the 1982/83 season were five times higher than the previous year and the best since the 1977/78 season (see Table 7.2). Although the CMB was still encountering difficulties handling the crop, these figures were taken as a vindication of key elements of Government policy.[37] The questions to be considered are, firstly, why the PNDC apparently succeeded where others had failed; and secondly, why it failed to capitalize on its early achievements.

Table 7.1:

Cocoa Purchases in Likpe-Kukurantumi District By Society, 1977/8-1984/5 (tonnes)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
(a) Likpe:									
Kukurantumi	179	113	69	12	16	60	28	6	21
Abrani	91	76	40	8	16	48	18	4	10
Nkwanta	90	44	55	12	7	24	9	4	3
Bakwa	39	18	30	8	4	11	5	2	2
Bala	67	25	24	8	5	8	8	2	3
Mate	72	32	34	10	6	12	12	3	2
Koforidua	130	41	39	5	17	35	6	2	3
Agbozome	175	58	57	4	17	25	8	1	6
(b) Akpafu:									
Sokpo	76	48	48	6	8	42	53	n.a.	10
Adorkor	213	115	92	3	18	91	99	n.a.	32
(c) Buem:									
Old Baika	294	222	225	12	26	127	41	4	18
New Baika	115	79	75	5	9	47	20	2	5
Total:	1,541	871	788	93	149	490	307	n.a.	115

(Source: Cocoa Board, Regional Office, Hohoe)

Table 7.2:

Coffee Purchases in Volta Region, 1980/81-1982/83 (tonnes)

Society	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
Hohoe	14.5	0.9	14.3
Leklebi	6.3	0.9	0.8
Logba	3.6	0.9	14.6
Likpe-Abrani	2.3	0.3	2.8
Kute	4.6	0.6	3.9
New Ayoma	2.3	0.6	3.3
Jasikan	7.7	1.4	6.9
Ahamansu	2.3	0.3	1.9
Kadjebi	5.3	1.8	1.5
Kpedze	3.6	0.6	8.6
Vane	9.5	0.4	11.4
Ashanti-Kpoeta	4.4	2.0	8.2
Vakpo	4.4	1.7	11.0
Bowiri	16.6	1.6	7.9
Ho/Peki	11.7	-	-
Ho	0.5	1.9	-
Peki	-	4.7	9.8
Apesokubi	6.4	2.0	2.1
Worawora	-	2.3	1.8
Dain Town	1.1	0.9	7.8
Total:	106.6	23.5	120.5

(Source: COCOBOD, Hohoe)

It is, of course, possible that rising CMB purchases did not represent lower rates of smuggling, but higher levels of output. There are, however, two pieces of evidence that suggest this is unlikely. If more favourable weather conditions had

affected yields one would have expected this to manifest itself throughout the sub-region. In fact, Togolese cocoa production fell from 11,000 to 10,000 tonnes over this period (see Table 7.3). Similarly, production elsewhere in Ghana continued its descent. Since the Volta Region was aberrant, it is reasonable to surmise that political factors made the difference. Given that the PDCs were a new variable in the equation, it seems logical to look to them for an answer. During fieldwork, former PDC Chairmen and Secretaries from five Likpe villages were interviewed and their testimony suggests that the impact of the PDCs had been marginal. Although a discussion of the social basis of the PDCs belongs more properly to the next Chapter, it is necessary to make some preliminary observations at this juncture.

Table 7.3:

Purchases of Cocoa in the Volta Region and Togo, 1979/80 to 1985/86 (tonnes)

Crop Year	Volta Region	Togo
1979/80	4,776	16,000
1980/81	1,496	16,000
1981/82	1,683	11,000
1982/83	3,776	10,000
1983/84	2,656	17,000
1984/85	n.a.	10,000
1985/86	876	14,000

(Source: Cocoa Board, Accra; Gill and Duffus, Cocoa Statistics, April 1981 and November 1989)

A problem was that official images of rural society were at variance with realities in Likpe. Within the PDC Guidelines it was simply assumed that a community consisted of the sum total of people resident within a particular locality. Yet there were farm labourers who had spent most of their lives in Likpe, but who were not counted as full members of the community. Their distinct status was

underlined by their isolation on the farms, from which they emerged on market days. They were for the most part excluded from social events and political deliberations. The partial exception to this pattern was Nkwanta, which was settled around 1950 by strangers from Anlo and French Togoland. Although they originally entered as labourers, some had managed to acquire their own land and a more permanent stake in the area. They were incorporated into the political structure through an *odikro* appointed by the Bakwa chief. Elsewhere, the strangers were integrated into the life of the community through their ties to individual employers. The significance of these details lies in the fact that when the PDCs were founded in Likpe, the farm labourers were never canvassed as potential members. Since many of the labourers were suspected of stealing cocoa beans, their exclusion may have made it easier for the PDCs to deal dispassionately with smuggling. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that the labourers would co-operate with this aspect of PDC activities.

The upper echelons of the INCC/NDC also applied a framework of community politics that did not always fit local conditions. Maxwell Owusu has observed that the PDCs were conceived of as a modern equivalent of the Asafo companies which had served as the focus of anti-chiefly agitation during the colonial period and after.[38] The continuity lay in the deliberate exclusion of the chiefs and in the expectation that the youngmen would use the PDCs to launch an assault on local power structures.[39] The reality is that it was the young men and women of Likpe were the most deeply immersed in smuggling for reasons that have already been identified. Consequently, their reaction to PDC campaigns was decidedly lukewarm as the Mate Secretary noted:

> "The concept [of the PDCs] stood against malpractices, embezzlement and smuggling. The smugglers didn't like the idea. We met opposition on that. The drivers also didn't like us because of the pressure we put on them to reduce fares. And some market women didn't like it because of education to reduce prices of foodstuffs. Some youth supported the PDC by slogan only, since they might be smugglers, whereas old people don't smuggle."[40]

Most of the Likpe PDCs were in fact formed on the initiative of the chiefs.

A further peculiarity of the Likpe PDCs was that they were established along clan lines. Each village had a PDC executive consisting of a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and someone who was in charge of communications. In 1982, these positions were parcelled out amongst the constituent clans who wanted to ensure that they were not cut off from a possible locus of power. This made the PDCs especially vulnerable to the infiltration of kin pressures, especially in the context of genuine hardship. The Danyi villages remained the principal source of essential commodities for which local substitutes were not available. Again the headloading of goods between villages on either side of the frontier provided a vital source of income for the young men and women of the community. The extent to which young men were excluded from cocoa farming is clear from the data summarized in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4:

Distribution of Cocoa Holdings Amongst Bakpele Men, By Age and Acreage, 1986

(Total: 205 respondents)

Age	None	Below 3	3-4.9	5-9.9	10-19.9	20+
Below 30 years	17 73.9%	5 21.7%	0 0%	1 4.4%	0 0%	0 0%
30 to 39 years	16 36.4%	20 45.5%	6 13.6%	1 2.3%	1 2.3%	0 0%
40 to 49 years	8 18.2%	29 65.9%	1 2.3%	5 11.4%	1 2.3%	0 0%
50 to 59 years	2 5.9%	26 76.5%	3 8.8%	3 8.8%	0 0%	0 0%
60 to 69 years	1 3.3%	18 60.0%	3 10.0%	6 20.0%	2 6.7%	0 0%
70 and over	1 3.3%	18 60.0%	2 6.7%	5 16.7%	3 10.0%	1 3.3%

(Source: Survey of Likpe, 1986)[41]

(Note: For basis of survey see Appendix to thesis)

Moreover, the cocoa farmers were hit harder than ever by black pod disease in 1982. The farmers could cushion some of the financial blow if they traded more

of their crops on the black market. During the 1981/82 main crop, the Togolese price was only slightly higher than that offered by the CMB, but it widened during the mid-crop and a sizeable gulf had opened up by the beginning of the main crop in September. Over 1982 as a whole, Togolese prices averaged around ¢907 per load as against the ¢360 of the CMB.[42] The differential was enough to enable smugglers to offer farmers an attractive price, to pay their carriers and still to reap an adequate return.

The introduction of the Akuafo Cheque if anything worsened the plight of the Bakpele farmers. On a visit to the Volta Region in September, Rawlings promised to establish a Rural Bank at Likpe-Kukurantumi.[43] The United Rural Bank commenced operations that year, with the Bank of Ghana as its principal shareholder.[44] Nevertheless, the Bank was only accessible to the farmers of west Likpe. The inhabitants of Mate, Bala, Todome, Bakwa, Nkwanta and Avedzeme had to travel for miles on foot, since there were no direct transport links to Kukurantumi. Those who made the pilgrimage commonly found that the Bank was unable to dispense cash. Older men who feared being waylaid on the way home, felt obliged to travel to Hohoe which was expensive and inconvenient at a time when there were fewer vehicles plying the routes.

For all these reasons, virtually anybody who was caught smuggling could justify their actions and elicit a sympathetic response from their kinsmen within the PDC. In 1983, the Mate Chairman was forced to resign after having released some smuggled goods that belonged to a relative of his.[45] Another Mate Secretary, who chose to resign rather than give way to these pressures, coined the following cynical dictum:

> "If you speak the truth, you become the enemy of the people. If you follow them blindly, you'll be loved."[46]

Whenever members of the executive did intercede on behalf of kin, they exposed themselves to charges of favouritism. Thus, the only way in which the PDCs

could maintain any internal cohesion was by turning a blind eye to the transgressions of their fellow villagers. The PDCs held public meetings at which they relayed what they had been told at the District headquarters about the pernicious effects of smuggling, but that was often the extent of it. Nevertheless, the PDCs were not entirely passive. Many Bakpele resented the way the Lolobi, Akpafu and Buem used Likpe as a conduit for their own illicit practices. Some of the PDCs therefore concentrated on frustrating the efforts of outsiders. As a result, the Abrani and Agbozome PDCs accumulated sufficient proceeds to finance the construction of a kindergarten and other village amenities.[47] However, since the professional smugglers were often armed, many of the PDCs scaled down their operations once they became too dangerous. The Mate PDC, for example, ceased to participate after its repeated requests for torches and guns went unheeded.[48]

A final factor which deterred PDCs throughout the Volta Region was their exposure to harassment. During 1982, Likpe played reluctant host to the Border Guards, Police and the Army who were either based in the community or who occasionally fell upon it like a plague of locusts. The high priority accorded to the campaign against smuggling created an environment in which extortion was more or less condoned. If the PDCs spoke up for the local population or simply tried to play by the book, they made themselves unpopular and often risked physical violence. A series of incidents over the course of the year revealed the vulnerability of the PDCs in clashes with the coercive branches of the state apparatus. Nsamankow, for example, reported that Border Guards from Akanu had threatened to shoot members of the Penyi PDC when the latter refused to release contraband that they had intercepted.[49]

The Deputy Regional Secretary, Kwasi Kamasa, and a number of students were beaten up by Border Guards at Aflao in another inglorious episode.[50] Tensions came to a head in September when PDCs who had set up a road block near Hlefi were assaulted by Policemen, who were allegedly in the pay of one Alhaji

Munaga.[51] When the news reached Ho, members of the PDC Regional Co-ordinating Committee staged a demonstration that culminated in the ransacking of the lodge houses and an attack on the Police headquarters. The demonstrators issued a statement purporting to dismiss the Volta Regional Administrative Officer, the Assistant Commissioner of Police and the head of the Border Guards at Honuta.[52] The attempt to seize the initiative misfired. The Regional Secretary returned from Sekondi and issued a statement that was critical of the PDCs. Kamasa was summoned to the Castle and eventually dismissed from office. In December the Co-ordinating Committee was itself dissolved, as part of a campaign to root out 'ultra-leftists'. Some of those who had supported the tactics of Kamasa were imprisoned and at least one of them died in the jail-break and coup attempt of June 1983. Others were sent on courses to Bulgaria or Cuba, the major object of which was to remove them from the flow of Regional politics.[53] In the months that followed the dressing down of the PDC Regional leadership, reports of victimization multiplied. When PDC members congregated at Afienya in October, they filed a catalogue of complaints against the Border Guards and Police. Yet Rawlings failed to respond to calls to arm the PDCs, because of he was conscious of military sensitivities. The Likpe PDCs would have been familiar with these happenings and this may explain a reluctance to become too deeply embroiled. It may also be no accident that the most active PDCs were to be found in west Likpe, where security personnel were less conspicuous.

Having discounted the catalytic effect of the PDCs, one is left with the conundrum as originally posed. It would appear as if lower rates of smuggling in fact resulted from a conjuncture of two other factors. The first was the closure of the frontier between September 1982 (starting on the day before the Ho riot) and March 1983. Between June and September of that year it was closed once again. The PNDC acted on the first occasion in order to assist the campaign against smuggling during the new cocoa season.[54] Non-commercial quantities of unscheduled goods were normally allowed to cross the frontier without paying

duties. The flow of traffic often made it difficult to distinguish legitimate from illicit trade. Once the frontier was sealed, however, detection was greatly simplified, since any movement of goods could be treated as evidence of intent to break the law. The second factor was the quasi-piratical behaviour of state personnel, who interpreted Government injunctions as an invitation to separate border peoples from their property. In Likpe, the Police Task Force (known by the revealing nickname of *Aluta*) was especially feared. Farmers whose plots lay towards the mountain risked being shot at. The Police also mounted house to house searches in some villages in search of Togolese goods that might count as evidence of smuggling.[55] According to people in Likpe, property that was seized under pretext was taken away as booty. A number of respondents referred to Policemen who had raised sufficient capital while on border duty to buy a lorry or to build a house.[56] Whereas the Police raided Likpe from time to time, the Border Guards drew their profits from a steady rake-off from smugglers who were known to them. There was therefore a conflict of interests between the two bodies which almost came to blows.

The Border Guards remained the butt of criticism during the year. As early as March 1982, soldiers were complaining about Border Guards who deliberately fed them false information so as to guarantee safe passage for their clients.[57] The Bakpele were inclined to take a benevolent view of the Guardsmen by comparison with Policemen and soldiers who molested them and seized their goods. It was the climate of fear which, more than anything, seems to have attenuated local involvement in cross-border exchange.

Since the heavy-handed approach seems for once to have borne fruit, one is left with the perplexing question of why the PNDC later changed tack. It is not possible to establish the answer with complete certainty, since the matter was never publicly addressed, but there are three likely reasons. The first is that the PNDC perceived a conflict between its political objectives and this particular solution. At a time when the regime was courting the rural population, it made

little sense to treat border peoples in an arbitrary fashion. The vital importance of retaining their confidence was underlined in 1983 when fears of an invasion from Togo were realized. Having survived the coup attempt, the PNDC was more anxious than ever to deploy an effective early warning system along the frontier, which was contingent on local co-operation. It is in the light of these considerations (aside from local loyalty) that one should interpret a speech given by Dr. Obed Asamoah in Hohoe in early 1985. In it he was especially defensive of the rights of border communities:

> "I must say that in my observation of events in this District the attitude of some of the Police and the cadres leaves much to be desired. Roadblocks have been mounted more as a means of extorting things from people than for the purpose of checking smuggling or preserving security.... Goods are often wrongly seized from people and when seized are not accounted for; and in the name of checking smuggling very small quantities of items such as batteries, cutlasses, meat and other food items have been seized from people. I have received many complaintsand many of you know that I have consistently attempted to check harassment and extortion which have caused considerable disaffection among the people."[58]

Secondly, there was a clear incompatibility between striving to restore the probity (and hence the effectiveness) of state institutions, whilst tolerating abuses of power by the Police and Border Guards. Thirdly, the PNDC could not seal the frontier on a permanent basis without alienating neighbouring countries. In October 1982, both Côte d'Ivoire and Togo protested that the closures were in breach of the protocols of the Economic Community of West African States. Following the expulsion of over a million Ghanaians from Nigeria in early 1983, the PNDC had no option but to reopen the frontiers. The Togo border was swiftly closed after the June invasion, but sustained pressure obliged the PNDC to give way the following year. Since Dr. Obed Asamoah had repeatedly committed Ghana to the ideal of West African integration, it would have appeared anomalous if the PNDC had continued to restrict freedom of movement across its eastern frontier. Finally, the PNDC may have under-rated its success because it consistently overestimated the level of cocoa production in the Region. In September 1982, Rawlings attributed the fall in purchases since the 1960s to the effects of smuggling.[59] Kwamena Ahwoi later repeated the mistake when he

deduced that 5,000 tonnes of cocoa had been smuggled during the 1983/84 season.[60] Both failed to appreciate that productivity had fallen off markedly because of an ageing stock of trees and the effects of black pod. If Government officials had been more informed about these matters, they might have taken greater heart from the results. Instead they initiated a search for alternative strategies.

7.2. The Fruits of Pragmatism, 1983-86

7.2.1. The Shaping of Government Policy

Nobody associated with the PNDC was under any illusion that the stop-gap measures of the first six months amounted to a lasting solution. Having built up political momentum, it was inevitable that attention should turn to longer term recovery and development options. In the course of so doing, the regime unleashed the ideological tensions that had been latent within its ranks from the start. While there is insufficient space to explore these in detail, much of what follows rests on an appreciation of where the options lay.[61]

One point on which general agreement prevailed was that a reform of economic structures had to be accompanied by a substantial infusion of foreign aid, if recovery was not to be prolonged and overly traumatic. At an early stage, fierce debate centred upon the merits of seeking an accord with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who patrolled the gateways to western aid. The National Economic Review Committee, which was established in February under the chairmanship of Dr. Joe Abbey, favoured an early approach to the IMF, and exploratory talks duly opened the following month.[62] This proved highly controversial since the Fund was bound to impose conditions which were unpalatable to Ghanaians across the political spectrum. Dr. Obed Asamoah, whose own appointment as Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been criticized by the militants, publicly declared that IMF pressure to devalue the

currency was unacceptable.[63] The fiercest critics were understandably grouped on the 'left'.[64] Their vision was an integrated national economy, released from the chains of dependency. In their eyes, an agreement on IMF terms was tantamount to abandoning the Revolution at the first hurdle. Chris Atim headed a delegation to the Communist bloc in April, but returned without any firm promises of economic assistance. Rawlings, who had wavered until now, was increasingly won over to the view that there was no realistic alternative to mending fences with the Fund. A more surprising convert was Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, the newly appointed Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning. As a member of the NDM, his writings had hitherto been fiercely critical of the Fund and its role in perpetuating western imperialism.[65]

By August 1982, the advocates of an IMF deal had compiled a package of proposals which they intended to submit to the Fund. When the details were revealed to a joint meeting of the NDC and PNDC Secretaries, they encountered a hostile reception. Challenged by Rawlings to come up with something better, the critics tabled their own document at short notice.[66] The 'Alternative Economic Programme' was surprisingly accommodating towards the earlier Abbey report. Most notably, it accepted the case for devaluation quite apart from IMF conditions.[67] It also conceded that austerity was unavoidable, but added that the brunt should be borne by the parasitic commercial class rather than by workers.[68] For the most part, however, the plan ran against the grain of the IMF package. It envisaged an even greater economic rôle for the state. For example, the report proposed the nationalization of Ashanti Goldfields and favoured the promotion of large-scale agriculture over the peasant option.[69] Confronted with the historical association between statism, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, the architects of the plan envisaged some new departures. On the one hand, the mass-based P/WDCs would strive to reduce waste and to increase productivity, while introducing a measure of accountability into economic management.[70] On the other, state control over the import/export trade and over key items of internal trade was supposed to choke off opportunities for

speculation. If the proposals had been adopted, the PNDC would have been forced to concentrate still harder on perfecting the mechanisms of social control. However, the tide was running against the militants. By September, Botchwey was engaged in exploratory talks with the IMF, and the following month he was able to announce that full negotiations were underway.

The outcome of bitter rivalries within the regime, which turned on the political direction of the Revolution as much as on economic policy, was settled during a struggle for power in October and November.[71] Alolga Akata-Pore was detained, Chris Atim retreated into exile and JFM activists were purged from the NDC. As it happened, the principal casualties were Northerners, while Kojo Tsikata was accused of spinning a web of Ewe intrigue which had ensnared Rawlings.[72] It is worth noting, however, that in his letter of resignation Atim dismissed the ethnic version of events, maintaining that he had parted company with Rawlings on ideological grounds.[73] Given that the Ewe 'tribal' tag would have been the easiest to pin on Rawlings it is significant that Atim chose not to do so.

Purged of its dissenting voices, the PNDC was able to proceed openly with its recovery plan. Botchwey unveiled the Programme for Reconstruction and Development in December. This envisaged a one-year stabilization phase to be followed by a three-year recovery programme.[74] The document contained some concessions to the 'Alternative Economic Programme': notably a state monopoly over the import/export trade, the creation of People's Shops, and increased state shareholding in the leading foreign banks. When the final version of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was published in April 1983, however, these items were conspicuously absent.[75] But the scheme for People's Shops was revived in the context of the crisis of that year. The conjunction of a severe drought and the mass expulsion of over one million Ghanaians from Nigeria in January 1983 required the PNDC to seek emergency relief. The PNDC set up a National Emergency Relief Committee to co-ordinate the resettlement of the

refugees and a National Mobilization Programme (NMP) to deal with the wider context.[76] When the United Nations agreed to provide aid, it stipulated that the returnees should not be treated separately but handled as part of a more embracing recovery programme.[77] The NMP therefore promoted the People's Shops as a mechanism through which to channel relief items to the villages.

For the sake of simplicity, the ERP can be reduced to three core components. The first of these, upon which everything else hinged, was the rehabilitation of dilapidated infrastructure.[78] From 1983, the Ghana Highways Authority was able to increase expenditure on feeder as well as trunk roads in the Volta Region.[79] Secondly, the ERP aimed to restore incentives to productive as opposed to middleman activity. In his broadcast on the controversial 1983 budget, Rawlings summed the matter up as follows:

> "Countrymen, the surest cure to our longstanding ailment as a nation is a set of policies that will stimulate production and at the same time discourage unproductive activity. We have reached a critical stage in our history and we need to ask ourselves serious questions: why has it become so profitable in this country simply to engage in trade instead of production? Why are the most productive and industrious people usually the poorest?"[80]

Whereas the 'Alternative Economic Programme' envisaged the state as the cutting edge of development, the ERP was weighted towards the private sector. Central to the ERP was the revitalization of the export sector, which had visibly wilted over the preceding decade. This required the PNDC to grasp the nettle of overvaluation. The 1983 Budget introduced a system of bonuses and surcharges that rewarded the earners of foreign exchange at the expense of its consumers. In October 1983 the scheme was abandoned as the PNDC embarked on the first of a series of devaluations. The official rate of the cedi fell from ¢2.75 to ¢25 against the dollar. By 1986, it had reached ¢90 to the dollar before the PNDC finally introduced a foreign exchange auction.

The revitalization of agriculture was a *sine qua non* for economic recovery. Here too, the PNDC aimed to achieve higher levels of output through greater financial incentives. Retreating from the expedients of 1982, the Government permitted

farmers to seek the highest price for their crops. When drought was followed by glut, precipitating a collapse of food prices in 1984, the PNDC introduced the safety net of minimum guaranteed prices.[81] It also aimed to expand access to rural credit, through the commercial and development banks as well as through an expanding network of Rural Banks.[82] Cocoa posed special difficulties, since the state could not afford to extend the world market price to the farmers. The PNDC did nevertheless concede that excessive levels of taxation had discouraged producers from planting new trees and from properly maintaining their farms.[83] It proposed to reverse the trend by raising the farmers' share of the world price from around 24% in 1983 to no less than 55%.[84] That was a feasible target only if COCOBOD (as the revamped CMB came to be known) lowered its operating costs. By the end of 1985, 16,000 workers had been retrenched and 10,000 ghost employees had been removed from the payroll.[85]

Thirdly, as resources were channelled back into productive activity, the PNDC aimed to squeeze the vitality out of the parallel economy. Whereas the success of the 'Alternative Economic Programme' would have depended upon more effective surveillance, the PNDC warmed to the idea that the market could accomplish the desired results more effectively. Hence official statements stressed the futility of trying to enforce unrealistic price controls:

> "As regards price controls, the Government is aware that a rigid system not only discourages production and legitimate economic activities but also promotes speculation, profiteering in trade and inflation."[86]

The aim was to expand the volume of goods in circulation, through import liberalization and incentives to domestic industry, whilst phasing out price controls. The intended effect was the elimination of a range of rent-seeking activities that went by the generic name of *kalabule*. As of July 1985, only eight items were still subject to price control: namely imported rice, sugar, baby food, textiles, drugs, matches and soap.[87] Furthermore, devaluation, competitive bidding for foreign exchange and (in due course) the licensing of foreign exchange bureaux, were all designed to close the gap between the official and parallel rates of exchange. The PNDC calculated that as the profit margin shrank,

more transactions would take place within the official market, thus allowing the state to withdraw from thankless policing activities.

Even then, the PNDC could not surrender itself immediately and completely to the logic of the market. It retained limited subsidies on farm inputs and on petroleum products, which continued to reward the enterprising smuggler.[88] Again, the PNDC was conscious that it might take years before COCOBOD was able to offer cocoa farmers a price that was commensurate with prevailing rates in Côte d'Ivoire or Togo.[89] In consequence, efficient border controls remained a priority area.

After 1983, the PNDC initiated two reforms. Following perennial complaints about corruption within the Border Guards, the unit was disbanded towards the beginning of 1985. Some of its personnel were absorbed into the Army, which henceforth assumed full responsibility for border duties.[90] In the Volta Region, the Mortar Regiment (based at Ho) took command. One of the advantages of this arrangement was that soldiers could be rotated between border and other duties so as impede participation in smuggling rings.

Secondly, the PNDC learned from the experience of the PDCs when it established a People's Militia in 1984. The Militia was recruited locally, preserving all the advantages of the PDCs. Yet at any given time, most Militiamen (and women) would be operating outside their home villages and therefore beyond the influence of immediate kin. A further difference from the PDCs was that the Militia was responsible not to the community but to the District Secretary and the Civil Defence Organization (CDO). In that sense, the Militia was quite unlike the Sungusungu phenomenon in Tanzania, which spread as a vigilante movement outside the state.[91] The Militiamen were no longer expected to counteract smuggling merely out of a sense of patriotic duty, but also in return for material reward. Contraband was to be sold and the proceeds divided between the individual Militiamen and the District secretariat.[92] Provided the Militia bands

were small and reasonably active, they could expect to earn a respectable sum of money without incurring any of the risks associated with smuggling. Finally, the PNDC endeavoured to forge collaborative links between the Militia and the Army. The CDO was headed by an Army officer, Brigadier Tehn-Addy, and retired soldiers were posted to the Regional and District secretariats. They provided basic weapons training and attempted to inculcate some military discipline into their recruits.

The distance the Rawlings regime had travelled by 1986 is quite remarkable. Old shibboleths had been recycled as canons of official belief. Radical analysts blamed the PNDC for capitulating to the IMF and dismissed the ERP as a ruse to shift the burden of adjustment on to poor.[93] The PNDC claimed to have forged a more fruitful relationship with the countryside and, to that extent, to have discovered the formula for a successful integration of the periphery. In the final section, the object is to assess this claim by examining the impact of PNDC policies on Likpe.

7.2.2. Producers and Smugglers in Likpe, 1983-86

7.2.2.1. The Rediscovery of Food

In Chapter Five, smuggling and the attitudes displayed towards it were linked to the land shortage and contracting incomes. In 1983, the Bakpele experienced real hardship that was matched in living memory only by the hunger of the early war years.[94] Drought and bush fire exacted a heavy toll on food production in what was already a deficit area. Nobody starved, but nutrition suffered as the Bakpele were reduced to consuming almost anything that was edible.[95]

Although the crops failed, farmers who had planted food were usually able to salvage something. Also many people were able to reclaim cocoyams from land which was under fallow. Moreover, active farmers were more likely to have food

stored up from previous seasons. By contrast, those who had previously bought their food on the market, often with income generated from smuggling, were highly exposed. The youth, who were the least endowed with land, were often reduced to stealing foodstuffs, which superimposed social tensions upon personal difficulty.

In the longer term, the hunger of 1983 heightened local awareness about the serious implications of a recurrent food deficit. This was apparent from the way in which the Bakpele cleared their dead and dying cocoa farms and (where possible) substituted crops such as maize and cassava. It was also manifested in a willingness to move beyond the community in search of land. As early as the mid-1970s, Lolobi women were leaving their villages (where the density of cocoa strictly limited the scope for food farming) in order to rent plots in the grassland area between Kpandu and Hohoe. This low-lying land was not cultivated by local farmers, but was ideally suited to swamp rice cultivation, a subject on which the Lolobis were reputed to be especially knowledgeable. In 1984, they were joined by a trickle of farmers from Likpe, which turned into a steady stream two years later. A profile of the earliest migrants suggests that the least advantaged members of the community were the most likely to leave Likpe. Women predominated not only because rice is regarded as a female crop,[96] but also because they were the most vulnerable. Widows and divorcees experienced particular difficulties in securing access to land in their home villages. Once the migrations began in earnest, the women were joined by young men who faced a land shortage of their own. People from Kukurantumi made up the largest single group, mainly because they had lost valuable land to Ayoma, but they were joined in ever larger numbers by individuals from other villages.

What began as a strategy of risk aversion came to be viewed in more positive terms. In the vicinity of Hohoe, yields were seldom much below 10 bags of rice per acre which (depending on the month of sale) could yield anywhere between ¢35,000 and ¢50,000, exclusive of production costs of about ¢5,000 per acre.[97]

This compared favourably with returns to smuggling. In late 1986, someone who purchased cocoa belonging to another farmer and headloaded it across the border would have needed to transport between 120 and 180 loads in order to earn an equivalent income (see Table 7.5). That was a tall order for anyone to meet in the space of a single cocoa season. By way of qualification, it should be noted that the two sets of activities were not entirely incompatible. Since rice was harvested over October and November, it was still possible to take advantage of the second half of the main crop season. The returns also compared favourably with earnings on cocoa production. A cocoa farmer would have needed to produce about 10 loads in 1986, in order to earn an equivalent sum. This was an optimistic target for most Bakpele farmers. After the drought, black pod disease returned with a vengeance and virtually wiped out local production. A typical experience was that of a farmer who lost one cocoa farm in the bush fires and whose yield on the remaining four farms fall from around 90 loads (270 kilograms) to less than 20 kilograms.[98] Many farmers were still mildly optimistic about the long-term future of the crop. They tended to regard rice farming as a means to raise the capital needed to replant with a hybrid variety which was thought to be immune to black pod. In the words of one such farmer:

> "We are cocoa farmers. For the past three years, the cocoa yield has been declining. We put all our land under cocoa. It isn't possible for us to cut our cocoa trees, and we have no land left for food production. So we decided to come here to start something with which to rehabilitate our cocoa farms."[99]

By contrast, the landless youth looked on black pod as something of a blessing:

> "Our parents derived their income from cocoa, so the younger generation hardly have any land for themselves except by cutting out cocoa. Black pod and the other diseases are actually a blessing in disguise."[100]

Yet even if old farms were uprooted, everyone was conscious that there was insufficient land to meet the demands of an extended family. The Bakpele were therefore forced to look for alternatives to cocoa and it was rice that best seemed to fit the bill.

It is not enough merely to emphasize a change in local consciousness. The fact of the matter is that the Bakpele could never have turned to rice were it not for the more favourable environment created by Government policy. The removal of price controls allowed the farmers to exploit market fluctuations in such a way as to maximize the financial returns on their labour. The PNDC had also resurfaced a number of vital roads, thereby enabling the Bakpele to travel fairly comfortably between the rice farms and home. This, together with the greater availability of spare parts and petrol, also made it feasible for southern traders to pay regular visits to local markets to buy mangoes and oranges as well as rice. By 1986, the Region was once more feeling the pulse of the national economy, as yams from as far afield as Nkwanta passed through Hohoe en route to Accra.

The rice boom may be seen a local vindication of the ERP, in the sense that it offered money-earning opportunities to the Bakpele, while assisting the PNDC to counter the allure of smuggling. In that way, the re-orientation of the local economy away from a dependence on cocoa was rendered as painless as possible. Nevertheless, the future of this accord remained problematic at the end of 1986. A return to the logic of the market was ridden with contradictions. As more people migrated, so the rental value of land appreciated and litigation proliferated. At the same time, there was a tendency for prices to fall, at least in relative terms, as rice production expanded. The experience of 1984, when a bumper harvest resulted in a price collapse, taught many people a painful lesson. During that year, it was not even possible to smuggle food crops, since the Togolese market was equally saturated.[101] By 1986, some farmers were in fact finding a market across the frontier, which the authorities viewed as an unwelcome development. Thirdly, exchange rate policies raised the cost of mechanized services, which were essential to successful swamp rice cultivation.[102] The price of a tractor jumped from about ¢500,000 in 1984 to ¢2 million in 1986, so that only the wealthiest farmers could afford to purchase new machines.[103] The majority of farmers were dependent upon them for tractor services in what was a sellers' market. In 1986, it was common practice for

drivers to demand advances before the start of the season and then to renege on their verbal agreements. The farmers were then left to prepare the land manually. This was an exceptionally laborious task once the rains began to fall and invariably resulted in lower yields.

Since the PNDC was not disposed to interfere with the operations of the market, the only help it could offer was to assist peasants in acquiring their own tractors. In the mid-1980s, official policy aimed at grouping peasants into co-operatives which would qualify for bank credit. Since the commercial banks preferred to finance traders, because of lower risks, the farmers had to turn to the Rural Banks. In the case of the Kukurantumi Rural Bank, however, there was a reluctance to lend to food farmers because so many had defaulted on their loans in 1984.[104] Many Bakpele had to turn to moneylenders, who demanded higher rates of interest and repayment immediately after the harvest when prices were at their lowest.

In one noteworthy instance, peasants successfully acquired a bank loan in order to purchase a tractor. A group of Lolobi rice farmers at Gbi-Godenu had repeatedly failed to raise a loan before someone suggested affiliating to the 31st December Womens' Movement. This was an inspired thought since the PNDC desperately needed a visible symbol of its commitment to women. The Lolobi women joined for essentially mercenary motives as their leader explained:

> "When we started farming here, we were having difficulties getting our fields well-prepared for the sowing of the rice. When I saw that the burden was becoming too much for individuals, I called them together and discussed things with them, with the intention of getting a group formed so that the Government could get us a tractor. They all accepted the idea. Then we started contributing towards buying a tractor and joined the December 31st Womens' Movement."[105]

The December 31st Womens' Movement Farm subsequently became a Government showpiece. The women acquired credit from the Agricultural Development Bank, while the Hohoe District Secretary loaned them his vehicle as they negotiated the purchase of a tractor. As head of the Movement, Mrs.

Rawlings came to work alongside the Lolobi women in 1985. The visit left a tangible mark in the form of a new feeder road that joined the main trunk road near Hohoe. The Lolobi women were the focus of envy in Likpe, where the search for credit had not ended as happily. By the end of 1986, the Bakpele farmers had a catalogue of complaints and worries. Whether or not they persevered with rice was likely to depend on the availability of alternative sources of income. The salient point remains that, for the moment at least, the Bakpele were able to exploit openings in food farming, now that cocoa was in decline and access to state employment had been closed off.

7.2.2.2. The Fruits of Smuggling

Cocoa had established its position as the most favoured item of contraband before the PNDC came to power. By 1986, the regime had succeeded in restricting the attractions of smuggling through a combination of higher producer prices and the shrinkage of the black market differential. In 1980 a farmer who sold his cocoa in Togo could earn 4.4 times the CMB price in real terms, whereas at the start of the 1986/7 season he might have received a bit more than double (¢5,750 as against ¢2,550).[106] A number of additional overheads have to be built into the equation in order to arrive at a realistic comparison. An elderly farmer would have had to employ someone to headload his cocoa. In 1986, the cost of carriage to Dzidrame was ¢500 per load or double that if the cocoa came from west Likpe. A further CFA 1,000 (or ¢500) was paid to the soldiers. If the farmer was fortunate, he might therefore pocket ¢4,250 as against the COCOBOD price of ¢2,550. In practice, most of the operations were carried out by individuals who made their income almost solely from smuggling - at least during peak periods. They had to pay these overheads on top of the purchase price. In 1986, farmers were demanding ¢4,000 per load. At the end of the process, the smuggler was left with a meagre return of ¢250 per load (see Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 :

Returns to Cocoa Smuggling in Likpe, September 1986

Category	CFA	Cedis
1. The farmer/smuggler:		
(i) Gross earnings:	11,500	5,750
(ii) Costs:		
Carriage to border	1,000	500
Carriage to Dzidrame	1,000	500
Bribes to soldiers	1,000	500
(iii) Net earnings:	8,500	4,250
(iv) Black market price less Ghana price:		¢1,700 per load
2. The full-time smuggler:		
(i) Gross earnings:	11,500	5,750
(ii) Costs:		
Purchase of cocoa	8,000	4,000
Carriage to border	1,000	500
Carriage to Dzidrame	1,000	500
Bribes to soldiers	1,000	500
(iii) Net earnings:	500	¢250 per load

(Data from informal interviews with Likpe smugglers, 1986)

The Bakpele who did not own their cocoa often specialized in handling petroleum products. In 1986, a lorry visited Likpe weekly and sold kerosene directly to the villagers. In Mate, the owner of a set of storage tanks managed to persuade the drivers to sell exclusively to himself. Having cornered the supply, he insisted that local smugglers change their CFA earnings with him. The francs were then used to purchase Togolese goods for sale in Hohoe.[107] The market in petrol was less susceptible to manipulation. Normally smugglers bought petrol in Hohoe and paid a driver to convey it to Likpe. The petrol was then adulterated with kerosene before being carted over the mountain to Togo and sold at a profit.

The advantage of petroleum products was that the supply was not affected by seasonal fluctuations or shortages of supply through disease. Moreover, the financial returns were almost as good as for cocoa (see Table 7.6). There was general agreement that the smuggling of petroleum products beat every other alternative. As one young woman, who made the journey daily, explained:

> "The reason we are doing this work is that if you prepare food and sell it on the market, you won't get any money. But if you send kerosene or petrol you can always come back with money in your hand."[108]

In 1986, the golden age of smuggling appeared to be at an end. During fieldwork, young men contrasted their impecuniosity with the recent past when they could have afforded many more luxuries. For all that, smuggling remained at least a reliable source of income.

Table 7.6:

Profits From Smuggling of Petroleum Products

(per 6 gallons), As of August 1986

Item	Kerosene	Petrol
Purchase price	¢600	¢1,100
Transport from Hohoe	-	¢100
Bribes 50	¢100	
Total overheads:	¢650	¢1,300
Sale price in Togo converted into Cedis	¢850	¢1,750
Net Profit:	¢200	¢450

(Data from informal interviews with smugglers)

7.2.2.3. The Politics of Consumption

Disruption of the internal market has already been cited as the single most important incitement to smuggle. The PNDC was aware that unless it facilitated

the flow of essential commodities into the border areas, the inhabitants would be forced to shop elsewhere. In 1983, the regime attempted to intervene directly in the market through the creation of People's Shops. The NMP was responsible for supplies, while the PDCs were expected to raise the money to stock the Shops and to manage their affairs. In Mate, shares in the People's Shop were sold at ¢50 and by the time it ceased operation a tidy sum of ¢25,000 had been collected.[109] In some areas this appears to have been the most valued PDC activity,[110] but the Bakpele experience was not an altogether happy one. One of the problems was that the supply of goods was both irregular and inadequate to satisfy local requirements. Since goods were first despatched to Jasikan, they were often spoiled by the time they reached Likpe. After a while, the Shops ceased to function altogether for reasons outlined by the PDC Secretary in Mate:

> "It [the Mate Shop] functioned when the goods were coming, but that was not the idea of it. The Government's aim was that it should be used mainly for selling local goods, but we were depending on Government goods. So when the commodities stopped coming, it became dormant."[111]

Allegations of corruption had an even more corrosive effect on local morale. It is claimed that some monies from Likpe were misappropriated at the District level, while in Kukurantumi suspicion fell on the PDC when it was unable to render proper accounts.[112] Although it is probable that fraud did occur, managerial confusion helped to breed mistrust. This very point was made by U.S. Clarke, the Jasikan District Secretary:

> "Initially the cadres were not properly educated on the concept. Even where there was not outright embezzlement, there was a lack of initial education on how to keep the records. In some areas, no records were kept at all. So the people lost confidence in the Shops because they paid monies but they never received the goods. Sometimes one individual would pay the lion's share of the money towards the People's Shop and then would expect most of the goods for himself."[113]

By 1984, official enthusiasm for the People's Shops had visibly waned. Consistent with the tenor of the ERP, the PNDC looked to private traders to take up the slack once it had re-created the essential preconditions for commercial activity. Two years later, the results were apparent throughout the Volta Region. Hohoe

had recovered its vitality as a commercial centre straddling the grassland and forest zones. Private traders and chain stores such as the Ghana National Trading Corporation brought consignments of every conceivable consumer item into town. A network of smaller traders then dispersed the goods throughout the surrounding villages. There was a sense here of history repeating itself in the mould of the recovery in the latter part of the 1920s. Many of the goods were manufactured in Ghana, although a wide range of imported commodities was also on sale.

The revival of internal commerce did not render cross-border trade entirely redundant. Some commodities, like clothing and sugar, remained in short supply. Moreover, some Togolese goods were cheaper than their Ghanaian equivalents. For example, a bottle of Togolese beer cost ¢90, whereas the Ghanaian equivalent sold for ¢120. For these reasons, the Bakpele continued to cross to Dzidrame on market days. In order to assess the volume and composition of this trade, several days were spent conducting an informal census along the bush paths in February 1986. Roughly 300 people crossed the frontier on market day, returning with consumer goods like clothing, blankets, sugar, metal pans and cigarettes. Many carried small quantities of cocoa, coffee and palm-nuts with them in order to earn the CFA francs.[114] Traders within Likpe also stocked a selection of Togolese goods. An inspection of one store in Todome revealed that seventeen of the twenty items on display were of Togolese origin.[115]

7.2.2.4. Pledging and Contraband

One further initiative is worthy of mention. Reference has already been made to the presence of Togolese farmers on Ghanaian soil. In January 1983, the Jasikan District Secretary issued a statement reminding chiefs that it was illegal for them to alienate land to non-nationals without the consent of Government.[116] He was partly concerned about threats to territorial sovereignty, mentioning a village

where the Togolese had built their own school and flew their own flag. He also argued that the Togolese were more likely to engage in smuggling. In an interview three years later he re-iterated the point:

> "Most pledged farms are on the border. No farmer would walk one mile to the buying centre on the Ghanaian side to get a lower price, when he can walk 200 yards over the border into Ghana and then back to Togo where he can get a better price. That is just expecting too much. All along the eastern border the Togolese have tarred their roads and they have dumped a lot of goods in the towns."[117]

The farmers, who had pledged their land for reasons of financial hardship, shared an interest in reversing the tide. In September 1986, a meeting of the Regional and District Secretaries passed a resolution that abrogated all pledging agreements with immediate effect.[118] Henceforth both parties were prohibited from harvesting any of the crop. The farms were to be taken over by the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), the Town/Village/Area Councils and by the newly formed mobisquads. The latter would then rehabilitate the farms in return for a one-third share of the proceeds. The remainder was to be deposited with the District Councils and topped up with loans from COCOBOD, to raise the money to pay off the creditors. Ultimately, the farms were expected to revert to their owners. By mid-November, 24 farms in the Jasikan District had been taken over by mobisquads, of which 18 had been fully redeemed for their original owners.[119] There is, no specific data for Likpe. Pledging of farms was common enough, but the pledgees seem to have come predominantly from northern Togo. They did not have kin on the other side of the mountain, but still needed CFA francs to visit home with. At the time of concluding fieldwork, it was not yet possible to gauge the success of these efforts on the part of the Regional administration.

7.2.2.5. The Flexibility of Control

The evidence presented thus far suggests that, while both push and pull factors lost much of their force, they remained sufficiently strong to pose a dilemma for the authorities. Consequently, reform of the coercive apparatus remained a

matter of some importance. After 1985, a detachment from the Mortar regiment was stationed in Mate. Its remit was to monitor traffic across the frontier and to curb any illicit trade. Although the soldiers were supposed to be rotated, many of them stayed long enough to bring their families with them. The soldiers were required to live on wages which were inadequate, not least because they expected to live in a certain amount of comfort. Given that many had recently escaped from a rural environment, they were keen to distance themselves from anything that smacked of a peasant lifestyle. Whereas the Bakpele drank akpeteshie and palm wine, the soldiers insisted on consuming beer - preferably well-chilled. The soldiers consequently needed to look for additional sources of income, which drew them inexorably into the business of smuggling. Local smugglers would establish a relationship with a particular soldier, who they knew would be on duty at a specific time. They would pay a standard bribe, which entitled them to safe passage across the border. In 1986, the soldiers charged CFA 1,000 on a load of cocoa, ¢100 on a can of petrol, ¢50 on a can of kerosene and ¢40 on a load of fruit.[120] The fact that the Bakpele also paid bribes on legal consignments of fruit shows that this was essentially a protection racket. Smugglers could try to avoid the soldiers by using obscure bush-paths, but they risked physical assault and possible arrest (ironically enough, on charges of smuggling) if found out. Consequently, it was safer to cultivate a military patron.

The soldiers based in Mate did not confine themselves to taking bribes, but were actively engaged in their own illicit trade. Thus, the Sergeant in charge had a wife who hired local girls to carry petrol on her behalf. Many other wives traded in Togolese goods. Apart from the soldiers based in Mate, others passed through periodically on border operations. They tended to be more rapacious because they had less time in which to make their fortune. In short, then, the militarization of border security did not have the desired effects, at least as far as smuggling is concerned. The soldiers engaged in precisely the same subterfuges as their predecessors in the Border Guards. Indeed, the Jasikan District Secretary rated their performance below that of the much-maligned Guardsmen:

> "The old Border Guards were a bit better than now, when they have been joined with the military. Now the soldiers come for a short period of two weeks and will want to make a fortune in this short time. The old ones still did it, but they were around for a long time and so did it in bits."[121]

The record of the People's Militia was more encouraging. Although Likpe belonged to the Jasikan District, it was brought under the Hohoe District CDO for the sake of convenience. By the end of 1986, the District Militia contained perhaps as many as 120 recruits who were based in Hohoe for deployment to the outlying areas.[122] The recruits were formally expected to belong to one of the existing 'revolutionary organs', such as the JFM or the 31st December Womens' Movement. They were also supposed to be screened by Zonal CDRs and again at the CDO District Secretariat, in order to ensure that petty criminals did not infiltrate the structure.[123] In practice, evidence of political consciousness was not rated very highly. The CDO actively recruited from amongst the unemployed youth of both sexes. These were precisely the people who, under normal circumstances, might be engaged in smuggling. Indeed the Commander of the Hohoe CDO regarded this as their greatest asset:

> "Since the Militia has been on the scene, smuggling is on the decline. The reason is that some Militiamen were ex-smugglers, so they know the routes and the people who are involved. Most are operating in their own localities."[124]

The relationship between the Militiamen and the District authorities was one of mutual convenience. The authorities were convinced that the border villages remained a hotbed of illegal activity, as exemplified by the following comment by the Hohoe Commander:

> "Likpe is noted to be full of very hardened smugglers since time immemorial, because of the geographical position. It would be very difficult to set up a border station there because of the mountain, so they're taking advantage of that."[125]

Since external surveillance had never worked particularly well, the administration was dependent on local participation. For their part, the Militiamen were assured a source of income. They were expected to pay for their

uniforms and to fund their period of basic training, which was conducted along quasi-military lines. On the other hand, once they passed out they could expect the full backing of the authorities as they went about tackling the smugglers. If a Militia platoon intercepted an item of contraband and handed it over (together with the offender) to the authorities the members were assured of half the resale value. One-sixth was forwarded to the National and Regional secretariats of the CDO, leaving a one-third share for the District office.[126] Through a simple arithmetic exercise, it can be seen that Militiamen usually had an incentive to arrest goods rather than to take bribes. If a group of five Militiamen intercepted a load of cocoa and relayed it to the COCOBOD in late 1986, they would have received ¢255 per head. If they accepted the standard bribe of CFA1,000 (or ¢500), they would have only received ¢100 each. The greater the number of Militiamen, the smaller the individual reward, but this was still more than the equivalent of a thinly spread bribe. A smuggler could not realistically be expected to pay more than CFA 1,000 without the whole exercise losing its profitability. According to U.S. Clarke, the only scenario under which it paid Militiamen to collude was when the threat of appearing before a Tribunal induced a smuggler to offer a bribe in excess of the value of the load.[127] This thwarted the immediate aims of the regime, but it promised to render smuggling unviable in the longer run.

Initially, the Militia was a bit of a disappointment to its progenitors. Until the end of 1985, the Militiamen were working alongside the soldiers, an arrangement which suited almost nobody. The District administration suspected that the Militiamen were being drawn into clientelistic relations with corrupt soldiers. The latter regarded the Militia as an unsolicited intrusion on their patch. Finally, the Militiamen themselves derived little financial gain from tagging behind the military. Thereafter, the CDO detached the Militia and concentrated most of its activities on the second line of villages. This produced a startling transformation. By August 1986, seasoned smugglers were complaining that the Militia had become scrupulously honest and that it was raising the risks to intolerable levels. With characteristic cunning, some people ceased operating on their own behalf

and teamed up with others they knew were untouchable. One young man began to collect bribes on a commission basis for a soldier.[128] Another young woman switched from smuggling her own kerosene to headloading petrol on behalf of the Sergeant's wife. Because this course of action was only open to a minority, a number of smugglers were forced to disengage altogether. For example, a Todome storekeeper, who had hitherto brought his beer from Togo, started to buy his stocks in Hohoe because of the risk of losing everything.

An unmistakeable sign that the activities of the Militia were beginning to bite was the hostility displayed by the soldiers. Since they were not offered a percentage of anything they seized, their interests were diametrically opposed to those of the Militiamen.[129] The Jasikan District Secretary recalled that he had been forced to defuse clashes between the Army and the Militia on more than one occasion.[130] In Likpe itself, Militiamen were subjected to harassment, as the PDCs had been. The difference was the authorities were more willing to investigate the facts of a case and, if necessary, to support the Militia. The latter scored a significant victory in Mate towards the end of 1986, when one of the most notorious soldier-smugglers was arrested following Militia complaints that he had released some goods they had seized.

Within the Hohoe and Jasikan District administrations, there was agreement that the Militia had helped to significantly reduce smuggling over 1985/86. This is difficult to prove, but it is consistent with perceptions in Likpe itself. But this came at some cost to local goodwill. A contradiction that underlay the activities of the Militia is that if they became too successful they risked putting themselves out of business. There were signs that this was happening towards the end of 1986, at a time when the Bakpele were inclined to avoid Togo anyway for political reasons.[131] Together with seasonal fluctuations in smuggling, this sometimes left the Militiamen with little work and the threat of a reduced income. They were therefore tempted to seize goods indiscriminately on the

grounds of intent to break the law. The Abrani chief spoke for many when he voiced his concern about Militia activities:

> "If the Militia are doing honest work, they are doing the correct thing. But I don't think they are very sincere. They are not paid. I think that if the CMB paid them, the corruption would decrease. Recently, the Militia were complaining that they had seized loads of cocoa, but the buying season had ended and they couldn't get their money, and they were hungry."[132]

The chiefs and village worthies especially resented the pretensions of 'small boys', who had often been avid smugglers up until the time they enlisted in the Militia. Nana Soglo Allo III was blunt on this point, tarring the CDR and the Militia with the same brush:

> "The CDRs are interested in border checks and smuggling and that's all. Now the Militia is being trained by the Army and the CDRs are under a different set-up, but the Militia are supposed to be the police of the CDRs. And since the Militia have no pay, its an extortion unit. I think they get 50%. What I see of the CDR question is that its becoming a problem, because we don't get decent people joining the CDRs or the Militia. Its the riffraff who join the Militia. Any new organization like that starts with the ruffians and the unemployed."[133]

But hostility was not confined to the chiefs. It was often as pronounced amongst the youth, who objected to Militiamen from nearby communities throwing their weight about in villages that were not their own. Matters came to a head in mid-1986 when the young men of Abrani retaliated against the Militia for an assault on one of their number. On this occasion, they were only spared a beating because of the intervention of the Abrani chief.[134]

Towards the end of the decade, the Militia were subjected to stringent public criticism for alleged involvement in criminal activities across the country. Much of this criticism emanated from PNDC officials, who even hinted that the outfit might be disbanded. This is indicative of a shift in the balance of power within the Rawlings regime. For a time, the PNDC was prepared to use parallel institutions, like the PDCs, the Militia and the Public Tribunals, because it could not rely on the existing state machinery. Having achieved some of its objectives and restored some order to the bureaucracy, the regime began to revert to a more

conventional model of interaction between state and civil society. The Militiamen and the cadres were starting to outlive their usefulness.

7.3. Conclusion:

The evidence that has been advanced in this Chapter adds up to at least a partial vindication of Government policy during the Rawlings years. The regime began by repeating most of the errors of the previous decade in the space of a single year, but learned to respond more imaginatively to situations as they arose.

It has already been argued that the scope for smuggling functioned as a safety-valve by alleviating endemic shortages and propping up rural incomes. Yet successive governments have failed to see it that way. In 1982, the Rawlings regime was more determined than ever to choke off illicit trade using all the coercive might at its disposal. It was more optimistic than its predecessors in the sense of believing that it was possible to enlist the support of border peoples. According to the official script, state and community were supposed to fight alongside each other against the kings and queens of *kalabule*. The regime had manifestly misunderstood the makeup of rural society, since smuggling involved the whole spectrum of border society, and the youth most of all. Moreover, the PNDC had not addressed the underlying causes of smuggling or solved the idiosyncrasies of the state apparatus. Consequently, the PDCs were able to deliver very little. The use of indiscriminate force had some of the intended effect, but undermined everything else the PNDC set out to achieve.

After 1983, the PNDC adopted a fundamentally different strategy for dealing with border communities and their covert activities. It relied on a devaluation of the currency to wring many of the financial attractions out of the black market. It paid the cocoa farmers a more remunerative price for their crop, whilst removing all price controls on food crops. And finally, the PNDC reverted to the performance of the most basic functions of state, such as reconstructing roads

and building bridges. The result was that commercial activity began to pick up, sucking the outlying villages back into the orbit of commercial centres such as Hohoe, Jasikan and Kpandu. Under these conditions, the Bakpele were able to start adapting to the decline of cocoa as the mainstay of the local economy, by cultivating rice instead. The Volta Region, in short, underwent an experience which was very similar to the dislocation and adjustment that followed the partition of the Togolands.

At the same time, the PNDC reorganized the security apparatus and enlisted the services of the unemployed youth in the People's Militia. As a result of this unorthodox pincer movement, smuggling ceased to be as lucrative and became more risky than before. In 1990, more than three years after fieldwork, Rawlings was able to announce that the prevailing trend since the 1950s had been terminated and that cocoa was now being smuggled into Ghana - "an ironic reversal of what pertained in the past".[136] This is an indication that the state and border communities were now pulling in more or less the same direction for the first time in decades.

Footnotes To Chapter Seven

1. The late Dr. Emmanuel Hansen once noted in private conversation that he had initially been highly sceptical, but swallowed his doubts once he had witnessed mass support for the revolution. The scepticism about radical coups is echoed by Eboe Hutchful in "New Elements in Militarism: Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina", International Journal, XLI, 4, 1986.

2. Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-1986: Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana For the Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris - November 1983, Volume I, October 1983, p.8.

3. Although total demand for cereal crops was around 793,000 tonnes, production stood at only 616,000 tonnes per annum. See World Bank, Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review, January 1985, Background Paper No. 1, "Incentives and Comparative Advantage", p.7. This paper gives the total demand, while actual production is calculated here using production of cereal crops less 15% for post-harvest losses, as estimated in the same paper.

4. This figure covers the period from July 1980 to July 1981. See Kodwo Ewusi, "Financing Recent Increases in the Producer Price of Cash Crops", Legon Observer, XIV, 1, January 1982, p.8. A lower estimate of 110% is quoted by the Ghana Commercial Bank, Quarterly Economic Review, Volume 8, Nos. 3, and 4, July-December 1985, p.3. On the contribution of food prices to inflation, see Emmanuel Hansen, "The State and Food Agriculture", in E. Hansen and K. Ninsin (eds.), The State, Development and Politics in Ghana, (London: Codesria, 1989), pp.192-197.

5. Interview with Dr. Kwesi Botchway reported in West Africa 12 January 1987, pp.63-65.

6. For details, see Simon Baynham, "Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXIII, 4, 1985. Also Kojo Yankah, The Trial of J.J. Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution (Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1986), chapters 7 and 8.

7. Further information on these organizations, and a number of others not dealt with here, is available in Donald Ray, Ghana: Politics, Economy and Society (London: Francis Pinter, 1986), especially chapter 4.

8. The Legon connection is stressed in James C.W. Ahiakpor, "The Success and Failure of Dependency Theory: The Experience of Ghana", International Organization, XXXIX, 3, 1985, pp.539-542. Emmanuel Hansen made the point that the terrain was dominated by the writings of Fanon, Cabral, Walter Rodney, Nkrumah, Paul Baran and André Gunder Frank rather than the Marxist classics. Hansen, "The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-86", in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), Popular Struggles For Democracy in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1987), p.187.

9. The JFM believed that it was they who were using Rawlings. Interview with Nyeya Yen in Revolutionary Banner, II, 4, June 1986, pp.7-8.

10. Those with a military background were Rawlings himself, Warrant Officer Adjei Boadi, Sergeant Akata-Pore, and Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah. The civilians were Chris Atim, Reverend Dr. Vincent Damuah and Amartey Kwei, a trade unionist who was later executed his role in the murder of the High Court judges and a retired army officer. For an examination of their backgrounds, see Ray op. cit., pp.31-34.

11. These were Akata-Pore and Atim.

12. See Ghana, The PNDC's Programme For Reconstruction and Development: a Statement by the Secretary on Radio and Television, December 30 1982.

13. By 1987, Ghanaians had still not been compensated for any of the notes that were taken out of circulation.

14. Bates argues that African Governments have repeatedly imposed policies containing an urban bias, because of the need to placate the more restive urban population. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1981).

15. An Essential Commodities Monitoring Unit was set up within the Police in 1982. Ghana: Two Years of Transformation, 1982-83 (Accra: Information Services Department, undated), p.23.

16. Ibid., p.9.

17. One report estimates the share of the sale price that accrued to the farmers at between 50% and 80%. World Bank, Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review (World Bank, 1985), Background Paper no. 5, "Marketing and Input Supply", p.147-8.

18. "Ve-Hoeme PDC On The Move", Nsamankow July 30- 6 August 1982, p.3. Also "High prices of Foodstuffs... Traders Are To Be Blamed", Nsamankow July 16-22 1982, p.1. I am grateful to Jeff Haynes for lending me his rare copies of this newspaper.

19. A speech made by Rawlings at Tamale on 14 October 1982, reproduced in A Revolutionary Journey: Selected Speeches of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC, Dec.31st 1981 - Dec.31st 1982 (Volume One), (Accra: Information Services Department, undated).

20. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 4 September 1982.

21. Reported in Ghanaian Times, 4 February 1982. The Interim National Co-ordinating Committee was the central co-ordinating body of the PDCs. It was replaced by the National Defence Committee in July.

22. Reported in Ghanaian Times, 9 November 1982.

23. Kwame Saarah-Mensah, Brong Ahafo Regional Secretary, quoted in Ghanaian Times, 9 November 1982.

24. For example, see the lead article entitled "The Police and The Revolution", Nsamankow, I, 4, August 13-19 1982.

25. Reported in The Daily Graphic, 30 July 1982.

26. Utuka envisaged that these teams would act as a counter-check on the Border Guards. See The Daily Graphic 29 June 1976.

27. See the speech by Rawlings on 5 January 1982, reproduced in A Revolutionary Journey, p.6.

28. "Guidelines for the Proper Functioning and Effectiveness of the People's Defence Committees, Released by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for People's Defence Committees", published as a supplement to the Legon Observer, April 1982, p.iv.

29. See report in The Daily Graphic 17 June 1982. GAFACO-OPS consisted of the Ghana National Farmers Council; the Ghana Co-operative Marketing Association; the Ghana National Farmers Union; the Ghana General Farmers Association; the Ghana Food Growers Association; the Federation of Ghana Farmers; the Rice Growers Association; and the Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association. Interview with Dr. Martin Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Secretary-General, GAFACO-OPS, Accra, 6 June 1986.

30. For example, farmers in the Nyame Bekyere area of Sefwi-Wiawso were reported to have agreed to accept a price cut from ¢720 to ¢300 a bag following the appeal by Rawlings. See West Africa, 19 July 1982, p.1911. See also the reaction by Elizabeth Ohene, former editor of The Daily Graphic, in West Africa, 16 August 1982, pp.2103-4.

31. The cost of insecticides rose from fifty pesewas to ¢30 per litre and spraying machines from ¢30 to ¢700 each.

32. Speech by Rawlings on the launching of the Akuafo cheque, 20 August 1982, reproduced in A Revolutionary Journey, pp.50-58.

33. This proposal was, for example, contained in the report of the NDC and Secretaries, which is considered below.

34. Ghana, The PNDC's Programme For Reconstruction and Development (Accra: Information Services Department, 1983), p.7.

35. See the coverage in the Ghanaian Times, 23 November 1982.

36. Figures supplied by Cocoa Board, Accra.

37. It was reported that more than 150 tonnes of cocoa lay unbagged in the Likpe-Kukurantumi and Jasikan Districts. Ghanaian Times, 23 November 1982.

38. Maxwell Owusu, "Custom and Coups: A Juridical Interpretation of Civil Order and Disorder in Ghana", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXIV, 1, 1986, pp.95-98; and "Rebellion, Revolution, and Tradition: Reinterpreting Coups in Ghana", Comparative Studies in Society and History XXXI, 2, April 1989, *passim*.

39. The PDC Guidelines lumped chiefs together with smugglers, thieves and 'discredited politicians'. "Guidelines for the Proper Functioning and Effectiveness of the People's Defence Committees, Released by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for People's Defence Committees", published as a supplement to the Legon Observer, April 1982, p.III.

40. Interview with G.A.N. Noamesi, PDC Secretary for Mate, 28 September 1986.

41. These statistics are necessarily approximate because they are based upon estimates given by the farmers in local acres, which in Likpe are measured at "16 X 16" armlengths. Since only two sides are measured, the total area of a local acre may be more or less than 16 square metres. On the problems of calculation, see R.A. Kotey, Competition Between Cocoa and Coffee: A Case Study, University of Ghana, I.S.S.E.R., Technical Publication Series, No.29, 1972, Appendix A.

42. Ernesto May, Exchange Controls And Parallel Market Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Focus on Ghana, World Bank Staff Working Paper, no.711, 1985, p.129.

43. Report in The Daily Graphic, 4 September 1982.

44. The plans for the Bank were in place by 1981. Interview with K.K. Foli, Manager of United Rural Bank, Kukurantumi, 13 March 1986.

45. The Mate Chairman was none other than Mensah Lemboe, former Matehene and the brains behind the Volta River compensation fraud.

46. The immediate cause of his resignation was not a dispute over smuggling but concerned the fraudulent issue of receipts for market tolls. Interview with G.A.N. Noamesi, as above.

47. Interviews with C.K. Akoto, Chairman of Agbozome PDC, 13 October 1986; and Edward Balappa, Chairman of Abrani PDC, 5 October 1986.

48. Interview with Nana Oforite Dzahene, Mate PDC Chairman, 28 September 1986.

49. "'Yaa Asantewa' Surfaces in Dzodze PDC", Nsamankow, 16-22 July 1982.

50. Report in The Daily Graphic, 23 September 1982.

51. Discussion with Harry Asimah, Ho District CDR Organizing Assistant, 13 November 1986.

52. The Co-ordinating Committee tried to replace the position of Regional Administrative Officer with a "22nd September Interim Body", chaired by the Ho District Chief Executive and manned by workers from different government departments. This information is gleaned from "Oath of Struggle Till Victory By the PDCs and WDCs of Ho on the 1st Monthly Anniversary of the 22nd September Action", dated October 1982. See also report in The Daily Graphic, 23 September 1982.

53. Discussion with Harry Asimah, 13 November 1986.

54. This was declared, amongst others, by Chris Atim. See report in Ghanaian Times, 9 November 1982.

55. Interview with Grace Sronipah, Bakwa, 17 January 1986.

56. Interview with Kwaku Ofori, CDR Secretary, Bakwa, 17 January 1986.

57. Reported in West Africa 15 March 1982.

58. "CDRs and the Image of Ghana - Speech to the CDRs at Hohoe on 3rd May, 1985", copy in Library of Congress, African Section.

59. Rawlings' speech at Okadjakrom is quoted in The Daily Graphic, 4 September 1982.

60. Ahwoi, speaking as a member of the Implementation and Monitoring Committee of COCOBOD, said that 7,000 tonnes had been expected but only 2,000 had materialized. West Africa, 21 May 1984, p.1091.

61. There is a substantial literature of a largely polemical nature on the struggles within the regime over economic policy. See Chris Atim and Ahmed Gariba "Ghana: Revolution or Counter-Revolution?", Journal of African Marxists, Issue 10, June 1987; Hansen "State and Popular Struggles",
Richard Jeffries "Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule", in Donal Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.94-6; Kwesi Jonah, "Rawlings Revolution Two Years After", Journal of African Marxists, Issue 5, 1984; Kwame Ninsin, "Ghanaian Politics After 1981: Revolution or Evolution?", Canadian Journal of African Studies, XX, 1, 1987; Zaya Yeebo, "Ghana: Defence Committees and the Class Struggle", Review of African Political Economy, 32, 1985 and "How the IMF Tamed a Leftist Apostle", African Events, November 1984.

62. Hansen, "State and Popular", p.197.

63. Objections were raised to the 'reactionary' appointments of Dr. Asamoah, Mr. Kuffour, Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu and K.B. Asante. Interestingly, three of those remained in office by the turn of the decade. For the intervention of Asamoah, see The Ghanaian Times, 1 March 1982.

64. 'Left-right' terminology often serves as convenient shorthand, and it is used as such here. When it is deployed as a tool of analysis, it can obfuscate. This is illustrated in the somewhat fruitless exchange between Ninsin and Ahiakpor. See Ninsin, "Ghanaian Politics", op. cit.; James Ahiakpor, "Recognizing 'Left' From 'Right' in Ghana: A Comment on Ninsin" as well as the rejoinder "Recognising Left and Right in Ghanaian Politics: A Reply to Ahiakpor" in Canadian Journal of African Studies, XXII, 1, 1988.

65. Botchwey wrote a thesis in this vein. The point is clinched by reading a paper he published in 1981. see Kwesi Botchwey, "Transforming the 'Periphery': A Study of the Struggle of the Social Forces in Ghana for Democracy and National Sovereignty" (Japan: United Nations University, 1981).

66. The report was drawn up under the joint supervision of Yao Graham of the NDM and Mahama Bawa of the JFM. See Hansen, "State and Popular", p.197.

67. Report of the Committee of the National Defence Committee and Secretaries on the Economy (unpublished), p.26.

68. Ibid., pp. 21.

69. Ibid., pp.13, 16.

70. Ibid., pp.30-31.

71. On these events, see Ray, op. cit., chapter 7.

72. "Ghana on the Brink of Civil War", The Crusader, I, 2, 1986, pp.1-2.

73. Atim cited the direction of the revolution and the personal style of leadership by Rawlings as points of contention. See Revolutionary Banner, II, 1, June 1986, p.15.

74. The PNDC's Programme For Reconstruction and Development (1983).

75. Eboe Hutchful, amongst others, sees this as a result of World Bank pressure. See his "From Revolution to Monetarism: The Economics and Politics of the Adjustment Programme in Ghana", in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley (eds.), Structural Adjustment in Africa (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.105-106.

76. The precise relationship between these two bodies is somewhat unclear.

77. L. Brydon, "Ghanaian Responses to the Nigerian Expulsions of 1983, African Affairs LXXXIV, 337, 1985, p.575. See also the interview with Steve Obimpeh, former Chairman of the NMP in West Africa, 23 February 1987.

78. The World Bank granted a Reconstruction Imports credit worth 40 million dollars in June 1983 and an Export Rehabilitation Credit of 93 million in January 1984. See Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme 1984-86, November 1984, p.4. By the end of 1986, the Bank had provided total loans of 208 million dollars under programme aid and 170 million under project aid. See John Toye, "Ghana's Economic Reforms and World Bank Policy-Conditioned Lending, 1983-88" (unpublished manuscript), p.21.

79. B.L.T. Sakibu, "Transport (Roads and Waterways) as Basic Infrastructure For Regional Development", in N.D. Sodzi (ed.), Volta Region: Plans, Projects and Prospects (Ho: Volta Regional Administration, 1986), p.27.

80. Ghana's Moment of Truth, Radio and Television broadcast by Flt-Lt. Rawlings, 2 May 1983, p.4.

81. Ministry of Agriculture, Ghana Agricultural Policy: Action Plans and Strategies, 1984-86, February 1984, pp.81-83.

82. The Government instructed the banks to open branches in all 136 cocoa districts by September 1983, while the Bank of Ghana was to expand the number of Rural Banks. The first of these had been opened as early as 1976 in the Central Region. By 1985 there were 105 such banks in Ghana. Nii Kwaku Sowa, "Financial Intermediation and Economic Development", in Hansen and Ninsin, op. cit., p.127.

83. See "The Cocoa Sector", Background paper prepared for the Ghana Policies and Programme for Adjustment report, October 1983, *passim.*

84. Tony Hodges, "Ghana's Strategy for Adjustment With Growth", Africa Recovery, II, 3, August 1988, p.18.

85. Toye, op. cit., p.44.

86. Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-86: Report Prepared for Second Meeting of Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris, 1984, p.6.

87. Toye, op. cit., p. 47

88. The PNDC fulfilled its commitment to reduce subsidies on petroleum more faithfully than it did on fertilizers. Toye, ibid., p.47.

89. This finally came to pass in 1990.

90. The Commander of the Second Infantry Brigade, Colonel Seidu Ayumah, went on record as saying that the Border Guards had been dissolved not as a punitive measure but to strengthen national defences against external aggression. This is a hint that people perceived the corruption and inefficiency of the Guards as the major reason. See The People's Daily Graphic, 7 March 1985.

91. See Ray Abrahams, "Sungusungu: Village Vigilante Groups in Tanzania", African Affairs, LXXXVI, 343, April 1987; and Horace Campbell, "Popular Resistance in Tanzania: Lessons From Sungusungu", Africa Development, XIV, 4, 1989.

92. This arrangement prevailed in the Hohoe and Jasikan Districts in 1986. From my more recent involvement in a political asylum case in 1991, I have received further confirmation that this was normal practice.

93. For example Kwesi Jonah, "The Social Impact of Ghana's Adjustment Programme", in Bade Onimode (ed.), The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt: The Social and Political Impact (Volume Two), (London: Zed\IFAA, 1989).

94. A number of respondents remembered an even more serious food shortage in about 1939. This apparently followed on from the 1937/38 cocoa holdup. Many farmers had burnt their cocoa in protest and were forced to sell rice. When drought intervened, local farmers found themselves without adequate supplies. Interview with Arnold Gidiga, Abrani, 29 May 1986.

95. This included the stems of cocoyams and grated cassava, which had not been properly fermented. The Bakpele were not alone. See George J.S. Dei, "Coping With the Effects of the 1982-83 Drought in Ghana: The View From the Village", Africa Development, XIII, 1, 1988.

96. Rice is a female crop in Likpe and Lolobi, but not in Avatime which is one of the other major rice-growing communities in the Region.

97. These figures are derived from numerous interviews with rice farmers in the area.

98. Interview with Marcus Goodman, Agbozome, 6 February 1986.

99. Interview with Martin Ashiaman, Gbi-Wegbe, 17 June 1986.

100. Interview with R.K. Asare, Bakwa, 28 January 1986.

101. "Enquiries at the southern Ghana-Togo border revealed that maize had been regularly smuggled into Togo but now is stopped because 'they have plenty themselves'." World Bank, Ghana: Agricultural Sector Review, Background Paper no. 5 "Marketing and Input Supply", p.142 footnote 2.

102. Access to these services both determined the total amount of land that could be cleared for cropping before the rains came and limited weed growth.

103. Interview with Mr. Adortsey, Manager of Ameyi Farms, Gbefi, 18 June 1986.

104. The Kukurantumi Rural Bank ceased granting loans in 1985 as a result of non-repayment. In March 1986, a number of defaulters were put before the Volta Region Public Tribunal. Interview with K.K. Foli, Manager of United Rural Bank, Kukurantumi, 13 March 1986.

105. Interview with Martha Kwame, group leader, Gbi-Godenu, 16 July 1986.

106. The estimate provided here, and which is derived from Table 5.5, is based on a calendar year. It should be noted that Nyanteng, who based his estimates on each crop year for the 1970s, calculated the rewards of smuggling at a significantly higher level. See V.K. Nyanteng, The Declining Ghana Cocoa Industry: An Analysis of Some Fundamental Problems, Technical Publication Series, no.40, I.S.S.E.R., University of Ghana, 1980, table 7, p.24. In 1985/86, the Ghana price was ¢1698 per load of cocoa, while the cedi equivalent of the CFA10,000 offered in Togo was about ¢4000.

107. Discussions with a smuggler, 27 May 1986.

108. Discussions with a smuggler, 19 August 1986.

109. Interview with G.A.N. Noamesi, as above.

110. T.K. Effah, "Village\Town Development Committees and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, Local Development in the Post-December 31 Era in Ghana. Confrontation or Collaboration: The Case of Berekum", B.A. Long Essay, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, May 1985, p.62.

111. Interview with G.A.N. Noamesi, as above.

112. Interviews with Nana Agyeman II, Kukurantumi, 3 October 1986; Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 20 January 1986.

113. Interview with U.S. Clarke, District Secretary, as above.

114. In February 1986, the Sergeant in charge of the Mate contingent consented to a survey of traffic crossing the boundary. On successive market-days in Dzidrame and Likpe-Mate, a record was taken of the number of people and the merchandise crossing between the two sets of villages on either side of the frontier. This information is not easily displayed in a tabular form. However, it is worth recording the nature of the exchange. The Togolese who visited Mate did not carry much of value, mainly because they had access to CFA francs. Their main reason for visiting was to acquire rice, salt and dried fish from the Volta Lake. The Bakpele tended to cross in much larger numbers, carrying cocoa, coffee and fruit, in order to acquire consumer goods which were not available or were cheaper than in Ghana. During the course of the survey, I witnessed the passing of bribes between smugglers and the soldiers. This was perhaps the major reason for why the soldiers subsequently complained about the research, although the ostensible reason was concern for national security.

115. The Togolese goods comprised soap, tinned sardines, tinned pilchards, batteries, razor blades, soft drinks, cigarettes, talcum powder, pomade, cocoa butter, sugar cubes, granulated sugar, pens and tinned tomatoes. The only Ghanaian goods were soap, Cerelac and Guinness. Personal Diary, 27 September 1986.

116. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

117. People's Daily Graphic, 11 January 1983.

118. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

119. "Policy on Pledged Cocoa Farms - Volta Region", a circular letter by U.S. Clarke, Jasikan District Secretary, dated 19 September 1986.

120. Interview with Laida Obideabah, Jasikan District Liason Officer, NMP, Jasikan, 17 November 1986.

121. These figures were obtained through interviews and direct observations.

122. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

123. In July 1986, the second intake of the Hohoe District Militia, consisting of 68 new recruits and including 10 women, passed out. The estimate is a rather conservative one, given that there had been a previous intake and others to follow. See "Militiamen Must Help Combat Economic Crimes", People's Daily Graphic, 29 July 1986.

124. Interviews with Lawrence Akoto, CDO District Commander, Hohoe, 6 October 1986; and U.S. Clarke, above.

125. Interview with Lawrence Akoto, as above.

126. Interview with Lawrence Akoto, as above.

127. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

128. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

129. Discussions with a former smuggler, 20 October 1988.

130. A political asylum case in which I was involved in June 1991 turned on a claim by a Militiaman that he had been framed by the soldiers and the Police. He cited the different economic interests of the two groups as the major source of conflict. This case came from the Ivorian border.

131. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

132. The frontier was closed in September 1986, after an alleged invasion of coup plotters from Ghana who attempted to overthrow the Eyadema regime. The PNDC denied any involvement. The Bakpele were wary of the Togolese border guards at the best of times. It was inviting trouble to cross at a time of political uncertainty.

133. Interview with Nana Mantey Akototse IV, Abrani, 3 October 1986.

134. Interview with Nana Soglo Allo III, Mate, 20 August 1986.

135. Interview with Nana Akototse, Abrani, 3 October 1986.

136. "Nationwide Radio and Television Broadcast by the Chairman of the P.N.D.C., Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings", Home Front, IX, 1, March 1990.

Chapter Eight:

'People's Power' and Local Responsibility:

The Bakpele and the Matter of Democracy, 1982-86

What was lacking in the early 1980s was not the inclination on the part of rural dwellers to engage with the state, but the apparent inability of the latter to perform its side of the deal. The inauguration of the Third Republic had elicited a positive if guarded response in 1979, but the corruption, and more importantly the ineptitude, of the Limann administration had taken much of the gloss off multi-party politics two years later. The incoming Rawlings regime professed to embody something unique in the Ghanaian historical experience. As a revolutionary government, it claimed to belong to neither of the conventional moulds - military or civilian - although it embraced members of both constituencies. The '31st December Revolution' was intended to cut through the failures of the past thirty years, and to usher in a 'people's democracy' with its centre of gravity at the base of the social pyramid. Whereas Ghana had been governed under an 'administocracy' for most of the years since independence, and indeed before then, the PNDC aimed to open up avenues for mass participation at the village level. Local bodies would, in turn, would lock into higher tiers so as to forge a single political structure.

In 1982, the primary agents of popular power were the People's and Worker's Defence Committees (P/WDCs). In subsequent years, the Rawlings regime downgraded these bodies and abandoned much of the revolutionary rhetoric, yet insisted that its aim remained one of restoring power to the grassroots. This glossed over a significant departure from the revolutionary phase. Instead of trying to reshape the local environment, the PNDC began to concentrate on working through the many local institutions which were already in place. This Chapter traces Bakpele reactions to PNDC initiatives over a five year period. Because the political reforms were at a comparatively early stage of

implementation when fieldwork was completed, the conclusions are necessarily tentative.

8.1. From 'People's Power' to Local Democracy

The commitment of the Rawlings regime to the building of alternative political structures was contained in the preamble to the PNDC policy guidelines:

> "The national struggle has a very important corollary and this is the struggle for a new democracy. The content of this struggle is to place power in the hands of the people and to ensure their genuine participation in the decisionmaking process."[1]

The emphasis upon mass participation was partly a defensive posture. Having toppled a duly elected government, the onus was on the PNDC to demonstrate that the structures of the Third Republic were in some sense flawed. It also reflected genuine disillusionment with the operation of imported political models. Supporters of the '31st December Revolution' argued that elections had repeatedly paved the way for the entrenchment and enrichment of a wealthy minority. As Rawlings saw it a couple of years later:

> "In the search for a democratic system of government, much has been made of Western parliamentary institutions. Our experience in this country provides enough evidence to show that in their actual working, those institutions are dominated by the interest of the rich and influential members of society. The vast majority of the population, of the ordinary citizens, have always been left without any control over their so-called representatives... That is why the people, in their practical wisdom have rejected this sham democracy."[2]

As in the Libyan model, the P/WDCs were supposed to supplant representative institutions with mechanisms for a participatory democracy.[3] The PDC Guidelines of April 1982 even limited the size of local executives, on the grounds that they might otherwise be tempted to usurp the prerogatives of the rank-and-file.[4] The District, Regional and Interim National Co-ordinating Committees (INCC) were initially appointed from above, but the intention was that they would ultimately be democratized - presumably as a result of

community PDCs sending delegates to higher councils. At the end of the process, the INCC was to fuse with the PNDC, thereby completing the political circuit.

There were other reasons why a participatory model was attractive to sections of the ruling coalition. One of these has already been dealt with, namely the invaluable contribution that politically conscious citizens could make towards the enforcement of social controls. A second was the importance of mass mobilization for meeting basic development objectives. Since the state apparatus was manifestly overloaded, much of the initiative for alleviating communal squalor and rehabilitating local amenities had to come from the 'people' themselves. A final factor was the preclusion of a vanguardist alternative for the radical wing of the regime. Neither the June 4 Movement (JFM) nor the New Democratic Movement (NDM) had established much of a following outside the Regional capitals. Their influence within Government was also closely circumscribed. Although Atim and Akata-Pore sat on the PNDC, it convened only spasmodically, while the Ministries were in the hands of committed reformists.[5] The INCC and later the National Defence Committee (NDC) was left as the epicentre of JFM activity. The leadership was aware that it could only strengthen its own hand by making the P/WDCs a live presence in all parts of the country. With the weight of the 'people' behind them, the radicals believed they would be in a better position to steer policy in the direction they desired.

During the early months of 1982, a veil of ambiguity surrounded the activities of the PDCs. The scourge of *kalabule* had become such a stock-in-trade of political debate that ideologically disparate groupings momentarily seemed to share a language and common concerns. It quickly transpired, however, that the INCC perceived the enemy in class terms and not simply as that minority which had misused public office or profited from the parallel economy. The first set of PDC Guidelines, which bore the imprint of the JFM, made this clear:

> "Chiefs, Moneylenders, Landlords, Absentee Farmers, Tractor Owners, Transport owners, Smugglers, discredited politicians, thieves, embezzlers of peoples funds, kalabule people, and such characters are banned from forming defence committees."[6]

According to Atim and Gariba this followed repeated attempts by members of the dominant class to 'hijack' the PDCs and to remove their sting.[7] In July the INCC was replaced by an expanded NDC under the chairmanship of Rawlings, who unsuccessfully sought to open the PDCs to all Ghanaians.[8]

As the year progressed, the debate over economic policy was mirrored by an equally heated exchange over the P/WDCs. Incidents such as the workers' takeover of the Ghana Textile Printing Company and raids on lodge houses provoked criticism from within the Government as well as from outside it.[9] Rawlings increasingly distanced himself from the confrontational stance of many P/WDCs and from the NDC militants who were suspected of incitement. Defenders of the P/WDCs have claimed that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank induced the PNDC to rein in the more radical initiatives.[10] The published comments of the Bank suggest that the WDCs were indeed regarded as a barrier to sound economic management.[11] It is also true that the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) tended to promote a technocratic approach to development.

From the end of 1982, when the so-called 'ultra-leftists' were purged, the political content of the P/WDCs was progressively emptied. Whereas the WDCs had been formed to represent the interests of workers, greater importance was now attached to raising productivity and maintaining discipline at the work-place.[12] The PDC Guidelines were also amended in 1983 to allow anybody to join provided they subscribed to the objectives of the revolution and had "a proven record of patriotism, integrity and democratic practice".[13] Elaborating on the reasons for the amendment, Rawlings observed that:

> "The character and commitment of the individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes from or the position he or she holds"[14]

The new Guidelines continued to project the formation of a new ruling council out of a hierarchy of popularly elected PDCs.[15] But even this was set aside the following year. The purges of late 1982 had displaced the JFM and created an opening for supporters of the rival NDM, but their relationship with the PNDC was soon strained by the unrelenting pursuit of austerity. In 1983, Rawlings warned of the NDC becoming a parallel source of authority and it therefore came as no surprise when the entire structure was overhauled at the end of the following year.[16]

The P/WDCs were redesignated as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) in order to underline the point that the 'revolution' had a home for anybody who was prepared to contribute towards the national recovery effort. More importantly, the NDC was replaced by a CDR national secretariat (headed by an appropriately named Political Counsellor for the Economic Development of the CDRs) which was attached to the Office of the PNDC. Henceforth there was to be no doubt that the CDRs were an instrument of central authority rather than an autonomous political force. Finally, all references to the CDRs as the building blocks of a new political order were excised from the revised Guidelines.

Nevertheless, Rawlings and his colleagues insisted that their mission remained to serve as the midwife of a new political dispensation. In November 1984 the National Commission on Democracy (NCD) was reconstituted under the Chairmanship of Justice D.F. Annan, a member of the PNDC.[17] Amongst its responsibilities, the NCD was mandated to collate expert and public opinion on the political experience of the past thirty years and to make recommendations on the path towards a 'truly democratic' order.[18] Although the regime professed to have an open mind, it did not wait for the NCD to report before pursuing its decentralization plans, which had first been tabled in December 1982. In common with multilateral institutions and a growing body of development experts, the

PNDC contended that the centralization of power from the colonial era onwards had impeded the efficiency of the state apparatus and inhibited local initiative.[19] It proposed two remedies. The first was the reintroduction of elected local government, which had never really been given a chance to succeed. The lowest tier was to consist of Town/Village/Area (TVA) Councils. The middle tier of District Councils was to constitute the operational unit of local government. Finally, elected representatives from the District Councils would sit on Regional Councils which would perform a co-ordinating and planning function.[20]

The second remedy was to decentralize the Ministries (with some obvious exceptions)[21] to the Regional and District levels where their operations would fuse with those of the respective Councils. Since the PNDC aimed at something more than deconcentration, it proposed the replacement of the existing national budget (based on the projected expenditure of individual Ministries) by a composite budget, representing the total cost of the District Council programmes.[22] The 1982 version of the programme also envisaged that the PDCs would furnish the personnel to run the local government machinery.[23] In its later incarnations, the CDRs were allotted no specific role. The modalities for the District elections provided a mechanism for appointing CDR members to the one-third share of unelected seats. But the remainder were to be filled by open election.[24]

Although there may be little excitement to be derived from the supervision of a village market or the construction of a KVIP toilet, the PNDC argued that it was real improvements in living standards that mattered.[25] The reforms were also hailed as a step towards empowering the 'people' to determine their own development priorities. Yet it was obvious that they did not add up to a fundamentally new dispensation in themselves. The work of the NCD in exploring the alternative for national structures consequently remained as important as ever. The Rawlings regime was, however, ensnared in a contradiction between the requirements of the ERP and the imperatives of open

political debate. To encourage debate was also to invite criticism of the recovery programme. Under pressure, the PNDC jammed the lines of communication leading from its urban constituency, whilst posing as the champion of the rights of the voiceless rural majority. The change of emphasis was most clearly embodied in The Rural Manifesto, which was launched amidst some publicity in 1984.[26] The document expounded a simplified version of the urban bias thesis, claiming that the urban working class had participated in the exploitation of the peasantry:

> "As far as members are concerned, the masses of Ghana and indeed of Africa live in the rural areas. There is no doubt that a portion of the masses live in the urban areas - described mainly as the urban poor. The organised urban workers, because they are articulate... claim to speak for the working classes. The claim is grossly erroneous since the majority of the working classes who happen to live in the rural areas have little or no say in the cities where negotiations for salaries, wages, prices of commodities and other social benefits are carried out between government, management and the organised urban working classes. As a group, both the urban rich and poor have exploited the majority in the rural areas..."[27]

This was an interesting commentary on the uneven dimensions of civil society: coherent in the towns, but lumpy in the countryside. The implication was that the PNDC should pay less attention to the howls of urban protest, while pushing ahead with decentralization and essential economic reforms. In the longer term, the solution was to assist the peasantry to defend its own corner. The regime did try to manufacture a counterweight to the Trades Union Congress in the guise of the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (GAFACO-OPS), with whom it chose to negotiate on producer prices.[28] But GAFACO-OPS failed to attract significant rural support. Moreover, its leadership was dominated by personalities such as Martin Appiah-Danquah, who had been prominent in the United Ghana Farmers' Council. Their Nkrumahist schooling inclined them towards statist solutions that were an anathema to the PNDC In 1987, a committee of enquiry was set up to look into charges of corruption and four years later the Federation was disbanded altogether. The result was that the PNDC was prevented from engaging in a corporatist balancing act.

In its efforts to iron out the contradictions, the PNDC adopted a style of governance which bore a striking resemblance to the ideology and procedures of the colonial state. The regime accused its critics of advancing vested interests under the cloak of the national good, much as the colonial authorities had once pilloried early nationalists. The PNDC also revived the conservative precept that political development was an organic process that could not be accelerated without damaging the fragile roots of a political system. The Lugardian school of colonial administration had envisioned the construction of a national government on the foundations laid by a sound Native Authority structure. The PNDC did not share quite the same obsession with chiefs, although the latter were re-admitted to local government, but otherwise the assumptions were strikingly similar. Consistent with the premise, the PNDC claimed that it was unable to specify a date for the unveiling of a new political package or to reveal the likely nature of its contents. In July 1987, the Government did announce that District Assembly elections would be held at the end of the following year. But the NCD was expected to distil the lessons from the performance of the Assemblies before carefully proceeding to the next stage. A third similarity was that, in spite of its professed commitment to democratic local government, the PNDC was determined to maintain a firm grip over local administration. The voluntarism of 1982 was quietly abandoned, as the PNDC settled back into a tested prefectoral mode. The District Secretaries, like their colonial and CPP predecessors, served as the operative link between rural communities and the state. They were expected to maintain law-and-order, communicate government policy down the structure and implement official directives within their Districts. The People's Militia and the CDRs both functioned as the eyes and ears of the District administration.

A final echo was an insistence on the strict limits of public expenditure. Colonial Governors were expected to finance administration through a combination of direct and indirect taxes, since the metropolitan state was unwilling to foot the bill. The Rawlings regime was subject to its own external restraints in the shape

of the IMF, but had concluded anyway that the expansion of the state tended to stifle productive activity. In the short-term, the PNDC could enforce stricter financial discipline, but its ambition in the longer term was to transform Ghanaian political culture. The hidden agenda behind the decentralization scheme was the liberation of the state from many of its accumulated responsibilities. District Assemblies were expected to finance government services through improved revenue collection, except in the provision of education, health and highways.[29] In 1987, Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu was explicit on this point:

> "The District Assembly will manage part of the national government finances; and when this is done efficiently and properly, it will support the national government in the sense that the work load at the top will be reduced particularly with the implementation of the decentralisation programme. This will help to initiate and sustain development at the local level so that people do not shift the burden of development into some father *'ABAN'* who stays far away, perhaps in Accra."[30]

All of this begs the question of who stood to gain. It is difficult to detect a cabal of class or ethnic interests working through the regime. For that reason, it is tempting to describe the PNDC as Bonapartist. Nevertheless, Government policy did help to recreate an environment in which the Ghanaian bourgeoisie (including its Anlo component) could find its feet.

8.2. The Bakpele and the Changing Tides

Having charted the passage of the '31st December Revolution' since 1982, the next step is to examine how the Bakpele responded to the events unfolding around them. Since so much of the debate has turned on the performance and potential of the PDCs, it is appropriate to consider their impact in some detail.

8.2.1. Death by Natural Causes: The PDCs in Likpe

The first year of operations divides into an early phase when the PDCs were being installed and a subsequent period of consolidation. The first set of PDC Guidelines denotes the transition. When the call to form PDCs was first issued, the response was decidedly patchy. They sprang up more or less spontaneously in the cities, but a certain amount of prompting was required in the countryside. In some areas such as Berekum, the Student Task Force took the initiative in registering members and supervising the early vetting procedures.[31] In Dodowa, the PDCs were formed after the visitation of an official delegation.[32] The PDCs often gained a foothold where they could attach themselves to existing constituencies. In Akropong, they served as a means by which the youngmen could strike back at the chiefs. And in the Volta Region, the PDCs of Leklebi Agbesia and Logba Vuinta became embroiled in a long-running land dispute between these villages.[33]

In the case of Likpe, the advent of 'people's power' was fairly undramatic, mainly because the call to arms failed to strike a chord. In his radio broadcasts, Rawlings repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the PDCs was to enable Ghanaians to take their destiny in their own hands. Yet the community had already taken the lead in planning local development and even administering its own informal system of justice. Whereas the residual power of the chiefs in the Akan heartland lent itself to the mobilization of the youngmen, this was much less true of Likpe. The Bakpele had appropriated the overt symbols of Akan chieftaincy, but in most respects the institution was closer to the Ewe model. As has been noted, authority was not so much attached to the stool as constructed afresh by each incumbent. The wisest strategy a chief could adopt, therefore, was to seek the co-operation of elders as well as the youngmen. A trial of strength was seldom successful in the long-run and risked the ultimate threat of destoolment or (more commonly) the withdrawal of consent.

As has been seen, the Bakpele youth was preoccupied with a struggle for survival when so many options had been foreclosed. Their reaction to adversity was for the most individualistic. That is, the youth had become used to making the most of circumstances, rather than engaging in political action to change them. A contrast between the civic consciousness of the older generation and the anomie of youth is one of the most striking features of Likpe at this time. Secondly, the Bakpele chiefs did not control any stool land, although some land was brought under chiefly supervision in 1982 in order to arrest Togolese encroachment. Thus they could not be accused of commandeering local resources for their own benefit. Thirdly, since the crisis had adversely affected all sections of the community, it was difficult to lay the blame on a class of local accumulators. The political dynamic was probably slightly different in Hohoe, where a group of wealthy individuals dominated trade, controlled local transport and owned much of the fixed property. Finally, the youngmen of Likpe were not immune to the schisms which were endemic to each village. Hence they tended to burst onto the scene as an organized group in response to a specific issue, only to disband again under countervailing
pressures.

In most cases, PDCs were formed when the chiefs beat gong-gong and announced that the Government had issued instructions for changes to take effect. They were responding to perceived pressure from above. Although no delegation was received, the Regional Secretary let it be known that he expected a rapid response. One PDC Chairman recalled that:

> "The PDC in Mate was formed in early 1982. It was constantly announced that PDCs should be formed in every town. The Government would step in if any town did not accept the idea."[34]

The chiefs responded more because they wished to avoid accusations of obstructionism than out of a Machiavellian desire to subvert the PDCs. Their influence over the selection procedure varied. In Kukurantumi, the executive was selected at the house of the chief and was simply submitted to a meeting of the

village for ratification.[35] In Bala four members were chosen by the people of the village, while the chief and elders added three appointees of their own.[36]

A distinctive feature of the early PDCs was that they mirrored the clan composition of each village. Although there was little enthusiasm for the PDCs, nobody could be sure of how much influence they might come to wield. In order to preserve a rough balance of power, therefore, each clan added a member to the executive. They typically chose educated men who would be equipped to defend their specific interests. In Mate, the first Secretary was a school teacher of about thirty years of age, while the Chairman was a retired white-collar worker recently back from the city. In 1983, the latter was ousted by Mensah Lemboe who had been the Matehene prior to his conviction. The ousted Chairman went on to replace Lemboe as the new Matehene.

The village of Agbozome yielded a different pattern. The impetus here did not come from the chiefs, but from the youngmen who had lost patience with the bickering between the three chiefly factions. In their view, village development had suffered because the chiefs were unable to put their differences behind them. Thus, the Vute and Basio clans had withdrawn from the Town Development Committee (TDC) and had refused to contribute finance or labour towards the construction of a new school.[37] The driving force behind the PDC was a man in his fifties, who succeeded in gaining the backing of about 50 young men and women in the village. The PDC emerged as the one body that was able to straddle the divide between the clans, as he later explained:

> "We would have had three PDCs, so we grouped together in unity. Anyone who was elected was for the three towns. But we saw to it that at least two members came from each town."[38]

Thus, in spite (or because) of their desire to heal the wounds, the Agbozome activists themselves engaged in a delicate balancing act between different clan interests.

Once established, the PDC executives needed to carve out a niche. By mid-year they were emboldened by NDC directives to assert their independence. The previous Chapter dealt at some length with the constraints upon PDC involvement in price control and border surveillance. It is necessary merely to re-iterate that the PDCs tended to moderate their activity at the point when they risked unpopularity. Several PDCs did, however, claim competence over the trial and punishment of petty offences. The theft of crops was a charged issue, and became steadily more so after the repatriation of many Bakpele from Nigeria in 1983. There were a number of stand-offs between the chiefs and the PDCs, which culminated in a resounding victory for traditional authority. In Abrani, for example, the PDCs established a court to try people caught growing or smoking 'wee'. They were forced to disband after the chief made clear that they had no jurisdiction.[39] Hence the overall record of the PDCs in the sphere of social control was not, on the whole, very encouraging.

The prime target for a PDC takeover bid was in the field of community development, which ranked highest in the priorities of almost everyone. The April 1982 Guidelines enjoined the PDCs to take the initiative and this they tried to do. However, most villages already had an active TDC, which in many cases had been in operation for half a century and had a long list of achievements to its name. As in other parts of the country, a trial of strength ensued.[40] The PDCs demanded that the TDCs give way because they bore the imprimatur of the PNDC. When the chiefs sided with the TDCs, this usually settled the matter because the PDCs did not have a cohesive following of their own. The humbling of the Mate PDC was recalled by the former Chairman as follows:

> "We tried to abolish the TDC. We were not giving them a place. We gave them the impression that they no longer had a role. We should rather tell them what to do. But it didn't work because Nana Soglo was very strong. His argument was that the TDCs were set up under Nkrumah's regime and were still going, so they could not be abolished just because a new government came to power."[41]

The Abrani chief similarly remembered putting the PDC in its place:

> "I didn't allow it. I surpassed that controversy. They said that the TDC would have to die out. I called the two parties together and told the PDCs that in town development matters they could help the TDC but they were not to take over."[42]

The PDCs did not always give in so easily. In Bala, the PDC organized its own day for communal labour over and above the demands of the TDC.[43] But as in the Berekum District, the duplication of TDC activities was unpopular because it placed an excessive burden on the villagers. The one category of project reserved for the PDCs was the communal farm. In some areas, these appear to have been quite large. The Ministry of Agriculture registered a PDC farm at Sovie-Kudzra which covered as much as 40 acres.[44] But in Likpe, because there was insufficient land the farms were seldom much larger than an acre - dimensions that were hardly likely to inspire awe or enthusiasm.

In 1982, the most significant initiative was the commencement of the Likpe and East Buem Mini-Hydroelectric Project. The plan had originated before the coup in the offices of the Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation (AESC), where an Indian employee had advocated damming the Dayi River at Kukurantumi. The project, which was endorsed by the Ministry of Fuel and Power in early 1982, was supposed to provide "electricity, pipe-borne water, fish farms and some recreational facilities."[45] The first phase was to electrify Kukurantumi, Abrani, Koforidua, Agbozome and New Ayoma. Under the second phase, power was to be extended to Mate, Bala, Bakwa and the rest of East Buem.[46] The Ministry arranged funding from the Indian Government, while nearby communities were expected to provide the physical labour. From April onwards, people from as far afield as Kute came to Kukurantumi to contribute their share of communal labour. Significantly, this work was co-ordinated not by the PDCs, but by the respective TDCs.

There were a few cases in which the PDCs fared slightly better. Where the relations between TDCs and chiefs were strained, the PDCs sometimes reaped the benefits. In Koforidua, the chief had abolished the TDC because he claimed it was ineffective and failed to keep proper accounts.[47] Another interpretation is

that he perceived the TDC as a threat to his own authority. It was difficult for him to justify taking the reins of village development under his personal control, so the PDCs provided a convenient ally. In Kukurantumi, the vacillating character of Nana Agyeman II bred confusion about the division of responsibilities. Before the revolution, the chief had accused the TDC of usurping his authority and of failing to keep proper accounts.[48] The TDC Chairman replied that he was paranoid about a possible destoolment plot.[49] When the village PDC was formed, Nana Agyeman claimed that it was intended to replace the TDC and he proceeded to steer all development work through the new body. The TDC then lapsed into inactivity until 1985.

These early victories did not, however, work to the ultimate advantage of the PDCs. For a start, the latter did not endear themselves to the villagers by allying with unpopular chiefs. Moreover, they soon came in for criticism in their own right. In Kukurantumi, the PDC inherited the revenue derived from fines placed on stray animals in the village. Before long, villagers were complaining that the PDC had slaughtered many of the animals and could not account for money that had been collected. The PDC also became embroiled in a bitter dispute between the chief and his subjects. The catalyst was an incident towards the end of 1982, in which the *asafoatse* had incited local youths to take revenge against some Policemen for repeated harassment. The *asafoatse* was arrested and later died in Police custody. Nana Agyeman was blamed for having handed him over instead of assisting his escape to Togo.[50] When a new *asafoatse* was chosen, he used his position as leader of the youngmen to countermand the authority of the chief. As a result, the youngmen of all clans refused to obey requests for communal labour which emanated from the chief and the PDC. Most of the work carried out on the dam was organized by the *asafoatse* instead.

Agbozome arrived at the same destination through a very different route. For the first time in many years, the leadership provided by the PDC made it possible to involve the whole village in development work. This prepared the ground for

reconciliation in 1984, when a Grand Council for Agbozome was set up. It consisted of the three chiefs, together with three elders from each side. The Chairman was elected for a year, during which time the whole village was expected to obey calls for communal labour. Alongside the Grand Council a new TDC was established, consisting of five members from each side. The PDC, having performed its mediating function, thereafter assumed an auxiliary function.

One other PDC activity which was highlighted in the PDC Guidelines and which deserves mention, is political education. By mid-1982, a political infrastructure had been put in place. Beneath the appointed Regional and District Co-ordinating Committees, the branches united to form a Likpe Zonal PDC. This was manned by a Chairman from Agbozome and two other executive members from Mate and Abrani. The limbs of the structures did not, however, receive enough exercise. It does not seem as if Likpe was visited by cadres from the Regional or District offices (although the Regional Secretary was once invited to Mate). The onus was on local activists to explain the objectives of the revolution. Since the JFM had not enlisted support outside of Ho, and certainly none in Likpe, the PDCs were unclear of the message they were expected to convey. As often as possible, they travelled to Jasikan and reported back, but they generally refrained from initiating political debate. Their dilemma was re-iterated by a CDR member some years later:

> "Really we've not been giving political education as such. Even though we are literates, we consider it a bit dangerous to give political education without a mandate from the senior people. If we had guidelines from the top we could work. Otherwise people will say that is what you have to say and that is not the policy of the Government."[51]

The evidence from Likpe suggests, therefore, that the PDCs had failed to sink roots long before the PNDC redefined the meaning of 'people's power'. They failed to offer anything the Bakpele did not already have, and they found it difficult to win the support of the youth. When they came into conflict with

existing sources of power at the village level, the verdict was never in doubt. Whereas the weakness of the rural PDCs has commonly been attributed to deficiencies of political consciousness,[52] it is essential to observe the disjunction between urban-based conceptions of revolution and the everyday concerns of communities such as Likpe. If there was a failure, it arguably lay with the revolutionaries rather than the rural population.

Nonetheless, the PNDC did certainly did little to assist the PDC/CDRs to overcome their teething troubles. Often they were encouraged to take a lead in planning local development, only to be reminded that they were expected to concentrate on outlining Government policy. The confusion over roles helped to perpetuate a struggle for power in some communities.[53] But in Likpe the establishment of TVA Councils towards the end of 1985 sealed the fate of the CDRs. The Chairman of the Western Likpe Area Council was Nana Akototse and his counterpart in Eastern Likpe was Emilson Kwashie, an influential school inspector from Mate. The Bakwa Village Council was similarly run by local 'heavyweights'. In 1986, the CDRs lacked not only a following but increasingly a leadership as well. In Kukurantumi, the CDR had effectively been reduced to a single individual. In Mate, the elderly brother of the Matehene had to be drafted in because nobody else was willing to serve as Chairman. In Agbozome, the subsequent collapse of the Grand Council had not only divided the TDC, but split the CDR as well. In many cases, the most diligent PDC members defected to the TDC. In two villages where the CDR still functioned, namely Bakwa and Todome, this was mainly because of an overlap in membership. The CDRs were therefore no match for the combined strength of TDCs and Area Councils, a point that was driven home through a series of incidents in 1986. In Bala a CDR Chairman who refused to participate in communal labour was brought before the Area Council court and fined. In Mate the CDR members were pointedly excluded from TDC finance meetings. When the young Secretary suggested that the CDRs should have a say in the appointment and destoolment of chiefs, he

was formally reprimanded before a village meeting and fined for his presumption.

The CDRs were only saved from extinction by the intelligence requirements of the regime. In successive stages between 1983 and 1985, the CDRs were re-organized in order to solidify the base of the structure. The Likpe Zonal PDC was dismantled and two new secretariats were created - one for west Likpe and the Buem villages of Old and New Baika, Teteman and Nanankor, and the other for the rest of Likpe.[54] Each Zone was allocated a number of paid officials whose task was to collect information, through five sub-committees, and to forward regular reports to the District authorities. Those who filled these positions understood that their function had fundamentally changed:

> "Formerly we were defending the communities; now the CDRs are defending the revolution. So sometimes the CDRs don't mind so much the affairs of the community. They are now for the Government."[55]

Yet the expropriation of the CDRs does not necessarily imply the extinction of avenues for local participation.

8.2.2. Two Cheers for the PNDC: Bakpele Reactions to Reform

After 1984 Government policy began to strike the right kind of note. Whenever officials expatiated on the need to reform local government, they met with a receptive audience. The Bakpele were particularly aggrieved at their treatment by the Jasikan District Council, which was accused of commandeering local revenue - a criticism that was endorsed by the District Secretary, U.S. Clarke.[56] The partition of the Kpandu District in 1979 had reopened the debate about the intensity of historic and economic links with Hohoe. Nana Agya Mensah and Nana Soglo Allo had opposed joining a new Hohoe District on the grounds that they were not Ewe, but this counted for much less once Akpafu and Lolobi made

the move. In October 1982, therefore, the Likpe Traditional Council formally announced its intention to join the Hohoe District, explaining that Jasikan was too remote and that the community had been starved of its rightful share of resources.[57] Much of the animus towards Hohoe was henceforth directed at Buem. The breakway of the Buem villages from the United Rural Bank was one source of irritation. Another was the revival of the hegemonic pretensions of Buem. In 1986, the translation of the Bible into Lelemi was at an advanced stage, fuelling demands for the replacement of Ewe as the language of the church in this part of the Region.[58] During the same year, Nana Akototse (who was under attack in Abrani) alerted his former rival, Nana Soglo, to the expansionist ambitions of the Buem Paramount Chief.[59]

The PNDC postponed a final decision on an administrative home for Likpe until the demarcation of 110 new Districts had been completed, but it did make one concession. From the end of 1985, Likpe shared a member on the Hohoe District Council in rotation with Santrokofi, while retaining representation on the Interim Management Committee of Jasikan District Council. The uncertain future of the community further weakened its claims on District finance, as U.S. Clarke observed:

> "We at the Jasikan District now feel reluctant to spend money on development in Likpe area, because we are aware that it might be leaving to join Hohoe District. So they should make up their mind what they want."[60]

Yet the PNDC did provide the community with greater leverage in its dealings with the District headquarters. At the end of 1985, Likpe acquired three new TVA Councils: Bakwa Village Council, East Likpe Area Council (Mate, Avedzeme, Bala and Todome) and West Likpe Area Council (Agbozome, Koforidua, Abrani and Kukurantumi). These Councils were guaranteed half of the revenues collected within their localities. This enabled them to put hard cash behind the plans of the respective TDCs, whose membership often overlapped. In September 1986 the TVA Councils received their first remittances from Jasikan, consisting of ¢27,000 for the East Likpe and ¢23,000 for the West Likpe Council.[61] Although these were modest beginnings, they engendered a mood of optimism for the first

time in years: for once at least the flow of resources seemed to be in the right direction.

Although all eyes were firmly fixed on development within Likpe, most Bakpele harboured opinions on the wider performance of the Rawlings regime. During innumerable informal discussions as well as more structured interviews, informants expressed a broadly favourable attitude towards the PNDC and what it was seeking to achieve, although many were still hedging their bets - "its not wise to praise a day in the morning-time" as one sceptic put it. Whereas the First Republic was treated as a golden age, the PNDC was credited with making the most of an imperfect world. It was perceived as a government of action, contrasting with the unfulfilled promises of the Acheampong years and the paralysis of Limann. On the other hand, there was no indication that the PNDC was viewed (positively or negatively) as an Ewe regime. This was as much due to the behaviour of the PNDC as to the fracturing of identity. Apart from the Nkrumah regime, there was no other serious contender in the Bakpele popularity stakes. (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1

Response to Question: "Since Independence Which Government Has Had the Most Creditable Record in Office ?"

Regime	First Choice Number	%	Second Choice Number	%
CPP	188	65.5%	83	28.9%
NLC	0	0.0%	5	1.7%
PP	0	0.0%	3	1.0%
SMC	1	0.4%	6	2.1%
PNP	0	0.0%	3	1.0%
PNDC	93	32.4%	182	63.4%
Don't know	5	1.7%	5	1.7%
Total	28	100.0%	287	99.8%

(Source: survey of Likpe, 1986)

There was even some sympathy for the contention, which was bandied about by Government officials, that the military had to be a full partner in any future dispensation (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.2

Response to Question: "Which Political System Do You Think Would Be Best Suited to Ghana ?"

	Civilian	Military	Mix	Don't Know	Total
Number	37	100	147	3	287
Percent	13%	34.8%	51.2%	1%	100%

(Source: survey of Likpe, 1986)[62]

Although the Bakpele response was positive, there was a clear divergence of opinions on fundamentals aspects of the reform programme. The first concerned the funding of community development. Although the District Councils (later Assemblies) were supposed to establish a solid foundation for the entire political structure, they were subjected to acute financial hardship in 1986. The TVA Councils began to absorb a share of local government revenue at the very moment when central government was clawing back its financial commitments. After a decision to halve the state contribution to District Council salaries, the Jasikan District Council was forced to restrict its staff to a four-hour working day, while other Councils resorted to summary dismissals.[63] Not surprisingly, the morale of Council employees greatly suffered. Since the Bakpele were ill-disposed towards District authority anyway, these difficulties provoked little anguish, but the impact upon Government objectives was potentially serious.

Ultimately, the only solution was to raise the ceiling on local taxation. At first glance, the burden in the Jasikan District may appear slight. In 1986 the basic rate for adults over the age of 18 years was ¢120 per head: the price of a bottle of beer. But many were forced to pay up more than once since the Militia was in the habit

of mounting surprise road-blocks and demanding to see tax receipts. This was a time when most people Bakpele were already shouldering additional responsibilities. An increase in school fees in mid-1986, backdated to the beginning of the year, required parents to pay an extra ¢2,300 per child.[64] Similarly, market-oriented reforms had escalated the cost of medical services. Towards the end of 1985, consultation fees at Hohoe hospital stood at ¢50 for adults and ¢30 for children. The comparable charges at Bakwa health clinic were ¢30 and ¢20 respectively.[65] These did not include separate charges for laboratory tests and drugs.

Furthermore, the Bakpele were making 'voluntary contributions' towards a series of local projects. For example, ¢200 was levied on each man and ¢100 on each woman in Bala in order to finance extensions to its Middle School.[66] The Likpe Traditional Council had also earmarked three projects of its own in June 1985. One was a new block of classrooms for the Likpe Secondary School, at an estimated cost of ¢2 million. By the end of the year, that target still seemed a long way off (see Table 8.3). A second was the construction of an operating theatre for the Bakwa clinic, at a cost of ¢500,000, which was required for upgrading to hospital status. An equivalent sum was needed to build new offices for the Likpe Traditional Council. The total of ¢3 million could only be raised within the community. To that end, a further ¢100 was levied on each adult male and ¢50 on each woman in Likpe. In short, the existing burden was such that the Bakpele could not sustain significantly higher tax obligations. The Jasikan District Council attempted to square the circle in 1986 by requesting each TVA Council to cultivate 50 acres of cassava.[67] The Ghana Export Promotion Council was supposed to export the cassava chips to neighbouring states and to divide the proceeds between the TVA and District Councils. Yet the Bakpele were almost as saturated with demands for labour as for money, quite apart from the shortage of land. Thus the villages of Mate and Todome only managed to cultivate 4 acres between them, out of a target of 25 acres.

Table 8.3

Financial Contributions Towards LISEC From Likpe Villages, April 1981-December 1985 (¢)

Village	Target	Amount raised	Arrears
Agbozome	10,000	2,700	7,300
Bala	10,000	3,001	6,999
Mate	10,000	10,000	0
Bakwa	10,000	2,000	8,000
Nkwanta	5,000	580	4,420
Todome	5,000	5,000	0
Kukurantumi	10,000	1,150	8,850
Abrani	10,000	2,400	7,600
Avedzeme	3,000	1,500	1,500
Koforidua	6,000	0	6,000
Total	79,000	28,331	50,669

(Figures from "Likpe Traditional Council Affairs", personal files of Nana Soglo Allo III)

Although the Bakpele were not averse to self-help, as the record clearly shows, they retained a conception of development as a partnership between community and state. The expectation was that once the community had demonstrated its willingness to make sacrifices, central government would step in to reward local efforts with additional finance or expert advice as appropriate. Instead, the PNDC repeated a message which was familiar from the days of British administration, namely that it was beyond the ability of the state to commit limited resources to projects that could best be carried out by the villagers themselves. In 1986, it even appeared as if the PNDC was reneging on existing commitments. The fate of the mini-hydroelectric project was a case in point. A coffer dam had been completed by communal labour in 1984 and the following year it was reported that equipment had been imported from India in time for the commencement of the next phase.[68] At the end of 1986, the project remained at a

standstill. While the AESC blamed the villagers for failing to build secure premises to house the equipment, the Secretary for Fuel and Power suggested that the entire project might have been misconceived.[69] This experience, together with the slow progress on other fronts, exacted a heavy toll on morale. According to Nana Akototse, the Chairman of the East Likpe Area Council, there were definite signs of development fatigue:

> "At the time of LISEC, we were all eager to build it to the standards set by the Ministry of Education and then to put the ball in the Government's court. But now the Government says there is no money to build anything and the people are no longer interested. Despite the fact that the Government is educating us on mobilizing ourselves for communal labour, people are fed up with all these things. People expect the Government to put up new buildings. Local people are fed up with having to do so many things. They attend for fear of being fined, but the enthusiasm was not what it used to be. And because of black pod, people have no money to pay."[70]

Although the PNDC was mining for an authentic indigenous tradition on which to build, there was a strong leaning towards statist solutions in Likpe. The Bakpele had ceased to produce much cocoa, and so were less affected by government taxes on that crop. On the other hand, because the local economy remained in crisis, the Bakpele felt they deserved government assistance. The harsh realities partly explain why mention of the CPP evoked such fond memories during fieldwork.

The second area of misunderstanding, which was not quite as bruising in its implications, concerned the appropriate conduct of Government officials. Although much political baggage had been discarded at the end of 1982, the PNDC remained determined to break the mould of clientelist politics. Political appointments were made in such a way as to establish a rough balance between ethno-regional, gender and occupational constituencies, but the incumbents were expected to remain aloof from special interests. This explains why the PNDC failed to tackle the devastating effects of sea-erosion at Keta in spite of the family origins of Kojo Tsikata and Rawlings himself.

When Dr. Obed Asamoah was appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1982, apparently on the advice of Tsikata, he was expected to obey the rules like everybody else. On the other hand, the Bakpele hoped that he would intercede with central authority and they still saw that as his duty four years later (see Table 8.4). In local perceptions, this was not tantamount to endorsing corruption since what was wanted was for Dr. Asamoah to oil the wheels of a sluggish bureaucracy. The Government had after all conceded the existence of a problem by nominating PNDC members and Secretaries to oversee the completion of specific projects. Dr. Asamoah had himself been given custody of the Kukurantumi mini-hydroelectric project.

Dr. Asamoah was placed in a predicament. If he was over-zealous in taking up local issues, he exposed himself to allegations of abuse of office. Yet to ignore the pleas of his people risked the destruction of a political base that he had cultivated over two decades. Dr. Asamoah erred on the side of caution, intervening only when he was unlikely to attract adverse publicity. He was credited with the introduction of a daily bus service between Kute and Ho via Mate. But because he was reluctant to expose himself further, he was blamed for the non-completion of the mini-hydroelectric scheme and of the Likpe Water Supply Project, which had been on the verge of fruition since 1983.[71] The scrupulous honesty of Dr. Asamoah and other PNDC officials is noteworthy in the annals of recent Ghanaian history. But the implications for his own political career were potentially serious. One informant offered the following prognosis:

> "Asamoah says he is not playing party politics now, so he won't do anything about these local concerns. As a result, the people are angry with him. He will be sorry since Government will have nothing to show for itself over here... We were just worrying about ongoing projects which had never been completed, but because of his reaction we don't go to him anymore."[72]

Behind this tale rests a serious political point. The PNDC had suspended politics at the national level in an effort to divert attention to local theatres. But important though local government might be, people in Likpe understood that it was an ability to unravel the mysteries of the central state machinery that really counted.

The Bakpele were demanding of Dr. Asamoah no more than was reasonable to expect of an elected representative, which he once had been: that is, to hold the centre to its promises. Their approach was more in tune with the realities of bureaucratic inertia than the some of homilies that emanated from the centre.

Table 8.4
Response to Question: "'If Someone From Likpe Is Not Elected to Represent the Area, But Is Nominated to a Ministerial Post, It Would Be Wrong for Him to Use His Influence to Benefit His Area.' Do You Agree?"

Agree	Agree Strongly	Disagree	Disagree Strongly	Total
18	9	96	164	287
6.3%	3.1%	33.5%	57.1%	100%

(Data from survey of Likpe, 1986)

Finally, the Bakpele were deeply concerned about control over the means of coercion, an issue which seldom intruded in official discourse. In spite of genuine efforts to come to terms with the aspirations of border peoples, there remained a tendency to regard the latter as habitual criminals. In 1985, Dr. Asamoah himself felt compelled to make a public speech at Hohoe in defence of the rights of border communities.[73] The crux of the matter was that there was often little that villagers could do if they were assaulted or deprived of their possessions, because the Government was still chary of subjecting the Army to public scrutiny - although they were more likely to be brought to book than before. Aside from issues of national security, the PNDC remained acutely aware that its authority was underpinned by the military. Thus, in the words of one informant:

> "We are exposed to disturbances and harassment by the Policemen and so on. People are beaten and their movement is restricted. For example, they detain you when you go to farm. They beat first, ask questions later. We don't normally drag these matters up; we just forget them because they will only tell you they are sorry."[74]

The deployment of the Militia as tax-enforcer and as deterrent against smugglers may have been astute but it further alienated local opinion. There was more at stake than the methods employed by the Militia. What baffled members of the

older generation, in particular, was that the Government should seek an alliance with 'small boys' who were often regarded as little more than petty crooks. In their view, the function of the state was to arrest criminals and not to unleash them on the innocent.[75] Feelings often ran deep. The last word is left with a characteristically pugnacious Nana Agya Mensah, who has served in the course of this thesis as the bell-weather of Bakpele attitudes:

> "We are not in occupied territory, so what are the soldiers supposed to be doing? They are misusing their power. If they abided by their regulations, there would be no trouble. But now we are under military occupation... We know a man by the imprint he bears. Who appointed the CDRs? It was a military government. And their first born is the Militia... They have legalized these people to rob us. Who put them there? They did and not the people. The only solution is to have a general election."[76]

8.3. Conclusion:

In 1982, there was a widespread feeling that the drift in national affairs could not be allowed to continue. Whereas rural dwellers could grow their own food and even find alternative markets for their cash crops, urban wage-earners were caught in a spiral of falling incomes and mounting shortages. The revolution therefore began in the cities, from where an attempt was made to spread the message of national salvation to the villages. In 1982, the regime was not content merely to ensure the passive consent of the peasantry, but wanted to implant new political structures in the smallest of villages and to draw the latter into centre.

This Chapter has demonstrated that communities like Likpe did not necessarily respond as the leadership of the NDC imagined they would. The PDCs certainly came to Likpe, but they did not conquer. For the most part, they were redundant. Although they were supposed to channel the energies of rural youth, the latter tended to exhibit the least interest in political solutions, particularly when these got in the way of the struggle to make a living. There have been precious few studies of the PDCs, but it is likely that the pattern in Likpe recurred across the

countryside and especially along the borders. The PNDC seems to have received the message. It did not abolish the PDCs, but turned them into the long-arm of the District Secretary. However, the centre of activity consisted of a familiar coalition of chiefs and TDCs, the uses of which the PNDC came to appreciate.

In place of the revolution, the Rawlings regime endeavoured to sell the vision of a decentralized governmental structure, in which rural communities would control decisions over key areas of their lives. The Bakpele were enthusiastic about financial support for local initiatives, but were sceptical about the grand vision. Although the PNDC postulated a conflict of interests between the noisy urbanites and the long-suffering peasantry, the reality was that the latter shared many of the same attitudes towards the state. The Bakpele wanted the Government to provide better amenities, motorable roads and employment. The PNDC wanted to cut back on public spending and to shoulder as many responsibilities as possible onto local government bodies. In 1986, one had a clear sense of *dèja vu*, listening to a dialogue of the deaf between government officials and local residents. The echoes came from piles of correspondence in the files of the Togoland administration. Nevertheless, the PNDC had done enough to address local concerns for a dialogue still to be possible.

Footnotes to Chapter Eight

1. Quoted in Kojo Yankah, The Trial of J.J. Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution, (Tema; Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1986), p.90.

2. A 1984 speech quoted in E. Hutchful, "New Elements in Militarism: Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina", International Journal, XLI, 4, 1986, p.809

3. The Libyan connection is mentioned as an influence by Baffour Agyeman-Duah in "Ghana, 1982-86: The Politics of the PNDC", The Journal of Modern African Studies, XXV, 4, 1987, p.619. There is more than a passing resemblance to arguments put forward in the Green Book to the effect that parliamentary forms of government cannot be democratic. In 1986, the Libyan People's Bureau continued to maintain a string of Green Book study Clubs across the country.

4. "Guidelines for the Proper Functioning and Effectiveness of the People's Defence Committees, Released by the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for People's Defence Committees", published as a supplement to The Legon Observer, April 1982, p.ii.

5. The only exception was Zaya Yeebo at Youth and Sports, although Kwesi Botchwey was regarded as more left-wing than he turned out to be. See Piet Konings, The State and the Defence Committees in the Ghanaian Revolution, Revolutionary Monographs on Culture and Society in Africa (Nigeria), Series 2, no. 2, 1986, p.9.

6. "Guidelines for People's Defence Committees" (1982), p.iii.

7. Chris Atim and Ahmed Gariba "Ghana: Revolution or Counter-Revolution?", Journal of African Marxists, Issue 10, June 1987, p.96.

8. Interview with Nyeya Yen, formerly of NDC, Revolutionary Banner , II, 1, June 1986, p.7.

9. See Yao Graham, "From GTP to Assene: Aspects of Industrial Working Class Struggles, 1982-1986", in E. Hansen and K. Ninsin (eds.), The State, Development and Politics in Ghana, (London: Codesria, 1989), pp.52-55; Also "Workers Confront the PNDC", (London: United Revolutionary Front of Ghana, undated), pp. 2-12.

10. For example Emmanuel Hansen, "The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-86", in P. Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.), Popular Struggles For Democracy in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1987), p.193.

11. World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program of Adjustment (Washington, 1984), p.51

12. This was noted by Kwesi Jonah, "Rawlings Revolution Two Years After", Journal of African Marxists, Issue 5, 1984.

13. Ghana, Power to the People: The New Guidelines for the National Defence Committee and People's Defence Committees, April 1983, p.5.

14. Rawlings quoted in Forging Ahead: Selected Speeches of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC, Volume Two: January 1st 1983 - December 31st 1983 (Accra: Information Services Department, undated), part two, p.8.

15. Power to the People, p.12.

16. See the broadcast by Rawlings on 28 August 1983, reproduced in Forging Ahead, p.32.

17. The NCD was established in 1982. See The Search for True Democracy in Ghana (Information Services Department, undated), p.1. It received a new lease of life in 1984, when Annan was appointed to head it.

18. Ibid., p.3.

19. Ghana, Outlines of the Decentralization Plan of the Provisional National Defence Council (Information Services Department, undated), pp.2-3.

20. Ibid., pp.4-7.

21. The exceptions being Defence, the Police, External Trade, Audit and Foreign Affairs. Ghana, Decentralization in Ghana, (Information Services Department), p.4.

22. Ibid., p.8.

23. Outlines of the Decentralization Plan, pp.4-5.

24. The one-third share of non-elected seats was reserved for traditional authorities, their representatives and "other organised associations of productive economic groupings in the district". Ghana, District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections, (Ghana Publishing Corporation, July 1987), p.2.

25. Ghana, Statement on National Economic Programme and District Level Elections by Mr. Justice D.F. Annan, Member of the PNDC at a Press Conference in Kumasi on Wednesday, July 1, 1987, (Information Services Department, undated), p.3.

26. Gareth Austin, who made his own enquiries, found that field officers had never seen the document. Nevertheless, its central arguments have often been repeated by the regime. For example, in the wake of the dispute over leave allowances in April 1986, the Secretary of Labour, Ato Austin, asserted that it was the farmers who would have to bear the burden thereof. See Peoples Daily Graphic, 15 April 1986.

27. Ghana, The Rural Manifesto: Policies, Plans and Strategies of the Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operatives to Effect Accelerated Rural Development in Ghana, (Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operatives, 1984), p.1.

28. Interview with Dr. Martin Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Secretary-General, GAFACO-OPS, Accra, 6 June 1986.

29. Decentralization in Ghana, p.8-9. In 1989, the new District Assemblies were still receiving subventions covering 50% of costs. Interview with Kofi Kwakye, Secretary for Information, London, 22 August 1989.

30. Ghana, The Challenges of the District Elections: Address by Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, Member of the PNDC at a Public Forum on the District Level Elections at Wa on Wednesday, August 12, 1987, (Information Services Department, undated), p.13.

31. T.K. Effah, "Village/Town Development Committees and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution in Local Development in the Post-December 31 Era in Ghana. Collaboration or Confrontation: The Case of Berekum", B.A. Long Essay, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 1985, chapter 4.

32. E.A. Tetteh-Wayo, "The Performance of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: A Study of the Dangme/Shai District", B.A. Long Essay, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 1986.

33. Stool Land Boundaries Settlement Commission, Accra, "Togbe Konda and other (Leklebi Agbesia) Versus Togbe Dompre and others (Logba Vuinta)".

34. Interview with Nana Oforite Dzahene, formerly PDC Chairman, Mate, 28 September 1986.

35. Interview with F.M. Aniewu, formerly TDC Chairman, Kukurantumi, 5 September 1986.

36. Interview with Eusebius Ottah, formerly PDC Chairman, Bala, 12 October 1986.

37. "A Resolution Adopted by the Chiefs, Elders and King Makers of Likpe Agbozome in Support of Elevation of Vute and Basio Clans into Townships", dated 10 June 1986.

38. Interview with C.K. Akoto, formerly PDC Chairman, Agbozome, 13 October 1986.

39. Interview with Nana Akototse IV, Abrani, 3 October 1986.

40. Effah, op. cit., *passim*.

41. Interview with Nana Oforite Dzahene, as above.

42. Interview with Nana Akototse IV, 3 October 1986.

43. Interview with Eusebius Ottah, as above.

44. A.K. Agbeka, Acting District Agricultural Co-ordinator, Kpandu, to Project Manager, VORADEP, Ho, dated 13 May 1982, in "Operation Feed Yourself", Ministry of Agriculture, VORADEP, Ho.

45. Ghana, Ghana: Two Years of Transformation, 1982-83 (Information Services Department, undated), p.65.

46. Interview with Nana Akototse IV, Abrani, 4 March 1986.

47. Discussion with Nana Samba, Koforidua, 4 October 1986.

48. Interview with Nana Agyeman II, Kukurantumi, 5 October 1986.

49. Interview with F.M. Aniewu, Kukurantumi, 3 October 1986.

50. In Avedzeme, one young man was brutally murdered by members of another clan after an altercation with Nana Agya Mensah over the theft of crops from the People's Farm. In 1986, the Police were still unable to prosecute because the culprits has escaped to Togo.

51. Interview with Jacob Egbeadzo, CDR Chairman, Abrani, 5 October 1986.

52. Atim and Gariba, op. cit., p.103; Zaya Yeebo, "Ghana: Defence Committees and the Class Struggle", Review of African Political Economy, 32, April 1985, p.70. The failure is conceded in Hansen, "The State and Popular Struggles", pp.191-2.

53. "The Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and the Town/Village/Area Councils", a speech by U.S. Clarke, Jasikan District Secretary, 1986.

54. Interview with C.K. Akoto, as above; and with Gustav Aniewu, CDR Zonal Secretary, Abrani, 15 October 1986.

55. Interview with C.K. Akoto, as above.

56. Interview with U.S. Clarke, District Secretary, Jasikan, 29 September 1986.

57. Ghanaian Times, 23 October 1982.

58. In 1986, Nana Soglo was himself exploring the possibilities of translating the Bible into Sekpele.

59. Nana Mantey Akototse IV, Abranihene, to Nana Soglo Allo III, Omanhene of Likpe, 2 March 1986 in "Likpe Traditional Council Affairs", personal files of Nana Soglo.

60. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

61. Interviews with Emilson Kwashie, 16 October 1986; and with Nana Mantey Akototse IV, Abrani, 3 October 1986.

62. The period of AFRC rule was not included in the survey, since it was such a brief interregnum.

63. Interview with U.S. Clarke, as above.

64. Interview with Martin Ashiaman, Gbi-Wegbe, 17 June 1986.

65. "Minutes of the Likpe Traditional Council held at the Council Hall, Likpe Mate on Friday 2nd August 1985", in "Likpe Traditional Council Affairs".

66. Interview with Eusebius Ottah, as above.

67. I am grateful to Mr. Kwashie for access to a document entitled "Operation Solution: To Strengthen Finances of District Councils and TVA Councils".

68. "Equipment in For Work on Dam", People's Daily Graphic, 17 December 1985.

69. Africa Contemporary Record, 1985/86, p.B44.

70. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, as above.

71. S.E. Kena-Amoah, Regional Manager of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, "Water as Basic Infrastructure For Regional Development", in N.D. Sodzi (ed.), Volta Region: Plans, Projects and Prospects, proceedings of the Seminar on Economic Development of the Volta Region - Dec. 5th-9th, 1983, (Accra: Volta Regional Administration, 1986), p.23.

72. Interview with Emilson Kwashie, Mate, 30 January 1986.

73. "CDRs and the National Image of Ghana - Speech to the CDRs at Hohoe, 3 May 1985, By Dr. Obed Asamoah, PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs", a copy of which is housed in Library of Congress, African section.

74. Interview with Teddy Ofori, Bakwa, 28 January 1986.

75. The District Assembly proposals went some of the way to restoring control to community representatives. They stipulated that the Assemblies would be responsible for security and public safety "in co-operation with the appropriate national and local security services". Ghana, District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections (Ghana Publishing Corporation, July 1987), p.3.

76. Interview with Nana Agya Mensah III, Avedzeme, 19 February 1986.

Conclusions:

> "Since Britain was not sure what would become of such 'Trust Colonies' the British were obviously not interested in its development for fear that it might be taken away from them. The net result of this lackadaisical attitude of the British led to the Region being starved of development which also led to the massive migration of the enterprising people to other parts of the country where conditions were relatively better, to seek greener pastures... Then came the 1956 plebiscite and the question was finally resolved but then the harm had already been done. The success story of those who had left came trickling in and provided the stimuli for others to leave. Perhaps this explains why today Voltarians are found in every nook of the country. After Independence in 1957 also came the secession threat; the echoes of which are still being heard today. This also contributed in no small measure to the lacking behind [sic] of the Region in terms of development of infrastructural base for any meaningful economic development... [Let] me take this opportunity to disabuse the minds of some people who think that the people of the Volta Region are smugglers, litigants and prone to violence and who on the slightest provocation resort to arms as a means of settling scores... I would like to take this opportunity to assure all Ghanaians and the whole world that the People of Volta Region are peace-loving and law abiding just like any other people in this country."[1]

As with every research project, this study proceeded on the basis of a set of working assumptions - in this case, derived from an emerging literature on the relationship between African states and societies. This literature portrayed the state variously as disaggregated, personalized (as opposed to rational-bureaucratic) and 'soft'. On the other hand, it depicted African societies as localized, relatively cohesive and 'uncaptured'. The composite picture was one of fragile centres desperately fighting to overcome the centrifugal forces at their respective peripheries.

The problem was that this picture did not conform to the realities encountered in the field. The Ghanaian state appeared to be in better health than recent reports might have led one to expect. Governmental institutions were much in evidence at the District level and seemed reasonably effective in straddling the physical and mental distance from Accra. Nevertheless, it became apparent in the course of research that, while administrative breakdown had never been imminent, the previous decade had indeed seen a hardening of the institutional arteries. What I

was witnessing, therefore, was a regeneration of the state machinery, which was by no means complete in 1986.

What was more noteworthy was the strong sense of belonging to a national community. The Bakpele seemed to exhibit no particular aversion to dealing with local embodiments of the state. Moreover, they clearly operated within a frame of reference with was common to their compatriots at the opposite end of the country: they often supported the same football teams, attended the same churches and waited every Saturday for the same set of lotto results beamed out of the capital by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. After a couple of months of posing carefully crafted questions that elicited incomprehension or vague amusement, it became obvious that the starting assumptions were in need of closer scrutiny. Having retraced my steps, I found that earlier researchers had recorded similar observations to my own. Dunn and Robertson, for example, had remarked of Ahafo that:

> "The affairs of the nation as a whole are followed keenly on transistor radios and a in a town like Goaso 200 to 300 English-language newspapers may be sold daily. There can be few Ahafos who lack an awareness of the geographical and political unity of Ghana...."2

The authors had also noted *en passant* that the citizens of Ahafo described both the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta as 'French territory', an insight into the 'otherness' created by colonial boundaries.3 Again, Fred Hayward had occasion to remark on advanced levels of national awareness, even in comparatively remote rural areas.4 In a survey conducted in 1970, he found that 43% of respondents received news regularly by means of the mass media, and in particular by radio.5

Yet these studies were published before the onset of the most intense phase of the economic crisis, and the attenuation of state power which accompanied it in the second half of the 1970s. If the same features were still in evidence a decade later, then one had to ask more searching questions about the importance of the state to the process of national integration: did central authorities ever 'build' the nation,

had the state merely created the pre-conditions for the emergence of more embracing identities, or did integration taken place outside (and perhaps even in spite of) the state? This line of questioning underlies the issues examined in the body of this thesis. By way of conclusion, it remains to draw together the threads of the component sections, which addressed a number of subsidiary questions along the way.

1. The State and the Politics of Integration

The study was divided into three Parts, each of which corresponded to a broad phase in the trajectory of the Ghanaian state.

Part One, which examined the struggle between unificationists and integrationists, was set against the backdrop of a transformation in the ideology and structures of the state. For the greater part of the colonial period, an incumbent Governor was expected to administer his realm on a virtual shoe-string. Where possible, responsibility was devolved onto Native Authorities which, in the Indirect Rule tradition, were expected to administer justice, raise their own taxes, and finance their own local 'services'. It was shown in Chapter Two that British administration was more than usually parsimonious in Togoland, because the future of the territory was in question and because it promised less reliable returns upon the outlay of public finances. Yet the United Nations territory was fused administratively with the Gold Coast and subjected to a common tariff structure. This required the construction of basic infrastructural links to the west of the Volta River, in order to reorient the territory which still faced towards Palimé in 1919. The prime objective was to administer Togoland as cheaply as possible and not (until the 1940s, anyway) to inculcate new modes of consciousness. Nevertheless, the environment created by British rule drew the territory inexorably into the economic, social and ultimately the political orbit of the Gold Coast. With time, it became possible for Togolanders to conceive of themselves in new ways.

The reality of creeping integration on inferior terms, lies behind the confusing array of political platforms which emerged after the Second World War. The unification movement originally arose to protest against partition of the Ewe people, but significantly the All-Ewe Conference remained wedded to the principle of continuing membership of the Gold Coast. This betrayed its following amongst the Anlo elite. The movement ran aground in the Trust Territory on account of a belief that the Gold Coast Ewe were monopolizing access to scarce scholarships and jobs, as well as reaping the benefits associated with the expansion of the cocoa industry. The Togoland Congress could plausibly claim that a precondition for greater prosperity was to establish a healthy distance from the Gold Coast and to restore links with French Togoland. Yet the Congress was vulnerable to a flanking action by the Convention People's Party which joined in blaming the British for uneven development, but was also in a position to promise Togolanders a better deal in return for an acceptance of full integration.

A desire to catch up explains why the statist solutions of the CPP found a receptive audience in the former Trust Territory. As was seen in Chapter Three, a similar logic applied to politics within the Region. Many communities had been punished for their refusal to co-operate with British amalagamation policy. The minorities had been especially reluctant to do so, because what the authorities counted as an administrative convenience raised emotive issues of group identity. In several instances, minorities vigorously asserted their distinctiveness vis-a-vis the Ewe; the Bakpele were unusual for having split down the middle. The end result was the same, since resistance to the Atando Native Authority hardened the attitude of the administration. By the early 1960s, the constraints of a land-short economy created an additional imperative for employment beyond the confines of Likpe. The enthusiasm with which the minorities seized upon expanding educational opportunities is remarkable. Already by the time of the 1960 census, the Central Togo groups had the highest rates of literacy (48.2% as against a national average of 23.2% and 31.4% for the Ewe) and the highest levels

of school attendance in the country.6 This provided a springboard for entry into state employment, which expanded markedly under the CPP: in the schools, the civil service, the auxiliaries of the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Army. It was at this time that Likpe also produced its first cohort of University graduates, several of whom made their mark as professionals. This array of factors, all of which were firmly grounded in material circumstances, best explains the instrumentalist political behaviour to which Maxwell Owusu has drawn attention in another context.

Yet it is important to note that unification politics involved much more than a struggle over economic spoils. Many members of the older generation gravitated towards the *Ablode* camp because of a desire to recapture a golden age associated with the era of German rule. In Likpe, several Congress activists had participated in the Togo Bund during the 1930s for the very same reason. On the other hand, the most avid CPP supporters were younger, better educated males for whom the Gold Coast was the focus of attention. Personal ambitions played a part, but at a more mundane level these educated youngmen simply filtered their experiences through a lens which had been appropriated from the colony. Rival 'imaginings' therefore competed and did not always come with the price tag attached. That the second steadily gained ground was to have been expected. The robust tactics of the Nkrumah regime after independence merely accelerated the decomposition of a movement which was unable to outgrow its original social base. As was argued in Chapter Four, the 1969 election results are perhaps more significant for signalling the death-knell of the unification movement than as a measure of the depth of ethnic cleavage.

By the 1970s, the shrinking fiscal base of the state created a gulf between official ideology and the practical realities that confronted Ghanaians every day. Part Two examined the net impact upon interactions between state and community in the Volta Region. The Acheampong regime bought short-term support by embarking on high profile development programmes, of which Operation Feed

Yourself was but the most famous example, and by making lavish promises of state assistance to the Regions. Most of the schemes came to grief, as the operating procedures of the state became increasingly warped by the demoralization of underpaid government employees and the abuse of public office. The Ghanaian state eventually ceased to perform a number of its most basic functions, such as the maintenance of trunk roads and bridges, which even the minimalist incarnation of the colonial state had seen to.

If political behaviour had been entirely instrumental, one would have expected the citizens of the Volta Region to exhibit renewed interest in union with Togo, where economic and social conditions were showing distinct signs of improvement. In fact, TOLIMO singularly failed to re-activate the networks that had once serviced the Togoland Congress. It fell victim to many of the same contradictions which had undermined the latter and was ultimately unable to develop a programme with broad popular appeal. The eclipse of TOLIMO was the final act in the unificationist saga. Smuggling certainly proliferated along the eastern frontier, which it is tempting to interpret as a covert expression of popular protest. It was argued in Chapter Five. however, that smuggling was more of a substitute for political expression: it furnished a much-needed source of income for the landless youth and made available a range of essential commodities which were otherwise unobtainable. Even then, what is striking is the level of ambivalence displayed towards smuggling in Likpe, especially on the part of older farmers and chiefs who blamed its incidence for theft and moral decay.

Chapter Six used the case of Likpe to illustrate the decline of the state as a credible source of patronage. Following the frustrations of the Second Republic, the elevation of Major-General Utuka to a position on the Supreme Military Council understandably raised expectations. Yet in the end Utuka proved incapable of cutting a path through the maze of vested interests which hindered the completion of government projects. From this episode the Bakpele derived

the lesson that there were limits to what an individual patron could achieve in the midst of such a free-for-all. They then proceeded to apply the lesson to the 1979 elections. Dr. Asamoah was deserted by many of his people, who calculated that the People's National Party was most likely to succeed in putting the affairs of state back on even keel. The Bakpele participated in this poll less out of an expectation of material reward (an unlikely prospect by now) than an interest in the trajectory of national politics. By way of qualification, it has nevertheless to be noted that civic consciousness was more fully developed amongst members of the older generation than the youth, whose scepticism was not tempered by memories of better times. This anomie may have posed a danger over the linger term were it not for the coup of 31 December 1981.

Part Three dealt in some detail with efforts to recast the relationship between state and society during the Rawlings years. The PNDC was not content simply to govern a quiescent rural population, but equally it had limited resources with which to entice the latter into taking a part in the revolution. Indeed the PNDC needed to tap the energies and resources of the countryside more successfully if it was to find a way out of the crisis it had inherited. During 1982, the PNDC relied on political measures to cope with a bewildering range of pressing problems. In the villages, the PDCs were expected to act as political watchdogs, to eradicate 'economic crimes' and to mobilize local resources for the purposes of development. In important respects, the PDCs were a substitute for an integral state. Chapter Seven examined the campaign against smuggling and concluded that the PDCs had failed to make a lasting impression. Whereas the PDCs were supposed to galvanize the rural youth, the latter were the most likely to be implicated in smuggling and other infringements of the law. The PNDC had done very little to redress the conditions which nurtured the panoply of 'economic crimes'. Furthermore, the Border Guards and Police subjected the PDCs to persistent harassment. Chapter Eight went further and demonstrated the inability of the PDCs to offer anything significantly new in competition with an alliance of chiefs and Town Development Committees. In sum, the PDCs failed to

deliver to central government a secure foothold in the villages.

From 1983, the PNDC embarked on a political experiment which amounted to a retraction of the state whilst persisting with the effort to bind centre and periphery. The campaign against smuggling involved judicious use of the market to wring the vitality out of the parallel economy and to attract trade back into officially sanctioned markets, at the same time as recruiting the unemployed youth into the People's Militia. Through this pincer movement, the PNDC was able to establish a firmer grip over the frontier economy, without incurring the difficulties associated with more direct methods of state control and without alienating border peoples. On the political plane, the PNDC endeavoured to build structures through which the rural population could articulate their own interests in competition with the more vocal urban population. In other words, the PNDC was aiming to deepen civil society in the countryside. Paradoxically, this meant stifling the political expression of a range of institutions perceived as obstructive, including the trade unions, the press and even the churches. There were some indications in 1986 that the Rawlings regime had overestimated the conflict of interests between town and country. In Likpe, at least, the ongoing crisis within the local economy fostered an outlook which was sympathetic to statist solutions. There was broad support for the local government initiative, but mainly because it was seen as devolving responsibility from the District to the locality. The ability of the PNDC to have its cake and eat it - that is to create a more articulated polity around a minimalist state - still had to be proven in 1986.

The principal conclusion, therefore, is that the growth and reproduction of a national community that embraced Togoland, was not contingent upon the state. The latter merely set the parameters within which new social bonds could be forged by local elites. This conclusion has more in common with the perspectives of Kimble and Benedict Anderson than it does with the modernization paradigm and most of the recent literature, with the exception of Bayart. It is heartening, since it suggests an in-built element of cohesion that could compensate for the

decay within formal institutions. Lest this appear an excessively sanguine conclusion, it would be appropriate to return to some of the factors which academic analysis has conventionally regarded as subversive of the integrity of African polities.

2. African Societies: The Strength of Centrifugal Forces

2.1. Localism as Parochialism

A staple of many local studies is the depth of attachment to lineages, villages and stools in Ghana. At different junctures, this study has found itself in agreement with and dissenting from some of the generalizations that have been drawn from this corpus of material. Where I have parted company with Brown, Coleman and others is over the implication that local attachments are not only deep but determinant. It was argued in Chapter Three that, while Likpe (like Kpandu) may be viewed as a seething mass of factional struggles, these did not determine the positions which the Bakpele adopted on the unification question. To be sure, party politics broadly replicated the pattern of alignments in the Atando dispute, but the latter turned on issues of communal identity which transcended earlier cleavages. If there was continuity, that was because cognate sets of issues were involved in the first instance. Later, the battle came to be fought along lines that were roughly speaking generational, rather than factional. Indeed, it was only after the unification question had been decisively settled that succession to the Likpe Stool became a serious bone of contention.

To suggest that the Bakpele selected their political preferences on the perceived merits of the case clearly does not imply that local attachments were insignificant. The writings of Naomi Chazan are anomalous in that they appear to have forgotten some of the key lessons that were taught by local studies. Although central government ceased to command access to substantial material resources during the 1970s, the state remained the repository of information and

procedures for deciding between rival claimants for chiefly office. It is no exaggeration to suggest that 'traditional' institutions were validated by official practices. Chazan mistakes vitality for autonomy. If for no other reason, it made little sense for rural dwellers to withdraw from the state. In the case of Likpe, for example, the Acheampong regime was required to arbitrate in a series of local disputes, most notably in Agbozome. The correspondence hoarded by Nana Soglo Allo III is tangible evidence that the 'exit option' was never seriously in contention. In a nutshell, then, national politics has always consisted of more than the sum of its factional parts, although the latter have been weaved into the fabric from time to time.

(b) *'Hereditas Damnosa'*?: The Perils of Ethnicity

Ethnicity is often regarded as a serious threat to the cohesion of African states, even if few analysts would accept that 'tribes' are in any sense primordial. A recognition that 'tribes' have been manufactured, often with a striking degree of audacity, arguably does not make ethnic conflict any less cause for concern. In the case of Ghana, the 'Ewe problem' has been the most frequently debated variant on the national question. The reason is not just that the Ewe are divided by a frontier, but also that they are perceived as unusually solidaristic. This image of the Ewe has been convincingly disputed by David Brown.7 The evidence tabled in this thesis carry his argument one step further.

What is striking about the 1940-50s is precisely the lack of a clear sense of Ewe solidarity, for reasons that have already been alluded to. Although the behaviour of the Volta Region electorate in the 1969 elections has commonly been explained in ethnic terms, some of the most eminent Ewe politicians were in fact rebuffed. Conversely, those who were elected to constituencies in the former Trust Territory were the representatives of a newly emergent elite (often graduates) who were precisely the most cosmopolitan in outlook. And while the Acheampong regime was happy to exploit Ewe stereotypes, there is no evidence

to suggest that they were any more cohesive in the 1970s than they had been two decades before. The internal politics of the Region divided along a north-south axis which cut through the Ewe. There is more mileage in the notion of Anlo solidarity, but even this has revolved around ties of kinship and friendship forged in Keta - the operative units being face-to-face rather imagined communities.

Where this study has broken new ground is in examining the dilemmas of the Central Togo minorities. From the time of British amalgamation policy onwards, these communities have struggled to define themselves in relation to much larger (albeit notional) ethnic blocs. There were many Bakpele in the 1940s who were prepared to claim they were close cousins of the Ewe in terms of history, language, political institutions and a patrilineal social structure. Nana Agya Mensah took issue with this and largely as a result of the campaign launched by the Likpe Grand Council, it became fashionable to claim an entitlement to the Akan mantle. During the early 1960s, Likpe actually imported an Akan model of wing chiefs and linguists. A decade later, the Bakpele were involved in a further process of ethnic redefinition. The experience of the Second Republic discouraged the Bakpele and their neighbours from identifying too closely with groupings which were perceived as either Ewe or Akan. Some chiefs and intellectuals flirted with the idea of membership of a Guan culture. At the same time, the Buem and the Bakpele took steps to translate the Bible into their respective languages, which is often seen as the first step towards ethnogenesis. The salient point is that the vagaries of national politics and the deflation of state capacities have combined to fragment the ethnic map of the Region. The fluidity of political attachments, and even of something as basic as identity, have in turn imparted a flexibility to the Ghanaian system which is not always appreciated.

(c) Artifice and the Artificiality of Boundaries:

Two observations are commonly made about African boundaries. The first is that

they are artificial in the sense that even where they do not cut across pre-colonial polities, they often segment discrete culture areas.8 The second observation is that African boundaries have demonstrated a remarkable resilience. Jackson and Rosberg have explained this apparent paradox by invoking the norms of international relations. Often the movement of populations and the trafficking of goods are taken as evidence that African boundaries retain a dubious legitimacy.

At several points along the way, this study has had occasion to question conventional wisdom. The paradox is more apparent than real. Although the Ghana-Togo boundary is clearly a construct, it has acquired a permanence that is rooted in popular consciousness as much as in the codes of practice prescribed by the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations. The original frontier between the Gold Coast and German Togo, which had existed for no more than thirty years, proved devilishly difficult to redraw. The network of infrastructure and patterns of trade had been moulded to fit the geographical limits of Togo. Moreover, there were many Togolanders who had acquired an attachment to that territorial unit. If this had not been so, the Togoland unification movement would never have posed such a barrier to integration.

Sylvanus Olympio and his allies asserted that the frontier was an affront to the Ewe, but as members of the Working Party on the Conventional Zone were to discover, they were not complaining about a physical barrier. Indeed, there were many Ewes who had a vested interest in the maintenance of the frontier, which was highly porous. Throughout this century, border populations have valued the freedom of action which their location has bestowed upon them. They have been able to buy the cheapest consumer goods and to sell their agricultural products at the most remunerative prices. Contemporary academic literature interprets this kind of behaviour as a cunning ploy to exploit the weakness of the state. What is less often appreciated is that the same communities also use the state to secure an advantage at the expense of neighbours on the other side of the frontier. Governments tend to be infinitely malleable on account of their sensitivity to

questions of national sovereignty. Following Ghanaian independence, communities on either side of the frontier attempted to expel 'strangers' from the lands, which they had hitherto been guaranteed access to. The Bakpele villages of Mate, Todome and Bala had been deprived of land in this way. In the 1980s, the Bakpele enlisted the support of the military to arrest further Togolese encroachment. Conversely, the villagers of Danyi exploited the vulnerability of Bakpele smugglers and often robbed them of their wares. Although members of the two communities intermarried and visited each other's markets, the relationship was often fraught. In this way, arbitrary lines on a map have been etched into popular consciousness. Frontiers like the one between Ghana and Togo survive precisely because they have been translated into mental frontiers.

Footnotes to Conclusion:

1. Opening address by Dr. Austin Asamoah-Tutu, PNDC Regional Secretary to the Seminar on Economic Development of the Volta Region, 5-9 December 1983, in N.D. Sodzi (ed.), Volta Region: Plans, Projects and Prospects (Ho: Volta Region Administration, 1986), pp. 2, 4.

2. John Dunn and A.F. Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.34.

3. Ibid., p.35.

4. Fred Hayward, "Correlates of National Integration: the Case of Ghana", Comparative Political Studies, VII, 2, 1974; "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana", American Political Science Review, LXX, 2, 1976; "Perceptions of Well-Being in Ghana: 1970 and 1975", African Studies Review, XXII, 1, 1979.

5. Hayward, "Conventional Wisdom", pp.443-4.

6. Ghana, 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Special Report 'E': Tribes in Ghana, (Accra: Census Office 1964), -pp.lviii-lxvi

7. David Brown, "Who are the Tribalists?: Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana", African Affairs, LXXXI, 322, 1982.

8. See, the introduction to A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1984).

Appendix:

Questionnaire Conducted in Likpe, November 1986

1. The Rationale:

What follows is the text of a questionnaire which was administered to 320 people across Likpe towards the end of 1986. The object was to gather information across a wide range of subjects, from details of educational background, through data on farming activities, to political attitudes. Of the total, 287 sets of responses were utilized. The rest were excluded for a variety of reasons:. some were ambiguous, incomplete or contradictory. Others were not used because it transpired that the respondents belonged to the same immediate family, which would have distorted the results.

2. Text of Questionnaire:

"This survey for a Ph.D Degree in Politics, is divided into two sections. Section A is concerned with questions about agriculture proper, while Section B is designed to elicit the views of farmers about national politics and their role in Ghanaian society. Answers should be ticked unless something more is called for.

NAME:.....
HOME TOWN:.....
AGE:.....
SEX:.....
DATE OF INTERVIEW:.....

Section A

1. What is your level of education?
(a) None..... (b) Secondary.....
(b) Primary..... (e) Post-Secondary.....
(c) Middle..... (f) University.....

2. Do you have sources of income outside farming?
If so, what are they?.....

3. Which of the following crops do you have on your farms this year?
(a) cocoa..... (b) maize.....
(b) coffee..... (i) rice (swamp or upland?)...
(c) oil palm..... (j) groundnuts.....
(d) plantain..... (k) vegetables.....
(e) cocoyam..... (l) others (specify).....
(f) cassava..... (g) yams.....

4. How many acres ("16x16") do you have under food crops at home?.....
How many acres do you have under food outside the area?
(Specify type of crops) .....

5. Fo you have sufficient land for your food crop needs?....

6. Do you think you would have coped with the 1983 shortages better if you had more land for food?.....

7. If you have a land shortage, when did it start?.....

8. Have you rented or bought any land outside the area? If so, where and for what purposes?.....

9. Do you employ labour regularly for your food crop farms?...
If so, what type of labour do you employ..... and for what tasks?.....

10. How would you describe the adequacy of the food you produce?
(a) self-sufficient..... (c) have a regular shortfall.....
(b) need only to buy the crops you don't produce.....

11. Do you sell food crops regularly?.....
If so, what crops do you sell?..... and to whom?.....

12. In relation to other goods on the market, such as cloth and roofing sheets, would you say that food prices since 1970 have
(a) risen..... (b) risen steeply.....
(c) stayed more or less the same..... .
(d) fallen..... (e) fallen sharply.....

13. What would you say is the greatest constraint on your ability to increase food production?
(a) lack of land..... (b) infertility of land.....
(c) difficulty of finding markets.....
(d) lack of credit..... (e) lack of labour.....
(f) other.....

14. If you are a cocoa farmer, how many farms do you have in each of the following categories, and how large are they (in local acres?)
(a) inherited..... (..... acres)
(b) planted yourself..... (..... acres)
(c) by dibi, as landowner..... (..... acres)
(d) by dibi, as labourer.... (.....acres)

15. When did you first start planting cocoa?
(a) before 1930.....
(b) between 1930 and the end of the War.
(c) between the end of the War and independence.....
(d) between independence and 1970.....
(e) since 1970.....
When did you stop planting cocoa?.....

16. Do you still have sufficient land to make new farms?....

17. How did you acquire the land on which you have planted cocoa?
(a) inherited family land..... (b) purchased land.....
(c) stool land..... (d) dibi land.....
(e) other.....

18. Do you have a permanent cocoa labourer?.....
If yes, how many do you have..... and how are they paid?
(a) fixed price per load.....
(b) one-third.....
(c) one-half.....
(d) other.....

19. This year will you employ any daily..... or contract labour?

20. What work do you yourself do on the cocoa farms?
(a) look after complete farm (s).....
(b) help in clearing.....
(c) help in spraying.....
(d) help in harvesting.....
(e) nothing.....

21. At your peak labour time, on average how many days per week..... and hours per day..... do you spend on your cocoa?

22. Have your farms been badly affected by the 1983 drought.... and black pod?.....
What yield did you receive last year from your farms?....
What yield would you have received around 1980?.....

23. Have any of your cocoa labourers recently left because of drought and black pod?.....
Do you now offer any incentives for them to stay that you were not offering before?
(a) palm trees for tapping.....
(b) more land for food crops.....
(c) other (specify).....

24. Are you rehabilitating your cocoa farms?.....
if yes, what will you use?
(a) own labour..... (b) hired labour.....
(c) mobisquads.....

25. Are you now having to pay more attention to your cocoa because of the departure of labourers and/or the need to rehabilitate?.....
If so, does that mean that you have less time to spend on food crops?.....

26. What has been the main reason for cocoa smuggling in recent years?
(a) low prices in Ghana..... (b) better prices in Togo.....
(c) people have farms on both sides of the border.....
(d) lack of goods.....
(e) shortcomings of buying system.....
(f) other.....

27. What would you say is the greatest advantage of cocoa over other food crops?
(a) brings more money.....
(b) cocoa trees bear for many years.....
(c) enables permanent use of land.....
(d) other.....

28. which do you think was the most efficient system for buying cocoa?
(a) the old buying firms.....
(b) the old co-operatives.....
(c) the United Ghana Farmers' Council.....
(d) Cocoa Marketing Board.....

29. Do you think the Farmers' Council protected the interests of Ghanaian farmers efficiently?
(a) yes..... (c) no.....
(b) don't know.....

30. Do you think the conduct of Marketing Board operations has improved since the present government came to power?
(a) yes..... (b) no.....
(c) don't know.....

31. Do you think Acheampong's Operation Feed Yourself Programme was successful in boosting food production?.....
If not, why not?.....

32. How successful would you say VORADEP has been in assisting farmers to increase their production of food crops?
(a) successful.....
(b) not very successful.....
(c) a failure.....
(d) a failure.....
(e) don't know anything about VORADEP.....

Section B

33. Before independence in 1957, which political party did you support?
(a) CPP..... (b) Togoland Congress/Ablode.....
(c) None.....

34. Were you a formal member of either party? Yes... No...
If yes, where did you first become involved in the party?
(a) at home..... (b) elsewhere in British Togoland
(c) in French Togoland (d) in Gold Coast.....

35. Why did you support that particular party?
(a) felt strongly about unification/integration.....
(b) felt strongly about amalgamation with Atando.....
(c) most people in town supported it.....
(d) other.....

36. If you supported unification, why did you do so?
(a) British and French Togoland used to be one.....
(b) similarity with the Ewes.....
(c) difficulties created by the border.....
(d) development of Togoland was too slow.....
(e) other.....

37. If you supported integration with the Gold Coast, why did you do so?
(a) Bakpele are not Ewes.....
(b) French Togoland was a poor country.....
(c) integration would speed up development.....
(d) would achieve independence quicker.....
(e) other

38. Why do you think the Togoland Congress faded so quickly after independence?
(a) lack of leadership.....
(b) supporters were not really committed.....
(c) coercion by CPP.....
(d) Ablode people were willingly converted to CPP.....
(e) other.....

39. Do you think the overthrow of the CPP government was justified?.....

40. After the overthrow of Nkrumah by the NLC military government, elections were held in 1969. Which party did you vote for?
(a) Progress Party (S.K. Aboagye).....
(b) NAL (Obed Asamoah).....
(c) other.....
(d) can't remember.....
(e) none.....

41. Why did you support that particular party?.....

42. Did you think the military coup by Acheampong against Busia was justified?
Yes..... No.....

43. Did you support Acheampong's for a Union Government of soldiers and civilians?
(a) yes..... (b) no..... (c) can't remember.....

44. What is your opinion on the coup of June 4 1979 and the events that followed?
(a) coup was unjustified.....
(b) coup was justified, but need not have been so bloody...
(c) both the coup and the shedding of blood were unavoidable.....

45. During the 1979 Parliamentary elections which party did you vote for?
(a) PNP..... (b) PFP..... (c) UNC.....
(d) none..... (e) can't remember.....

46. Why did you support that particular party?.....

47. Do you think the overthrow of the PNP Government was justified?
Yes..... (b) No.....

48. As far as you know are the CDRs
(a) bodies to represent government.....
(b) bodies to represent the people.....
(c) bodies to represent the chiefs.....
(d) don't know their functions.....

49. How satisfied are you with the work of the CDRs?
(a) they are working well.....
(b) like the concept, but they are not working well.....
(c) don't like the whole concept.....

50. Imagine that someone stole crops from your farm. Who would you be most likely to take the matter up with?
(a) the chief..... (b) CDRs.....
(c) Militia..... (d) Police.....

51. Compared to the period before the PNDC came to power do you think that
(a) you are more able to make your voice heard to those in government.....
(b) less able to make your voice heard.....
(c) no difference.....

52. Since independence which government has had the most creditable record in office? (Tick 1st and 2nd choices)
(a) CPP.....
(b) NLC.....
(c) PP.....
(d) SMC.....
(e) PNP.....
(f) PNDC.....
(g) None has performed well.....

Which government has the worst record?.....

53. What political system do you think is best suited to Ghana?
(a) civilian rule.....
(b) military rule.....
(c) a mixture of the two....

(d) "If someone from Likpe is not elected to represent the area, but is nominated to a ministerial post, it would be wrong for him to use his influence to benefit his area"
Do you:
(a) agree.....
(b) disagree.....
(c) agree strongly.....
(d) disagree strongly.....

Note:

In carrying out this survey, an effort was made to establish as representative a sample as possible, although the selection of respondents was not strictly random. Interviews were conducted on the basis of three major criteria. The first was that, since there was a significant variation of political attitudes and economic conditions across Likpe, the survey should reflect that diversity. With the exception of Nkwanta (which is a stranger village dominated by labourers) and Avedzeme (which is very small indeed), the whole of Likpe was included in the exercise. Secondly, a conscious effort was made to interview both men and women, although there was a bias towards the former for a variety of reasons, including the greater political activism of men and their dominance over the cocoa sector. Table 7.4, which presented data on the cocoa holdings of male farmers, was derived from this survey. Equivalent data was gathered for the women cocoa farmers, but the data was not presented in a tablular form since only slightly over 40% of women claimed any ownership of cocoa. Their holdings were typically small and were mostly inherited. Nevertheless, the interviews with Bakpele women were especially fruitful with respect to information on food crop cultivation. The third criterion was that the respondents should adequately reflect the generational make-up of the community, since this seemed to be a salient divide within Likpe through time. In the end, 11% of the respondents were below the age of 30 ; 46% fell between 30 and 49; 32% fell between 50 and 69 and 11 % were over 70 years old. With these criteria in mind, individuals from different households were selected on the basis of their willingness to co-operate with what was a lengthy interviewing process.

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C. List of People Interviewed:

1. Likpe:

(a) Abrani:
Nana Akototse IV
Godfried Akorli
Matthew Kodzo Akorli
E. Akoto
Yao Akuamoah
Nana Mensah Ambor II, head of Gudeve clan [died 1986]
Edward Balappa, former PDC Chairman
Irenius Balappa, Chairman of TDC
Jacob Egbeadzo, CDR Chairman
Arnold Gidiga
Joseph Mensah

(b) Agbozome
C.K. Akoto, first PDC Chairman for Likpe
Anthony Anyageh
O. Bonsi
Lawrence Gisam
Marcus Goodman
Richard Okpeteh, CDR Chairman
Anastasius Udzuson

(c) Avedzeme
Nana Agya Mensah III
Christian Kwashie

(d) Bakwa
Hedita Adjei
Killian Afenyo
Daniel Akototse
Lakata Dente
Conrad Denyo
A.K. Djarson
Josephine Mawusi
Ralph Kofi-Asare
Oscar Kugblenu
Emmanuel E.K. Lartey
Herman Norgbe
Kwaku Ofori, CDR Secretary
Teddy Ofori
K.M. Onai
Christian Osei, CDR Chairman
Fidelia Sraku
Grace Sronipah
Thomas Kwame Sronipah
Celestine Venya

(e) Bala
Oscar Bonsi
C. Bulley
R. Dogbe, mobisquad leader
Winfried Dogbe
Phillip Dorleku
Traugott Dumelo
John Edjesi
F.Y. Etu
Simon Etu
Matthew Kakraba
Anthony Kumi
Pascal Kumi
Paul Kofi Kumi
Albert Onai
Nicholas Onai
Eusebius Ottah, former PDC Chairman
Ernest Yao Poku
Godwin E.Y. Yawotse

(f) Koforidua
Nana Dzamboe
Emmanuel Tano, former TDC Chairman

(g) Kukurantumi
Nana Agyeman II
G.Y. Abiti, Chairman of TDC
M. Agbetornyo, mobisquad leader
Moses Aglidza
Gustav Aniewu, CDR Zonal Secretary
F.M. Aniewu, former TDC Chairman
Winand Aniewu
K.K. Foli, Manager of United Rural Bank
Alex Kota
Alfred Okyerefo
Christina Okyerefo

(h) Mate
Nana Soglo Allo III
Kwame Agbavie
C.K. Agblobi, Chief Farmer
Amatus Adela
Gladys Akla
Emmanuel Bonsi
Anthony Broni
C.K. Broni
Nana Oforite Dzahene, Matehene and former PDC Chairman
Lucy Ekudi
G.K. Foli
Michael Gborgbortsi
Godwin Honu
S.K. Honu
Emilson Kwashie
Joseph Kwadzode
Mensah Lemboe, former Matehene and PDC Chairman
G.A.N. Noamesi, former PDC and CDR Chairman
Nichodemus Oloto
Lucy Onai
Seth Osei, CDR Chairman
Emmauel Osiboe
Sam Quist, TDC Chairman
G.M.K. Soglo

Deborah Yawotse

(i) Nkwanta
Darameni Aboagye, labourer
Kwame Agbalenyo, labourer
Klutse Akatsi, stranger farmer
Kodzotse Aresina, labourer
Musa Atsawazam, labourer
Aruna Azumanu, labourer
Mr. Bidjake, labourer
Alafia Kabré, labourer
Damasi Kabré, labourer
Matheus Kabré, labourer
Fuseini Salifu, labourer
Alfonse Wowoyi, labourer
Amadu Zame, labourer

(j) Todome

Mansa Dorothy Akakpo
Yao Kwame Agbovor
Margaret Amedodzi
Antonia Asabli
Herman Asabli
Christine Asorkor
Theodore Asorkor
Boniface Deku, leader of mobisquad
Raphael Deku
Henry Kwame Doe, Chairman TDC
Leo Asorkor, Treasurer TDC
Christian Kofi Kadzangla
Afua Kyenkyen, Queen Mother
Albert Tippah Kofi
Augustine Billy Letse
Alfred Sorkpah

2. **Rice Farmers** (Total: 53):

Martha Kwame, leader of Lolobi December 31st Womens' Movement Farm
Sebastiana Abiti
Paulina Agbeduamenu
Matthew Agbenyo
Emmanuel Agblo
Justine Addae
Johanna Abrey
Christina Agble
Josephine Abiti
Angelica Akonto
Emmanuel Akoto
Epiphania Akotor
Elias Aniewu
Pauline Aniewu
Magdalene Apatey
Agnes Asare
Martin Ashiaman
Margaret Atsu
Martina Aya
Seth Aya
Anna Bribi
Christina Dogbe
Freda Dzamboe
John Egbetah

Aurelia Egbetorke
Veronia Edzidzro
Philomena Gborgblorgbe
Elias Kalai
Augusta Kalate
Justine Kalate
Silas Kalate
Christian Kofi
Henry Kofitse
Theresa Konutse
Victoria Kofi
Aurelia Kota
Agnes Kwaku
Mary Kwaku
Pete Kwaku
Gabriel Mensah
Jacob Modjah
Cletus Nyalagbedzi
John Ogbey
Theodore Ogbey
Florencia Onyipayede
Agnes Oye
Faustina Owusu
John Owusu
Justina Samba
Martina Sokoto
Elizabeth Sunu
Stephen Tsra

3. Others:

Ms. R.E. Ababio, District Agricultural Co-ordinator
Mr. Adortsey, Ameyi farms, Gbefi
Lawrence Akoto, CDO District Commander
Harry Asimah, CDR Regional Secretariat
U.S. Clarke, Jasikan District Secretary
Frank Gyamwodie, Hohoe District Secretary
Kofi Kwakye, PNDC Secretary for Information.
Mr. Kponglo, Agricultural Development Bank, Hohoe
Laida Obideabah, Jasikan District Liason Officer, NMP
M. Owusu-Ansah, Deputy Secretary-General GAFACO-OPS
R.K. Nti, Manager of E.P. Model Farms
Frank Tsaku, Former Member of Parliament and Regional President of GAFACO-OPS.

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